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This thesis reads seminal texts such as Wordsworth’s prose, Lyrical Ballads, 
The Prelude, and The Excursion alongside Coleridge’s poetic theory and 
practice and Novalis, Tieck and Friedrich Schlegel’s philosophical novels and 
fragments, as ‘poetologies’. My initial research aim is to test how successfully 
Wordsworth can be read as part of this Anglo-German comparative 
framework, from which criticism has tended to exclude him. This is done 
through demonstrating the centrality of irony and drama to the philosophical 
character of Wordsworth’s poetry. Drawing on the theory of the 
Frühromantiker, I demonstrate that Wordsworth’s revisionary habit and his 
use of ballads and epitaphs shape a poetics constantly ‘in the process of 
becoming’ (F. Schlegel), the vehicle of the poet’s aspirations to dramatize a 
potentially infinite self-consciousness. Secondly, my thesis investigates the 
ways of reading these seminal texts which give us a clearer idea of how 
Romantic writers internally situate their own work through their use of 
contrasting genres. This investigation expands to examine how the 
collaborative, interdisciplinary ventures proposed by Romantic writers 
elaborate the concept of ‘poetology’ as a practicable theory. This leads to my 
final research aim: to make apparent that these methodologies result in the 
Mischgedicht, the ‘mixed poem’ which Schlegel theorizes as the ultimate 
incarnation of modern, ‘Romantic’ literature. The thesis concludes by drawing 
theories, methodologies and texts together and making sense of that ultimate 
continuity sought by the Romantic project. I do this by turning to the 
poetologizing of immortality (which supersedes death as a Romantic 
preoccupation) and arguing that to poetologize immortality – to poeticize and 
philosophize it simultaneously – is the test-case for producing the infinite 
from the finite. I suggest the necessity felt by Romantic writers to achieve this 
transformation in order to legitimate the permeable philosophical poetry and 
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This thesis seeks to address some of the most pressing questions early 
Romantic writers and thinkers find themselves asking. In one version of his 
famous ‘Preface’ to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth asks, ‘What is a Poet?’ An 
apparently simple enough question and furnished with an equally simple 
answer – ‘a Man speaking to men’ – the implications of this inquiry are 
actually far more complex, and I shall begin to work through these as my 
argument progresses. To begin with, however, I hope my graduation from 
considering what a Romantic poet is to defining the concept of poetology 
might be justified as both a technical necessity as well as a structural one: the 
drive behind my argument is that we cannot hope to have as rich an 
understanding of the methods employed by Wordsworth and other leading 
Romantic thinker-writers if we do not recognize the nature of the relationship 
between – if not always unity of – poetic theory, methodology and practice.  
 The word ‘poetology’ is not a term that always refers to study of the 
Romantic period. It is one that has been picked up in German criticism to refer 
to a type of literature which explores methods of arriving at knowledge. It has 
gained currency through the work of Joseph Vogl, whose phrase, ‘poetologies 
of knowledge’ has come to indicate the ways in which diverse disciplines such 
as poetry and science contribute towards new methods of knowledge. With 
this emphasis on reflexivity, it is unsurprising that it has become a term in 
usage when considering modern cultural and social scientific discourses of 
knowledge. What is more surprising, perhaps, is that in the United States and 
in contemporary British performance poetry it has also come to mean the 
study and practice of spoken poetic expression by some. My first encounter 
with the term was through ‘Anglo-German Poetologies Around 1800’, an 
invigorating research colloquium hosted by the Centre for Anglo-German 
Cultural Relations at Queen Mary, University of London (2007-9). This 
seminar series was concerned with the study of early Romantic intersection of 
poetic and philosophical theory (particularly theories of life and the self), and 
much of the material presented and discussed in and beyond this space 
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provided a stimulus for my own consideration of issues explored in this 
thesis.1 Poetology, then, is clearly a term that is flexible in its definition. In 
using it to consider the nature and interrelation of seminal early Romantic 
texts in England and Germany, I am arguing that such flexibility should be 
upheld when considering literary and philosophical theories and modes of 
texts production that are as diverse and collaborative as those of early 
Romantics. Poetology is a word that is suited to comparative studies – 
particularly those seeking to address how literature engenders modes of 
knowledge – because it seeks to bridge gaps between ‘literary’ and ‘non-
literary’ discourses. Strictly speaking, the only etymological definition of the 
word ‘poetology’ would have it as a study or science of poetry/literature. This 
thesis argues that early Romantic writers’ understanding of ‘poetry’ and 
‘science’ were broad enough to translate the terms as ‘literature’ and 
‘knowledge’ respectively. Thus, poetology according to both its etymological 
roots and Romantic appropriation of those root-terms is any literature 
theorizing knowledge, and we have only to cast a cursory glance over the 
manifestos produced by not only early but also ‘second-generation’ 
Romantics to see how poetry engenders privileged forms of knowledge. For 
Wordsworth, ‘poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge’, and he 
follows Aristotle in asserting that ‘Poetry is the most philosophic of all 
writing’, thus negating the need for systematic philosophical discourse; for 
Schlegel, philosophy has achieved all it can by itself, and now must unite with 
poetry; Coleridge famously states that the poet can ‘bring the whole soul of 
man into activity’; and for Novalis it is a renovating source that affords one 
with a fresher perspective of the world. But there are also bridges between 
early and later Romanticism:  Shelley, like Novalis, reads poets as ‘priests’ or 
‘hierophants’, who are also ‘the unacknowledged legislators of the world’ – a 
term that attaches undeniable importance to the poet’s understanding of how 
the world ought to be governed, even if actual legislation eludes the poet’s 
remit; and Keats is reminiscent of Schlegel when theorizing examples of 
                                                            
1 See Poetologien des Wissens um 1800, ed. by Joseph Vogl (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1999). 
For an example of its usage in contemporary performance/sound poetry, see Doreen King, 
The Poetology of Bob Cobbing (Shrewsbury: Feather Books, 2003). Further information on 




poetry, art and literary criticism as characterizing the great tendencies of his 
age.2   
Poetology is defined in this thesis as the broader type of work that 
early German and English writers sought actively to produce. It is not a 
method of writing, nor is it a category. Rather, poetology is a name given to 
the desired production – and this includes theorizing – of Romantic literature. 
I am defining poetology as a term that denotes an interdisciplinary and 
collaborative approach to the Romantic text. I am not, however, suggesting 
that ‘poetology’ can be translated merely as ‘poetic theory’, because for the 
Romantic writer, theory and poetic practice cannot – must not – be wholly 
separated. Poetology is more than an umbrella term, though; within it one 
might find Romantic manifesto, methodology, and that final production, the 
Mischgedicht. Although I am not arguing for a conscious synchronization or 
collaboration between say, Wordsworth and Friedrich Schlegel, I am arguing 
                                                            
2 See the 1850 text of William Wordsworth, ‘Preface to Lyrical Ballads’, in The Prose Works, 
ed. by W. J. B. Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser, 3 vols (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), i, p.167 and p.163. In citing the ‘Preface’ I have opted throughout to use the 
Oxford edition of Wordsworth’s prose rather than the Cornell Wordsworth edition of Lyrical 
Ballads, as I believe it remains the richer of the two: the parallel texts of the 1800 and 1850 
versions of the ‘Preface’ in Owen and Smyser’s edition make for a more transparent and 
rewarding reading of Wordsworth’s revisions. All subsequent references to the text will be 
footnoted as ‘Prose Works, i’ with page numbers for the 1800 and 1850 texts in parentheses. 
Where there is a reference to 1850 but not to 1800, I refer to a revision/addition made by 
1802, thus falling roughly within the early period of my focus. For a version of the 1802 
‘Preface’, see William Wordsworth, The Major Works, ed. by Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp.595-615. For Schlegel on the interdependence of the two 
disciplines, see Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. by Peter Firchow 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1971), Ideas, 108: ‘Whatever can be done 
while poetry and philosophy are separated has been done and accomplished. So, the time has 
come to unite the two’. (p.251). See also Friedrich Wilhelm Schlegel, Literary Notebooks, 
1797-1801, ed. by Hans Eichner (London: Athlone Press, 1957), 330, p.48, in which Schlegel 
states that a prophet is a poetic philosopher and a philosophical poet. For more on Coleridge 
and the role of poetry in bringing the whole soul of man into activity, see below. See Chapter 
6 for a detailed consideration of Novalis on the renovating and prophetic powers of the poet. 
For Shelley on poets as ‘hierophants’ and ‘legislators’ in ‘A Defence of Poetry’, see, Shelley’s 
Poetry and Prose, ed. by Neil Fraistat and Donald Reiman, 2nd edn (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2002): ‘Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; the mirrors of the 
gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present; the words which express what they 
understand not; the trumpets which sing to battle, and feel not what they inspire; the influence 
which is moved not, but moves. Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.’ 
(p.535). see also Shelley, Poetry and Prose, p.531: ‘It [poetry] is at once the centre and 
circumference of knowledge’. For Schlegel on the great ‘tendencies of the age’ as the French 
Revolution, Fichte’s Theory of Knowledge, and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, 
see Athenaeum Fragments, 216, in Lucinde and the Fragments, p.190. See also Keats’ letter 
to Benjamin Robert Haydon dated 10 January 1818, in The Letters of John Keats, 1814-1821, 
ed. by Hyder Edward Rollins, 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), i: ‘I 
am convinced that there are three things to rejoice at in this Age—The Excursion Your 
Pictures, and Hazlitt's depth of Taste.’ (p.203). 
8 
 
that such an approach is common within the constraints of geographical space 
– that is, a literary circle convening and operating in a particular locale – but 
also within a point in time across spatial distances, the time known in England 
as early first-generation Romanticism and in Germany as Frühromantik. So, 
one aspect of early Romanticism this thesis seeks to engage with is the Anglo-
German Romantic framework, and how this might be re-defined by its 
inclusion of Wordsworth. That is, my initial research question is as follows: 
how can reading Wordsworth within such a framework enable us to arrive at a 
better understanding of his philosophical poetry? This means that existing 
focus on reading conscious connections between seminal English and German 
texts of this period does not address adequately the similarities between the 
broader aims of writers as apparently diverse as Wordsworth and Novalis. The 
thrust of existing Anglo-German scholarship has tended largely to be towards 
reading Coleridge’s poetic fragments and his Biographia Literaria as models 
of Schlegelian theory. In order to begin to understand why such a critical 
approach is reductive, we need to examine further what poetology entails.  
Poetology as both theory and practice necessitates a re-evaluation of 
existing aesthetic, literary, and philosophical principles. One such principle is 
irony, which has become centralized from the late 1970s onwards in the work 
of scholars such as Peter Conrad, Anne K. Mellor, David Simpson and 
Kathleen Wheeler.3 Conrad’s Shandyism: the Character of Romantic Irony is 
predicated on reading Romantic irony through the lens of Sterne’s Tristram 
Shandy, in which Schlegel and his immediate circle show great interest. 
Schlegel reads Tristram Shandy as one of the novels that characterized the 
impossibility of a linear narrative; the process of arriving at a narrative of 
one’s self is as fraught and chaotic as understanding that self, and, as such, is 
constantly subject to interruption. Shandy is, like the eponymous narrator of 
Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste, an embodiment of the modern narrator and 
author for whom self-consciousness is always a process of becoming. As a 
                                                            
3 See Peter Conrad, Shandyism: the character of Romantic irony (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978); 
Anne K. Mellor, English Romantic Irony (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1980); 
David Simpson, Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry (London: Macmillan Press, 1979); 
Kathleen Wheeler’s Sources, Processes and Methods in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) and German Aesthetic and Literary 




reminder of the prevalence of Sternean irony in Romantic thought – 
particularly in writing narratives of the self, wherein I believe lies its real 
value – Shandyism has taken its place within a movement redirecting studies 
to Romantic irony. However, Conrad’s study does not quite get a handle on 
some of the complexities of irony in seminal Romantic texts – its title is 
somewhat misleading, since its focus tends to be firmly on the shift from 
classicism to Romanticism, rather than the ‘character of Romantic irony’ as 
we might wish to understand it, and Schlegel and his contemporary Jean Paul 
Richter make their appearance far too late in the study. Consequently, 
Conrad’s study has perhaps been more pertinent to readers of Sterne than 
those seeking to understand better the theory and uses of irony in leading 
Romantic texts.    
Anne K. Mellor’s English Romantic Irony has been more instructive in 
setting out the centrality of irony in Romantic textual practice. As the title 
suggests, her study is focused on reading the presentation of irony in English 
texts, though the nature of this irony takes us back to the post-Kantian theory 
of F. Schlegel. Like Conrad, Mellor has reminded us that irony for Romantic 
writers (neither Conrad nor Mellor particularly emphasizes chosen authors as 
thinkers) is born out of an understanding that narrative is chaos; just as there is 
no ‘absolute’ or order in the world, so there is no ordered linearity in literary 
narrative of either the self or world. Mellor’s study came at a point in 
Romantic scholarship when irony was becoming recognized as a legitimate 
focal point for study. However, perhaps it was published too shortly after 
David Simpson’s Irony and Authority in Romantic Poetry to engage 
meaningfully with its predecessor. Although Mellor does something very 
different from Simpson, one cannot help but wonder how some inclusion of 
Wordsworth in her consideration might have shaped her conclusions; would, 
for example, Coleridge have been as neatly separated from Keatsian irony as 
one finds in English Romantic Poetry? Mellor places Coleridge in a crisis 
category shared by Lewis Carroll – that of the Christian writer struggling to 
reconcile a literary ironic practice with a theological belief in absolutes. This 
has its obvious merits: Coleridge’s literary and philosophical ambitions are 
nothing if not conciliatory at times. However, to suggest that his are a poetics 
and intellectual discourse always in crisis is to toe a rather conservative line of 
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argument, and one that was beginning to seem dated even in 1980 when 
Mellor’s study was published. This argument, initiated most prominently by 
M. H. Abrams and adopted and adapted through the 1960s and 1970s most 
notably by Harold Bloom and Geoffrey Hartman and their followers, suggests 
that the big players of first-generation English Romantics – effectively, 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, with Bloom’s indefatigable pursuit of Blake still 
existing in a sphere and perhaps a class of its own – operate on a poetics of 
crisis. From the category of Abrams’ ‘greater Romantic lyric’ to the 
‘supernatural poems’ of Coleridge, the traditional heavyweights of 
Romanticism have insisted on dividing the canonical ‘big six’ Romantics by 
first- and second-generation poets. This is no longer the case. In the last three 
decades or so, Romantic scholarship has moved on from notions of 
‘canonical’ writers (the ‘canon’, if there is one, is expanding all the time) and 
definitive readings of seminal texts. Even those texts themselves no longer 
represent a constant – thanks to the growth of editions such as the Cornell 
Wordsworth series we have access now to a greater number of published and 
manuscript versions of texts than in the age of Abrams et al, making a 
definitive text harder to place. To put it another way, as students and scholars 
of Romanticism we are finding the increasing need for generosity in our 
approach to familiar texts. As such, we are constantly moving closer to early 
Romanticism in a practical way; through the collapse of individual theoretical 
and critical frameworks, we have been moving beyond critical absolutes in a 
way that makes the continued study of irony all the more pertinent.     
If such a statement sounds itself quasi-Romantic in its claims, it may 
be because it is: it is not a case of criticism being pushed through the lens of 
the art, rather that the very art concerns itself with the nature of criticism. To 
say that we are approaching texts with more critical generosity now than ever 
before is not to seek resolutely a ‘Romantic’ colouring over our reading of this 
period, it is simply to acknowledge that the authors of the texts we are 
examining prefigure many of our ‘-isms’ in some way or other, and concern 
themselves with the limitations of those individual frameworks. Many of the 
conclusions this thesis comes to address this, either directly or indirectly. 
Chapters 2 and 5, for example, examine the use of dreams, fairy tales, 
romance and the Nachtseite in order to understand better the roles of history 
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and consciousness in shaping the self in a way that pre-dates Freudian 
reading, Marxism, post-structuralism or Historicism. So it is with feminism: 
one of the wider aims of this thesis is to suggest that our understanding of 
authorship in early English and German Romanticism is advanced greatly by 
an appreciation of the ways in which these circles blur gendered distinctions 
of writing. Though it is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study to 
consider the richness of women’s writing in this period, I hope that some of 
the readings produced might stimulate further consideration of how gender 
affects practical collaboration and text production in this period. In a sense, 
Romantic scholarship is only just catching up with the Romantics, and the 
foundations for such study have been in place roughly since this transitional 
period from overt theoretical ‘-isms’ to plurality in interpretation.4  
From this period two scholars emerge most prominently in relation to 
Anglo-German irony. In seminal works such as Irony and Authority and 
Sources, Processes and Methods in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, David 
Simpson and Kathleen Wheeler have, respectively, tended to read irony as the 
principal framework within which leading early Romantic writers operate. 
While this critical approach has been highly influential for any work 
considering comparative Romantic approaches and Romantic methodology, 
there are two main drawbacks to confining Anglo-German Romanticism to 
such rigidity. The first is the danger that the comparative reading becomes too 
invested in this framework so as not to allow for consideration of texts which 
fall outside of its thematic or formal make-up. This is especially the case with 
Wheeler’s work, which draws close parallels between Coleridge’s Biographia 
Literaria and the Fragmente and literary practice (e.g. Schlegel’s novel, 
Lucinde) of the Frühromantiker. This is highly instructive insofar as it has 
enlightened readers on the formal and theoretical cross-currents between 
Coleridge and German Romanticism. But it has been too narrow, I am 
suggesting, in that it has not allowed for Wordsworth to be read as a conscious 
                                                            
4 I am situating my work within this body of criticism that accounts for plurality. Recently, 
scholars such as Simon Jarvis and Stephen Gill have become interested in reading 
Wordsworth in ways that are both established and strikingly fresh. Jarvis’ Wordsworth’s 
Philosophic Song (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) takes an old theme – 
Wordsworth’s intellectual influences – and produces new readings that account for the poet as 
a thinker. See also Gill’s Wordsworth’s Revisitings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
in which he re-addresses Wordsworth’s lifelong revisionary habit. 
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and active ironist, committed to producing a synthesis of poetry and 
philosophical concerns (Wheeler’s work focuses on poetry and philosophy as 
disciplines). Another drawback of reading English poetry in light of German 
literary theory is the risk we run of underestimating the originality and 
concurrence of any thinker-writers: to suggest that study of Anglo-German 
Romanticism comprises largely consideration of how Coleridge’s work 
follows thematic and formal patterns theorized by Schlegel and his Jena circle 
is to read the work of the former as ultimately derivative, thus falling into the 
all-too familiar pattern of attempting to source Coleridge’s work, rather than 
provide any fresh perspective on the uses of irony to achieve his literary and 
philosophical aims.5 
The second drawback is more evident in work following David 
Simpson’s line of enquiry, namely that irony becomes a way of reading 
Romantic self-reflexivity – which is essential to get on terms with for any 
reading of Romanticism – but often does not advance beyond that as a 
dramatized mode of writing. For Simpson, irony remains largely in the realm 
of theory; Romantic writers seek to challenge readers’ cognitive and 
epistemological claims by encouraging them to ‘question the meaning’6 of the 
text. Yet, irony is bound up with so many other theoretical and 
methodological concerns of poet-thinkers such as Wordsworth, Coleridge, the 
Schlegels and Novalis, that to preclude drama, collaborative authorship, and 
interdisciplinarity from consideration of it is to do a great disservice to the 





It is only in the last few decades that scholarship in general has begun to 
recognize gradually the legitimacy of Romantic philosophical thought; as with 
                                                            
5 That is not to overlook the great debt that anyone studying Coleridge’s writing owes to the 
critical and biographical work done by the likes of Kathleen Wheeler, Kathleen Coburn, E. L. 
Griggs, and the various editors of the Princeton Collected Coleridge editions, as well as the 
classic meticulous research into source material for the supernatural poetry, such as John 
Livingston Hughes’ The Road to Xanadu: A Study in the Ways of the Imagination (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1927) and Arthur H. Nethercot’s The Road to Tryermaine: a study of the 
history, background and purposes of Coleridge’s “Christabel” (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1939). 
6 Simpson, Irony and Authority, p.xii. 
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the rehabilitation of Shelley’s reputation in the 1960s as a major poet, far 
removed from the ineffectual ‘Ariel’ that dominated the consciousness of the 
nineteenth-century general reader, commentators have begun to focus on the 
philosophical premises that underlie the work of Novalis. Until recently, 
Novalis was read in a similar way to the romanticized mythopoeia 
surrounding Keats and Shelley. However, as with these two poets, Novalis’ 
own constructions of the self were not picked up as readily. This is still a 
problem in Anglophone scholarship, where there has been a tendency to focus 
on his mysticism (see Frederick Hiebel’s Novalis: German Poet – European 
Thinker – Christian Mystic);7 of course, as with Shelley, these portrayals are 
formed from the posthumous legacy that biographers have shaped. In Novalis’ 
case, this has been down to misreading or misappropriation of Ludwig Tieck’s 
brief biography of his friend, appended to Heinrich von Ofterdingen.8 Such 
portrayals depend on an appreciation of the concept of ‘Romanticizing’, rather 
than the (often pejorative) connotations the word has for readers today. Far 
from being an idealization, romanticizing refers to that which finds the poetic 
and the ideal situated very much within the real and commonplace. 
Romanticizing for Novalis, Schlegel and their circle turns to philosophizing, 
precisely because it seeks to mediate idealism and fantasy, not perpetuate 
them. It is on this concept of romanticizing that so much hinges in terms of 
Anglo-German Romantic poetologies; though The Prelude’s reputation as a 
foundational philosophical poem is firmly established, Die Lehrlinge zu Sais 
struggles for the same recognition, despite the fact that it (along with other 
central works by Novalis, as I demonstrate in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis) operates along strikingly similar lines. By ‘the same recognition’ I do 
not suggest an aesthetic re-evaluation that would necessarily find Novalis’ 
                                                            
7 Frederick Hiebel, Novalis: German Poet – European Thinker – Christian Mystic, 2nd edn, 
rev., University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures, 10 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959). Hiebel’s study does situate Novalis 
as a thinker, but tends to place this on equal footing with his mysticism – while the mysticism 
is important to understanding Novalis’ poetry (and therefore his poetology), I am arguing that 
centralizing or over-emphasizing it has placed the poet-thinker as more of a mythmaker than 
serious thinker.  
8 See especially Novalis, Henry of Ofterdingen: a Romance from the German of Novalis 
(Cambridge, MA: John Owen, 1842), p.xvi for Tieck’s comments on Novalis’ tendency to see 
the supernatural and fantastical in the everyday, so that ‘everyday life surrounded him like a 
supernatural story’. The implications of this are read in the concluding chapter, where I argue 
that this is precisely one of the things that drives Novalis as a serious philosophical poet.  
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poetry as any more (or less) meritorious than that of Wordsworth. Rather, I 
am referring to the reader’s recognition of the two as philosophical poets 
broadly sharing poetological approaches. This, I hope, becomes clearer in the 
chapters that follow. 
Arguably, some of this neglect in Anglophone scholarship is due to 
issues of accessibility: translators have historically tended to opt for focusing 
on what they see as Novalis’ ‘poetry’ and overlooking what have been 
presented as fragmentary (and fragmented) attempts at ‘philosophy’. As a 
result, there has been a polarization in presenting his literary theory and 
practice and only recently has this begun to be reconciled. A brief glance at 
the chronology of translation of major works will make this apparent. 
Compare, for example, the 1842 Henry of Ofterdingen: a Romance from the 
German of Novalis, Ralph Manheim’s The Novices at Sais (1949) and Charles 
E. Passage’s Hymns to the Night and Other Selected Writings (1960) with 
Margaret Mahoney Stoljar’s translations in Philosophical Writings (1997), 
Jane Kneller’s Fichte Studies (2003), and David Wood’s important Notes for a 
Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, and The Birth of 
Novalis: Friedrich von Hardenberg’s Journal of 1797, with Selected Letters 
and Documents (both published in 2007), and the traditional preponderance of 
perceived poetic over philosophical is clear.9 It is only in the last two decades 
that interest in Novalis as a thinker has really taken off in Anglophone 
scholarship.  
By identifying the relationship between poetry and philosophy in the 
work of Novalis and Wordsworth, then, I am following up influential work by 
commentators such as Kathleen Wheeler, Manfred Frank and Frederick Beiser 
on the unity of poetry and philosophy in Romanticism. However, where 
Wheeler reads this mainly in relation to Coleridge and Schlegel (and to an 
extent, Richter), and Beiser reads this generally as occurring within German 
                                                            
9 Originally published in 1949, Manheim’s translation has recently been reprinted – see The 
Novices at Sais, trans. by Ralph Manheim (New York: Archipelago Books, 2005); Hymns to 
the Night and Other Selected Writings, trans. by Charles E. Passage (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1960); Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. by Margaret Mahoney Stoljar (Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press, 1997); Fichte Studies, trans. by Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine 
Brouillon, trans. and ed. by David W. Wood (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007); and The Birth of 
Novalis: Friedrich von Hardenberg’s Journal of 1797, with Selected Letters and Documents, 
trans. and ed. by Bruce Donehower (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2007)  
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Romanticism, I suggest that Wordsworth and Novalis also belong to this type 
of literary production, broadly defined here as poetologizing. In the 
Introduction to his recent translation of Novalis’ Notes for a Romantic 
Encyclopaedia, David Wood explicates Manfred Frank’s influential reading 
of the Romantic endeavour to unite poetry and philosophy within a discourse 
that might be understood primarily as philosophical. German Romantics 
sought to incorporate poetics into philosophy, Wood notes, because existing 
philosophical enquiry did not stretch far enough without poetics. Concepts 
such as the Ego, the Infinite and the Absolute could not be understood by the 
prevalent philosophical discourses of Kant and Fichte, because they needed 
the language of art and poetry, discourses that fell outside of systematic 
strictures. However, Wood notes that Manfred Frank insists they sought to 
remain within the bounds of philosophical discourse: ‘Thus, although the 
early German Romantics sought to transform philosophy to include poetics, 
they still endeavoured to remain within the margins of philosophy.’10 This is 
the process I am calling poetology, the expansion of philosophical discourse 
to allow for poetics. By extension, however, it might also be understood as the 
expansion of literary and aesthetic discourse to allow for philosophy, and it is 
one of the arguments of this thesis that the preponderance of one over the 
other cannot accurately be determined if we are to extend our examination 
beyond the texts we see as belonging to either category. That is, in order to get 
a sense for the concept of the ‘Romantic project’ we must look beyond either 
poetry or philosophy as it was established in the 1790s, and understand the 
drive toward ‘philosophical poetry’ and ‘poetic philosophy’ as being 
interchangeable at various points. The second research question I seek to 
investigate, therefore, is how do these ways of reading Romantic texts give us 
a clearer idea of how Romantic writers situated their own work?   
An understanding of the philosophical and critical climate that 
Romantic writers find themselves thinking and writing in is paramount to any 
consideration of what they brought to bear upon it. There are a number of 
invaluable studies of German intellectual history up to and around the 
                                                            
10 See Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia, p.xxiii. See also Manfred Frank, The 
Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. by Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004). 
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Frühromantik period available to the English reader, and it is not within the 
scope of this thesis to consider this background in the detail and depth that 
would be needed in order to add constructively to the work of scholars such as 
Karl Ameriks, Ernst Behler Frederick Beiser, Andrew Bowie, Hans Eichner, 
and Manfred Frank (whose seminal The Philosophical Foundations of Early 
German Romanticism has been translated into English in the last decade by 
Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, and has made possible Millán-Zaibert’s own recent 
contribution to the study of this period, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence 
of Romantic Philosophy), to name a few.11 Nevertheless, some knowledge is 
needed if we are to appreciate the literary and poetological directions taken by 
early thinker-writers in Germany, e.g. to understand why irony transcends 
literary device and becomes as much philosophical as it is aesthetic (as I have 
suggested above), a clearer picture of post-Kantian notions such as the ‘Ego’ 
and the ‘Absolute’ become necessary.  
The philosophical story from Kant to Schlegel and his circle is neither 
a short nor simple narrative. At the risk of sounding reductive, however, I 
shall attempt to plot it out as basically as possible for the present discussion. 
German Idealism has been thought to continue from a Cartesian standpoint. 
Cogito ergo sum has been held as the philosophical starting point – in modern 
terms, anyway – for a consciousness that invents the world. In short, 
subjectivism is the inherited ruling principle. In degrees, however, Idealist 
thinkers gradually moved away from such a stance, beginning with Kant, 
whose early work can be situated within it at times. Kant’s shift away from 
                                                            
11 For important introductory and background material, see especially: The Cambridge 
Companion to German Idealism, ed. by Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); Ernst Behler’s Frühromantik (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992) and his German 
Romantic Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); numerous works 
authored or edited by Frederick Beiser, including The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy 
from Kant to Fichte (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), German Idealism: the 
Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801 (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), and 
The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism (Boston, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Andrew Bowie’s Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to 
Habermas (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) and Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche, 
2nd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Manfred Frank’s The Subject and 
the Text: Essays on Literary Theory and Philosophy, trans. by Helen Atkins, and ed. by 
Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); See also German 
Philosophy after Kant, ed. By Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic 




subjectivism was, however, not enough for his successors, and his systematic 
approach to the self’s relation to the world was still seen as being too rigid. 
Kant’s philosophy did not allow for the fluidity that would characterize 
Romantic writing. The next major player in German Idealism was Fichte, who 
moved away from Kantian systematization. However, Novalis and Schlegel, 
the philosophical leaders of the Jena circle, found themselves breaking with 
him, too, because he did not move away from subjectivism enough. For the 
early Romantics, Fichte erred by maintaining the idea that the consciousness 
was still at the centre of the knowable world. Fichte was unable to shake off 
the tenacity of the absolute ‘Ego’, something that Novalis’ Fichte-Studien 
would play with in an attempt to de-centre the self further. This goes some 
way towards explaining Schlegel’s theory of the infinitely perfectible (and, so, 
never perfected) and Wordsworthian practice of infinite revision. What is 
meant by this is that the negation of the ‘absolute’ self-consciousness finds its 
literary analogue in the practice of not only the fragment form, but also 
constant textual revisions to writing of the self. Wordsworth’s writing and re-
writing through revision, by this account, becomes central to his 
understanding that a definitive consciousness of ‘self’ cannot ever be arrived 
at (see Chapter 4 for my discussion of The Prelude as a poetological text). 
I am concerned here with briefly situating the Frühromantiker within 
the German Idealist tradition they – to some extent – inherited and adapted. 
Frederick Beiser’s relatively recent study, German Idealism: the Struggle 
Against Subjectivism 1781-1801, is instructive for its critical re-evaluation of 
what that adaptation entails. Beiser argues against a critical tradition that 
asserts that German Idealism from Kant to Hegel follows Cartesian thought 
and seeks to read this history of philosophy as teleological. That is, he is 
arguing against a tradition that suggests Kant follows Descartes’ subjectivism 
and that subsequent thinkers are attempting to reach a ‘universal spirit’ a la 
Hegel or an ‘Absolute Ego’. Beiser argues that German Idealism was a move 
away from subjectivism that had the self ‘invent’ the world through 
consciousness. Rather, these subject/object distinctions are collapsed in 
German Idealist philosophy. Thus, I am suggesting each move in this 
direction signals a step towards understanding Romantic poetological writing, 
whose ultimate end is to represent a self-consciousness that is constantly 
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deferred or interrupted (this is more often the case than it being disrupted, as it 
has been conventionally suggested). 
The term ‘poetologizing’ is broad, though, and reconciliation of 
disciplines and genres is only one aspect of it. Poetology also connotes a 
collaborative literary production, and this is integral to understanding how 
interdisciplinarity in Romantic writing functions. In the following chapters, 
particularly Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that in order to understand the 
philosophical poem, getting on terms with the collaborative methods of early 
Romantic writing is crucial; Chapters 3 and 5, for example, argue that the way 
in which Lyrical Ballads is read as a collaborative venture impacts profoundly 
on our understanding of not only that volume in its 1798 and 1800 editions, 
but also The Prelude, The Excursion, and Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria as 
much as his supernatural poetry.12 That is, Lyrical Ballads marks the 
beginning of interdisciplinary poetry in its reconciliation of poetry and 
philosophy for both Coleridge and Wordsworth, enabling us to consider how 
philosophical poetry is engendered partly by collaborative venture.13 These 
chapters, therefore, address my third research question: how do collaborative 
ventures in early Anglo-German Romanticism elaborate the concept of 
poetology as a practicable theory?  
It is thus building on the second chapter, which examines the terms 
Sympoesie and Symphilosophie, arguing that they are central to 
comprehending the relationship between collaborative and intergeneric text-
production, culminating in the philosophical literature envisaged by early 
                                                            
12 Although Biographia Literaria falls outside of the scope of my focus on early 
Romanticism, I shall draw on it when relevant for considering Coleridge’s own retrospective 
assessment of his collaboration with Wordsworth. 
13 For Coleridge, Wordsworth’s production of a projected epic philosophical poem was 
understood to be enough of a collaborative venture for him to assess The Excursion as a 
failure to meet his own criteria for such a project. See Coleridge’s disapproving letter to 
Wordsworth dated 30 May 1815 in The Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by 
E. L. Griggs, 6 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956-71), iv, pp.574-5. What is 
striking here is the stake that Coleridge clearly feels he had in Wordsworth’s project for a 
philosophical poem, expressed as it is by his appropriation of the project as collaborative: 
Coleridge’s disappointment lies not with what is in the poem itself (not in this case, anyway – 
that would come later with his critique in Biographia Literaria), but in what it does not 
contain. I have suggested above that ‘philosophical poetry’ and ‘poetic philosophy’ are to an 
extent interchangeable terms for thinking about how Romantic writers situate their own texts. 
What is meant by ‘poetic philosophy’ in this respect is philosophical discourse that 
accommodates poetry. This is in contrast to Coleridge’s conception of the Recluse project, 
because that conception seeks almost to ventriloquize various philosophies through a poetic 
mouthpiece, rather than demonstrate philosophy’s dependence on poetic discourse.  
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Romantics in England and Germany. This philosophical poetry, ultimately the 
exemplary Romantic literature, finds full expression in the Mischgedicht – the 
‘mixed poem’. The fifth chapter gives itself over to considering this curious 
concept of Friedrich Schlegel’s, examining how far the concept of 
poetologizing is taken into practice. That is, my final main research question 
is: how far do the concept of poetologizing and the practice of collaborative 
text production result in the Romantic Mischgedicht? The final chapter seeks 
to draw these elements – theory, methodology and text – together and make 
sense of both continuity in and the continuity of the Romantic project. I do 
this by turning to the poetologizing of immortality (which, by far, supersedes 
death as a Romantic preoccupation) and arguing that to poetologize 
immortality – to poeticize and philosophize it simultaneously – is to produce 
from the finite the infinite. I suggest the necessity for Romantic thinker-
writers (particularly for Wordsworth and Novalis) to make sense of this in 
order to make their envisaged projects of permeable philosophical poetry and 
poetic philosophy cohere. 
 
 
‘the successive satiation of all forms and substances’ 
 
Some further words about terminology are needed in order to elucidate the 
treatment of Romantic theory and practice regarding genre and mixing. I am 
using the term ‘intergeneric’ to describe the ideal Romantic project, the 
Mischgedicht. Though it is a term used primarily in biology to mean the plant 
or animal species produced by crossing different genera, I am applying it here 
in a literary sense, for the reason that the existing terms ‘interdisciplinarity’ 
and ‘hybridity’ are not quite adequate in conveying either the scope or the 
depth of the Romantic project. ‘Interdisciplinarity’, for one, is exclusive in 
that it focuses on the mixing of disciplines, rather than genres and sub-genres 
as Friedrich Schlegel, the chief architect of the Mischgedicht, intends.14 
                                                            
14 Though it is the case that Schlegel most notably uses the term Mischgedicht and leads the 
theorization of it within the circle, a closer consideration of Novalis in the following chapters 
(particularly the second chapter) will show up the ways in which Novalis is just as committed 
to the Mischgedicht before and during the Jena period. Indeed, the very transition of his 
literary and public ‘self’ from Friedrich von Hardenberg to ‘Novalis’ highlights his early 
concern with forging an identity mediating between ancient and new, tradition and 
innovation; the name ‘Novalis’ was taken from an old family name (de Novali), but is also 
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‘Hybridity’ is, on the other hand, a little too broad to indicate the innovative 
nature of what Romanticism is to early writers and thinkers. I am using the 
term intergeneric partly to emphasise the affinity between ‘genre’ as category 
and ‘genre’ as species – Schlegel himself frequently uses the word die 
Gattung rather than das Genre when treating the subject of genre in his 
theoretical prose and fragments. As [die] Gattung relates to race, gender, 
taxonomic categories, or genre, Schlegel’s preference for it over the rather 
limited [das] Genre is certainly revealing. Such an alignment suggests 
Schlegel’s accentuation of not only the shared etymology of both categories of 
classification (the Latin genus, and Greek genos) but also, therefore, its impact 
on any understanding of Romantic attempts at Mischung. Genre itself 
becomes interdisciplinary for Schlegel et al as they cross literary with 
scientific terminology in theorizing romantische Poesie, or Universalpoesie. 
Intergeneric, then, might be understood as a term that suggests not 
only the mixing of genres, but of types, in the broadest sense of the word, so 
that categories [Gattungen] themselves become universalised. By this it is 
meant that distinctions of forms, genres and disciplines all become collapsed; 
they are simply types, and the goal of the Romantic writer is to produce from 
these types a singular type:  
 
Universality is the successive satiation of all forms and substances. 
Universality can attain harmony only through the conjunction of 
poetry and philosophy; and even the greatest, most universal works of 
isolated poetry and philosophy seem to lack this final synthesis.15 
      
This is Universalpoesie in its essence. The ‘conjunction of poetry and 
philosophy’, for Schlegel, is primarily where the synthesis begins. Although it 
is often expressed as an ideal goal for Romantic ‘poetry’, I am arguing for a 
more generous interpretation of universality that would see this unity as a first 
step toward the desired Universalpoesie. By this account, Universalpoesie 
                                                                                                                                                           
etymologically connected to the Latin word  for ‘new’. In his edition of Novalis’ early journal 
extracts and letters Bruce Donehower also emphasizes the name as being indicative of a 
desire to cross boundaries. Though these are traditionally in a territorial sense – as a ‘clearer 
of new land’ – Donehower connects this to the desire to transgress existing disciplinary 
boundaries. He continues this by discussing the ‘relentless urge to synthesis’ that is obvious in 
Das Allgemeine Brouillon, noting Manfred Frank’s view that Hardenberg did not suffer with 
the notion of a double life and actually always wanted to synthesise the poetry and mysticism 
with work and science – see The Birth of Novalis, pp.6-8. 
15 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Athenaeum Fragments, 451, p.240. 
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could be read as a literature that supersedes the category of discipline itself. 
This is the ‘successive satiation of all forms and substances’ expressed by 
Schlegel in the fragment above. The word ‘satiation’ is interesting here, as it 
implies that universality as a concept (and, subsequently, Universalpoesie as 
the embodiment in practice of that concept) is necessary; without it there is a 
deficiency, a sort of malnourishment in even the most outstanding ‘isolated’ 
work of either poetry or philosophy. Perhaps one reason that commentators 
have generally focused almost exclusively on poetry and philosophy as the 
desired disciplines for mixing is that they crop up most often in Schlegel’s 
fragments when unity and genre-mixing are discussed. Even in the quoted 
fragment, the ‘final synthesis’ necessary to a Romantic text is wanting without 
the union of these two. However, the fragment does not suggest that a union 
of poetry and philosophy is the only pre-requisite for a synthesized literature, 
and a greater understanding of what Poesie and Philosophie mean to Schlegel 
and his circle might go some way to illuminating just how original and 
ambitious the early German conception of a ‘romantische’ project or text 
really was. 
It is, therefore, another aim of this thesis to investigate how Poesie and 
Philosophie are understood primarily by Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis. In 
part, I hope to demonstrate that for these two thinker-writers these were much 
broader terms than understood in either Germany or England in the 1790s. 
This has, of course, often been the point at which comparisons to Coleridge 
arise in Anglo-German Romanticism. A very prominent argument of Kathleen 
Wheeler’s Sources, Processes and Methods in Coleridge’s Biographia 
Literaria is that its text is in its structure a conscious imitation of the sort of 
literature F. Schlegel theorizes in his fragments and practises with his 1799 
semi-autobiographical novel Lucinde: a Mischgedicht, the result of the theory 
of Universalpoesie. Wheeler’s study is important for the connections it makes 
between German literature and the Biographia, and in terms of grasping the 
intergeneric its real value can be seen to lie in its discussion of the unity of 
poetry and philosophy for Coleridge. However, it must be taken as a starting-
point for reading parallels between German and English Romantic theory and 
projects, as its conception of ‘poetry’ and ‘philosophy’ does not quite push 
these connections far enough. It is assumed that (as with Schlegel), for 
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Coleridge, ‘poetry’ means poetry and ‘philosophy’ means philosophy. In such 
a case it is understandable to focus on the unity of poetry and philosophy in 
the Biographia and other theoretical prose as a mirror of Schlegelian 
fragments and theory. However, closer readings of the major texts themselves 
yield much that suggests that these terms are not so limited. Indeed, as shall be 
discussed below, even terms that might be thought of as interchangeable, such 
as Dichtung and Poesie, are far more complex. Thus, understanding of 
terminology and of categories/genres/types etc. is another core issue facing 
any scholar of German Romanticism. The principal way in which to approach 
study of these broad terms is, I argue, to consider them poetologically. That is, 
to suggest that one way of defining Romantic poetology (or rather, 
poetologies: for, just as there is no one ‘Romanticism’, there is no one 
‘poetology’) is to say that it is a process of universalization, of expansion of 
categories and types. As will be seen below and in later chapters, expansion 
and then universalization, or ‘reciprocal elevation and debasement’, of terms 
is one way in which Novalis defines ‘romanticizing’. By this account, then, on 
the most basic level poetology is the process of romanticizing. 
Although I do not quite read ‘poetology’ and ‘romanticization’ as 
interchangeable terms, an understanding of the latter will nevertheless furnish 
us with a grasp of (and thus more fruitful discussion of) the former. To say 
Romantic thinker-writers place a greater emphasis on self-reflexivity in 
literary production, for example, is now generally accepted and taken for 
granted by scholarship; very few would argue, I think, against the notion that 
a drive toward self-consciousness is a primary ontological and philosophical 
preoccupation in English and German Romantic writing. However, self-
reflexivity in a poetological sense becomes central to understanding the 
process of romanticizing, precisely because of the way in which the 
intergeneric shapes this drive; not only is poetry epistemological (even if this 
means, as Andrew Bennett has recently argued in relation to Wordsworth, that 
poetry reveals itself as a sort of science of ignorance as well as of 
knowledge)16, but producing great poetry is inextricably connected to 
producing great philosophy, and vice versa. Both Coleridge and Schlegel 
                                                            
16 For more on this poetics of ignorance in relation to Lyrical Ballads, see Chapter 3. 
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write about this poetry-philosophy chiasmus. Yet, when they do so it is not as 
a simple mixture [Vermischung]; rather it is what I elaborate below as an 
intergeneric process of fusion [Verschmelzung]. This Verschmelzung is 
poetological, in that it allows for this chiasmic interdependence. Poetry is 
assimilated into the language of philosophy and philosophy is poeticized. For 
Coleridge, this is because criticism of poetry must be subject to philosophical 
scrutiny; not only are poetry and philosophy brought together, but literary 
criticism also takes its place in poetologizing. For Schlegel, too, the critic is 
on a par with writer and reader when it comes to generating meaning – for 
him, ‘The critic is a reader who ruminates. Therefore, he ought to have more 
than one stomach’.17 Reading is a democratic process whereby the critic is a 
kind of reader, with neither one seen as superior to the other.  
 Verschmelzung, which we might translate as ‘fusion’ or ‘assimilation’ 
is essential to the Coleridgean poetic vocation, as well as the Schlegelian one 
(by implication, this extends to the philosophical vocation too). In Chapter 
XIV of the second volume of Biographia Literaria, Coleridge makes his 
famous claim of the poetic vocation:  
      
The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man 
into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, 
according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone, and 
spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by 
that synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively 
appropriated the name of imagination.18 
       
To bring the ‘whole soul of man into activity’ is to manage this assimilative 
quality that makes up a poet. Part of this quality itself is outlined here by 
Coleridge; the poet’s success is dependent upon the ability to use the 
‘synthetic’ power of imagination to moderate and unify discordant faculties. 
Thus, imagination has as much to do with intellectual capacity for Coleridge 
as it has to do with creative power. In a move similar to the Frühromantiker 
rejection of the Kantian or Fichtean imagination, Coleridge is reclaiming the 
ideal imagination as a poetological mixing-ground; the poet’s imagination is 
                                                            
17 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Critical Fragments, 27, p.145. 
18 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria or Biographical Sketches of My Literary 
Life and Opinions, 2 vols,  Collected Works, 16 vols, ed. by James Engell and W. Jackson 
Bate (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), ii. pp.15-16. 
24 
 
superior to that of the common man because of its capacity for synthesizing. 
Despite the organicism suggested by the phrase ‘ideal perfection’ (which 
Coleridge constantly struggled against as much as he strived for), the extract 
indicates that Coleridge is venturing beyond systematization here: it is the 
poet, not the philosopher, to whom this galvanizing quality is attributed, and 
such a choice on the part of the Biographia Literaria’s polymathic persona 
may show up a tacit acknowledgment of philosophy’s debt to poetry, the 





When understood as the literary manifestation of poetological theory the 
Mischgedicht – Romantic poetry in its exemplary mode and the umbrella term 
I am using for the practice of Romantic theory (under which the various 
categories of theory and writing are considered) – is both illuminating and 
problematic. The term itself eludes simple explication, and its literal 
translation, ‘mixed poem’, remains ambiguous as well as insufficient in 
encapsulating its complexity. Friedrich Schlegel uses the word Mischgedicht 
once in his Notebooks, but makes several references to the concept of mixing 
existing genres and disciplines in what he theorizes as Romantic writing. 
These references, however, do not always correlate with one another; what is 
sometimes described as a ‘mixing’ of genres [Vermischung] is, at other times, 
a deeper, ‘fusing’ process [Verschmelzung]. This leads to the question of 
whether or not these terms are interchangeable for Schlegel. And if not, what 
significance does each of the words have for the theory of the Mischgedicht? 
Mischung is undoubtedly used more frequently in his fragments. However, 
here it stands mainly to describe the mixing of genres, rather than disciplines:  
 
Does mimetic prose not differ from idyllic or satirical prose? – In the 
mimetic, idyllic and satirical modes of poetry, metre is not essential, 
because these modes themselves are not rigorous. Romantic prose is a 
mixture of these three, like a novel of three genres. If the idyllic 
prevails it is a sentimental novel, if the satirical it is comic, if the 
progressive prevails it is a philosophical novel. However, all these 
extremes are lacking because the essence of the novel itself, namely 
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the mixture, is destroyed in them. <So it is not at all a novel. This 
overbalance is in opposition to political totality.>19 
 
[Ist die mimische Prosa nicht noch verschieden von der Idyll[ischen] 
und Satir[ischen]? – In der mim[ischen] Idyll[ischen] Sat[irischen] 
Dichtart ist das Metrum nicht wesentlich, weil diese Dichtarten selbst 
nicht rigoristisch sind. Die romantische  Prosa ist eine Mischung dieser 
dreien, wie der Roman der 3 Gattungen. Ueberwiegt das Idyll[ische] 
so ists ein sentimentaler Roman, das Sat[irische] so ists ein komischer, 
das Progressive so ists ein philos[ophischer] Roman. Aber alle diese 
Extreme sind fehlerhaft weil dadurch das Wesen des Romans selbst 
nämlich die Mischung zerstört wird <eben darum schon. Es ist also 
dann gar kein Roman. Dieβ Uebergewicht ist gegen die politische 
Totalität.>]20 
 
In the Notebook entry quoted above, the ‘Mischung’ relates to the three 
principal types of poetry as well as prose (broadly categorized as the Roman); 
the mimetic, idyllic, and satiric, each of which is destructive to the concept of 
Romantic literature if stood alone. The Mischung, then, is here clearly a 
breakdown of existing literary generic boundaries. Schlegel takes this one 
step further by politicizing this process: for him, the dominance of any one 
genre stands in opposition to ‘political totality’, which is meant by Schlegel to 
refer to universality, or democratization. Thus, generic dominance negates the 
democratization that he envisages poetry as enabling.  
However, Schlegel’s theory frequently extends this amalgamating 
approach to existing disciplinary boundaries too, and explication of this 
similarly occurs using the keywords of the generic Mischung. Another 
notebook entry on the theory of the Mischgedicht introduces the second key 
verb verschmelzen:  
 
All constituent parts must be fused in the novel so that the learned 
reader, who is not poet, philosopher nor philologist, can conceive of 
them all. In this respect, the romantic style is the absolute antithesis of 
the critical style, in which all accumulated constituent parts are cut off 
and isolated. So, the critical style is virtually satirical. – 
       
[Alle Bestandtheile müβten im Roman so verschmolzen sein, das der 
gebildete Kenner der weder classischer P[oet] noch Philos[oph] noch 
Philol[og] ist alles fassen kann. In dieser Rücksicht ist der kritische 
                                                            
19 My translation: where I have primarily consulted the text in German I provide both original 
and my translation. Otherwise, I cite the translation I have consulted and draw attention to the 
German where it is deemed particularly significant for the discussion to do so.  
20 Schlegel, Literary Notebooks, 20, p.21. 
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Styl die absolute Antithese des romantischen, den im kritischen 
müssen alle Bildungsbestandtheile abgeschnitten classisch und isoliert 
sein. Der kritische Stil ist also gradezu satirisch. –]21 
 
So, the Kenner, the learned author, recognizes that the Roman cannot 
accommodate a single discipline; a writer who specializes in any one 
discipline – whether poetry, philosophy, or philology – fails to conceptualize 
the modern literature. Schlegel goes on to say that this is what makes the 
critical style the Antithese of the Romantic style of writing, his reason being 
that critical writing isolates and compartmentalizes literary types. In other 
words, it maintains disciplinary and generic boundaries. This antithesis set up 
by Schlegel introduces the dominant subject/object dichotomy that he seeks to 
explode. Romantic writing is the writing of self-consciousness, the ontological 
necessity following failed systematic theories, and to that end it must make 
sense of this inadequate dichotomy. The critical style is satirical and classical 
precisely because, in needing a clearly identified object towards which to 
direct its focus, it stylistically holds to some notion of system or framework. 
In the satirical mode, there is no doubt as to which roles are played by whom; 
the author commands the reader’s attention, directing it towards the definable 
object of satire in a way that echoes the individual roles of various genres. 
Here, philosophy, poetry, and the sciences are all distinguished from one 
another as they, presumably, each enjoy self-sufficient status.  
Romantic writing, however, cannot create in isolation, nor can it 
perpetuate a clear subject/object distinction; Schlegel’s Kritische Fragmente 
of this period make this ambiguity of roles clear as evidenced by 112, in 
which Schlegel sets out his distinctions between the ‘analytic’ writer and the 
‘synthetic’ writer. As we shall see in the second and third chapters, the 
synthetic writer is Schlegel’s ideal, as he or she ‘doesn’t try to make any 
particular impression on him [the reader], but enters with him into the sacred 
relationship of deepest symphilosophy or sympoetry.’22 The ‘sacred 
relationship’ here described is one which includes the reader in not only 
reception of the text, but also production of the text itself. With no definable 
roles, reader, writer, and critic are placed on an equal footing that allows – 
                                                            
21 Schlegel, Literary Notebooks, 185, p.36.   
22 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Critical Fragments, 112, pp. 156-7.  
27 
 
requires – each to generate the literary text. This concern with the very 
production of literature sets Romantic writing apart from dominant 
contemporary modes of writing for Schlegel; ‘symphilosophy’ and 
‘sympoetry’ as embodied in the Mischgedicht depend on a democratization of 
literary processes, so that writing no longer belongs within an entirely art-
oriented context. If we think back to Entry 20 of the Literary Notebooks, we 
might see that such a democratization of the reading and interpretation of texts 
avoids an ‘overbalance’ of one element of authority over others, just as a 
genuine Verschelzmung of genres prevents the dominance of any one. 
 Rather, literary production in a poetological framework resists and 
replaces systematization; taking it out of this restrictive framework allows it to 
develop into the post-Kantian, post-Fichtean theory of self-consciousness that 
Romanticism seeks to express. Though he initiated a departure from the 
insufficient Kantian theory of the self-world relationship, Fichte failed to 
explicate adequately the relationship of the self in the world, mainly through 
maintaining subject/object distinctions. Romantic (literary) theory, on the 
other hand, is a theory of mediation and participation – perhaps seen most 
clearly in works of Novalis, such as Glaube und Liebe [Faith and Love], 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Die Christenheit oder Europa [Christianity, or 
Europe], and Die Lehrlinge zu Sais [The Novices at Sais]23 – and the 
interchangeability of roles between author, reader, and critic validates this 
possibility. As shall become clearer in the following chapters, I am arguing 
that the final or ‘absolute’ meaning is deferred through the collaborative 
process. More than a literary theory, then, the Mischgedicht emerges in early 
Romantic theory as a conception of genre through which to realize the literary 
and philosophical ambitions of a post-Enlightenment age. Schlegel and his 
collaborators’ criteria for this ‘modern’ genre are indeed ambitious, and this 
ambitiousness goes some way in explaining the ambiguous and sometimes 
apparently contradictory theory behind it. Irony becomes central here, and it is 
the Mischgedicht that, along with drama, ensures that it is more than a literary 
                                                            
23 Though I have in general provided the English translations before the original German 
when quoting directly from the texts, I name the titles of texts themselves in their original 
language and provide translated titles in square brackets. This is in order to prevent confusion 




technique, and instead a mode of writing (and re-writing) in itself. The 
flexibility in the Mischgedicht’s relationship between author and reader is 
predicated on a fluidity that aims to eradicate boundaries. The breakdown of 
these boundaries – whether generic or disciplinary – ultimately contributes to 
the same infinity which makes drama an exemplary vehicle for expressing the 
otherwise ineffable self. The fragmentary writing itself is a literal repetition of 
the dramatic parabasis that irony comes to stand for in the theory of Schlegel 
and Jean Paul Richter.24 
 
 
‘in the state of becoming’ 
 
Schlegel’s much-discussed theory of a universal and progressive Romantic 
poetry naturally gives shape to the envisaged Mischgedicht – the poetics of 
democratic participation is also the poetics of progress, though, paradoxically, 
infinitely so: 
 
Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry…It tries to and 
should mix and fuse poetry and prose, inspiration and criticism, the 
poetry of art and the poetry of nature…The romantic kind of poetry is 
still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it 
should forever be becoming and never be perfected…The romantic 
kind of poetry is the only one that is more than a kind, that is, as it 
were, poetry itself: for in a certain sense all poetry is or should be 
romantic.25 
 
Perhaps the single most famous Schlegelian statement on the Romantic 
manifesto, this fragment is particularly interesting when considered in the 
context of the Mischgedicht; Schlegel presents it as being ‘progressive’, a 
word suggesting an eventual goal. Yet, the chief characteristic of Romantic 
poetry (or literature) is that it has no end as a goal. In fact, far from being 
perfected, it should ‘forever be becoming’. This is indicative of an ever 
embryonic mode of writing and suggests that Romantic literature needs to be a 
starting point from which to generate several representations of an infinite 
drive towards self-consciousness. A foreseeable end, then, is contrary to 
Romantic intentions, and the Mischgedicht accommodates such ambitions. 
                                                            
24 See Chapter 4 for parabasis and its relationship to drama. 
25 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Athenaeum Fragments, 116, p.175.  
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Through it, the concept of Potenzirung – or intensification – is better 
understood.26 For both Schlegel and Novalis, Potenzirung is a stage of 
intensifying the everyday (what Novalis equates with ‘romanticizing’) into the 
poetic. This process mirrors the philosophical intentions of the writing in that 
it represents the endless drive towards self-expression (a consideration of 
which is developed in the concluding chapter), itself forever ‘in the state of 
becoming’. 
 Novalis’ famous fragment is central to any discussion of 
intensification and is the most reflective of Romanticism’s many explications 
of its processes: 
 
The world must be romanticized. Then one will again find the original 
sense. Romanticizing is nothing more than a qualitative involution. In 
this operation the lower self is identified with a better self. In the same 
manner we are such a qualitative series of powers. This operation is 
still completely unknown. When I give the commonplace a higher 
meaning, the customary a mysterious appearance, the known the 
dignity of the unknown, the finite the illusion of the infinite, I 
romanticize it. The operation is the converse for the higher, unknown, 
mystical and infinite; through this connection it becomes 
logarithimized. It receives a customary expression. Romantic 
philosophy. Lingua romana. Reciprocal elevation and debasement.27 
  
Aside from its obvious implications for an infinite, progressive poetic 
discourse (which is discussed in greater detail in the concluding chapter), the 
fragment quoted above is also important for the interdisciplinary possibilities 
it sets up. As an ‘operation’ romanticizing is ‘a qualitative involution’, 
‘logarithimized’; the language of mathematics is the language of romantic 
poetry. The two are interchangeable and, when one is used to express the 
other, it serves to understand better Romantic philosophy. This Romantic 
philosophy, then, is partly the theorizing of interdisciplinarity itself, the idea 
                                                            
26 Potenzirung is the word Novalis uses for intensification. Novalis’ process is predominantly 
philosophical intensification, which ultimately suggests a relationship with the process of 
romanticization in Novalis’ thought. As I am demonstrating here, romanticization for Novalis 
is a process whereby higher orders or powers and lower orders or powers are negotiated. Such 
a negotiation of two extremes necessitates an inherent polarity in the first place – whether that 
is of high and low, infinite and finite, commonplace and extraordinary – and reinforces the 
current of German idealism running through Novalis’ inherited philosophy. In particular, it 
brings to mind Schelling’s ‘intensification’ or ‘potentiation’ of nature, which makes possible 
his Naturphilosophie¸ according to which increasing degrees of Potenzirung produce greater 
development and organization in nature.   
27 See Novalis, Sketches, 105, in Frederick C. Beiser, ed., The Early Political Writings of the 
German Romantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.85. 
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that one disciplinary discourse can be used to arrive at a better understanding 
of another. Encapsulating these various discourses is the lingua romana, the 
modern, universal Romantic language. This lingua romana is to language 
what the Mischgedicht is to existing generic and disciplinary frameworks, a 
fulfilment of the ‘republican speech’ that Schlegel credits poetry with being, 
‘Poetry is republican speech: a speech which is its own law and end unto 
itself, and in which all the parts are free citizens and have the right to vote.’28 
The republican speech is the practice of the breakdown of specific roles in the 
production of literary texts. ‘All the parts are free citizens and have the right 
to vote’ because they have been created by a democratic process between the 
author and reader (with each also being a critic). Elsewhere, Schlegel clearly 
uses the words ‘author’ and ‘creator’ synonymously, further consolidating the 
open, infinite nature of Romantic literature.29 Of course, it follows that 
‘poetry’ itself is subject to such broadening, and no longer comes to signify 
solely the metrically structured writing that it has classically been associated 
with. Being true to its republican nature means that poetry is representative of 
modern writing; however, the names under which it appears resist a 
straightforward analysis. A consideration of the significance of the 
terminology used by Schlegel and Novalis – in particular the words 
‘Dichtung’ and ‘Poesie’ – is necessary to understand fully the radical nature 
of the Frühromantik manifesto. 
 
 
Dichtung or Poesie? 
 
The discussion of the Mischgedicht was opened up by the problematic nature 
of German-English translation of the theory of Frühromantik, and I would like 
to return to this in more detail here in relation to the Dichtung/Poesie 
question. Added to this is the fact that, in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of the reasons behind the choice of one word over another by 
Schlegel, we must probe into etymologies. The word Schlegel usually favours 
in the primary theoretical pieces – namely the various Fragmente and the 
Notebook entries – on the modern literature (or Mischgedicht) is Poesie. In 
                                                            
28 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Critical Fragments, 65, p. 65. 
29 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Critical Fragments, ‘68. How many authors are there 
among writers? Author means creator’, p.151. 
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fact, in the Notebook fragments the word Dichtung (or Gedicht) does not 
appear at all, suggesting that it is far from interchangeable with Poesie, 
despite the standard translation of both into English being ‘poetry’. Yet, the 
Mischgedicht takes its name from this root. Here, a consideration of how 
significant the choice of Poesie is becomes central to the Mischgedicht, as 
does the question of whether or not the two words represent discourses on two 
different levels, a consideration which leads us back to the centrality of the 
ancient/modern debate in early Schlegelian theory. 
 Towards the end of the eighteenth century – and certainly by the 1790s 
when the Frühromantiker were writing – the word Dichtung had come to be 
the standard German word for poetry, with Poesie going out of fashion.30 As 
with its English counterpart, ‘poesy’, Poesie was a comparatively traditional 
word for discussing poetry, and the modern – and Germanized – Dichtung had 
entered mainstream usage. The most influential pre-Grimm German 
dictionary of the day, J. C. Adelung’s Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der 
Hochdeutschen Mundart (1793-1801), defines Poesie as the following: 
 
Die Poesīe, (dreysylbig,) plur. die Poesīen, (viersylbig,) aus dem 
Griech. und Lat. Poesis. 1) Die Fertigkeit, ein Gedicht zu verfertigen, 
ohne Plural; die Dichtkunst, welches jetzt in der anständigern 
Sprechart üblicher ist. 2) Ein Gedicht; auch nur noch im gemeinen 
Leben.31 
 
So, before and during the time Schlegel is writing, Poesie is primarily the 
skill, or proficiency [Fertigkeit] for composing a Gedicht, which is understood 
to be poetry, and thus Poesie equates with the process of composition, less 
than with the end literary result itself. The implications of the word Fertigkeit 
itself are interesting; Fertigkeit has etymological connections to the word for 
something complete [fertig], and this context is important for 
                                                            
30 See Friedrich  Kluge (ed.), An Etymological Dictionary of the German Language, 4th edn, 
trans. by John Francis Davis (London: George Bell & Sons, 1891) - dichten2swV. ‘ein 
sprachliches Kunstwerk verfassen’ ( < 9. Jh.). Mhd. tihten, ahd. dihtōn, mndd. dichten, mndl. 
dichten ‘den Text eines Schriftstucks verfassen, dichten’, sind wie afr.dichta ‘abfassen’, ae. 
dihtan ‘anordnen’, anord. dikta ‘etwas auf Latein abfassen’ entlehnt aus 1. dictāre ‘etwas zum 
Aufschreiben vorsagen’, einem Intensivum zu 1. dīcere ‘sagen’. Dichter belegt seit dem 12. 
Jh., ist zunächst kein häufiges Wort (mhd. tihter, tichtœre); erst seit es im 18. Jh. Als 
Verdeutschung von Poet durch gesetz wird, hat es im Deutschen einen fest Platz. Abstraktum: 
Dichtung; Kollektivum: Gedicht. 
31 Johann Christoph Adelung, Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der hochdeutschen 
Mundart, 4 vols (Leipzig: J. G. I. Breitkopf, 1793-1801), iii, p.799. 
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comparison/contrast with Romantic theory. Adelung’s choice of Fertigkeit for 
skill or proficiency over another word e.g. Fähigkeit (also translated as 
capability or skill) may suggest that not only is composition of poetry a 
process, but a perfectible process, one that can certainly be completed. This 
stands in stark contrast to Schlegel’s idea of a fragmentary, progressive poetry 
that is forever ‘in the state of becoming’, suggesting that Schlegel’s decision 
to revert to using Poesie as the standard word for poetry is a decision to return 
to the classical roots of the word. However, Schlegel develops the concept and 
Poesie comes to signify both the composition and end result of poetry. If 
Adelung (re)presents the classical view that Poesie denotes the completion of 
the poem [Gedicht], Schlegel’s adoption of the word can be seen as taking the 
concept beyond literature; Poesie now comes to signify something with wider 
resonance than was hitherto thought – the Frühromantiker theorize Poesie as 
poetological and thus the reversion to the etymologically classical word means 
a conscious shift away from the contemporary German understanding of the 
apparently limited word Gedicht. 
 To recapitulate, then, in using the word Poesie Schlegel and Novalis 
innovate in three main ways. Firstly, they are making the concept of a 
poetological literature more democratic, more universal; relating back to the 
Greek/Latin root of poesis is one way in which it is possible to recover 
something of what has since been lost in general understanding of creativity, 
the lingua romana Novalis was to allude to in his famous fragment on 
‘romanticizing’ (see also the fifth and sixth chapters for more on this); 
Romantic Poesie is democratic because it focuses on creation through 
participation, a pre-requisite of which is writing outside established 
boundaries. Secondly, the adoption of Poesie represents a move away from 
contemporary associations of the Gedicht which were too limited to 
accommodate poetological writing. Finally, and importantly, Schlegel is 
challenging the assumption (represented by Adelung) that modern literature, 
Poesie, can be a completed process, thus enabling Poesie to signify 
33 
 
simultaneously both a state of composition and the ongoing result of that 
process.32 
Adelung’s 1793 Wörterbuch entry for Dichtung defines it as primarily, 
‘in der weitesten Bedeutung, wie Dichtkunst’33 – poetry in the broadest sense. 
Dichtung is thus the word that Schlegel effectively replaces with his concept 
of Poesie. Yet Poesie itself is often used synonymously with the word Roman 
in Schlegel’s fragments. Throughout the Notebooks the driving idea behind 
the Mischgedicht of Verschmelzung – the integration of genres, forms, and 
disciplines – can be seen through the etymologically complex word, der 
Roman. It is this word that most obviously drives Schlegel’s theory of a 
reconciliation of the ancient and modern in literature, and it is this word that 
becomes central to further consideration of the Mischgedicht. 
 
 
Der Roman, die romantische 
 
The following fragment may help to shed some light on the relationship 
between die Poesie and der Roman: 
 
As preliminary practice towards Romantic poetry, satirical, idyllic and 
mimetic types are excellent. Satire is predisposed towards comment on 
moral, scientific, social and civic development. – That which is 
arabian, romantic, and absolutely marvellous is also preliminary 
practice towards the novel. <All types of poetry are chosen from the 
three classical types. These constituent parts are then bound together 
towards a progressive unity.> 
  
[Als Vorübung zur Rom[antischen] P[oesie] auβer der Sat[irischen] 
auch Idyll[ische] und die mim[ische] vorzüglich. – Die Satire ist sehr 
empfänglich fur Aeuβerung der sittlichen, wissenschaftlichen, 
gesellschaftlichen, bürgerlichen Bildung. – Das arabische, 
romantische, absolute Wunderbare auch eine Vorübung zum Roman. 
<Alle Dichtarten, die drei alten classischen ausgenommen. Diese 
Bestandtheile dann zu einer progressive Einheit verknüpft.>]34 
 
                                                            
32 This relationship between the state of composition and the writing that forms the ongoing 
result of that composition is introduced in the third chapter, and expounded further in the 
fourth chapter, wherein it is argued that Wordsworth’s Prelude is a key demonstration of such 
Romantic practice of Poesie in the Schlegelian sense. I argue that, as a seminal Romantic 
poetological text, The Prelude encourages us to reconsider the significance of Wordsworth’s 
lifelong revisionary habit across his entire corpus in light of his dependence upon the use of 
Romantic irony in self-representation and philosophical poetry.  
33 Adelung, Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der hochdeutschen Mundart, i, p.1479. 
34 Schlegel, Literary Notebooks, 65, p.25. 
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Here, Schlegel sets romantic poetry and literature [die Romantische Poesie] as 
being apart from existing forms of satirical, idyllic, and mimetic writing, 
going on to say that the novel [der Roman] is directly linked to the romantic, 
here defined as the exotic or, literally, marvellous. The word ‘arabische’ is 
difficult to translate: it literally means ‘Arabian’, but Schlegel is taking the 
word to stand for a more generalized eclecticism that is antithetical to the 
everyday. The word ‘romantic’ correlates to both the Roman, the literary 
genre of the novel, and the ‘romantische’, the properties or characteristics of 
that genre.35 However, if we refer to Entry 823 of the Literary Notebooks, we 
can see that the Roman consists of a Verschmelzung of Romantic poetry and 
prose, ‘Die Poesie und Prosa soll im R[oman] nicht bloβ vermischt sondern 
auch verschmolzen werden’36. The Roman is thus seen as the exemplary genre 
of the Mischgedicht, the modern literary text that not only mixes but fuses 
poetry and prose to make each form in itself indistinct. This in turn leads to 
the question of whether or not Poesie and der Roman are actually 
interchangeable terms; Schlegel’s separation of Poesie and Prosa at times is, 
at other points, eradicated by his referring to modern literature using the word 
Roman.  
 Turning to Novalis’ theory of interdisciplinarity – which I have 
highlighted as the ‘intergeneric’ above – in modern, Romantic writing, we see 
a similar generosity in characterizing the novel, ‘ROMANTICISM. Shouldn’t 
the novel include all sorts of styles, bound together in a varying order, and 
animated by a common spirit?’37 In placing his entry on the novel under the 
heading ‘ROMANTICISM’, Novalis holds the novel up as the primary genre 
of modern literature. However, as with Schlegel, this genre is dependent upon 
the conscious move away from subscription to any one discernible genre. 
                                                            
35 For more on the etymology of ‘Roman’ and for early German usage of it see Hans 
Eichner’s chapter, entitled ‘Germany / Romantisch – Romantik – Romantiker’  in 
“Romantic” and its Cognates: The European History of a Word, ed. by Hans Eichner 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972), pp.98-156. As the title makes apparent, 
Eichner’s volume aims to uncover the history of the usage of the word ‘Romantic’ in Europe. 
As such, it remains a useful reference for those wishing to trace the word’s pre-Romantic 
roots as well as an insightful critical commentary on how it progressed through the various 
stages of Romanticism. More recently, Larry H. Peer has been among those to review the 
etymology of the word in order to produce comparative readings of European Romanticism – 
see (Roman)ticism  (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008). 
36 [‘Poetry and prose should not only be mixed in the novel, but fused.’] Schlegel, Literary 
Notebooks, 823, p.94.  
37 Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia, 169, p.26. 
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Novalis’ theory similarly steps outside of its critical genre in presenting itself 
in the form of a rhetorical question. As with the Fichte-Studien, the tone here 
is playful and aims to engage in a critical dialogue with other thinkers. But, 
Schlegel, not Fichte, is the writer with whom Novalis is communicating, and 
the tone is suitably Schlegelian here. What is perhaps more true to Novalis’ 
theory is the ‘common spirit’, found so often in the fragments; in Über 
Goethe, no. 465 (1798) Novalis writes,  
      
Journals are actually the first books to be written in common. Writing 
in company is an interesting symptom giving us an inkling of a great 
development in authorship. Perhaps one day people will write, think 
and act as a mass. Entire communities, even nations, will undertake 
One Work.38 
 
Such collaborative leanings bring to mind Schlegel’s fragments on Sympoesie 
and Symphilosophie, those envisaged literary and philosophical undertakings 
of joint authorship and the basis for discussion of Romantic literary practice in 
the following chapter. The commonality of such endeavours reminds us of 
how closely these thinker-writers operated when producing poetological texts. 
It encourages us to make connections between the theory and practice of early 
Romanticism in a way that confirms its primary aim as delivering intergeneric 
texts through authorship that is, either directly or indirectly, collaborative. 
Returning to Entry 169 for Das Allgemeine Brouillon, then, we see that that 
the heading ‘ROMANTICISM’ presents a ‘common spirit’ as including the 
commonality of both literature (whether it is Poesie, Roman, or Philosophie) 
and its production. The common spirit is the communal spirit, and this is made 
clear through the consideration that the writer, reader and critic of ‘Romantic’ 
poetologies will recognize the intergeneric as the ‘common spirit’ precisely 
because those poetologies are authored communally. As we shall see in 
exploration of the uses of irony and of the ironic relationship in Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, the successful mixing of genres in Sympoesie / Symphilosophie 
depends upon more generous notions of authorship than have hitherto been 
afforded to texts.  
Novalis’ fragment on the relationship between the novel and 
romanticism, then, is indicative of the ways in which the novel – der Roman – 
                                                            
38 Wheeler, German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, pp.106-7. 
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comes to represent the exemplary, all-embracing process of the Mischgedicht. 
The crux of the Poesie versus Roman dilemma is this: the Roman is 
intrinsically romantic – and so Romantic – precisely because it enables mixing 
of the kind that Universalpoesie (or the Mischgedicht) requires. The novel is 
thus broadened to accommodate such a poetological text, and so joins the term 
Poesie in its expansion of genres. So, while the terms Roman and Poesie are 
not quite interchangeable they are nevertheless both part of the same umbrella 
concept that is poetology. Further exposition of this can be found in another 
fragment of Das Allgemeine Brouillon:  
 
Nothing is more Romantic than what we commonly call world and 
destiny. We live in a colossal novel (writ large and small). 
Contemplation of surrounding events. Romantic orientation, 
examination, and treatment of human life.39  
 
To be living in ‘a colossal novel’ is akin to be romanticizing the world for 
Novalis. That is, philosophizing it to the extent that one’s orientation within it 
might be understood. For Novalis, the ‘examination’ and ‘treatment of human 
life’ is at the heart of the Romantic endeavour; what makes such ‘treatment of 
human life’ and the world Romantic is the poetologizing that both writers and 
readers bring to bear upon texts. As I shall demonstrate in the following 
chapters, such an approach is common to both the Wordsworth-Coleridge 
circle in the late 1790s and the Jena circle of roughly the same time period. 
Wordsworth’s ideal poet is the ordinary man who can bring an extraordinary 
perspective to bear on precisely what Novalis terms the ‘treatment of human 
life’. For the Wordsworth writing the ‘Preface’ to the 1800 edition of Lyrical 
Ballads it is in ‘low and rustic life’ that extended treatment of humanity is 
found, but this is not to overlook the several ‘Wordsworths’ of The Prelude, 
for whom sustained evaluation of urban life is every bit as critical in the 
poetologist’s ‘treatment of human life’. To what end scrutiny and 
romanticization of both rustic and urban life aspire forms the basis of the third 
and fourth chapters of this thesis, respectively.  
The division between Wordsworth and the other thinker-writers I 
consider in this study might seem a little fractured: after all, it is one argument 
                                                            
39 Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia, 44, p.155. 
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of this thesis that Wordsworth be included in a framework which he is outside 
of at present, so the separation might initially seem odd. Such a contention is 
understandable, yet I hope my methodology might shed some light on its own 
processes by justifying extended reading of some of Wordsworth’s major 
works (for the sake of retaining focus I have had to limit my scope to Lyrical 
Ballads and associated poems and the major contributions to The Recluse 
project, namely The Prelude and The Excursion)40 as timely re-evaluations in 
their own right. Nevertheless, the case for reading Wordsworth comparatively 
is strong indeed and my concluding chapter herein aims to show the ways in 
which we might read major philosophical works by Novalis and Wordsworth 
alongside them in order to arrive at a better understanding of the early 
Romantic tendency to situate an infinite quest for self-consciousness within 
literature of immortality. The ‘Romantic orientation’ finds itself in its most 
active and successful stage when it anchors its orientation within this 
discourse of the infinite; in Novalis’ words, philosophy is ‘homesickness’ for 
the Romantic writer. Poetological writing aspires, thus, to enable one to 
orientate oneself within the world, to attain what might be attainable of self-
consciousness. To ‘live in a colossal novel’ is to live in the world, certainly, 
but it is also to live in a state of romanticizing, a state in which Mischung and 
Verschmelzung take place. This happens in writing the fictional self – the fairy 
tale such as Heinrich von Ofterdingen, for example, the dreamscapes of Tieck 
or Coleridge, or the Mischgedicht novels of Friedrich and Dorothea Schlegel – 
or the rewriting of the infinite ‘I’, such as Wordsworth’s London. As I will 
demonstrate throughout this thesis, any stage that is a Mischgedicht – urban, 
rural or psychological – is a ‘colossal novel’ within which the poetologist 





For the present discussion, a little more needs to be said about usage of the 
word Mischgedicht. Although it is referenced indirectly much more frequently 
                                                            
40 Though publication dates for both The Prelude and The Excursion fall outside of the period 
known in either English or German literary history as ‘early’ Romanticism, their inclusion 
here is justified on the grounds that the conception of, and initial work on, the Recluse project 
dates back to this period.  
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than directly by Schlegel, it has been picked up by commentators, particularly 
more recently. Of these, David Duff’s use of the term has been one of the 
more important examples of how the concept of the Mischgedicht can lead to 
a better understanding of the Romantic treatment of genre. In Romanticism 
and the Uses of Genre, Duff highlights the importance of re-evaluating our 
understanding of genre in the Romantic period, reminding us that the origins 
of the term ‘Romantic’ itself are bound up with genre, meaning, ‘Ideas about 
genre are inseparable from Romanticism’.41 Following work on Romantic 
genre theory by commentators such as Stuart Curran, Duff’s reading 
challenges what he identifies as the ‘anti-generic hypothesis’. By ‘anti-
generic’ it is meant that Romantic writers were opposed to genre or that they 
were interested in genre only so far as they were able to ‘transcend’ or 
‘dissolve’ it.42 My own reading of the respective literary circles surrounding 
Wordsworth and Schlegel leads me to situate my work within the responses to 
such an ‘anti-generic hypothesis’; any consideration of early Anglo-German 
Romantic attitudes towards genre – a basic understanding of which is a pre-
requisite for appreciating the poetological seriousness and legitimacy of 
writers in the Wordsworth and Schlegel circles – is also indebted to the 
scholarship of Thomas McFarland and Marjorie Levinson, whose seminal 
work on, for example, the fragment as an emergent poetic form and its 
relationship to the ruin has opened up pathways for considering part of what 
makes Romantic text production so innovative.43  
 So, although I am arguing that Romantic poetologies are based on a 
permeability of generic boundaries, I am not defining the Mischgedicht or 
Romantic poetologies as equating with abandonment of genre nor simply 
                                                            
41 David Duff, Romanticism and the Uses of Genre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
p.1. 
42 See Introduction in Romanticism and the Uses of Genre, particularly p.1. See also, Stuart 
Curran’s Poetic Form and British Romanticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) for a 
study specific to British Romanticism, particularly the first chapter, pp.3-13. 
43 See Marjorie Levinson, Wordsworth’s Great Period Poems: Four Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.14-57 for a historicist reading of the relationship 
between ruin and ‘Tintern Abbey’; see also her study on the fragment form, The Romantic 
Fragment Poem: A Critique of a Form (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1987), and Thomas McFarland, Romanticism and the Forms of Ruin: Wordsworth, Coleridge, 
and Modalities of Fragmentation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). See Anne 
Janowitz, ‘Coleridge's 1816 Volume: Fragment as Rubric’, in Studies in Romanticism, 24, 1 
(1985), pp.21-39, and Anne Janowitz, England’s Ruins: Poetic Purpose and the National 
Landscape (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), especially pp.92-144 for discussion of the 
relationship between form and ruin in The Prelude.  
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blurring of all genres into one ‘super-genre’. Rather, the Mischgedicht 
suggests permeability that enables mixing of genres. It is not, therefore, a new 
genre that emerges from Romantic text production: rather, it is a new 
conceptualization of genre theory in Romantic text production itself. This is 
what ‘poetology’ denotes and what it includes is irony, dramatic narrative and 
literature of mediation (this last being the Mischgedicht). Owing to its 
mediatory nature, then, I suggest the Mischgedicht might also serve as a useful 
umbrella term for the diversity in form and genre that Duff notes Romantic 
writers successfully manage to achieve.44 
 So far I have based my consideration mainly on the conception of 
genre and discipline, yet this is also inextricably connected to form: the 
Roman is not the Gedicht, because they are separated by form, certainly, but 
they also carry generic connotations. For Schlegel, the Romantic novel is 
characterized as something very distinct from contemporary understanding of 
the word Roman. Some further explication of form itself is needed in order to 
understand better the Romantic literary project. As with genre, any serious 
treatment of form in the early Romantic period needs to take into account not 
only the formal innovations initiated by the writers but also the ways in which 
old forms and modes are taken up for poetologies. Among these I shall be 
looking at poetry, prose and aphorisms/fragments. Of these, the ballad, lyric, 
novel, the short story in the form of the literary fairy tale [Märchen] – which 
is both a form and a genre – and the philosophical fragment will be 
considered. What has become interesting about considering Romantic uses of 
form in relatively modern scholarship is just how much writers and thinkers of 
this period invest in the print culture of their day in order to re-galvanize oral 
literary forms. The fashionable antiquarianism of the eighteenth-century 
ballad has been documented well, and the fragment has long been a rich focal 
point for readers wishing to break away from the classic view of Romanticism 
as relying on itself operating in neat cycles: the Judeo-Christian structure 
makes persuasive connections between the Milton-complex held by major 
Romantics and their own attempts at epic (of which Wordsworth’s Recluse is 
always the foremost example), but it overlooks the extent to which 
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Romanticism is concerned with mediation on a grander scale. Philosophically, 
Wordsworth and company attempt something far more audacious than 
Milton’s Paradise Lost, because they seek to effect new ways to mediate 
conceptions of the self. In poetic terms Milton is certainly the model for 
writers as apparently different as Shelley, Blake, Keats, Coleridge and 
Wordsworth, who seek to write an epic in which the ‘I’ would become the 
primary creator. With this in mind it is important to consider that even 
familiar forms such as Wordsworth’s Miltonic Prospectus to The Recluse, 
written in the style of high epic are driven by an ironic mode of writing and 
rewriting – the linear narrative of beginning and end collapses to give way to 
an infinite re-presentation of the ‘self’. Even in its most conservative 
incarnations, Romantic use of form is looking to negotiate its predecessors 
and forge a new path for itself. So, Wordsworth’s ‘high argument’ as set out 
in his Prospectus does not seek to surpass Milton on strictly poetic grounds. 
On the contrary, he is making a formal decision, by which part of the 
originality and success of his poetic project lies in the ability to pursue 
‘Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhime’ through established forms of 
prose or rhyme. It is now to these things ‘unattempted’ – in the case of 
























Chapter 2. ‘in fairy tales and poetry / One sees the world’s true histories’: 
Sympoesie – Symphilosophie 
 
If in communicating a thought, one fluctuates between absolute 
comprehension and absolute incomprehension, then this process might 
already be termed a philosophical friendship. For it’s no different with 
ourselves. Is the life of a thinking human being anything else than a 
continuous inner symphilosophy?45 
 
‘a philosophical friendship 
 
Written by Friedrich Schlegel for Novalis’ collection of fragments, 
Blütenstaub, and published in the Schlegels’ Athenaeum in 1798 the fragment 
quoted above raises three main points of interest and importance regarding the 
concepts of Sympoesie and Symphilosophie as theorized and practiced by 
Schlegel and his circle. Firstly, the concept of collaboration is central to these 
literary and intellectual practices. Collaboration is one of the components at 
the heart of Sympoesie and Symphilosophie, but here it becomes more evident 
in the way in which texts are presented and disseminated. Of just four 
contributions by Schlegel to Blütenstaub (which is otherwise mainly authored 
by Novalis, with a few fragments from August Wilhelm Schlegel and 
Schleiermacher), this fragment addresses the complexity of Romantic text 
production, by situating collaborative enterprise alongside paradoxical or 
opposing thoughts within one’s own mind. Secondly, then, Symphilosophie – 
either internal or external – strives to reconcile heterogeneity. Thirdly and 
lastly, the fluctuation between ‘absolute comprehension and absolute 
incomprehension’ brings us back to Universalpoesie, the poetry whose 
progressiveness negates any one absolute prevailing over another. Bringing 
his focus to the heart of Unverständlichkeit, Schlegel makes it clear Sympoesie 
and Symphilosophie are concepts which enable the right kind of ‘philosophical 
friendship’. 
 This ‘philosophical friendship’ is the basis for the relationship between 
writer, reader, and critic envisaged by Schlegel and his circle. However, it is 
also the basis of that circle itself. Consisting chiefly of Friedrich Schlegel, 
August Wilhelm Schlegel, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis) and Ludwig 
Tieck from the late 1790s through to the early 1800s (and, to a lesser extent, 
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Schleiermacher), the Frühromantiker were actively producing collaborative 
and interdisciplinary literature under the broad category of romantische 
Poesie, which will be outlined here as philosophical literature.46 As seen in 
the introductory chapter, terms such as der Roman or die Poesie cover literary, 
political, and scientific discourses well beyond the formal limits and 
conventions of a ‘novel’ or ‘poem’. Part of what allows a traversing of formal 
and disciplinary boundaries in a variety of ways is the very process of 
collaborative venture, evidenced by the practice of the Frühromantiker in 
producing theory. This is embedded in the theory itself, as in the Schlegel 
fragment above.      
 In the first chapter, I highlighted the Mischgedicht as one of the terms 
central to an understanding of Frühromantik theory and practice. The 
Mischgedicht within the Schlegel circle is intergeneric, I have argued, because 
it opens up textual possibilities by allowing writers and readers to negotiate 
formal limitations. It does this, not by collapsing genre itself, but by 
collapsing the strictures of any one genre. Therefore, the result is not to do 
away with genre altogether, but rather a heightened interest in it is revealed, 
meaning that early German Romantic theory is partly genre theory. But genre 
theory is in turn pushed further to accommodate interdisciplinarity. Such text 
production is symphilosophical or sympoetic because it fluctuates between 
absolute boundaries and definitions and between what in the self and world is 
comprehensible and what is not. It also depends upon collaborative 
endeavour, in reminding the reader that a ‘philosophical friendship’ is formed 
through communicating poetologies of the infinite and incomprehensible. In 
the following chapters I shall attempt to set out and consider some of the 
important ways in which symphilosophical and sympoetic intellectual and 
creative exchange leads to collaborative, intergeneric literary practice in early 
English Romanticism, too. This applies to some extent to the wider circles in 
which Wordsworth and Coleridge moved, but for the sake of retaining focus I 
will be considering the circle consisting of Dorothy, Mary and William 
Wordsworth, Coleridge and Sara Hutchinson, in which early works come to 
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fruition. Where relevant and of particular importance for the text under 
consideration, I will turn to those who are at some time or other ‘external’ or 
‘extended’ members of that circle, such as Henry Crabb Robinson or Charles 
Lamb. Any consideration of the ‘philosophical friendship’ the ironist thinker-
writer attempts to forge in this early period would be left wanting if 
considerable effort wasn’t made to discuss critics, of which Wordsworth and 
Coleridge were never short. Rather than repeat material that others have so 
ably researched, compiled and documented at length, my interest in the role 
played by literary critics extends further than citing. All texts operate and 
function through the nexus of writing, reading, and critiquing, but early 
Romantic poetologies are among the first to insist that this nexus be kept in 
mind when theorizing and writing.  
Schlegel’s assertion, for example, that ‘The critic is a reader who 
ruminates. Therefore, he ought to have more than one stomach’ is a tongue-in-
cheek reminder that the best kind of reading produces rumination. 
Characteristically, he plays the word for maximum laughs by punning on 
‘ruminate’ to suggest that a critic ought ‘to have more than one stomach’. The 
logological play is typically Schlegelian, but, importantly, it informs us 
beyond his sense of humour; Schlegel’s play on ‘ruminate’ introduces 
biological discourse, suggesting the act of reading is an active process, akin to 
a process of digestion. This play draws attention to his interest in mixing 
disciplines, but it communicates clearly his insistence on both reader and critic 
entering into the ‘philosophical friendship’ a writer establishes through 
producing a text; neither critic nor reader is detached from authorship. To read 
is to ruminate, in both senses of the word and to do this means to partake in 
generation of meaning. In this the writer is matched by his or her critic or 
reader – each is positioned as author to some extent.          
As such, the Mischgedicht is predicated on collaboration and 
mediation. The relationship between writer and reader or critic is 
collaborative, certainly, but it is mediatory too; Schlegel’s ideal reader or 
critic completes a process of negotiation initiated by the Romantic writer. A 
fragment that will become pertinent for discussion of the importance of 
mediation in the intergeneric and collaborative Romantic work, the 
Mischgedicht, in the fifth chapter is from Schlegel’s Ideen (1800): ‘Join the 
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extremes and you will find the true middle’.47 Here, we find that joining the 
‘two extremes’ is akin to presenting a reconciliation of some sort (what I 
argue is a mediation in disciplinary, generic, thematic and chronological 
terms). Finding the ‘true middle’ through negotiating polarities is, of course, 
the method of philosophizing and poeticizing that Novalis names 
‘romanticizing’, as we saw in the first chapter. In consideration of that 
fragment, I noted the interchangeability of the language of one discipline for 
another: thus ‘logarithmizing’ holds as much weight as a poetic process as it 
does a mathematical one. As a number that marks the value of raising a base 
number, a logarithm is a vehicle for intensification in mathematics. Poetically, 
too, the word has currency for a Romantic thinker-writer. A logarithm in both 
mathematical and poetic discourses for Novalis is primarily a mediator for 
romanticizing, but this negotiation again depends upon entering an ironic 
relationship with the reader, whereby one type of discourse will be readily 
accepted in place of another, so that each has its own currency but all the 
while contributing to the process of romanticization.  
Novalis uses mathematical discourse to a similar end in Entry 290 of 
Das Allgemeine Brouillon, the first part of which facilitates an understanding 
of his use of mathematics as a mediator: 
 
THEORY OF MAN. The developed and the undeveloped, raw 
character can be eccentric and common. Developed and structured are 
identical. Even the most ordinary character can be infinitely 
developed. His infinity, in contrast to the developed eccentric 
character’s infinity, is of the lowest order. / ONTOLOGY. Infinities 
behave like finitenesses, with which they alternate. Finiteness is the 
integral of the one (small) infinity – and the differential of the other 
(large) infinity – which is one and the same thing.48 
 
The language of calculus is used to mediate between the developed and 
undeveloped – either one can be ‘infinitely developed’, according to Novalis, 
even ‘the most ordinary character’. By using integrals and differentials he is 
able to show how infinity and the finite alternate. This is similar to the 
logarithmizing discussed above, and what it means in essence is that even the 
lowest or most commonplace object or thing (or, in this case, the most 
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undeveloped person) can be made to be raised infinitely. The integral and 
differential of calculus function as the logarithm to show the dynamism of the 
finite becoming infinite; in this case the implications for this are that a person 
is constantly intellectually and poetologically perfectible, but not perfected 
because the concept of infinity is always in a state of flux. In this way, 
Novalis’ use of mathematical language to describe poetologies finds a 
reflective origin in mathematical discourse used to formulate a theory of the 
ideal person, the potential writer and reader of those poetologies.  
 Entry 286 is also of relevance when considering the Romantic drive 
towards reconciliation: ‘PHILOSOPHY. Product of the harmony between 
subject and object – their chemical mixture, their mechanical contact etc.’49 
Here we see another reminder by Novalis that to de-centre conception of the 
absolute ‘I’ – the subject that still creates the external world according to 
Fichte – is to strive towards a certain ‘harmony’ between what is 
conventionally perceived as ‘subject’ and ‘object’. By this account, 
philosophy’s end is to reconcile a striving towards understanding the self with 
the understanding that this striving leads to no absolute selfhood. Harmony 
between the self and object in this sense is the product of a philosophical 
pursuit for negating the ‘Absolute’. This ‘harmony’ is also one in chemical 
and mechanical senses, meaning that Novalis is also suggesting that 
philosophical enquiry has a bearing on scientific discourses: a mechanical 
harmony between self and world would seem to project that romantic 
philosophy needs to extend its perimeters beyond the empirical knowledge of 
the self reaching out and sensing or perceiving the world. If we take Entry 286 
in this regard we see Novalis essentially stating why the Lockean vein of 
empiricism has failed. The ‘chemical mixture’ Novalis brings up is more 
problematic, due to the broad possibilities of what might be meant by 
‘chemical’. On the other hand, this broadness indicates that Novalis is 
deliberately evading a narrow definition in favour of a chemical mixture in the 
most basic sense, that of harmonizing the self and world in their substantial 
and structural make up. If philosophy is the product of a chemical harmony, 
we might assume that Novalis is arguing for a re-orientation in the way we 
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perceive the world in its physical and chemical construction, a point that 
becomes central to understanding the philosophical poetry of works such as 
Die Lehrlinge zu Saïs, Heinrich von Ofterdingen and Hymnen an die Nacht, in 
which orientation within the world – and so the drive towards ‘home’ – 
depends very much upon an acute awareness of the external world in its 
geological, biological and chemical senses.  
  
 
‘the world’s true histories’ 
 
So far I have introduced the concepts of Sympoesie and Symphilosophie (and, 
so, the intergeneric) in terms of their formal, generic and disciplinary 
qualities. However, they are not just terms that relate to the form of the text, 
but also to ideas within the text. This is the Mischgedicht, of which more 
follows in the penultimate chapter; there, the concept is anchored more firmly 
in textual readings in relation to the several other integral terms surrounding it 
that were considered in the first chapter. For now it is enough to follow the 
exposition provided in the previous chapter by taking the Mischgedicht to 
mean the ‘mixed poem’ – that final incarnation of the intergeneric, the 
Romantic poem. The fifth chapter will explore several central examples of 
Mischgedichte, texts which are both formally and conceptually intergeneric. 
Among these, Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1802) is prominent for its 
presentation of history as historicized. The unfinished novel is a semi-
autobiographical account of the growth of a young poet, Heinrich, and it 
comprises prose, lyric poetry, hymns, mythology, fairy tale and history. But in 
its medieval setting it is simultaneously a tapestry of fictional histories – a 
history of Heinrich the individual and a commentary on an imagined point in 
human history before Novalis’ own ‘modern’ age. The contemporary narrative 
is historicized by its medieval setting but also, crucially, by its narrator’s 
meta-discursive meditations on the tendencies of that age. While these are 
discussed at greater length in the chapter devoted to the Mischgedicht, my 
purpose in briefly outlining them here is to elucidate historicization as a 
central Romantic pursuit. There are several points within the novel upon 
which a reader might draw in order to illustrate this. Presently, however, I 
wish to look beyond the narrative as we have it in published form, to a 
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fragment by Novalis, which – according to Ludwig Tieck – was intended for 
inclusion within the finished novel. Published posthumously by Tieck with his 
version of how Heinrich von Ofterdingen was to end, the poem stands as a 
succinct manifesto for the novel: 
 
Wenn nicht mehr Zahlen und Figuren 
Sind Schlüssel aller Kreaturen, 
Wenn die, so singen oder küssen 
Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen, 
Wenn sich die Welt ins freie Leben 
Und in die Welt wird zurückgegeben, 
Wenn dann sich wieder Licht und Schatten 
Zu echter Klarheit wieder gatten 
Und man in Märchen und Gedichten 
Erkennt die wahren Weltgeschichten, 
Dann fliegt vor einem geheimen Wort 
Das ganze verkehrte Wesen fort. 
 
Stanley Applebaum’s literal translation of this poem is as follows: 
 
When numbers and figures no longer 
Are keys to everything created, 
When those who sing or kiss 
Know more than the learned scholars, 
When the world returns to a free life 
And to the world, 
When then once more light and shadow 
Will couple to produce genuine clarity, 
And people will recognize that the true histories of the world 
Lie in fairy tales and poems, 
Then at a single secret word 
This whole wrongheaded existence will fly away.50 
 
From Applebaum’s faithful translation (which he deliberately avoids 
poeticizing51) we can see that the poem looks beyond the present age to a 
future where poetry and fairy tales – die Märchen – reveal ‘die wahren 
Weltgeschichten’, the ‘true histories of the world’. In this projected image of 
the future, then, ontological truth as understood and recorded into histories is 
to be found. So, this poem is important for what it reveals about Novalis’ 
thoughts on the functions and value of history – history as a broad discipline 
and/or narrative form (I do not think Novalis is making a distinction between 
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the literary or the scientific here) is valuable for what it might help us recover 
of ourselves, and it is to be documented in fairy tales and poetry, Märchen and 
Dichtung/Poesie.  
As I suggested above, the novel itself is an ongoing historicization as 
well as metadiscursive exposition of this historicizing tendency; Heinrich the 
young poet participates in the creation of fairy tales and poetry – the stuff that 
histories are made of – at the same moment in which the narrative reflects on 
the age in broader times. The poem, then, is an important extension of the 
unfinished novel in that it is both a continuation of the text and a neat 
commentary reflecting on the role of the Mischgedicht in Romantic 
conceptions of history. One of the principal statements that Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen sets out to make is concerning the necessity of poetic 
composition and dissemination. In the novel, poetry is not just a way for 
Heinrich to recover a mysterious identity that seems to beckon him quite 
literally from his dreams, but also a way for him to take his place in the world. 
Paradoxically, Märchen and Poesie serve to socialize the young Heinrich, 
who has never ventured beyond his birthplace until he journeys with his 
mother back to her maternal home to meet his grandparents. This journey 
turns out to be fateful in the exposure it gives Heinrich to poetry, song and 
folk and fairy tales, the very elements that enable him to make sense of his 
history as well as the histories and stories that his own depend on.  
For the word Weltgeschichten owes its meaning in this context to 
‘stories of the world’ as much as ‘histories of the world’, and Novalis is re-
establishing conceptual links between the two meanings of the word 
Geschichte, much as Schlegel is seen to do with, for example, die Gattung. 
The appropriation of story for writing – and rewriting – history is another 
example of the intergeneric; Novalis is not simply substituting one definition 
for the other. He is revealing the latent relationship between the purported fact 
of history and the supposed fictionality and fantasy of poems and fairy tales. 
In doing so, he is forging the same epistemological connections that Schlegel 
had done a few years prior to Heinrich von Ofterdingen with his semi-
autobiographical novel, Lucinde. In this respect, Coleridge is also doing 
something similar (albeit in a more covert manner) in his Biographia Literaria 
almost two decades later. As it will be seen in the fifth chapter of this thesis, 
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Heinrich is also semi-autobiographical in its pursuit of truth through fantasy 
or fictionality, but it is his overt emphasis on history that always gives Novalis 
the optimal standpoint for his brand of romanticizing.  
However, as the poem champions an epistemology predicated on love 
and aesthetics over intellectual rationality (‘Wenn die, so singen oder küssen / 
Mehr als die Tiefgelehrten wissen’), it might be a worthwhile exercise to 
consider it in its poetic context. By this I mean that, though Applebaum’s is a 
masterful translation of the literal words, it is perhaps profitable to consider 
the poem in relation to metre and rhyme. The following version does not 
intend to provide an ideal representation of this – the rhyme scheme has been 
altered, for one – and nor does it seek to be held up to poetic scrutiny. The 
purpose of my translation, rather, is to reiterate the importance of the poetic in 
Heinrich-Novalis’ epistemology – that is, poetology:  
 
When numbers and figures no more 
Are the key to all created things, 
When those who kiss or those who sing 
Know more than those of learned lore 
When the world returns to a life free 
And the world to itself returns 
When light and shadow again in turns 
Will couple towards true clarity 
And in fairy tales and poetry 
One sees the world’s true histories, 
Then, at a single word of mystery, 
      Away this inverted existence will fly. 
 
This translation of the poem champions the essence of the verse as song, 
seeking to recover some of the oral culture that is at the heart of the novel; 
Heinrich’s world and poetic vocation unravel partly through singing 
merchants’ folk tales and, later, balladeering courtly troubadours. These 
Gedichte appear early on in the novel and they serve as a poetological 
compass for the young man, complementing his dream of the elusive blue 
flower at the very beginning of the novel. This dream, together with the poet 
Klingsohr’s fairy tale in chapter nine of the unfinished novel, represents the 
all-important category of Märchen, and together they envelop the Gedichten 
within the novel. Though the word is often translated as ‘fairy tales’, Märchen 
also defines folk tales in a broader sense. Klingsohr, who is the father of 
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Mathilde, Heinrich’s love-interest, narrates a beguiling Märchen that certainly 
falls into the category of fairy tale, with its allegorical and fantastical figures. 
In this respect it is more akin to Goethe’s Fairy Tale (with which it is in 
dialogue) than, for example, his friend Ludwig Tieck’s The Fair Eckbert, 
which seems to operate along the lines of the Grimm brothers’ more famous 
Märchen in its sinister unravelling of the heimlich aspect of human nature and 
experience. Der blonde Eckbert [The Fair Eckbert] taps into the very 
fundamental ontological questions we face by projecting a familiar, routine 
solitary existence onto a shadowy, uncanny truth in his own history that 
unfolds through story-telling. Eckbert discovers that his relationship with his 
wife, Bertha, is so familiar and resonant of another time in his life precisely 
because she was known to him in a previous life. As the truth of his identity 
and his life unfolds at the end of the narrative Tieck’s protagonist discovers 
that the life he has known in conscious adulthood has actually been a veneer 
underneath which lurks a history that has always been hinted at.  
 Yet, the tale is certainly closer to Heinrich von Ofterdingen than it 
might seem. This uncanny sense of the familiar within the unknown and vice 
versa is a version of Novalis’ light and shadow. For Eckbert this only 
‘couples’ through story-telling and for Tieck the secret essence of this story – 
and the relating of this relationship to history – can best be conveyed through 
the fairy tale; at the heart of Der blonde Eckbert is a Romantic recovery of 
‘die wahren Weltgeschichten’, ‘the world’s true histories’ through the history 
of the individual. For Tieck there is no distinction between the two – the 
uncanny is central to all human existence and the fairy tale is integral to 
decoding this. In fact, Tieck’s understanding of the role played by the fairy 
tale in human consciousness extends to his romanticized assessment of 
Novalis’ life in his edition of his friend’s posthumously-published works, in 
which biography bridges the gap between life and fairy tale. As with 
Schlegel’s fragment for Novalis’ Blüthenstaub, such collaborative endeavour 
highlights a ‘philosophical friendship’ – Sympoesie / Symphilosophie – in its 







‘a continuous inner symphilosophy’ 
 
Tieck’s characterization also hints at Schlegel’s Universalpoesie. In the old 
woman we see manifest the forms of Walther – Eckbert’s only friend – and 
Hugo, his companion after Eckbert’s murder of Walther. Walther is the only 
visitor to Eckbert’s castle, and the story takes a turn when Eckbert’s wife, 
Bertha relates her history in detail to Walther and Eckbert one night. While 
Eckbert is familiar with this story, Walther is hearing it for the first time, and 
after narrating it Bertha is later troubled to remember that Walther mentioned 
her old dog by name although she had not revealed it while telling her story. It 
is this strange realization that reinforces Eckbert’s sense of foreboding when a 
troubled Bertha relates it to him, and causes him to shoot and kill Walther, 
quite suddenly and without fully realizing why. With Walther gone, Eckbert is 
left friendless again, until he meets Hugo. At the end of the narrative, Eckbert 
sees ‘Walther’, who then transforms into ‘Hugo’ and then finally into the old 
woman whom Bertha had known in the past. It is thus revealed that ‘Walther’ 
knew the details of Bertha’s former life as ‘he’ was, in fact, the old woman to 
whom Bertha was bound, and who returns as ‘Hugo’ in expectation of what is 
due to her. Upon revealing her true identity, she then delivers the final blow to 
Eckbert by imparting to him, ‘Und Bertha war deine Schwester’: Eckbert’s 
recently deceased wife was, in truth, his sister.  
 Such complex and disturbing details allow for two important things in 
the tale. Firstly, they bring a kind of order to an otherwise non-rational world 
in which chance encounters turn into confidences, reliable friends become 
strangers, and actions as momentous as shooting dead the only society one has 
are decided upon for no logical reason; after hearing Bertha’s anxious doubts, 
Eckbert intuits that there is something alien about Walther, yet he does not 
know what that something is. His decision to kill Walther while out hunting is 
a sudden, unselfconscious one, much like Coleridge’s Mariner shooting the 
albatross. Yet Tieck’s protagonist appears to act on a psychological impulse 
that is in some way comprehensible to the reader, even if it is not so for 
Eckbert himself; we can understand why Eckbert feels the compulsion – even 
if we do not know the source of that compulsion – in a way that is not 
afforded to us when reading Coleridge’s Rime. Yet both return to a version of 
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Schlegelian Unverständlichkeit in the importance that they place on intuition 
and the non-ratiocinative faculties. A certain prescience in Romantic writing 
manifests itself in the implications of such a discourse; both Tieck and 
Coleridge are negotiating a precursor of the dialogue the as-yet ‘undiscovered’ 
Freudian unconscious entailed.52 Psychoanalytical/psychological readings of 
Romantic texts, particularly of Coleridge’s ‘supernatural’ poems, have 
appeared in abundance since Freud, but to my mind the important thing to 
keep sight of is the shared interest in the Märchen of Tieck and Novalis and 
the supernatural poems of Coleridge in telling stories about stories and 
histories: the protagonists of the Märchen and poems in question are 
fundamentally concerned with uncovering, understanding and/or narrating 
their own stories and selves. In the most ambitious and exemplary case – that 
of Heinrich von Ofterdingen – this concern is taken beyond histories and 
stories, Geschichte, into drama of the self. Heinrich’s true quest as presented 
by Novalis is the quest to uncover enough of his identity to realize that this 
identity is constantly in flux and that any hold on understanding one’s own 
narrative depends upon becoming a participant in it, incomprehensibility and 
all.    
 It is this Unverständlichkeit which illuminates the second function of 
the non-linearity in Der blonde Eckbert in relation to characterization. If we 
return to the fragment quoted at the opening of this chapter, we see that this 
constant fluctuation between ‘absolute comprehension and absolute 
incomprehension’ characterizes the ‘continuous inner symphilosophy’ that is 
central to communicating philosophical literature. In this case, this fluctuation 
comes from the relationship between intuition and the uncanny, but it also 
originates from the unverständlich presentation of identity in the text. 
Identities are conflated in Tieck’s Märchen so that the old woman takes on 
simultaneous forms at various points in the narrative (of course, her unknown 
appearance and protean qualities are already hinted at by Bertha, who recalls 
                                                            
52 Although my argument here concerns itself with poetry and Märchen, a broader look at the 
foundations of the Freudian unconscious would need to consider also the Romantic 
philosophical and psychological foundations of the unconscious. For a recent study on this, 
see Matt Ffytche, The Foundation of the Unconscious: Schelling , Freud and the Birth of the 
Modern Psyche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Ffytche’s study identifies 
the roots of Freudian psychoanalysis and modern theories of individuality in Romantic theory 
of the unconscious.   
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in her story that she was never sure of what her old companion looked like).53 
This refusal to present a discernible identity is compatible with the 
championing of a philosophical drive that necessarily reconciles the 
fluctuation between absolute comprehension and incomprehension. The 
comprehension here springs from the conscious awareness that a single, fixed 
‘identity’ is not definable. Tieck’s story maps out a psychological landscape in 
which several figures and relationships are distorted and conflated until the 
very notion of a ‘self’ is destabilized.54 The reader’s reward when facing 
incomprehension of this deliberately confusing narrative topography is that 
she enters into the ‘philosophical friendship’ of Sympoesie / Symphilosophie 
with the writer; in Der blonde Eckbert Tieck does not seek to present a story 
in which (and through which) resolutions might be achieved. Rather, he 
endeavours to unsettle the reader by presenting several gaps within it – for 
example, was the meeting of Eckbert and Bertha in adulthood a union of 
chance or fate? – and by leaving them unanswered. As such, the tale has no 
real ‘conclusion’ beyond Eckbert discovering the truth of Bertha’s and the old 
woman’s identities. However, of course, this truth is not a conclusion because 
the very notion of identity has undergone a shift.  
 Perhaps one of the most significant things about Der blonde Eckbert in 
relation to Schlegel’s Symphilosophie for the present discussion is the 
rhetorical question he poses: ‘Is the life of a thinking human being anything 
else than a continuous inner symphilosophy?’ If the poetic figures I have 
drawn on here – Eckbert, the Ancient Mariner, Christabel and Heinrich – are 
all considered together it will be seen that their common feature is that their 
defining actions are predicated on a distinct lack of conscious thought. 
Eckbert and the Mariner kill without conscious reason, Christabel does not 
appear to act on independent thought at all, instead moving in various 
unselfconscious or subconscious states of being (prayer, dream, trance, 
possession), and even Heinrich von Ofterdingen’s actions are compassed by 
dreams, myths and fairy tales. Of these figures, all but Heinrich are excluded 
                                                            
53 German Literary Fairy Tales, ed. by Frank G. Ryder and Robert M. Browning (New York: 
Continuum, 1983), pp.34-35. 
54 Such displacement positions it on a level with Coleridge’s fairy tale of displaced and 




from this all-important ‘continuous inner symphilosophy’ by virtue of the fact 
that none among them is presented as ‘a thinking human being’. Though they 
are intermediaries that enable the writer and reader to enter into a 
philosophical friendship they do not in themselves represent rational or 
independent thought. However, even this is not quite the decisive factor 
splitting Heinrich off from the others, for rationality and philosophizing are 
not for the poetic figure within the fairy tale or philosophical poem, but for the 
reader. What determines whether or not an ‘inner symphilosophy’ is present 
within the figure is that figure’s relationship to poetic composition: it is of no 
use merely to think, the Romantic writer appears to suggest, one must also 
compose. Heinrich is spared the fate of either a Hamlet or a Mariner because 
he is able to reconcile an epistemology developed through experiencing poetry 
with one developed through creating it. Heinrich is a poet because he 
reconciles his quest for answers – that yearning for comprehension – with his 
intuitions and poetic faith in Unverständlichkeit. By reconciling philosophy 
(and history) with poetry Heinrich successfully undertakes a poetological 
quest in which neither the compulsion towards knowledge nor the impulse to 
compose is diminished. He is no longer merely a poetic figure or a fairy tale 
hero, he manipulates his own consciousness and orientation within the world 
through composing poems and fairy tales and through a genuine desire that 
this composition should become an ontological compass: Heinrich is a 
poetologist because he knows that he cannot entirely know himself or the 
world, and that absolute knowledge must give way to a poetics/philosophy of 
intuition and sympathy. By accepting the deferral of the absolute, Heinrich is 
able to become an actor in his own narrative. 
 
 
‘like one that hath been stunned’ 
 
In Heinrich’s world, as extremes are mediated and history is created rather 
than merely interpreted, light and shadow mingle and ‘couple’ in order to 
present a clearer truth which rejuvenates the beholder’s vision. Tieck’s and 
Coleridge’s dramatic explorations of Märchen and Gedichte, on the other 
hand, dwell more on the Nachtseite, the darker side of human experience and 
55 
 
history.55 In the Märchen and Gedichte of Tieck and the poetry of Coleridge, 
the Nachtseite is certainly seen in the causes of the pivotal action – 
inexplicable and impulsive murders, bodily and psychological usurpation, 
strange doppelgängers, supernatural forces, and troubling dreams are just 
some of these – but perhaps more interesting than these is the result in each 
text, and the similarities between these. As with ‘The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner’ and ‘Christabel’, the conclusion of Der blonde Eckbert sees the 
protagonist gain in some knowledge and/or wisdom. The Nachtseite explored 
through these texts is in the effect that this knowledge or wisdom has. For 
Coleridge’s Mariner this becomes a moral imprisonment of sorts that costs 
him his consciousness and free will – having shot the albatross, he is punished 
and his utterance remains within the control of an external agency: 
 
Forthwith this frame of mine was wrenched 
With a woeful agony, 
Which forced me to begin my tale; 
And then it left me free. 
 
Since then, at an uncertain hour, 
That agony returns: 
And till my ghastly tale is told, 
This heart within me burns. 
 
I pass, like night, from land to land; 
I have strange power of speech: 
The moment that his face I see, 
I know the man that must hear me: 
To him my tale I teach.56 
                                                            
55 As Monika Schmitz-Emans makes clear in her exploration of the Nachtseite, ‘Night-sides 
of existence: Madness, dream, etc.’ in Romantic Prose Fiction, ed. by Gerald Gillespie, 
Manfred Engel, Bernard Dieterle (Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing, 2008) pp.139-
167: ‘The word »Nachtseite« (night-side) originally has an astronomical meaning: it refers to 
those parts of a planet’s surface which are turned away from the sun’, (p.139). However, 
Schmitz-Emans notes, G. H. Schubert  extends this meaning to a metaphorical dark- or night-
side in which the darker aspects of human existence are revealed/explored in his Aspects of 
the Night-side of Science [Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Wissenschaft] (1808). Though 
this usage of the term comes after the period in which the texts I am considering here appear, I 
am following other commentators on the Nachtseite in seeing it as useful to apply 
retrospectively to early Romantic fascination with what we now know as the darker aspects of 
experience and consciousness, for example, dreams, nightmares, madness, the 
unconscious/subconscious and possession. See also Carol Tully’s Introduction in Romantic 
Fairy Tales (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2007), pp.vii-xx, and William Gray, Fantasy, Myth 
and the Measure of Truth: Tales of Pullman, Lewis, Tolkien, MacDonald and Hoffmann 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.10-24.  
56 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Poetical Works, 3 vols,  Collected Works, 16 vols, ed. by J. C. C. 




The Mariner has learnt a lesson; following his ordeal at sea, he knows he erred 
in shooting the albatross, and to harm a creature of God is to sin grievously. 
However, this tale and its moral are not entirely his to teach. Instead, he 
becomes a vehicle for his own narrative, and in doing so he becomes in part a 
spectator to his own suffering. However, this is not the ideal spectator ab 
extra that Coleridge, Wordsworth and the Frühromantiker value so much as 
ironists; rather, the Mariner’s spectatorship is a mechanical fate devoid of 
control over his utterance. Similarly, Christabel’s usurpation is bound up by 
the loss of her conscious utterance, making both figures only spectators and 
not conscious actors in their own respective narratives.57  
 The Mariner’s comparison of his movement from land to land as being 
‘like night’ is interesting for its emphasis on the darker human experience as 
occurring like, or during, the night. Though in this context the night is used as 
effective imagery to convey the Mariner’s solitary, unnoticed travels, it also 
highlights just how shadowy his presence has become. The Mariner’s 
existence is cursed and the night empathically points towards this enforced 
solitude lived on the outskirts of sociability and community. In this way, 
Christabel is also disowned by her father at the end of the second part of the 
poem, having been usurped in bodily, emotional and filial presence by 
Geraldine and thereby ousted from her domestic community. Her state of 
being is thus also a shadowy one, in which the limits of community are 
exposed as the reality for those whose ‘strange powers of speech’ are emptied 
of consciousness. This comprehension of one’s alienation from a former 
familiarity is common to Tieck’s Eckbert along with Coleridge’s figures; 
                                                                                                                                                           
590). All references to Coleridge’s poetry are from this edition, unless otherwise stated. All 
subsequent line references are given parenthetically in the main text. I quote the 1834 version 
of the poem as it is the more frequently cited version. However, line references refer to both 
versions and I quote the 1798 text where there is a significant difference between the two 
versions.  
57 For the Frühromantiker in theory and for Coleridge and Wordsworth in implicit practice, 
the ironic-dramatic narrator is the one who historicizes. This is the exemplary narrator, who is 
also an actor or character(s). The Mariner fails in this respect because he is a spectator and not 
an active body – in noting that he ‘does not act but is continually acted upon’, Wordsworth 
astutely pointed out the importance of the dramatic for the Lyrical Ballads volume. What is 
perhaps unfair in this account is the refusal to acknowledge that Coleridge was grappling with 
the difficulties of such narrative; Coleridge was exploring the complexities that taking on a 
dramatic persona entailed, and his insights into the difficulty of mediation certainly do ring 
true to his purpose in portraying the ‘romantic’ and ‘supernatural’ in his Lyrical Ballads. 
57 
 
Tieck’s protagonist has always lived in an unsociable way with only Walther 
(and later Hugo) and his wife Bertha for company. So, when Bertha is 
revealed as his sister and Walther and Hugo as the shape-shifting old woman 
from whom Bertha has run, the world Eckbert has hitherto known is engulfed 
by a strange, traumatic knowledge that he has always been a condemned man. 
History overshadows this ‘pale’ melancholy man from the very beginning of 
the narrative, as he chooses solitude over sociability.  
But the Nachtseite is not just explored in relation to protagonists; the 
Wedding-Guest of Coleridge’s Rime, too, is changed by the Mariner’s 
narrative. Having listened to the story and heard its moral – ‘He prayeth best, 
who loveth best / All things both great and small’ (ll.614-615) – the Wedding-
Guest apparently turns away with a newfound wisdom. However: 
 
He went like one that hath been stunned, 
And is of sense forlorn: 
A sadder and a wiser man, 
He rose the morrow morn. 
  (ll.622-625) 
 
Knowledge and wisdom have not enlightened the Wedding-Guest; rather, the 
effect of the Mariner’s tale (and, we might assume, the circumstances in 
which it must always be communicated) has left him exposed to the darker 
aspects of human experience. Indeed, the word ‘stunned’ suggests a kind of 
trauma, and perhaps this is puzzling if it is remembered that Christabel’s face 
‘Grows sad and soft’ when she awakens from her trance following her fearful 
experience with Geraldine, and that the ‘dull, hollow confusion’58 felt by the 
dying Eckbert follows the traumatic revelations of inadvertent incest and the 
truth about Walther and Hugo. With these latter two examples, there is a clear 
connection between personal experience and trauma – but in the case of the 
Wedding-Guest this feeling akin to being ‘stunned’ is a result of a second-
hand experience to which he is an unwitting auditor in the first place; the 
trauma does not, significantly, arise from the kind of empathy that 
Wordsworthian irony explores, and which become prominent in the next two 
chapters. Rather, it is indirect exposure to the Nachtseite – the nightmarish 
tale of the Mariner’s experiences – that triggers an inversion of empathy in the 
                                                            
58 German Literary Fairy Tales, p.46. 
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Wedding-Guest. The Mariner’s tale awakens in him the consciousness of the 
possible relationship between the personal human experience and the 
universal one.  
The Wedding-Guest is a ‘sadder and a wiser man’ because he is now 
conscious of the universality of the narrator’s moral: one implication, at least, 
seems to be that if it can happen to one person, it can happen to anyone. Such 
thinking seems to belong more to a distorted version of the eighteenth-century 
dominant moral psychology that Romanticism seeks to re-evaluate and 
refashion into a genuine empathy. Like Adam Smith’s sympathizer, the 
Wedding-Guest is able (or, rather, he is forced) to figure himself 
imaginatively in the place of the sufferer. Crucially, however, he does not 
succeed in remaining an ‘impartial spectator’ to this suffering, as it seems to 
breed in him a fear of possible personal loss. This inverted reminder of 
community – and possible exclusion from it – is what eventually connects the 
Wedding-Guest to Christabel, the Mariner and Eckbert. None of these figures 
is able to distance the self from this fear – Coleridge and Tieck seem to 
suggest that they fail as ironists because they fixate on how the individual 
nightmare might become universal, and not on how the universal nightmare 
might enter the individual’s empathetic consciousness with necessary 
distance. That is, the relationship between part and whole, self and external, is 
sacrificed for the solipsism of the part or self, whereas the ironist ought 
always to endeavour to understand all suffering and trauma through a release 
from solipsism. And this is always achieved through creation of narrative and 
conscious utterance, not just indirect participation in it.  
 This distinction between activity and passivity, however, is less clear 
in the use of the dream in these texts. As it will be seen in the discussion of 
the Mischgedicht in chapter five, the dream is a fertile ground for 
Verschmelzung – or fusion – of many kinds; the intergeneric Romantic text 
finds its fullest expression in Mischgedichte, of which many employ the 
poetological use of the dreamscape. For the present discussion I am interested 
in how the presentation of the dream impacts upon poetological exploration of 
the Nachtseite in the texts discussed above. As the Nachtseite is clearly 
associated with the nightmare experience, it might seem odd to think of the 
dream as being central to it, if it is not remembered that both dream and 
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nightmare are on equal footing as grounds for Verschmelzung. Heinrich, 
Christabel, the Ancient Mariner and Eckbert all experience dreams and/or 
trance-like states at crucial points of their narratives, but Heinrich’s dream-
experience differs from those of the others in relation to the control of the 
narrative that it enables him to take. Heinrich’s dream of the blue flower is a 
spur for poetic composition, for activity. This is in contrast to the others, for 
whom the dream or trance is at the limits of conscious activity, and very 
quickly slips into the subconscious or unselfconscious realms of cognition 
and/or activity. When this happens, the dream – der Traum – becomes bound 
up with the trauma – das Trauma – experienced. By using romance and 
fantasy, Tieck and Coleridge appear to be formulating the types of 
connections between passivity and trauma that Freud would later theorize in 
terms of repression and neuroses. However, I am not suggesting that a 
Freudian reading of these texts will necessarily yield more fruitful responses 
to them – indeed, there are so many fundamental differences between 
Romantic theorizing on the dream and Freudian analysis of them that such a 
reading would be counter-intuitive in many senses.  
  
 
‘to escape the round of the ever-recurrent commonplace’ 
 
Tieck’s other famous fairy tale about possession, Der Runenberg, also takes 
the usurpation of a stable identity and uses it as a vehicle for exploring the 
instability of genre. As with Der blonde Eckbert, the protagonist of this tale, 
Christian, is consumed by a stranger knowledge which is threatening to 
overshadow his conceptions of reality and normality throughout the tale. 
Christian is a young man who has escaped his birthplace in order to live as a 
hunter in the mountains. His father is a gardener and he is expected to follow 
in these footsteps; however, at the beginning of the story we are told that he 
has left his native village, in order ‘to escape from the round of the ever-
recurrent commonplace’.59 Such a description appears to place Christian 
firmly within the same category as Novalis’ and Wordsworth’s wanderers. 
Like these characters, Christian prizes an experience outside of known 
perimeters. However, there is a key difference between him and Novalis’ and 
                                                            
59 German Literary Fairy Tales, p.81 
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Wordsworth’s figures, and this is that Christian seeks to ‘escape’ the 
commonplace, whereas figures from The Excursion, Heinrich von Ofterdingen 
or Die Lehrlinge zu Sais seek to transform the commonplace. As I shall show 
in the chapters that follow, this is true of the narrators of Wordsworth’s 
‘lyrical ballads’, too, and is also in evidence in the literary theory of these 
writers as well as Schlegel and Richter. This difference, then, might provide 
us with an initial point from which to determine how Tieck’s tale differs from 
his Der blonde Eckbert and his contemporaries’ figurations of the solitary 
wanderer and how it fits into the patterns of activity and passivity I have 
already established. That is, how it sits with Der blonde Eckbert and 
Coleridge’s ‘lyrical ballads’ of the 1790s. 
 Like the Mariner, Christabel or Eckbert, Christian is a figure who is 
always on the borders of knowledge or articulation; he is certain that there is 
something that he does not know and this haunts him as it haunts Eckbert 
throughout their respective narratives, until the moments of clarity appear in 
the form of some bodily or psychological usurpation. Eckbert is tortured by 
the shadows of Bertha’s past, which bear down on him through a shape-
shifting old woman, and Christian’s determination to escape the heimlich 
leads him to a lifelong struggle with the unheimlich, prefiguring in a way our 
post-Freudian understanding of how the two meanings converge. The heimlich 
has become comparable to the unheimlich in its secretiveness, but for 
Christian experience of such convergence comes too late. His consciousness 
and subsequent conscious utterance are restricted by his experience with this 
Nachtseite, as were Christabel’s and the Mariner’s; his departure from home 
leads him to a lonely existence in the mountains where he meets a stranger 
who tells him of the Runenberg, the sublime mountain where, according to 
legend, one can find all that one’s heart desires. Christian, having heard of this 
strange place before, embarks on an arduous journey there and finds a strange 
female figure with a tablet bejewelled with many coloured precious stones, 
which she leaves behind with Christian after vanishing. Christian loses 
consciousness at some point during his journey back but when he recovers he 
finds he no longer has the tablet. From this point onwards his consciousness is 
blighted by the memory of this tablet and the eroticized figure, both of which, 
he believes, hold the key to the knowledge he desires. 
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 To begin with, the story suggests a poetological struggle akin to 
Novalis’ Heinrich, whose quest is also predicated on a search for the ineffable. 
We see parallels between Christian and the narrator of Die Lehrlinge zu Sais 
in their respective mountainous wanderings, and if Wordsworth’s Wanderer 
were not already a product of a natural education, we might have added him to 
these too. Reading on, however, it becomes clear that Christian’s is not a 
poetological journey, nor is it bound up with the spirituality of Die Lehrlinge 
zu Sais’ narrator or the quasi-Methodist piety of Wordsworth’s Wanderer. The 
protagonist of Der Runenberg is on a quest for neither spiritual nor intellectual 
enlightenment, and this might go some way to indicating why his solitary 
sojourn in the mountains fails to provide him the fulfilment he seeks. In 
fleeing the commonplace rather than altering its representation via a poetic 
sensibility, he has contravened a major poetological standard; he longs for an 
experience outside of the commonplace, but seeks it in the fantastical when it 
ought to be sought out in an altered perception of that same quotidian 
experience. Christian does not undertake a poetological pursuit because he 
seeks a poeticized experience purely outside of himself – he fails to internalize 
in the way that Heinrich or a Wordsworthian narrator does and instead seeks 
solipsism rather than a type of solitude conducive to observation of the 
external.60 He is the fictionalized equivalent of Jean Paul Richter’s poetic 
nihilists (see below), who seek to negate the real in favour of fantastical 
desires, and this is what ultimately draws him to the Runenberg and to his 
downfall. Tieck escapes the fate of the poetic nihilist by documenting 
Christian’s downfall in this manner. His narrative makes it clear that there is 
no real poetological depth to Christian’s thirst for experience, and this is 
accentuated by his obsession with – to the point of possession by – the 
bejewelled tablet. The lust for the tablet and the female figure become 
conflated in his mind, though he is temporarily redeemed by his chancing 
upon a village that reminds him of his native village, and fills him with an 
‘indescribably sweet nostalgia’.61 This nostalgia is the first substantial sign of 
                                                            
60 Also see Wordsworth’s justification as a poet in the ‘Preface’ to Lyrical Ballads, in which 
he speaks of looking ‘steadily’ at his ‘subject’ prior to poetic composition, and Novalis’ 
fragments on poetic genius as being predicated on an ability to romanticize the external world 
through observation, which are focused on in greater detail in the concluding chapter. 
61 German Literary Fairy Tales, p.89. 
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affinity with the early-Romantic poetological hero, yet it still does not amount 
to the kind of homesickness that leads to a poetological quest. Christian feels 
the impiety of his former desires as a kind of shame and the scenes of 
domesticity, innocence and piety in and around the village church draw him 
automatically. He sees Elizabeth, to whom he develops an instant attraction, 
and is effortlessly integrated into her family life as the gardener he sought to 
avoid becoming. The narrative very rapidly moves through a seemingly 
inevitable marriage between Elizabeth and Christian and in no time they are 
settled with children and are prospering in the village. Tieck moves through 
these pleasant and convenient details swiftly and the narrative only slows 
down once more when the old possession takes hold of Christian.  
Before this happens, however, Christian is prompted to return to his 
native village in search of his parents after reflecting on his new domestic 
happiness. The reader discovers that Christian and his father are bound 
together by a mysterious, rare flower; in a passage that is reminiscent of the 
blue flower that both triggers Heinrich’s quest and the memory of a dream his 
father once had, Christian’s father is convinced that he will meet his son again 
because he saw a flower he had long yearned to see. The flower acts as a tie 
between the father and son. However, Tieck’s flower motif also serves to 
reinforce the fact that Christian had turned away from such communion with 
nature in favour of a barren solitude among the mountains, one which has 
produced in him strange and unnatural desires which have not left him despite 
domestic bliss.62 Like Coleridge’s Mariner, he fails to find a ‘harmony 
between subject and object’. For the Mariner this failure occurs as a result of 
viewing himself as being at so far a remove from the Albatross that he 
neglects to think about the bond of sympathy and fellowship with the external 
world – which is in one sense what Novalis’ harmony is referring to – he is 
severing. For Christian the harmony is disrupted by his desire to escape the 
‘commonplace’ life as a gardener: artificial as it might be the garden is a 
ground for cultivation that Christian has rejected capriciously. It is not for the 
love of the mountains that he leaves his home and this is clear from the outset 
                                                            
62 For more on the significance of the plant world in the tale, see Gordon Birrell, The 
Boundless Present: Space and time in the Literary Fairy Tales of Novalis and Tieck (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp.103-115. 
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of the tale, which finds Christian lamenting his solitary life.63 Rather, he is 
driven by a reckless desire to escape familiarity – like Wordsworth’s earlier, 
animal self of ‘Tintern Abbey’, Christian acts ‘more like a man / Flying from 
something that he dreads, than one / Who sought the thing he loved’. 
Eventually, his temporary moments of solace in domestic and filial duties are 
not enough to save him; despite the apparent comfort in life with his wife and 
his father, the old greed for the mysterious tablet and its inherent solipsism 
overcomes him, and manifests itself in his obsession with money left to his 
keeping by a stranger. The stranger – who, by definition, has no identity – 
represents the eventual fate of Christian, who will return to his wife in an 
unrecognizable state, only to disappear again. The final sentence of the story – 
‘The unhappy wanderer was never seen again’64 – becomes a grim reminder 
of the fate of solipsism: Christian loses his identity as well as his claim to 






63 In his solitude, Christian is more akin to the version of Wordsworth Francis Jeffrey would 
later seek to write off in his review of The Excursion as solipsistic: ‘Long habits of seclusion, 
and an excessive ambition of originality, can alone account for the disproportion which seems 
to exist between this author’s taste and his genius; or for the devotion with which he has 
sacrificed so many precious gifts at the shrine of those paltry idols which he has set up for 
himself among his lakes and mountains.’ – Francis Jeffrey, ‘On Wordsworth’s Excursion’, in 
Edinburgh Review, 24, 47, November 1814, pp.1-30, in On the Lake Poets, ed. by Jonathan 
Wordsworth (Washington, D.C.: Woodstock, 1998), p.3. Jeffrey’s attack (which is here 
similar to Keats’ accusation of Wordsworth’s ‘egotistical sublime’) is predicated, in this 
instance, on his reading of Wordsworth’s solitude being a bar to his poetic genius. In other 
words, he is prevented by his solipsism from creating a successful narrative. Though my 
readings of Wordsworth’s perceived solipsism and The Excursion argue that this is a 
fundamental error in contemporary perceptions of the poet’s major work, I find it useful to 
draw attention to Christian as a contemporary figuration of the solipsistic figure barring his 
own poetological potential. For criticism of Wordsworth’s perceived solipsism in Lyrical 
Ballads, see Charles Burney’s ‘Review of Lyrical Ballads’ in The Monthly Review, XXIX 
(June 1799). Reprinted in Elsie Smith, An Estimate of William Wordsworth: By his 
Contemporaries 1793-1822 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1932), pp.34-37: ‘Lines written near 
Tintern Abbey. - The reflections of no common mind; poetical, beautiful, and philosophical: 
but somewhat tinctured with gloomy, narrow, and unsociable ideas of seclusion from the 
commerce of the world: as if men were born to live in woods and wilds, unconnected with 
each other… So much genius and originality are discovered in this publication, that we wish 
to see another from the same hand, written on more elevated subjects and in a more cheerful 
disposition’, p.37. Although Wordsworth’s idea of solitude has been misread as a sort of 
regression into a Rousseauistic state of original man, in which men are ‘unconnected with 
each other’, it is interesting to see Burney’s political and philosophical concerns here, as well 
as the shrewdness of a review which highlights the philosophical thinking of Wordsworth’s 
poetry. 
64 German Literary Fairy Tales, p.101. 
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‘as many definitions of poetry as readers and listeners’ 
 
I have, so far, highlighted some directions in which Romantic theory of the 
intergeneric seeks to advance itself, and some directions in which I hope to 
pursue my own readings; I have outlined the importance of Sympoesie and 
Symphilosophie as both internal collaborations that mediate opposing states of 
comprehension, and as broader tendencies that see individual writers each 
value the creative, poetic impulse over passivity. In doing so, I have 
endeavoured to show the connections between different Romantic writers in 
relation to their poetological uses of history, Märchen and Gedichte. That is, I 
have begun to show how an emergent Romantic Mischgedicht is predicated on 
historicization of narrative through fairy tales, poetry and the dream. This is 
continued in the chapters that follow, in which elaboration on the centrality of 
irony and drama allows for further, more comprehensive readings of the kind 
of text Romantic thinkers and writers sought to produce. For now, though, it is 
important to return to some more of the theoretical works in which these aims 
are couched, and to trace in them the overtly collaborative spirit of Romantic 
text production. In order to do so, history – and the need to historicize – must 
once again be a starting point. 
 In the discussion that has followed Schlegel’s definition of ‘a 
philosophical friendship’, the fluctuation between two cognitive absolutes has 
been charted in some central Romantic folk and fairy tales. The purpose of 
this has been to understand better some of the importance Novalis claims for 
these, and this in turn is a crucial exercise because these claims have 
implications reaching further than the literary type. I began reading these 
Märchen and Gedichte above by suggesting that they reveal the Romantic 
need to historicize – what now needs to be established is, firstly, precisely 
why this need is so acutely felt by several thinkers and writers, and secondly, 
what bearing this has on their poetologizing. In other words, I am addressing 
two of my primary research questions by continuing to investigate how 
Romantic literary theory enables writers to situate their poetologies, and then 
to consider how collaborative ventures render these poetologies practicable.  
 It is here that the intersection of poetry and philosophy that was 
outlined in the previous chapter becomes pivotal to an understanding of the 
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philosophical conditions that galvanized the collaborative theory and practice 
of the Frühromantiker. Philosophy after Kant and Fichtean Idealism enabled 
the collapse of the subject/object distinction to form a vacuum out of which a 
new consideration of the ‘I’ could begin to emerge. This, in turn, had wider 
repercussions for distinction: it recognized the sort of permeable boundaries 
that allowed for Schlegel’s generous assessment of the ideal literature as a sort 
of Universalpoesie. It was these same conditions that invited the broader shift 
in aesthetics that drove collaborative practice of this. Beyond Schlegel’s 
immediate circle, Jean Paul Richter is also seen to set out a theory of poetics 
extensively formulated on the basis of this shift that allowed for permeable 
boundaries. Richter’s assertion that, ‘Nothing can actually be defined except a 
definition itself’65 opens his major work of poetic theory, Vorschule der 
Ästhetik (1804) [School for Aesthetics], making clear his intention to place a 
re-evaluation of the taxonomic shift aesthetic theory undergoes in this period 
at the fore of the work. Richter does this by examining the classic polarization 
between mimetic poetry and fantastical poetry. The intention to clear a 
mediatory pathway between these – a pathway to accommodate the modern, 
Romantic poetry – is also made clear in the first Course, ‘On Poetry in 
General’, noting that ‘nothing brings out better the individuality of men than 
the effect which poetry has on them. Hence, there will be just as many 
definitions of poetry as readers and listeners’.66 As well as elucidating the 
decision to resist hitherto dominant forms of categorization in poetic theory, 
such a statement also seeks to announce that the author is concerned with 
perspective as an authoritative principle at work in poetry. Jean Paul is 
outlining here an essential tenet of Romantic irony; by suggesting that the 
shift in perspective from writer to reader/listener connotes a potential shift in 
meaning he is decentralizing authorship. Based on this logic, if a definition of 
poetry is subjective because its affective and intellectual impact varies from 
each individual reader/listener, then each work of poetry (the term, again, 
being rather more inclusive and generous than contemporary understanding of 
                                                            
65 Jean Paul Richter, Horn of Oberon: Jean Paul Richter’s School for Aesthetics, trans. by 
Margaret R. Hale (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), p.15. 
66 Richter, School for Aesthetics, p.15. 
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it), too, is subject to the same principle. This concept of Romantic irony is 
explored further below and, in relation to its practice, in the following chapter. 
 For now, the concern is with the presentation and uses of history and 
how Romantic writers and thinkers perceive historicization. Richter outlines 
Aristotelian theory of poetic imitation as ‘negatively the best’, because it 
precludes the ‘two extremes’ of poetic nihilism and poetic materialism. For 
Richter, nihilism is dangerous because it equates with a loss of the sense of 
history that poets must have. By rejecting imitation nihilists move to the 
extreme opposite by indulging in ‘free play in the void’, by which Richter 
means to suggest that nihilism seeks to annihilate existing poetic (and 
representational) foundations. It is a ‘lawless, capricious spirit of the present 
age’ that impels poets of his day to pursue an egotism that will overcome the 
subject itself by rejecting mimesis.67 It follows, then, that such annihilation 
overwrites history, and when history becomes unimportant to an historian, 
‘religion and patriotism are lost, and the arbitrariness of egotism must stumble 
at last on the hard, sharp commandments of reality. Then egotism prefers to 
flee into the desert of fantasy, where it finds no law to follow except its own 
narrower and pettier ones for the construction of rhyme and assonance.’68 
Richter finds a relationship between religion and history that Novalis found in 
Christianity, or Europe [Die Christenheit oder Europa] a few years before. In 
his essay, Novalis argues that the essence of Christianity has been lost in the 
modern age; a historical sense of the religion is necessary in order to recover 
this spirit of the religion. Novalis sees the Reformation as a crucial turning 
point in the history of the religion, as it marks the moment that the written text 
of the Bible – the ‘dead letter’ – becomes commonplace. When this happens 
philology destroys the spoken communication by virtue of which the religion 
has survived, as it begins to distort the spirit of the religion.69 For Novalis, an 
appreciation of the history of Europe and of the religion is essential for 
preserving Christianity in its poetic, spiritual and political senses, because 
Christianity is a mediator between old and new. As for Richter, Novalis’ 
                                                            
67 Richter, School for Aesthetics, p.15. 
68 Richter, School for Aesthetics, p.16. 
69 See The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, p.66. The significance of the 
dead letter and its hindrance to mediatory communication and irony is explored in the 
concluding chapter, wherein it is argued that the ability to rewrite, re-envision and revise both 
experience and poetry is central to the Romantic thinker-writer.  
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appreciation for a sense of history derives (in part at least) from the fact that 
any mediation between ancient and modern must be done through a thorough 
understanding of the past. History is that pre-requisite for historicization; it is 
the initial reference point from which the Romantic writer can begin to 
generate its infinite definitions and references, and this is no tautology that 
Novalis and Richter are peddling. It is, rather, a timely reminder that what 
should be obvious is in fact in desperate need of reiteration for contemporary 
readers.  
 Going back to Richter’s original statement on the many definitions of 
poetry it is interesting to note that he includes both readers and listeners, the 
latter bringing his reader back to the orality which we have seen to preoccupy 
Novalis, Tieck and Coleridge in their presentations of Mischgedichte. Richter 
reminds us that poetry is as much heard as it is read, and in doing so he is 
retreading the reconciliatory path between ancient and modern that Schlegel 
began to theorize in the previous decade. Given that this drive underlying Jean 
Paul’s poetic theory is so similar in crucial respects to that of Novalis, it is 
perhaps a little surprising to see that he categorizes the poet-thinker as a 
‘neighbor’ of the poetic nihilists. Richter classifies Novalis, broadly, with 
those poets whose poetic faculties are immature and who know little of 
external things and so are more concerned with presenting ‘a poet or painter 
or other artist as hero’, concluding that ‘They would rather give us a poet than 
a poem’.70 Interestingly, this view of Novalis’ approach to presenting the poet 
as a necessary externalization of the quest for selfhood is positioned against 
Tieck’s posthumous biography of Novalis, in which the poet is valorized and 
becomes part of the romance he once wrote. On the one hand Richter calls for 
a separation of the poet and his poem and on the other hand we see Tieck 
constructing a poet out of his very poetic landscape. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, 
it is Tieck who has a greater handle on how the fictionality of selfhood 
informs the poet’s presentation of fiction and history, as I have argued.  
Nevertheless, though Richter might be a little short-sighted in not 
seeing clearly enough the affinity between himself and Novalis on theoretical 
grounds (and thus missing the significance of Novalis’ poetic practice), we 
                                                            
70 See Richter, School for Aesthetics, pp.17-18. 
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may take his comments on how nihilism detracts from superior poetry on 
board; after all, Richter’s argument does appreciate that a fusion of natural 
knowledge through observation and genuine poetic imagination is necessary 
for genuine poetry. In other words, real poetry is born out of a Wordsworthian 
ability to ‘look steadily’ at one’s subject, or a Novalis-like understanding that 
‘the world must be romanticized’ by allowing one’s own keen knowledge and 
understanding of the external world to take on a renewed appearance through 
one’s imaginative re-visioning. In placing Novalis’ poetry with egotistical 
poetic nihilism, Jean Paul misses a critical trick by underplaying the 
importance of the poet-narrator internalizing experience. He does not quite get 
on terms with the significance of a Heinrich von Ofterdingen, for example, for 
whom a poetic or spiritual journey is aligned to a historical consciousness. 
The presentation of the poet-figure in this novel is as poetological as Richter 
would ideally have it, because his recovery from internal crisis – the dream of 
the Blue Flower and its possible signification – is charted via a universalizing 
experience that sees him relate his own history and sense of being to history in 
a broader sense. The internalization of Heinrich and his companions 
constantly leads to historicization, preventing them from falling into the way 
of what Richter identifies as poetic nihilism. 
 The poetic materialists, on the other hand, confuse an ‘aping’ of nature 
with poetic imitation of nature, according to Richter.71 We might see poetic 
imitation of nature as the term he uses for the poet’s ability to represent nature 
with an imaginative or spiritual inflection, seeing as it is neither the ‘lawless’ 
and ‘capricious’ fancy of the nihilists nor the meticulous – but decidedly 
unpoetic – mirroring of nature. Rather, it is the kind of imaginative rendering 
of nature and the external world that had already been theorized since the 
previous decade and that had set the poetic practice of English Romanticism 
as well as the German Märchen and Gedichte into motion. Richter’s School 
for Aesthetics, then, is more a commentary on existing contemporary theory 
and practice than an original piece of aesthetic or poetic theory.72 It functions 
                                                            
71 Richter, School for Aesthetics, p.20. 
72 See also Chapter 4 herein, in which Wordsworth’s roughly contemporaneous denunciation 
of poetic aping of nature in the example of the fashionable London panorama in his 
Prelude(s) is explored. The chapter argues that Wordsworth also seeks to mediate between 
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more as a piece of literary criticism, and this is perhaps clearer when we 
remember that the definition of a literary tradition dominated by two distinct 
tendencies – one of internalization and the other of mimesis – is roughly the 
trajectory mapped out in scholarship a century and a half later by M. H. 
Abrams’ The Mirror and the Lamp.73 Whereas Abrams’ study introduced 
Anglo-German Romanticism as a negotiation of this trajectory through the 
motifs of the mirror and lamp, Richter, writing of his contemporaries, sets 
these two tendencies out as either nihilism or materialism. Nevertheless, what 
prevails is a sense of Richter’s engagement with his contemporaries through 
literary criticism. The fact that he is producing criticism within the format of 
aesthetic or poetic theory is also interesting as it enables us to trace very 
palpably the kind of mixing of literary criticism and theory that Schlegel 
advocates in his fragments, and which were highlighted in the first chapter. 
Such active and acute scholarship certainly looks to be engaging proactively 
with the concept of merging authorship and criticism. Richter’s text is 
poetological because it is commenting on the literary functions and processes 
it is using.  
 
 
‘that wonderful plant of love and caprice’  
 
Early Romantic-period women’s writing in Germany is harder to trace in 
terms of literary circles; as Gesa Dane has put it, ‘anyone concerned to 
discover the truth about women writers in Germany around 1800 needs to 
resolve some thorny problems of literary historiography’.74 Dane highlights 
the fact that this is partly down to a question of which writers are to be 
included (the better known Dorothea Veit-Schlegel, Caroline Schlegel, Bettina 
von Arnim, Rahel Varnhagen-Levin, and Karoline von Günderrode, or lesser-
known figures such as Benedikte Naubert and Sophie Mereau?), and what sort 
of relationships are to be traced. Dane notes that some of these writers were 
connected through friendship, but that ‘some were bound only by critical 
                                                                                                                                                           
two aesthetic extremes – that of mechanical imitation on the one hand and Gothicized 
sensationalism on the other – and this is accentuated in Books VI-VIII of The Prelude. 
73 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953). 
74 Gesa Dane, ‘Women Writers and Romanticism’ in The Cambridge Companion to German 
Romanticism, ed. by Nicholas Saul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.133. 
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distance or even total rejection’. While it is difficult to argue that writing the 
history of these writers is considerably more complex than that of the male 
Frühromantiker – and, I would add, this ‘thorny problem’ is made all the 
thornier for Anglophone scholars, for whom access to these writers’ works is 
critically narrower – I am inclined to deviate somewhat from Dane’s view that 
the five better-known women writers named above, ‘unlike the men, belonged 
to no school or group with a defined literary programme’.75 Dane suggests 
that they were ‘linked’ with leading literary circles but did not interact with 
each other significantly outside of these groupings. Again, I agree that the 
women writers did not produce any definable manifesto or statement in the 
way that the male Frühromantiker did, but I am suggesting that figures such 
as Caroline Schlegel and Dorothea Veit (and, through the wider salon culture, 
Henriette Herz and Rahel Varnhagen-Levin) did belong very much to that 
circle and produced romantische Poesie according to the theory of the 
Mischgedicht.  
The question of circles also needs to be addressed, as the women 
writers I have highlighted here are exemplary of the kind of active, practical 
collaboration in cultural and intellectual discourses that this chapter began by 
discussing. That is, the collaborative discourses that lead to text production in 
Romantic circles – of which women writers are an integral part – are a 
plurality of the sort of ‘philosophical friendship’ that Schlegel identified as 
belonging within the ‘thinking human being’. For the Frühromantiker, a 
literary circle is a collaborative and pluralized Sympoesie / Symphilosophie, 
and one in which their ironic and dramatic poetologizing is practicable in the 
first instance. By this I mean that multiplicity in discourse becomes a means 
                                                            
75 Dane, ‘Women Writers and Romanticism’, p.133. The difficulty of access in Anglophone 
scholarship I have mentioned persists. Much of the rich source material we might use to 
gauge women’s involvement in literary circles of this period is still in German. Consequently, 
the most insightful criticism has generally been in German, though this is something that will 
hopefully shift as further translations of seminal works and correspondence appear, such as 
the Schlegel Translation Series’ Florentin and Camilla. As recent electronic work on the 
‘Bluestocking’ women writers, such as Elizabeth Fay’s ‘The Bluestocking Archive’ 
[http://www.faculty.umb.edu/elizabeth_fay/archive2.html] and Elizabeth Eger and Lucy 
Peltz’s National Portrait Gallery exhibition, ‘Brilliant Women: 18th-Century Bluestockings’ 
(2008) have shown, moves towards digitizing and disseminating written and visual resources 
provide further opportunities for scholarship and resources on women’s writing, such as 
Douglas W. Stott’s ongoing translation project at www.carolineschelling.com. Stott’s 
resource is currently focused on Caroline Schelling’s letters and literary reviews, the former 
especially reaffirming that often the best example of women’s literary and intellectual 
contributions in this period slip under the radar as they remain uncodified by publication.   
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through which to explore the ‘continuous inner symphilosophy’ that gives rise 
to dramatic ontological enquiry; the various individuals generating 
poetological discourses within a circle become a vehicle for exploring how 
various ‘selves’ generate ironic-dramatic narratives within the individual’s 
mind. Thus, the literary circle identifies a ‘philosophical friendship’ within a 
part as well as its corresponding whole. Indeed, the circle is the first instance 
in which these thinker-writers become aware of the complex narratives that 
make up the part.  
Looking at this circle as a poetological body, we might become more 
aware of just how far the individual work is deemed to be communal, either 
through active collaboration in publishing, such as the joint authorship of the 
Schlegels’ fragments, or through discourse and debate. Though the 
publications of many of these women writers are often seen by readers such as 
Gesa Dane as being at a remove from their male contemporaries and their 
manifestos, it is in this latter sense – in practical conversation – that women 
writers emerge as thinkers in their own right and as participants in an 
exemplary philosophical friendship that moves beyond the dominant print 
culture. Friedrich Schlegel’s admiration of Caroline Schlegel’s intellect, and 
her influence upon his own intellectual development, has been noted by his 
editors, critics and biographers enough times76, but less attention has been 
given in Anglophone criticism to his own acknowledgement of the several 
feminine influences upon his semi-autobiographical protagonist of Lucinde, 
Julius. That Lucinde is in part a candid exploration – and celebration – of his 
apparently scandalous affair with Dorothea Mendelssohn-Veit has been 
established.77 But it is also a philosophical novel which is primarily concerned 
with how love and friendship drive the protagonist’s poetic and intellectual 
growth. As an exploration of the relationship between the various types of 
companionship that might engender poetologies, Lucinde is analogous in 
many respects to The Prelude. However, Schlegel’s novel is also an attempt to 
                                                            
76 See, for example, Gisela Horn, Romantische Frauen: Caroline Michaelis-Böhmer-Schlegel-
Schelling, Dorothea Mendelssohn-Veit-Schlegel, Sophie Schubert-Mereau-Brentano 
(Rudolstadt: Hain, 1996), and Bertha Meyer, Salon Sketches: Biographical Sketches of the 
Salons of the Emancipation (New York: Bloch, 1938). See also Lucinde and the Fragments, 
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set out the characteristics of different types of love and to understand the 
relationship between erotic and intellectual love and friendship, and it is thus a 
departure from any major model within Wordsworth’s philosophical poem 
with the exception, perhaps, of the semi-autobiographical ‘Julia and 
Vaudracour’ passage. The celebration of eroticism that outraged 
contemporary readers upon publication is, then, actually far removed from a 
one-dimensional reading of the novel as a celebration of a single love affair. I 
am suggesting that the eroticism in the text is driven, like everything else in 
the narrative, by the notion of ‘philosophical friendship’, both within the 
individual and between individuals. And this is where the presentation of 
women within the narrative is of particular interest for the present discussion. 
As a novel predicated on polarities, Lucinde immediately opens itself 
up to scrutiny as an erotically charged series of confessions, since one of the 
major polarities it concerns itself with is sexual polarity. With statements on 
the nature of sexual love such as, ‘The fire of love is inextinguishable, and 
even under the deepest heap of ashes there are still some sparks aglow’78, it 
appears that Schlegel is defiantly positioning the love between his fictional 
persona Julius and Lucinde, the fictional Dorothea Veit, as one that will 
endure in its sexual potency. The novel outlines ideal love between the sexes 
as a meeting and reconciliation of male-female relations and the other 
oppositions it is concerned with: men are refined but women are of nature; 
men are philosophers and women are naturally inclined to the poetic; 
masculinity is associated with light and activity, whereas femininity is 
associated with the night and passivity. The simple argument of Schlegel’s 
thesis on sexual love and friendship is as follows: men are rational – too 
rational – and need women to balance them out. Friendship between two men 
is always purely philosophical, but a man needs a woman in order to become 
complete (for men, like poetry, are in the state of becoming for Schlegel). So 
far, so Platonic.  
Where Schlegel deviates from the Platonic ideal is in his insistence 
that male relations with other males are restricted to friendship: philosophy 
plus philosophy equals philosophy. In other words, such a union is purely 
                                                            
78 Lucinde and the Fragments, p.61. 
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intellectual and falls short of the spiritual love and friendship needed to 
‘become’ a man.79 Schlegel’s theory of a new ‘religion of love’ 
[Liebesreligion] is predicated on love and friendship that are both intellectual 
and spiritual, which can only be achieved by a genuine union of the sexes. The 
eroticism of the novel, then, presents its lust as not for carnal pleasure but as a 
thirst for ‘becoming’ a fuller person [Mensch]. Knowing that Menschheit is 
the true state of Manhood for Schlegel and that it depends upon an unfettered 
mediation of sexual boundaries enables us to make better sense of the 
voluptuous excess of Schlegel’s prose: 
 
That is how the first germ of that wonderful plant of love and caprice 
was conceived. And as freely as it sprouted, I thought, should it also 
grow and run wild; and never, from a base love of order and frugality, 
will I prune its living fullness of superfluous leaves and branches.80 
 
A genuine union of the sexes is ‘that wonderful plant of love and caprice’ 
because it enables the male protagonist to become more attuned to the nature 
he has grown distant from through intellectual cultivation – the sexual excess 
that was dismissed as ‘pornographic’ by contemporary and nineteenth-century 
critics is in actuality intended to stand as a reminder of the ‘living fullness’ 
arising from the arbitration of polarities, of which sexual polarity is the 
starkest.81 The eroticism of Lucinde is a reaffirmation of the intergeneric in 
Romantic poetologies: that need to mediate and reconcile the gendered 
boundaries of poetry and philosophy, as well as the need to think, discourse 
and write freely in collaboration with others. The supposed libertinism of the 
novel is nothing more than the ‘republican speech’ which Schlegel has 
identified poetry with, meaning that the feminine influence upon the 
masculine intellect and imagination is championed even when it remains 
undocumented or unacknowledged in publication. It is a wonder that feminist 
criticism has not seized upon this aspect of Schlegel’s poetology, as it 
                                                            
79 For more on this and Schlegel’s various stages of manhood, see Peter Firchow’s 
introduction in Lucinde and the Fragments. See also Dorothea Mendelssohn-Veit-Schlegel, 
Florentin. A Novel. Translated, annotated, and introduced by Edwina Lawler and Ruth 
Richardson, Schlegel Translations (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1988), pp.xxiii-xxiv. 
80 Lucinde and the Fragments, p.64. 
81 For more on the negative reception of Lucinde, see Florentin, pp.cv-cvii. The editors 
provide excerpts of reviews from critics as diverse as Schiller, Goethe, Hegel, Heine, Dilthey 
and Haym. Somewhat surprisingly, Tieck is also among those who commented negatively on 
his friend’s novel, and Schleiermacher stands out as its most notable defender.  
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certainly appears to be fertile ground for debate on all sides: whether Lucinde 
posits a conservative male fantasy of the passive feminine ideal or a genuine 
attempt to even out the sexual and intellectual inequalities the Jena circle 
knew too well, the novel remains fresh for Anglophone scholarly pursuit of 
women in Frühromantik theory. 
 That the theory is predicated on sexual and intellectual practice 
between Dorothea and Friedrich lends credibility to it as a serious attempt to 
write the self as striving for consciousness. That it posits this self as being 
constantly and actively in a state of becoming through mediation of polarities 
and various versions of a ‘self’ makes it a poetological narrative in the vein of 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen or ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’. Novalis’ 
novel also champions the genuine union of Heinrich and Mathilde as 
necessary to the protagonist’s quest for selfhood and poetic vocation (this is 
also the case in his ‘Hyacinth and Rosebud’ [‘Hyazinth und Rosenblüten’], the 
tale within The Novices at Sais, which presents a love/self-consciousness 
chiasmus, in which Hyazinth must attain self-consciousness before he can 
settle, though that self-consciousness can only be attained through a spiritual 
journey that leads once more to his love, Rosenblüten). This is the case in 
women’s writing, too: Florentin is a Mischgedicht in the vein of Lucinde, in 
which part of Florentin’s education is one of love, and Sophie Tieck’s fairy 
tale, The Old Man in the Cave, provides a notable point of comparison to the 
poems and Märchen discussed above, in that the ultimate discovery for the 
protagonist is, not one of absolute knowledge as ‘the most noble goal of 
humanity’, but of love.82 Interestingly, Ludwig Tieck’s protagonists might 
also be placed within such a structure: if Der Runenberg follows any such 
gendered theory, its ‘hero’ Christian fails to achieve self-consciousness in part 
because he pursues solitude in the place of love and society, and Der blonde 
Eckbert presents us with a much more disturbing portrait of love and 
friendship – one that has led to the incestuous relationship between Bertha and 
                                                            
82 See Sophie Tieck Bernhardi von Knorring, The Old Man in the Cave, in The Queen’s 
Mirror: Fairy Tales by German Women, 1780-1900, ed. and trans. by Shawn C. Jarvis and 
Jeanine Blackwell (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pp.77-87. The desire of 
Tieck’s protagonist for absolute self-knowledge is proved to be misguided and to lead only to 
unhappiness, whereas the true path to self-consciousness and to finding his place within the 
world is only through genuine love. 
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Eckbert being read as narcissism.83 ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’ sends 
a clear message about excommunication: the cursed Mariner stands on the 
threshold of the wedding feast detaining the wedding-guest, but he never 
crosses the threshold. The conclusion of the poem makes clear his exclusion 
from company and the subsequent denial of self-consciousness, but the very 
stage for the drama of his narrative from the outset – the threshold of the 
wedding feast – immediately sets out his isolation from a conventional 
matrimonial union. Coleridge’s stance on gendered relationships with respect 
to self-consciousness in ‘Christabel’ is the most beguiling of all, perhaps 
because its hold on any one identity – regardless of gender – is so precarious 
from the outset. The only relationship the reader can expect to take at face 
value is the one between Christabel and the absent knight who is her lover, 
because that is the relationship the reader is given the least information about. 
It therefore comes across as a stock convention – the absent lover is a ‘plot 
device’ through which Christabel finds a means to transgress her domestic 
boundaries. He is also, of course, an archetype of the Gothic romance that 
Coleridge is gently parodying in the opening of the poem. Other relationships 
within the poem are harder to fix a definition on, because the poem sets out to 
render problematic the nature of identity partly through the ambiguity of 
relationships. This problematizing becomes a focal point for my reading of the 
poem in the fifth chapter, in which I set out to decode some of the main 
relationships between the figures by tracing the core relationship between 
Christabel and her dead mother.                
 
 
‘For thou art with me, here … my dearest Friend’ 
 
I have thus far established the concepts of Sympoesie and Symphilosophie as 
indicating the production of texts that are both intergeneric and collaborative, 
and have outlined ways in which Märchen are central to Romantic 
poetologies; Märchen and writings on the supernatural have both proven 
                                                            
83 See Gail Finney, ‘Self-Reflexive Siblings: Incest as Narcissism in Tieck, Wagner, and 
Thomas Mann’ in The German Quarterly, 56, 2 (1983), pp.243-256. Finney’s article reads the 
incest theme as an expression of an anxiety regarding solipsism. I am suggesting that the 
‘sameness’ of Bertha and Eckbert poses a problem for identity – the two are, in a sense, each 
other’s doppelgangers and so act as a barrier to getting a hold on a stable identity. 
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invaluable for historicizing the self (or, as is most often the case, ‘selves’) and, 
thus, for making sense of how one’s histories might enable one to make one’s 
place in the world more intelligible. They are also ideal for mediating the 
realms of systematic intellectual or philosophical enquiry and intellectual or 
artistic passivity: Romantic writings on fairy tales, the Nachtseite, and the 
supernatural enable writers to ‘find the true middle’ that Romanticism, 
according to the Jena Frühromantiker, aspires towards. As I have shown, this 
is a concern shared in Coleridge’s supernatural ‘lyrical ballads’ (this is taken 
up again in the fifth chapter), and the following chapters seek also to make 
sense of Wordsworth’s attempts at mediation in pursuit of similar goals. I 
have introduced the significance of gendered discourse in Schlegel’s Lucinde 
with a view to reading the novel as a similar negotiation of polarities, but one 
which brings us back to the collaboration inherent in poetological thinking, 
discourse, and writing. Gender matters, I have argued, because it holds the key 
to understanding Schlegel’s concept of Menschheit, that state of increased 
self-consciousness. But it also matters beyond making sense of Romantic 
Liebesreligion as we know it, because it redirects us to the fact that 
philosophical and poetic discourses for these writers are gendered and so a 
genuine poetological endeavour is partially dependent upon intellectual and 
sexual collaboration between men and women. Schlegel certainly blurs the 
line of distinction between eroticism and intellectualism, but beyond him, too, 
there exists a core emphasis on the importance of love in the drive to self-
consciousness – a kind of philosophized Liebesreligion – in Romantic 
poetological writing. As I have demonstrated, Novalis, Tieck and Coleridge 
place significant emphasis on the unity of the sexes as engendering 
successfully mediated (and, so, poetological) texts.  
One thing that emerges from the collaborative production of these 
texts is, then, that such unifying of sexual polarities – which is not in itself 
remotely unconventional – is made notable by the writers’ insistence on 
collaborations between the genders. That is, the ideological construct of 
gendered spheres is, if not quite challenged, then stirred up to accommodate a 
philosophically genuine mediation of what we know biologically as sexual 
distinctions. This means that, by giving free intellectual discourse and 
conviviality between the sexes – genuine sympoetic and symphilosophical 
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friendships – pride of place in their poetological methodology, early Romantic 
writers see the literary circle as a central sphere of text production. This also 
holds true for the Wordsworth-Coleridge circle, in which the three core 
permanent members of the coterie (that is, other than Wordsworth and 
Coleridge) are women. Though Dorothy Wordsworth, Mary Hutchinson-
Wordsworth and Sara Hutchinson were unpublished as writers, they remain 
central to the sympoetic and symphilosophical impulses driving their male 
collaborators. Dorothy’s influence as travelling companion and documenter of 
much of the source material from which William would draw upon freely in 
his poetry has been appreciated by scholars charting sources and origins for 
the poet’s work. The artefactual presence of Mary and Sara, too, has garnered 
some recognition; the two are often noted and credited along with Dorothy 
Wordsworth as amanuenses and transcribers for Wordsworth. And, of course, 
Sara Hutchinson’s ‘role’ as feminine ideal and poetic muse reaches such 
mythical status within Coleridge’s own writing that her literary presence 
within the circle cannot be overlooked.  
However, what is often under-emphasized is the point that these 
women are active collaborators in the generation of texts through poetic and 
intellectual discourses, and, thus, authors of sympoetic and symphilosophical 
poetologies. Dorothy’s apparent ‘cameo’ in ‘Tintern Abbey’, for example, is 
anything but: contrary to influential readings such as those by John Barrell 
and Harold Bloom, the ‘Dorothy’ of the poem is no mere repository for the 
thoughts of the latest incarnation of the ‘I’ constructed by ‘Wordsworth’, but a 
critical presence in the production of the text.84 Dorothy appears at the end of 
the poem as a final affirmation of the reflected reader; she is representative of 
a merging of the subject-poet’s ‘I’ and the otherwise distant object-reader. By 
becoming the vehicle for disseminating the poet’s re-writing and re-visiting of 
                                                            
84 See Johm Barrell, Poetry, Language and Politics (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988), pp.137-167. Barrell’s close reading of the poem argues for a gendered division 
in Wordsworth’s language whereby the ‘use’ of Dorothy is to validate his ‘polite, male 
poetics’ (see especially pp.160-167). See Harold Bloom, The Visionary Company: a Reading 
of English Romantic Poetry (New York: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp.137-140; Bloom 
reads the poem, rather conventionally, as a crisis point in which Wordsworth’s own mortality 
as man and poet is the overarching concern.. See also Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry 1787-
1814 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp.28-29. Hartman’s brief reading also 
figures Dorothy as a repository for the poet’s thoughts, though it is a little more generous in 
its allowance for Dorothy’s future mind as a concern for the poet. 
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the scene, Dorothy becomes the figure who enables mediation of subject-
object divisions (which form the basis for much of my reading of Wordsworth 
in the following chapter) and as such she plays a vital role in authoring the 
poem. But she is more than an ironic device. The ‘Dorothy’ of the poem 
serves as mediator between poet and reader, but also between one version of 
‘Wordsworth’ and another. She is monumentalizing the poet’s successful re-
writing of his ‘self’, certainly, but she is also partaking in that success through 
the poet’s admission that his experience is a shared one. Though it is quite a 
long passage (almost one third of the entire poem), I think it is worth quoting 
the entire section that addresses Dorothy. Firstly, this is precisely because it is 
such a significant and lengthy section: the address to Dorothy is the ‘third 
Act’ of the poem, that denouement or ironic realization wherein the poet finds 
the best possible resolution by looking simultaneously back and forward. It is 
by no means an ideal or certain resolution – as readers of the poem have 
pointed out, Wordsworth’s language is fixed very much on the conditional 
throughout the poem – but, crucially, it is a successful mediation of the many 
‘selves’ the poet has located by this point in time and an acceptance of the 
future ‘selves’ that will find philosophical and poetic impetus in this present 
moment. What can largely be overlooked, however, is the role attributed to 
Dorothy in this denouement, which is partly my interest in quoting the section 
in full. Secondly, then, the section is important as a coherent whole because it 
makes clear that Dorothy is not a mere repository or monument to 
Wordsworth’s egotism, but a sympoetic (and symphilosophical) presence in 
this mediation: 
 
         Nor perchance, 
If I were not thus taught, should I the more 
Suffer my genial spirits to decay: 
For thou art with me here upon the banks 
Of this fair river; thou my dearest Friend, 
            My dear, dear Friend; and in thy voice I catch 
The language of my former heart, and read 
My former pleasures in the shooting lights 
Of thy wild eyes. Oh! yet a little while 
May I behold in thee what I was once,   
            My dear, dear Sister! and this prayer I make, 
Knowing that Nature never did betray 
The heart that loved her; 'tis her privilege, 
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Through all the years of this our life, to lead 
From joy to joy: for she can so inform 
The mind that is within us, so impress 
With quietness and beauty, and so feed 
With lofty thoughts, that neither evil tongues, 
Rash judgments, nor the sneers of selfish men, 
Nor greetings where no kindness is, nor all          
The dreary intercourse of daily life, 
Shall e'er prevail against us, or disturb 
Our cheerful faith, that all which we behold 
Is full of blessings. Therefore let the moon 
Shine on thee in thy solitary walk; 
And let the misty mountain-winds be free 
To blow against thee: and, in after years, 
When these wild ecstasies shall be matured 
Into a sober pleasure; when thy mind 
Shall be a mansion for all lovely forms,                        
Thy memory be as a dwelling-place 
For all sweet sounds and harmonies; oh! then, 
If solitude, or fear, or pain, or grief, 
Should be thy portion, with what healing thoughts 
Of tender joy wilt thou remember me, 
            And these my exhortations! Nor, perchance-- 
If I should be where I no more can hear 
Thy voice, nor catch from thy wild eyes these gleams 
Of past existence--wilt thou then forget 
That on the banks of this delightful stream                    
We stood together; and that I, so long 
A worshipper of Nature, hither came 
Unwearied in that service: rather say 
With warmer love--oh! with far deeper zeal 
Of holier love. Nor wilt thou then forget, 
That after many wanderings, many years 
Of absence, these steep woods and lofty cliffs, 
And this green pastoral landscape, were to me 
More dear, both for themselves and for thy sake! 
    (ll.112-160) 
 
The first thing that I find striking about this passage is the repetition of the 
word ‘Friend’; for a poem that is so obviously weighing up its sense of loss 
and gain, of past and present – what Hartman has called a ‘vacillating calculus 
of loss and gain’85 – the conclusion of ‘Tintern Abbey’ is decidedly rooted in 
the notion of this friendship that has engendered thinking as well as poetic 
memorialisation of that thinking,. That is, poetological friendship.  
                                                            
85 Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry, p.27. 
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 As I have suggested above, Dorothy is not presented here as a 
repository or a pale shadow of the poet’s inchoate former self. What 
Wordsworth means, I am arguing, when he says that he can ‘catch’ his former 
self in Dorothy’s voice or eyes, is not that he sees a ‘self’ that he has moved 
on from, as is so often suggested by readings of this poem. Instead, it is more 
significant that the repetition of the word ‘Friend’ – an anchor of decisiveness 
weighing down the conditional and the undecided in the poem – expounds the 
collaborative nature of the thinking that has led to the composition of the 
poem. To catch his former self in Dorothy, then, is in part to recover some of 
this past self through her, but it also acknowledges the dependence of the poet 
upon Dorothy for finding and documenting futures ‘selves’. The opening lines 
of the section make it clear that Wordsworth is finding in Dorothy’s company 
the intellectual, moral, emotional and creative support that he has spent much 
of the ‘second act’ of the poem attributing to nature. That is, even if he ‘were 
not thus taught’ [by his natural education], he would not entirely suffer as a 
poet, because of Dorothy’s presence. Sympoetic collaboration can succeed 
even where nature might leave one wanting somewhat.  
 The implication seems to be, then, thus: even if the poet lacked the 
insights and hope that time and nature have afforded him since his previous 
visit to the site, the poetological friendship that Dorothy provides would still 
carry enough weight to give his poem the impetus towards the mediatory 
resolution it comes to. Though this is not a perfect or secure conclusion, it is 
solidified by Dorothy’s presence, which gives the poem a sense of certainty 
that is lacking elsewhere. The ‘Wordsworth’ of this poem needs ‘Dorothy’ in 
order to be able to look forward to future re-writing and re-visioning. To 
‘behold’ in her what he ‘was once’ is not as simple as seeing his immature 
former self reflected back at him, it is to find in Dorothy a sort of vital 
archive, not entirely dissimilar to the kind of living archive he finds in her 
journal writing. Dorothy is no mausoleum for a lost self or a monument to her 
brother’s poetic ego, she is a living poetic source whose very company 
initiates the engendering of poetic composition that her prose writing is far 
more often hailed for. What I mean is that, once again, we find that 
collaborative discourse and thought precedes the collaborative writing 
practice; before Wordsworth’s or Coleridge’s writing, there were often journal 
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entries of Dorothy, but we must not forget that these prose writings 
themselves are documents of collaborative oral sympoetic/symphilosophical 
practices. We might think of these collaborative poetological writings as 
sympoetologies: by definition, the shared practice of producing poetologies. 
 My interest in quoting the rest of the section is to reinforce my 
argument that Dorothy’s role is neither that of perfunctory amanuensis nor 
window to the past. The conclusion of the poem suggests quite strongly that 
Dorothy’s presence is enabling the necessary mediation between past, present 
and future ‘selves’ that Wordsworth is attempting to write and re-write; it 
looks to the future, choosing to end in a prayer that anticipates a time when 
Dorothy’s ‘wild ecstasies shall be matured / Into a sober pleasure’, such as the 
kind we are led to believe that the ‘Wordsworth’ of the present is at this point 
experiencing. This can, of course, draw criticism of egotism on Wordsworth’s 
part that sees him asserting a type of critical and poetic superiority over the 
‘Dorothy’ of the present. Given that the first and second sections of the poem 
have demonstrated at length that ‘Wordsworth’ has moved beyond the ‘glad 
animal movements’ which characterized his earlier encounters with, and 
relationship to, nature and which he is now associating with ‘Dorothy’, this 
may well be so. However, Wordsworth’s tendency to be selective in his 
estimation of who is best qualified to instruct in leading an exemplary life in 
nature and society is not limited to ‘Tintern Abbey’; after all, The Recluse was 
envisaged as a poetological meditation on such qualification, and what 
fragments Wordsworth did produce of the project all point to the conclusion 
that the way to such qualification is neither easy to pave nor comprehend. 
Indeed, Wordsworth’s entire poetological project is concerned with the 
impossibility of absolute conclusions, which is worth remembering when 
thinking about the conclusion of ‘Tintern Abbey’; if the poet does not seem so 
charitable when considering Dorothy’s maturation, it should be noted that his 
own capacity to apprehend his poetological vocation is constantly in play 
throughout the poem and beyond. And this is no different at the poem’s 
conclusion: a verdict on the superiority of one over the other is necessarily 
abandoned in favour of a reiteration of the sympoetic collaboration that has 
engendered the poem’s central concerns. The enduring image for both figures 
in the poem should ultimately be, according to the conclusion, that they ‘stood 
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together’ at this site of recollection and re-visioning. Moreover, Wordsworth’s 
final identification with his present ‘self’ is that of a hopeful ‘worshipper of 
nature’ looking forward, and, thus, one who is for now on a par with both the 
Dorothy of the present and the reader as an inchoate ‘self’ still in the process 
of becoming.             
 
 
‘…we have learnt / A different lore’ 
 
In Coleridge’s sympoetic works, too, we see poetic endeavour outside of the 
act of composition: ‘This Lime Tree Bower My Prison’, for example, 
principally laments not the loss of indulging in walking in company with 
friends, but the loss of a potential sympoetic moment – a result of the sort of 
poetological friendship the poem sketches out at length in its envisioning of 
vicarious pleasures – that the excursion might have engendered. Indeed, the 
very genre of ‘conversational’ poetry that Coleridge fashions for himself 
during the coterie years (and which is sympoetically developed into the 
autobiographical meditative lyric by Wordsworth) is driven by Sympoesie, or 
poetological friendship. ‘This Lime Tree Bower My Prison’ might be the 
clearest example of the influence of the circle, but it conforms to Coleridge’s 
tendency toward poetological verse produced in these collaborative years. It is 
not surprising that a poetic genre identified as ‘conversational’ should be 
sympoetic in its production: the ‘conversations’ Coleridge constructs within 
these poems (and from which these poems are constructed) are almost always 
fundamentally concerned with the poetic/philosophical vocation of various 
members of the Wordsworth-Hutchinson-Coleridge circle. The first poem to 
initiate this ‘conversational’ category, ‘The Eolian Harp’, pre-dates the 
literary circle (the poem was originally composed in 1795 with the title 
‘Effusion XXXV’); however, as the most sophisticated of his early 
‘Effusions’, it does begin to explore the poetological concerns that would 
feature overwhelmingly in his collaborative writings, what I have above 
suggested might be thought of as the sympoetological.  
Generically, the poem is as ambitious as one might expect from a 
Mischgedicht: it moves through various types of poem, without really 
committing to any one of those types. It engages directly with some of the 
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theological and philosophical dilemmas that Coleridge found pressing during 
the period in which it was written – however fraught that engagement might 
be – but it is clear from the opening lines of the poem that it is (ostensibly, at 
least) a poem about the romance of his new relationship with Sara Fricker, to 
whom he would soon be married. The central motif is used in various ways to 
illustrate Coleridge’s attempt at binding these two very diverse aspects 
together: the instrument plays over the breeze in a way that provokes, at 
different points, comparisons to ‘some coy maid half-yielding to her Lover’ 
(l.15) and the workings of a pantheistic nature on the individual.86 The 
incongruity of domestic and theological fixity and intellectual non-conformity 
(which I shall elaborate on in the fifth chapter) produces within the poem an 
instability that is not quite characteristic of the ironic poetologist of later 
work, who is comfortably aware of the fluctuation between comprehension 
and incomprehension. Instead, we find Coleridge deferring a realization of the 
uneasiness he feels at mediating these difficulties of comprehension through 
the generic and linguistic make-up of the poem. As I have outlined, the poem 
appears to be both a philosophical meditation and a love poem. Yet, the 
interesting thing to note about the use of the harp motif in both instances is 
that it allows Coleridge to change the direction the poem is taking without any 
satisfying conclusion. The love poem we begin to read in the opening verse 
paragraph almost disappears immediately after the use of ‘that simplest Lute’ 
to produce its sexual comparison to the ‘coy maid’: 
 
      And now its strings 
Boldlier swept, the long sequacious notes 
Over delicious surges sink and rise, 
Such a soft floating witchery of sound 
As twilight Elfins make, when they at eve 
Voyage on gentle gales from Fairy-Land, 
Where Melodies round honey-dropping flowers 
Footless and wild, like birds of Paradise, 
Nor pause nor perch, hovering on untamed wings. 
    (ll.17-25) 
 
Following the heavily sexual imagery, the shift from the romantic love poem 
to the romance ensures that the poem is protected from charges of indelicacy, 
                                                            
86 See also the inclusion of the ‘one life’ passage, added in 1803. 
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certainly, but it is otherwise puzzling as to why it should undergo a generic 
transition that leaves the original love poem unconsummated. That is to say, 
by this point the harp metaphor has dissolved into the ‘soft floating witchery’ 
of romance in a way that makes clear the intangibility and ephemerality with 
which the poem is more concerned; the romance of ‘Elfins’ and ‘Fairy-Land’ 
reveals the inadequacy of the conventional love poem for Coleridge as it 
shows up the greater interest he is taking in interior thoughts rather than that 
which is physical. 
 However, this romance, too, is abandoned immediately after the lines 
quoted above in favour of a brief dalliance with the eighteenth-century 
prospect poem that Coleridge had already experimented with in the early 
1790s. This genre is taken up primarily to allow for the introduction of the 
philosophical meditations that come to the poet: 
 
And thus, my love! as on the midway slope  
Of yonder hill I stretch my limbs at noon 
Whilst thro’ my half-closed eye-lids I behold 
The sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main, 
And tranquil muse upon tranquility; 
    (ll.34-38)                     
 
Yet, once again, the reason behind the shift from one generic affiliation to 
another is not all that clear, nor is it an easy transition: in moving beyond the 
momentary fancy that gives rise to the romance, it might be expected that 
Coleridge would return to the presence of Sara Fricker and lead the love poem 
to a conclusion. Instead, he seems to suggest that the romance inspires another 
kind of internalization: the Coleridge of the poem has moved from a state of 
passive contentedness in his domestic stability to a passive sort of reverie that 
leaves behind the love and domestic felicity hitherto fixed upon as the 
apparent subject of the poem. Yet, this passivity proves inadequate for the 
serious kind of philosophical musing that poetological writing requires, and 
this, too, is discarded for a theological resolution that ‘Sara’ apparently 
provokes. Having used the discourse of lover, poet and philosopher so far, 
Coleridge now takes on the language of the conversion narrative, wherein 
Sara’s reproachful eye reminds him of his current situation. The deferral of 
philosophical musing to divine authority proves to be no kind of resolution at 
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all, as I shall argue in the fifth chapter. For the purposes of assessing the poem 
in sympoetological terms, though, it is important to point out that the poem is 
intergeneric, but it is not poetological: it accepts an ‘easy’ and firm resolution, 
albeit uneasily, and its argument at the conclusion implies that this resolution 
is now to put an end to the search for the incomprehensible in philosophy, 
whereas the reader is left unconvinced by the various generic and tonal shifts 
in the poem that reveal a restlessness on the poet’s part. 
 Part of this poetological failure arises from the unfortunate and rather 
forced casting of ‘Sara Fricker’ in the role of lover and muse in ‘The Eolian 
Harp’, since it acts as a stimulus only to turn away from such thinking and 
writing and, instead, encourages passivity in the ‘Coleridge’ of the poem (of 
which more follows in my continued reading of the poem in the fifth chapter). 
In a sense, then, the poem is not as ‘conversational’ as we initially might 
think: it consists of a love poem in which ‘Sara’ is projected as an 
embodiment of the domestic stability that Coleridge would later search for, 
perhaps more honestly and certainly more painfully, in Sara Hutchinson’s 
‘Asra’; but this Sara is not a sympoetic collaborator, and the ensuing poem is 
more of a monologue than a conversation.87 She is, perhaps, closer to the harp 
image in that she is a symbol rather than an active figure or companion. As a 
stimulus both to uncovering and glossing over the friction between religious 
and philosophical, passive and active, intellectual and matrimonial ‘Sara’ 
emerges as an archetypal lover and muse rather than a personality. The fact 
that she fails as a poetological muse through her apparent redirection of 
Coleridge’s thoughts to safer topics indicates the instability of the poem as a 
whole in relation to sympoetology.  
 To conclude, I shall turn to a very different kind of ‘conversational’ 
poem, indeed the first poem within this category to label itself thus, ‘The 
Nightingale’. The poem was first published in the 1798 first edition of Lyrical 
Ballads under the title, ‘The Nightingale; A Conversational Poem. Written in 
April, 1798’ and documents precisely those sympoetic moments that we saw 
                                                            
87 For a retrospective and poignant composition on the casting of ‘Asra’ in Coleridge’s 
sympoetologies, see especially ‘The Day Dream’ in which Sara Hutchinson is both 
lover/muse and part of the wider stability afforded to Coleridge through the Wordsworth 
household. Although this was probably composed in 1802 before ‘A Letter to Sara 
Hutchinson’ and ‘Dejection: an Ode’, it was published much later in 1828, at a time when 
Coleridge had lost hope of much stability and sympoetry within the circle. 
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denied to the poet in ‘The Eolian Harp’. ‘The Nightingale’ is concerned, 
above all, with the shared, collaborative experience of walking and conversing 
and the sympoetological potential of this experience is found reflected in the 
poet’s projection of nature. Coleridge rejects the image of the nightingale as a 
‘melancholy’ bird, arguing that it is a human tendency to project one’s own 
melancholy onto the bird’s singing, for, ‘In nature there is nothing 
melancholy’ (ll.15). Such projection is an entirely human conceit: 
 
And many a poet echoes the conceit, 
Poet, who hath been building up the rhyme 
When he had better far have stretched his limbs 
Beside a brook in mossy forest-dell 
By sun or Moon-light, to the influxes 
Of shapes and sounds and shifting elements 
Surrendering his whole spirit, of his song 
And of his fame forgetful! so his fame 
Should share in Nature’s immortality, 
A venerable thing! and so his song 
Should make all Nature lovelier, and itself 
Be lov’d, like Nature! 
    (ll.23-34) 
 
It is a mistake, Coleridge is arguing here, to project one’s emotional state onto 
one’s conception of nature and allow it to become poetic convention. 
Coleridge’s prescient rejection of this literary cliché that Ruskin would later 
identify as ‘pathetic fallacy’ is predicated on a belief in the reciprocity 
between nature and poetic appreciation of it: to represent nature as faithfully 
as possible is to share in its immortality. So, the point Coleridge is making is 
that egotism leads to the danger of the poet producing a faithless 
representation of nature. This is as disagreeable to Coleridge as egotistical 
poetic nihilism is to Jean Paul Richter, since both have their foundations in the 
de-socialized, de-historicized self.  
 The self that Coleridge is constructing in ‘The Nightingale’ is both 
socialized and able to situate himself within a sympoetic community, the 
members of which – here named as the Wordsworths – have collectively 
learnt ‘A different lore’ (l.40). The poetological success of ‘The Nightingale’ 
depends upon its recognition of this collective experience, and within nature, 
too, there is a sense of collectivity over the solitary. In the place of the 
conventional image of the solitary, melancholy bird Coleridge turns his 
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thoughts to a spot housing several nightingales, and none of these sings in 
isolation: 
 
They answer and provoke each other’s songs – 
With skirmish and capricious passagings, 
And murmurs musical and swift jug jug 
And one low piping Sound more sweet than all – 
Stirring the air with such an harmony, 
That should you close your eyes, you might almost 
Forget it was not day! 
    (ll.58-64) 
 
The singing of the nightingales is described in sympoetic terms: each sings its 
own song, but this individual song is in dialogue with those of others. 
Through answering and provoking each other’s melodies the nightingales are 
in a sympoetic state, which then becomes the model for the sympoetological 
writings of the thinker-writers hearing them. Bearing in mind that Coleridge 
has clearly stated that a poet ought to allow nature to project its workings onto 
poetry and not vice versa, we can infer from this description of the 
nightingales that the poet’s intention is to suggest that the sympoetry of nature 
inspires the sympoetry of the circle. This is clearer still in the uniform ‘Choral 
minstrelsy’ that they burst into some lines further down from this section. This 
chorus is then compared to ‘one quick and sudden Gale’ over ‘An hundred 
airy harps’ (ll.80-82). However, this time the Eolian harp motif is used to 
describe an active process of creation, suggesting that the ‘different lore’ to 
which Coleridge refers is sympoetry.  
As I have demonstrated through my readings of various 
sympoetological writings within both the Jena and the Wordsworth-Coleridge 
circles, this collective experience that is central to collaborative endeavour 
occurs, in the first instance, in discourse. This means that the writing 
composed and/or published within these circles tells only half the story, if 
even that. For, in the case of both groups of thinker-writers, the majority of 
writing is produced by their male members, whereas those writings 
themselves reveal upon closer reading that the basis upon which they were 
produced is largely sympoetological. Thus, the apparent gulf between the 
salon culture of the Jena circle and the peripatetic practices of the 
Wordsworth-Coleridge coterie is bridged somewhat: though the women of the 
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former inherited the formal Jewish Emancipation/Enlightenment tendency to 
group together within, rather than outside of, homes, they are joined to the 
latter through the tendency towards active, collaborative discourse. In both 
England and Germany, the first years of the early Romantic period place an 
emphasis on collaborative endeavour between the genders, which separates 
them from earlier Enlightenment/eighteenth-century salons or coteries. For 
example, the early literary and intellectual circles in which Dorothea, the 
daughter of Moses Mendelssohn, grew up were necessarily selective, 
comprising mainly of the Jewish thinkers and artists who were denied access 
to the more conventional academic circles; racially, religiously, and culturally, 
they were essentially formed as a selective group whose enterprise and 
intellectual and/or creative brilliance later opened up their membership, but 
they were not in the first instance conceived of as being a porous and diverse 
circle. Moreover, Dorothea’s educational and artistic formation [Bildung] was 
unusual: she, like Anna Letitia Aikin-Barbauld, was in the somewhat 
privileged position of being the daughter of an intellectual teacher/leader.88 
Similarly, the notable circles or ‘groupings’ within eighteenth-century 
England in which women played an integral role were either consciously 
gendered spheres, such as the ‘Bluestockings’, or predominantly male 
informal circles within which women operated on a gendered basis, such as 
Mary Wollstonecraft within the Godwin-Blake circle. Of the ‘canonical’ 
Romantic women writers, those who wrote and published actively as poets or 
writers outside of moral or social philosophy, such as Mary Darby-Robinson, 
often operated independently or at some distance to established circles.89 
                                                            
88 There are differences between the two, of course: While Aikin-Barbauld was brought up 
within a Dissenting institution that was an alternative to Oxford and Cambridge, Dorothea 
was brought up in an atmosphere that provided an alternative to the academic institution 
altogether. The point in drawing the comparison here is to identify the ‘pre-Romantic’ 
tendency in both countries towards gendered spheres. For more on Dorothea’s early life and 
education, see the introduction to Florentin, which also contextualizes Dorothea’s 
consciousness of her own Bildung and her social/cultural identity as a German Jew. For more 
on Aikin-Barbauld’s early life at Warrington Academy, see Anne Janowitz, Women Romantic 
Poets: Anna Barbauld and Mary Robinson (Devon: Northcote, 2004), pp.13-26. For more on 
the German Jewish Enlightenment, see “The Spirit of Poesy”: Essays on Jewish and German 
Literature and Thought in Honor of Géza von Molnár, ed. by Richard Block and Peter Fenves 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2000) 
89 By those involved in social and moral philosophical writing I mean predominantly those 
seeking to use poetry as a rhetorical tool in the first instance, such as Hannah More, Ann 
Yearsley (nee Cromartie, also known as ‘Lactilla’, the milkwoman-poet), Helen Maria 
Williams at times, and even the later ‘Mrs Barbauld’; as leading female figures in writings on 
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I have also identified another aspect of Sympoesie and Symphilosophie 
that is implicit within collaboratively produced Romantic texts, that of the 
relationship between writers and readers; if, in the first instance, the 
‘authorship’ of a text is de-centred by more than one writer producing a text, 
then that text is already subject to an opening up of authorship in reading, 
since its discursive collaborators were also its first readers and critics. By its 
very nature, the sympoetological text is produced by the blurring of 
distinctions between writer, reader and critic, with these roles often performed 
simultaneously by various members within the literary circle. What this means 
is that the subject/object distinctions that remain philosophically thorny for the 
early Romantics gain another literary dimension, and it is this that I wish to 
examine more closely in the following chapter, which considers what it means 
to read Wordsworth as a Romantic ironist.      













the French Revolution and abolitionism, the poetry of these women took on a politicized and 
public rhetoric that, though not wholly dissociated from Romantic writing, did not quite share 
in the more ambitious personal claims their male counterparts would make at the turn of the 
century. In the case of Mary Robinson, the majority of her interaction with other literary 
circles and individuals occurred within London. As such, her involvement in organized 
structures (beyond the ill-fated sentimentalist Della Cruscans) was comparatively fluid and 
unregimented. For more on Mary Robinson’s influence on early writings of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge and her own ballads and lyrical poems, see Janowitz, Women Romantic Poets. The 
picture emerging from Janowitz’s short but incisive critical biography is that of a woman 
writer more often than not producing literature from her negative involvement in circles, 
whether social or intellectual. The result is a Mary Robinson who, perhaps true to a 
Schlegelian conception of the Romantic writer, is found to be constantly reinventing her 
literary ‘selves’. Robinson is a figure worthy of closer critical attention in this respect: she is 
very much the Romantic writer, though denied the sympoetic connections she often sought.    
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Chapter 3. ‘It is no tale; but should you think, / Perhaps a tale you’ll 
make it’: Wordsworth as Romantic ironist in Lyrical Ballads (1798 & 
1800), Peter Bell and Benjamin the Waggoner 
 
A project is the subjective embryo of a developing object. A perfect 
project should be at once completely subjective and completely 
objective, should be an indivisible and living individual…what is 
essential is to be able to idealize and realize objects immediately and 
simultaneously: to complete them and in part carry them out within 
oneself. Since transcendental is precisely whatever relates to the 
joining or separating of the ideal and the real, one might very well say 
that the feeling for fragments and projects is the transcendental 
element of the historical spirit.90 
 
‘something of a dramatic form’ 
 
Wordsworth’s aspiration to deliver philosophical poetry through Lyrical 
Ballads (1798) can, above all, be seen as achieved through the deployment of 
two dominant forms of the literary strategy of irony: comic-ironic humour and 
ironic revision/dramatization. The first of these is humour, which shall be my 
starting point for discussing Lyrical Ballads, the volume of poetry in which 
Wordsworth most fully explored the comic-ironic tone for philosophical 
speculation. This type of irony shows the poet as moral spectator of the human 
drama of the everyday (however, as we shall see, this spectator is never 
impartial, but always more attuned to human suffering than the moral 
philosophy of Wordsworth’s day would allow). The second form of irony 
shows a shift from mere spectator to moral actor. What this means is that 
humour – amongst other things – enables Wordsworth to find a springboard 
from which he is able to move from examining the everyday subject (human 
or natural) to participating in the drama that he finds inherent in being. This 
drama of being is then related by the poet through the drama of recollecting 
and revising in composition. In this chapter, I shall argue that this is a 
necessary shift for Wordsworth in order to achieve his ambition of becoming a 
philosophical poet. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, this notion of 
the philosophical poet is part of a wider early Anglo-German Romantic 
framework: the (sym)poetological thinker-writer.  
Beginning by considering humour and its dramatic implications in 
                                                            
90 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Atheneaum Fragments, 22, p.164. 
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Lyrical Ballads, I then move on to exploring the relationship between this 
volume and Peter Bell. I argue that Peter Bell must be considered to some 
extent as an extension of Lyrical Ballads if we are to understand how humour 
impacts upon Wordsworth’s moral philosophy. Having established this 
connection, I shall then begin to draw connections between these two 
publications and Benjamin the Waggoner. It is another argument of this 
chapter that Benjamin the Waggoner, rather than a work of fancy as it was 
generally presented and received, uses play, humour and the ‘biographical’ 
narrative voice to show the importance of acting and spectating 
simultaneously, thus making it a more important work than it is generally 
considered. The poem’s conclusion, in particular, reiterates the drama of 
recollection and poetic composition, as the ‘Wordsworth’ of the narrative 
voice considers what moral lesson Benjamin’s story might leave with the 
reader: it is argued that the result is, like many of the ‘lyrical ballads’, a 
reinforcement of the moral philosophy that might be uncovered from the 
poetry arising from human drama rather than a didactic tale about the perils of 
excessive drinking and the merriment of the ‘low’ classes. My consideration 
of the poem concludes by examining the significance of the poet’s own voice 
in the narrative. This, then, prompts a reminder of further connections 
between the poem and Lyrical Ballads’ ‘Tintern Abbey’ in relation to the 
plurality of the ‘Wordsworths’ created by the poet. Following my reading of 
how stories and histories intersect in Romantic biographies in the previous 
chapter, it will be seen once again that the autobiographical ‘self’ is 
historicized and pluralized through English Romantic writing and re-writing 
of the story of the ‘selves’ that one is continually shaping.  
This, in turn, leads onto the second form of irony: as ‘Tintern Abbey’ 
shows, the use of drama to displace or diffuse a central authorial voice into 
those of several characters is a technique that Wordsworth was 
contemporaneously experimenting with in what would become the Recluse 
fragments, such as ‘The Pedlar’ and ‘The Ruined Cottage’. This practice of 
diffusion – later misunderstood and criticized as ‘a species of ventriloquism’91 
                                                            
91 Biographia Literaria, i, p.135. Coleridge’s attack on this ‘ventriloquism’ arises mainly 
from his critique of The Excursion, and is representative of work which was antithetical to 
true drama - see p.135n. 
92 
 
by Coleridge – connects the experimental drama of Lyrical Ballads to the 
more systematically theorized Excursion, in the ‘Preface’ of which 
Wordsworth directly acknowledges his debt to drama, stating, ‘the 
intervention of Characters speaking is employed, and something of a dramatic 
form adopted’.92 In between these two works (and, in the case of the 1800 
Lyrical Ballads publication, alongside them), Wordsworth arrives at the task 
of self-representation with The Prelude. In the following chapter, I begin to 
look at the dramatic implications for Wordsworth’s own creation of his ‘self’ 
in the poem’s central three Books, with particular reference to his depiction of 
London. Here, I shall argue, Wordsworth utilizes the dramatic potential for 
irony in order to resolve the aesthetic, moral, and imaginative crises he faces 
in Books VI-VIII of The Prelude. The theatricality and diversity of London 
enable him to fashion – and repair – a ‘self’ out of drama itself. This recovery 
is achieved, it shall be argued, by an understanding that for Wordsworth, as 
for Schlegel and his collaborators, ‘Irony is permanent parabasis’.93 This self-
creation is explored further in the discussion of the Mischgedicht – the ‘mixed 
poem’ that Romantic literary theory strives to produce – in the fifth chapter. 
Along with Wordsworth, Coleridge, Friedrich Schlegel, and Novalis are seen 
to create ‘selves’ through this ideal literature, which is correspondent to the 
ironic, dramatic poem or novel that is always in the ‘state of becoming’. Thus, 
Wordsworth’s use of interruption in his writing (and rewriting) of the self 
allows itself to be read alongside Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, Novalis’ 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen, and Schlegel’s Lucinde. This infinite literary 
production of a literature that is itself infinite is then aligned with writings on 
immortality in the sixth and final chapter, which seeks to examine the 
relationship between infinity and immortality. Dramatic diffusion of a ‘self’ 
again becomes central to this exploration of the relationship between drama 
and irony. 
 Although a generally neglected area of criticism, Wordsworth’s use of 
humour and comedy in Lyrical Ballads has been explored briefly in the work 
of a handful of critics: the first serious re-evaluation of Wordsworth’s 
                                                            
92 Prose Works, iii, pp.5-6.  
93 [Die Ironie ist eine permanente Parekbase]. A fuller discussion of Schlegel’s famous 
dictum follows in the next chapter. 
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treatment of comedy was by John E. Jordan,94 who noted the critical tendency 
to dismiss humour in Wordsworth’s poetry, ‘Generally, speaking, we take 
Wordsworth too seriously.’95 Jordan’s essay sought to re-assess the reader’s 
perception of the type of humour the poet uses, achieving this through a 
predominantly biographical approach; several anecdotes are drawn upon from 
memoirs and letters to display the dominance of humour in Wordsworth’s life, 
subsequently illuminating much of his subtle humour, as it ‘crops out in mirth, 
gaiety, gamboling playfulness, and quirkish wit.’96 Jordan’s work on 
Wordsworth’s humour touched on the ironic tone of Lyrical Ballads, 
providing grounding for the important work of others, including John F. 
Danby, R. F. Storch, Mary Jacobus, Richard Gravil, and Mark Storey.97 
However, despite the centrality of comic and ironic tones in poems such as 
‘Simon Lee’, ‘The Thorn’, and ‘The Idiot Boy’, there has been no major 
recent work on Wordsworthian irony, with treatment of this subject largely 
tending to isolate itself from the wider theory and philosophy of his poetry, 
despite the suggestiveness of reconciling poetry with truth in Wordsworth’s 
critical prose.  
What I propose to argue here is, firstly, that Wordsworth’s ironic tone 
is integral to reading both the prefatory material and the poetic production of 
both 1798 and 1800 Lyrical Ballads. Such a reading, then, re-examines the 
actual nature of the poetic ‘experiment’ of the project offered by Wordsworth 
and Coleridge; far from reading the inherent irony of poems such as ‘Simon 
Lee’, ‘The Idiot Boy’, and, in the sixth chapter, ‘Christabel’, as isolated 
experiments with humour, I identify them as belonging to as much a 
                                                            
94  See John E. Jordan, ‘Wordsworth’s Humor’, in PMLA, 73, 1 (1958), 81-93. 
95  Jordan, ‘Wordsworth’s Humor’, p.81. 
96  Jordan, ‘Wordsworth’s Humor’, p.81. 
97  See John F. Danby, The Simple Wordsworth: Studies in the Poems 1797-1807 (London: 
Routledge, 1960) Danby writes: ‘It is unfortunate that Wordsworth’s irony has not been much 
remarked. If irony, however, can mean perspective and the co-presence of alternatives, the 
refusal to impose on the reader a pre-digested life-view, the insistence on the contrary that the 
reader should enter, himself, as full partner in the final judgement on the facts set before him 
– then Wordsworth is a superb ironist in Lyrical Ballads’, pp.37-8. I propose to extend 
Danby’s view here to read Wordsworth as an ironist in Book VII of The Prelude, as well as in 
his writings on immortality and epitaphs; R. F. Storch, ‘Wordsworth’s Experimental Ballads: 
The Radical Uses of Intelligence and Comedy’ in Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, 
11, 4 (1971), pp.621-639;  Mary Jacobus, Tradition and Experiment in Wordsworth’s Lyrical 
Ballads (1798) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Mark Storey, Poetry & Humour from 
Cowper to Clough (London: Macmillan, 1979), particularly, pp.19-42; and Richard Gravil, 
‘Lyrical Ballads (1798): Wordsworth as ironist’, in Critical Quarterly, 24, 4 (1982), pp.39-57. 
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philosophical tendency toward irony as a literary one. In this chapter, irony is 
set out as the mode of writing that invites reader participation in the 
production of literary texts, and it does so by de-centring the conventional 
notions of authority. So, one real innovation of the Lyrical Ballads 
‘experiment’, it is suggested here, is the use of the ballad form to reject 
explicitly the conventional role of the didactic or omniscient narrator of a 
linear tale, in favour of the ironic speaker who invites the reader to ‘make a 
tale’ of what is offered: an ‘anti-tale’ related through an ‘anti-ballad’, in other 
words. The other real major innovation of the project, the mediatory 
possibilities of this kind of poetry, is examined in more detail in the fifth 
chapter, which reads the aspired Romantic literature as the Mischgedicht.
  The second argument I wish to introduce here is that Wordsworth sets 
up with the Lyrical Ballads a relationship between drama and irony that he 
follows through in his other major project, The Recluse, of which we have The 
Prelude and The Excursion in publication. Though ‘Lines Written a Few 
Miles Above Tintern Abbey’ seems at first glance a little anomalous in a 
volume of ‘lyrical ballads’, with the poem Wordsworth introduces a sort of 
prelude to his Prelude not only by writing his self, but rather by rewriting his 
self, partaking in the very revisionary process that the entire project is 
concerned with. With poems such as ‘The Brothers’ and ‘The Thorn’, 
Wordsworth’s use of drama is primarily to the philosophical end that The 
Recluse was striving toward. So much so, in fact, that, in its philosophical use 
of epitaph, ‘The Brothers’ is clearly in dialogue with much of The Excursion. 
One of the wider implications of my argument, therefore, is that a linear 
reading of Wordsworth’s corpus is not practicable; Lyrical Ballads cannot be 
read as a complete project at a remove from The Recluse fragments, and so 
each chapter that follows is intended to address, firstly, an ongoing 
relationship between drama and irony in Wordsworth, and, secondly, how this 
relationship intersects the literary theory and production of the 
Frühromantiker.  
 
‘an infinite complexity of pain and pleasure’ 
 
Wordsworth’s ‘Preface’ to Lyrical Ballads can be taken as the most 
systematic early ‘manifesto’ of his philosophical poetry; here, pleasure plays a 
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key part in Wordsworth’s theory of poetic purpose, though he is particular in 
his separation of pleasure and ‘reasoning’, explicitly rejecting ‘a systematic 
defence of the theory, upon which the poems were written’98, thus refusing to 
offer a predominantly ratiocinative defence of an aesthetic that necessarily 
relies on both a common human sensibility, as well as an individual aesthetic 
sense. Wordsworth is aware of the subjectivity of pleasure, acknowledging 
that his volume will not appeal to the tastes of all. However, he places this 
within a unifying common sense of language; the poet readily recognises 
Lyrical Ballads as ‘an experiment’ through which poetic pleasure is imparted 
using ‘the real language of men in a state of vivid sensation’.99 However, 
alongside the poet’s responsibility to give his reader pleasure, Wordsworth is 
equally keen to emphasize the importance of purpose and truth, stating that 
each poem in Lyrical Ballads ‘has a worthy purpose’.100 This ‘purpose’ is 
presented in the 1800 text as the aim ‘to follow the fluxes and refluxes of the 
mind when agitated by the great and simple affections of our nature’,101 thus 
directly linked to truth in its attempt to reveal a deeper insight into common 
human experiences. In other words, the ‘worthy purpose’ is to evoke 
sympathy as well as to give pleasure, and to raise awareness in the reader of 
the relationship between individual pleasure and a universal sympathy. 
Although I am not suggesting that Wordsworth is consciously offering his 
thought in opposition to a Kantian incarnation of sensus communis, there is 
nevertheless a rupture in his ‘Preface’ between a philosophical system which 
assumes a ‘common sense’ in aesthetics and the subjectivity of poetics, and 
such a rupture does reveal the inadequacy of the Kantian formation of sensus 
communis.102  
 With his introduction of sympathy, it might be suggested that 
                                                            
98 Prose Works, i, (1800: p.140; 1850: 141).  
99  Prose Works, i, (1800: p.138; 1850: p.139). 
100 For a recent reading of how far this ‘worthy purpose’ is epistemological, see Andrew 
Bennett, ‘Wordsworth’s Poetic Ignorance’, in Wordsworth’s Poetry Theory: Knowledge, 
Experience, Language, ed. by Alexander Regier and Stefan H. Uhlig (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2010), p.22-23: Bennett considers the statement on ‘worthy purpose’ in the ‘Preface’, reading 
it as a statement on the unselfconscious production of poetry, in that the poet’s meditation is 
so trained to formulate purpose with the poetry that conscious application of purpose is 
redundant. Thus, the poet’s claim is not so much to knowledge, but rather to ignorance.  
101 Prose Works, i, (1800: p.146). 
102 For Kant on sensus communis in aesthetics, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 
trans. by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p.160. 
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Wordsworth seems to follow directly from Enlightenment moral philosophy 
of the eighteenth century with statements such as, ‘we have no sympathy but 
what is propagated by pleasure’;103 however, it is important to note how his 
treatment of sympathy in relation to pleasure is a significant departure from 
that associated with the dominant moral theorist, Adam Smith, whose Theory 
of Moral Sentiments (1759) posited morality as arising from a sympathy, or 
‘fellow-feeling’, which precedes pleasure, yet is ultimately governed by the 
pursuit of pleasure or sorrow of the self.104 Smith’s idea of sympathy, then, in 
a way, reduces it to being symptomatic of the self’s drive towards pleasure. 
Conversely, Wordsworth is more interested in showing that ‘wherever we 
sympathize with pain it will be found that the sympathy is produced and 
carried on by subtle combinations with pleasure’; the poet’s responsibility is 
to produce ‘an infinite complexity of pain and pleasure’,105 not to reduce one 
or the other to being a by-product of sympathy. Whereas Smith’s idea of 
sympathy necessarily requires individuals to figure themselves imaginatively 
as suffering in the place of another, Wordsworth’s sympathy is informed by a 
certain detached ironic awareness of a relationship between pain and pleasure 
that the poet takes on and transforms from dialectic to equilibrium. 
Paradoxically, it is this detachment that perpetuates a greater release from the 
solipsism that permeates Smith’s moral discourse, and allows Wordsworth’s 
narrators to retain a deeper philosophical involvement in their subject, 
unimpeded as it is by constant recourse to the self. Whether this is 
Wordsworth’s own ‘self’ of The Prelude, whose detachment in London 
enables him to regain a capacity for sympathising with fellow man, or The 
Excursion’s ironic Wanderer, who is able to go from narrating one tale of 
human suffering to another without risking any intensity of sympathy to be 
diminished, Wordsworth’s narrators’ capacity for sympathy is dependent on 
their capacity for the sort of ironic detachment theorized by Schlegel and his 
contemporaries.106  
                                                            
103 Prose Works, i, (1850: pp.163 & 165). 
104  Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: A. Millar, 1759), p.3. 
105  Prose Works, i, (1850: p.165). 
106 As Schlegel’s conception of irony as ‘permanent parabasis’ is, again, central to 
understanding Romantic theory in Wordsworth’s poetic practice, detailed discussion of this 
must necessarily be deferred until the following chapters. Nevertheless, this idea of irony as 
parabasis, or interruption of the self’s own narrative appears as an undercurrent to my 
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 To begin with, an affinity between Schlegel’s view of a literary 
‘project’ and Wordsworth’s particular poetic ‘projects’ of 1798 and 1800 
might be read. In the fragment quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
Schlegel sees the ideal project as ‘both subjective and objective’. To an extent, 
Schlegel is collapsing distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity by 
asserting that a ‘perfect’ project must be both subjective and objective – in the 
case of a literary project, this might be understood to refer to the narrator of a 
poem or novel, and so, the ideal narrator would be objective enough to 
maintain a distance from his or her tale, but subjective enough to maintain a 
sympathetic interest in its subjects.  Yet Wordsworthian sympathy is not 
solely the moral or psychological curiosity found in Smith’s discourse – the 
capacity for irony must be found prior to any realization of ‘fellow-feeling’ or 
sympathy, indicating that sympathy was as much a philosophical concern for 
Wordsworth as it was for his German contemporaries. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, for example, one condition on which Heinrich’s 
poetological success hinges is his sympathetic development. The theorized 
Romantic work of art is what is seen as ‘indivisible’ and ‘living’; the 
transcendental work of art is that which is able to fuse the real and the ideal. 
For Wordsworth the ‘real’ in a ‘lyrical ballad’ can only be the ‘real language 
of men’, since language – primarily spoken, not written – is the medium 
through which such art is conventionally transmitted. However, in a marriage 
of oral tradition and print culture, the ‘real’ necessarily becomes the ‘ideal’, 
too. So, Wordsworth’s depictions of rustic life and language are consciously 
concerned both with recovering the philosophical realities of human life and 
suffering, and with the drama and ironic self-reflexivity that is necessitated by 
such an attempt. The seemingly paradoxical idea of a literary project that 
strives for truth or verisimilitude through dramatic interjection is negotiated, I 
am arguing here, in Wordsworth’s own theory and poetic practice. The 
implications this has for autobiographical projects or writing a ‘self’ come 
into focus below and in the fourth and fifth chapters – for now I wish to return 
to Lyrical Ballads. 
With Lyrical Ballads, we see that in presenting this ‘truth, not 
                                                                                                                                                           
consideration of irony in Lyrical Ballads, Benjamin the Waggoner, and Peter Bell.  
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individual and local, but general and operative’, as the desired end for all 
philosophical poetry, and immediately following it with his assertion that the 
only restriction of a poet is ‘to give immediate pleasure’,107  Wordsworth thus 
sets up a dialectical theory which can best be reconciled through irony; on the 
one hand, pleasure exists as the poet’s greatest responsibility and restriction, 
whereas on the other, utility is the end of philosophical poetry, with an 
implicit morality that must necessarily relate to the gravity of human 
suffering. This mediating function of irony is what is often missed by 
commentators on Wordsworth’s poetry; even Coleridge in his respective roles 
as collaborator and critic of Lyrical Ballads undermines Wordsworth’s 
commitment to reconciling ‘truth’ and pleasure in that volume and elsewhere. 
In Chapter XXII of his Biographia Literaria, he offers this as one of his 
criticisms of Wordsworth’s poetic theory; though he does not take issue with 
the choice of a Pedlar as protagonist of The Excursion as vehemently as 
Francis Jeffrey had,108 he does attack what he sees as the precedence morality 
and truth take over pleasure: 
 
First, because the object in view, as an immediate object, belongs to the 
moral philosopher, and would be pursued, not only more appropriately, 
but in my opinion with far greater probability of success, in sermons or 
moral essays, than in an elevated poem. It seems, indeed, to destroy the 
main fundamental distinction, not only between a poem and prose, but 
even between philosophy and works of fiction, inasmuch as it proposes 
truth for its immediate object, instead of pleasure.109 
 
As a general criticism of Wordsworth’s poetry – and, thus, an alternative 
poetic theory – there is clearly much in this statement that is of interest. For 
the critic Coleridge, the communication of truth and pleasure in poetry in the 
first instance appear to be mutually exclusive (though I shall argue below that 
the poet Coleridge, too, found a reconciliation of both through irony in the 
‘Christabels’ of 1798 and 1816), and Wordsworth has erred in prioritising 
truth delivered through moral philosophy. What Coleridge’s distinctions 
between truth and pleasure do not account for, though, is Wordsworth’s 
                                                            
107 Prose Works, i, (1850: p.163). 
108 Coleridge, rather generously on this occasion, limits his disapproval of Wordsworth’s 
choice of protagonist to asking incredulously, ‘Is there one word for instance, attributed to the 
pedlar in THE EXCURSION, characteristic of a pedlar?’ – see Biographia Literaria, i, p. 134. 
109 Biographia Literaria, i, p.130. 
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reconciliation of the moral and aesthetic functions of poetry. If we are to take 
his treatment of sympathy as the central moral concern underpinning 
philosophical poetry, then the category of a moral philosophy so distinct from 
poetic pleasure itself is collapsed. Wordsworth’s narrators are not the 
Smithean impartial spectators they might initially be taken for; the voices that 
make up Lyrical Ballads are, conversely, as active in the creation and 
transmission of the ballad as the reader is expected to be. The implications this 
has for Wordsworth’s narrative of his ‘selves’ are taken up for consideration 
in the following chapter. I shall argue that the representative crises in The 
Prelude’s Books VI-VIII make it impossible for Wordsworth to remain an 
impartial spectator, with London proving the catalyst for active participation 
in the dramatization of ‘self’. In the case of Lyrical Ballads, however, 
impartial spectatorship is collapsed in one way through the irony that pervades 
the seemingly comic verse of the volume. 
 Moreover, Coleridge’s insistence on pleasure taking precedence over 
truth in poetry seems to suggest that The Excursion has not yet achieved that 
synthesis of truth and pleasure that the ideal poet-philosopher (or, in his own 
words, the philosophical poet) strives for: 
 
Now till the blessed time shall come, when truth itself shall be 
pleasure, and both shall be so united, as to be distinguishable in words 
only, not in feeling, it will remain the poet’s office to proceed upon 
that state of association, which actually exists as general; instead of 
attempting first to make it what it ought to be, and then to let the 
pleasure follow. But here is unfortunately a small Hysteron-
Proteron.110 
 
For Coleridge, the preponderance of moral philosophy in The Excursion 
produces a sort of ‘Hysteron-Proteron’, in that it is contrary to poetic purpose. 
Yet, if we take the unification of truth and pleasure to mean the synthesis of 
poetry and philosophy, we might suggest that The Excursion is closer to the 
synthesized philosophical poem that Wordsworth and Coleridge both 
conceived of in their respective ways.111 A comparison might be drawn 
between this and the following lines from The Prelude: 
                                                            
110 Biographia Literaria, i, p.130. 
111 Kathleen Wheeler’s Sources, Processes and Methods in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria 
is particularly instructive in its consideration of how the unification of truth and pleasure is 




         Many are our joys 
In youth, but oh! what happiness to live 
When every hour brings palpable access 
Of knowledge, when all knowledge is delight, 
And sorrow is not there! 
    (1850: II, 284-288; 1805: II, 303-307)112 
 
Whereas Coleridge’s synthesis is a projection toward a future development in 
the philosophical poet’s career, the lines quoted here suggest that a similar 
synthesis of cognition (if Wordsworth’s ‘knowledge’ is understood to equate 
with the ‘truth’ that Coleridge’s philosopher is concerned with), and pleasure 
– or ‘delight’ – has been at work in the mind of a past ‘self’ of the 
philosophical poet. The implications that tracing the childhood ‘self’ have for 
the development of the ironist-poet are considered in greater detail in the 
concluding chapter, where it shall be argued that the repetition in the ironist’s 
philosophical poem aims to recover, fundamentally, a capacity for 
comprehending a dramatized ontology that originates in the child. For the 
present discussion, I quote these lines to suggest that Coleridge’s critique of 
Wordsworth’s poetry does not quite get on terms with just how similar 
Wordsworth’s conception of the philosophical poem is to his own, and that 
this produces some fundamental misreading of not only The Excursion, but 
also his co-project, Lyrical Ballads.113 
 
 The ‘alive and critical’ reader 
 
As Stephen M. Parrish has noted, Wordsworth’s theory of poetic pleasure is 
inextricably bound with form and metre, thus this insistence on pleasure 
implicitly necessitates the adoption of the seemingly ‘light’ ballad form, 
      
Pleasure, it is clear, lay at the heart of the “sublime notion of Poetry” 
that Wordsworth was endeavoring to present. At once a psychological, 
                                                            
112 All references to the 1850 text are from The Fourteen-Book Prelude, ed. by W. J. B. 
Owen, The Cornell Wordsworth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), and all 
references to the 1805 text are from The Thirteen-Book Prelude, ed. by Mark L. Reed, The 
Cornell Wordsworth, 2 vols (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). Hereafter, all references 
appear parenthetically in the main text, abbreviated as either ‘1850’ or ‘1805’. The 1850 
reference is provided first, as its Cornell publication precedes that of the 1805 text.  
113 However, to suggest that Coleridge is responsible for the critical tendency to misread 
Wordsworth’s work would, of course, be reductive; rather, the extent to which his critique of 
Wordsworth’s poetry contributes to a reading of his own poetic theory and practice is what is 
principally of interest here. 
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esthetic, almost an epistemological term, pleasure was the “grand 
elementary principle” of man’s nature, the distinctive achievement of 
poetic art, and something like an instrument of truth. And a main 
source of pleasure in poetic art was meter, as Wordsworth has already 
made clear in his “general summary” of 1800.114 
 
In addition to providing an important defence of Wordsworth’s views on 
metre – often in contention with then-existing scholarship which tended to 
read the poet’s views in his 1800 ‘Preface’ as disparaging – Parrish notes the 
crucial relationship between metre, form, and the place the concept of 
pleasure held in Wordsworth’s poetic theory. However, the view that pleasure 
was ‘almost an epistemological term’ does not adequately highlight the 
dialectical thinking in Lyrical Ballads, often couched as it is in an 
ironic/comic tone. Instead, a closer reading of Wordsworth as an ironist can 
show that pleasure is an ‘epistemological term’, often induced and explored 
by Wordsworth simultaneously with philosophically searching questions on 
responses to human pain and suffering.115  
 Wordsworth’s comic irony is predicated on this incongruity of moral, 
philosophical poetry and the lightness of traditional balladry, and nowhere is 
this more clear than in ‘Simon Lee’ and ‘The Idiot Boy’, both of which 
employ the use of a deceptively light tone in order to subvert ironically the 
ballad form and evoke self-consciousness in the reader, a key aim of 
Romantic irony, as summarised by David Simpson’s influential Irony and 
Authority in Romantic Poetry. I have referred to Simpson in Chapter 1, but it 
is worth quoting his pithy summary of Romantic irony here: 
 
The situation as I see it is that, if a writer says ‘X’, then we question 
the meaning of what he says both as we receive it into our own codes 
and canons of significance and as it relates to the context of the rest of 
his utterances, their moods and voices. This double focus is likely to 
produce a paradox of the hermeneutic sort; how are we to be sure 
where one begins and the other ends? This is Romantic irony.116 
                                                            
114 Stephen M. Parrish, The Art of the Lyrical Ballads (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1973) p.21. 
115 Jordan’s discussion of Wordsworth’s humour takes into account this characteristic fusion 
of the comic and the pathetic: ‘Indeed, Wordsworth’s most typical humor is something which 
might be called a joyous parody of life. It approaches caricature, but its intention is only 
faintly satiric… It is closely allied to plain good humor, and grows out of an excess of animal 
spirits. Life, it seems to imply, is a comedy to the man who both thinks and feels, and a note 
of pathos only enriches and humanizes the comedy.’ (p.86). 




As well as supporting Wordsworth’s own dismissal of a systematic poetic 
theory, and emphasising the need for readers to think and decide on a 
‘meaning’ for themselves, Simpson’s definition is certainly indicative of the 
way in which Wordsworth immediately envisaged the Lyrical Ballads as 
challenging ‘pre-established codes of decision’117 - Wordsworth presents a 
direct challenge to the contemporary reading public’s ‘degrading thirst after 
outrageous stimulation’118, by presenting heightened drama from everyday 
situations. Indeed, irony through drama can be pinpointed as the very ‘double 
focus’ which Simpson only refers to in more general terms. In the case of 
‘Simon Lee’, the reader’s expectation of a ballad is completely ironically 
reversed, with a refusal to offer a story at all,119  
 
My gentle reader, I perceive 
How patiently you’ve waited, 
And I’m afraid that you expect 
Some tale will be related. 
 
O reader! had you in your mind 
Such stores as silent thought can bring, 
O gentle reader! you would find 
A tale in every thing. 
 
What more I have to say is short, 
I hope you’ll kindly take it; 
It is no tale; but should you think, 
Perhaps a tale you’ll make it.120 
 
Relating this back to Simpson’s definition of Romantic irony, it can be seen 
that Wordsworth’s narrative standpoints of Lyrical Ballads fundamentally 
posit an epistemology founded on the ironist’s desire to challenge readers’ 
perceptions. Wordsworth here forces the reader to ‘question the meaning’ 
with a direct invitation to think about what he is presenting, without the need 
for the expected ‘outrageous stimulation’. However, the use of the ballad form 
to subvert the convention of narrative is only one way in which irony presents 
                                                            
117 ‘Advertisement to Lyrical Ballads’ (1798), in Prose Works, i, p.136. 
118 Prose Works, i, (1800: p.150; 1850: p.151). 
119 See Gravil, ‘Wordsworth as ironist’, p.50. 
120 William Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads, and Other Poems, 1797-1800, ed. by James Butler 
and Karen Green, The Cornell Wordsworth (London: Cornell University Press, 1992), ll.69-
80. Further line references appear in the main text. All poetry is quoted from this edition, 
unless stated otherwise. 
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itself in the poem; a further irony is present in the ambiguity of the content of 
the poem. As Gravil has noted, Wordsworth’s skill as an ironist hinges on the 
way in which he forces the reader to think about what is said and what is 
meant, ‘Generic confidence gives way to bewilderment as we wonder what 
kind of poem this is intended to be: is it supposed to be funny? is it in fact 
funny?’121 Here, the irony lies in the inability to arrive confidently at a definite 
answer to this question; humour is used deceptively – and consistently at the 
reader’s expense – with the sole purpose of making the reader think about and 
re-evaluate convention and ‘pre-established codes of decision’.  
 This is considerably accentuated in the 1820 revised text; here, there is 
no doubt about the poet’s intention to challenge the reader’s pre-conceptions. 
In his discussion of the editing of the opening stanzas, Mark Storey notes now 
the revisions soften the 1798 poem’s comic tones and accentuated absurdities, 
while still abstaining from sentimentalism.122 While the 1798 text may 
highlight the comic build-up to the ‘anti-tale’, the 1832 revisions are 
nevertheless important in their reiteration of the philosophy which underpins 
the irony in what Wordsworth is making his reader confront: 
 
What more I have to say is short, 
And you must kindly take it: 
It is no tale; but, should you think, 
Perhaps a tale you’ll make it. 
    (ll. 69-72) 
 
1798’s gently ironic ‘I hope you’ll kindly take it’ has become a more 
confident expectation on the poet’s part, ‘And you must kindly take it’; 
Wordsworth is here extending the original irony by reversing the emphasis of 
the reader’s expectations of the poet, the irony eradicating the initial 
seemingly condescending tone of the latter text. Similarly, the italicized 
‘think’ may appear condescending; however, Wordsworth is again penetrating 
the literal, and his real target can be seen as the poetry and taste which does 
not require the reader to think, renewing his 1790s attack on hollow 
sentimentalism and convention. Thus, he retains the mood of the 1798 poem, 
while more openly acknowledging the passing of the fashionable Gothic and 
                                                            
121 Gravil, ‘Wordsworth as ironist’, p.50. 
122 See Storey, Poetry & Humour from Cowper to Clough, pp.34-5. 
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sentimental ballads of the 1790s.123 Most importantly, however, Wordsworth’s 
narrator reinforces the poet’s attempts to place the reader at the centre of the 
process of generating meaning. As with Schlegel’s ideal reader, the reader of a 
‘lyrical ballad’ (as opposed to the Gothic ballad on which some of these 
examples are parodied) is as much a subject of the poet’s expectations as vice 
versa,  
 
The analytic writer observes the reader as he is; and accordingly he 
makes his calculations and sets up his machines in order to make the 
proper impression on him. The synthetic writer constructs and creates 
a reader as he should be; he doesn’t imagine him calm and dead, but 
alive and critical. He allows whatever he has created to take shape 
gradually before the reader’s eyes, or else he tempts him to discover it 
himself. He doesn’t try to make any particular impression on him, but 
enters with him into the sacred relationship of deepest symphilosophy 
or sympoetry.124 
 
Schlegel’s analytic/synthetic distinction would be recognizable to a 
contemporary reader as a take on Kant’s division of judgments as either 
analytic or synthetic in his Critique of Pure Reason. According to Kant, an 
analytic judgment is a self-contained one, because it is based on logical fact, 
whereas a synthetic judgment is true by definition, because it synthesizes the 
various elements Kant believes make up our experiences. By adopting Kant’s 
terminology Schlegel is pushing this dichotomy further to suggest that 
authorship, too, can fall under two categories, either challenged or 
unchallenged. Schlegel’s playful adaptation of these terms is used to ridicule 
the ‘analytic’ that means the writer remains unchallenged as author, but also 
that the reader remains unchallenged intellectually or creatively, since she is 
                                                            
123 When discussing the gothic, Wordsworthian scholarship has generally extensively focused 
on the ‘Preface’s disparaging comments on German gothic literature. For an original and 
contextual reading of the complexity of Wordsworth’s attitude towards the gothic, see 
Michael Gamer, Romanticism and the Gothic: Genre, Reception, and Canon Formation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.90-126. Gamer rehabilitates the 
importance of the gothic in positively influencing the poet’s work, suggesting that the critique 
of the gothic was apposite and contextual, and concluding that the ‘Preface’ should be read, as 
‘strategic rather than wholesale rejection of gothic sensationalism, as “defence” of the first 
volume of Lyrical Ballads rather than as manifesto, as response to reviewer criticism rather 
than revolution against it.’ (p.126). Gamer’s emphasis on Wordsworth’s complex – 
sometimes implicitly bordering on ambivalent – reaction to gothic literature is particularly 
important for my discussion of Wordsworth’s ironic challenges to contemporary expectations 
of the reading experience. See also Robert Miles’ more recent Romantic Misfits (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), in which the position of the Gothic and its influence on canonical 
writings (including Lyrical Ballads) is re-evaluated, see pp.62-97. 
124 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Critical Fragments, 112, pp.156-7. 
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spoon-fed ‘the proper impression’. The ‘synthetic’ mode of writing, on the 
other hand, is superior because it ensures that the writer’s monopoly on 
authorship is challenged through the intellectual stimulation of the ‘critical’ 
reader. Schlegel’s joke – using Kant’s terminology to undermine Kant’s own 
system – works to a serious purpose by revealing the impossibility of limiting 
judgments to the ‘I’; any judgment made by the self is reflected in the 
reception of that judgment. That is, the concepts of ‘symphilosophy’ and 
‘sympoetry’ demonstrate that anything projected by a writer is reflected by the 
reader. So, in its Schlegelian incarnation, the distinction between the 
‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ writers naturally extends to the reader, meaning that 
there are also two classes of reader; ‘symphilosophy’ and ‘sympoetry’, then, 
are not only terms that relate to a relationship of collaboration between 
writers, but also between writer(s) and the reader. I am arguing here that 
Wordsworth, too, makes similar distinctions, and that these distinctions are 
less implicit than might initially be thought. In Schlegelian terms, then, 
Wordsworth’s ‘analytic’ writer would be the author of Gothic sensationalism 
– Lenore’s Gottfried Bürger, for instance – to his own ‘synthetic’ writer. The 
prevalent ‘analytic’ writer of the 1790s is concerned with a mechanical 
literary production that has established and continues to nourish the masses’ 
cognitive ‘codes of decision’. Though it is Schlegel’s conception of this breed 
of writer that might seem more overtly opposed to mechanical philosophical 
production in the vein of Kantian or Fichtean systems, Wordsworth, too, is 
rejecting systemization, whether it is literary, moral, or philosophical.125 The 
                                                            
125 It is worth reiterating that a contemporary criticism of Wordsworth’s philosophical poetry 
was that it all contributed to a curiously calculated – and yet inscrutable – ‘system’. For 
example, Francis Jeffrey’s famously critical review of The Excursion opens with a reference 
to Wordsworth’s poetic corpus: ‘This will never do. It bears no doubt the stamp of the 
author’s heart and fancy; but unfortunately not half so visibly as that of his peculiar system. 
His former poems were intended to recommend that system, and to bespeak favour for it by 
their individual merit; - but this, we suspect, must be recommended by the system – and can 
only expect to succeed where it has been previously established.’ – See Francis Jeffrey, ‘On 
Wordsworth’s Excursion’, in Edinburgh Review, 24, 47, November 1814, 1-30, in On the 
Lake Poets, ed. by Jonathan Wordsworth (Washington, D.C.: Woodstock, 1998), p.1. 
Jeffrey’s attack probably follows Wordsworth’s famous architectural metaphor of The 
Recluse as ‘a Gothic church’ but overlooks his subsequent assertion that, ‘It is not the 
Author's intention formally to announce a system; it was more animating to him to proceed in 
a different course; and if he shall succeed in conveying to the mind clear thoughts, lively 
images, and strong feelings, the Reader will have no difficulty in extracting the system for 
himself’, as well as his earlier explicit refutation of a ‘systematic defense’ of the theory on 
which Lyrical Ballads are predicated .  
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writer producing a hybrid text that is predicated on irony is not only rejecting 
‘system’ or division of ‘genre’, but is also automatically defined as a 
‘synthetic’ writer in that he or she is predominantly engaged in not only the 
synthesis of genres and disciplines, but also of roles; in envisaging the reader 
as ‘alive and critical’ Schlegel is expounding a primary concern of the 
Fragmente as a whole, that of interchangeability between writer, reader, and 
critic.126 In allowing ‘whatever he has created to take shape gradually before 
the reader’s eyes’ the Romantic writer is, thus, acknowledging that production 
of a ‘text’ and authorship of it are by no means interchangeable – they are, 
conversely, two distinct categories within Sympoesie and Symphilosophie.127  
 The Romantic ironist, then, emerges as the writer who assumes the 
reader’s complicity in reading and creating a ‘text’, whether primarily poetic 
or philosophical. Irony is the aesthetic and philosophical principle operating 
on a conscious level for both writer and the ideal reader (the cultured reader, 
or gebildete Kenner). However, the extent to which it might also operate on an 
unselfconscious level of writing has been questioned; Kathleen Wheeler’s 
seminal study of Biographia Literaria seeks, in part, to question how far irony 
might be conscious in the work of the German Romantic ironists and of 
                                                            
126 See once again Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, p.143-159. In particular, see Critical 
Fragments, 27 ‘The critic is a reader who ruminates. Therefore, he ought to have more than 
one stomach.’ (p.147); and 65 ‘Poetry is republican speech: a speech which is its own law and 
end unto itself, and in which all the parts are free citizens and have the right to vote.’ (p.150). 
The far-reaching implications of this ‘republican speech’ for the poet-philosopher are further 
considered in relation to Novalis and Coleridge in the fifth chapter. 
127 Arguably, the use of ‘synthetic’ is taken even further by Novalis in Notes for a Romantic 
Encyclopaedia, Entry 63, titled ‘THEORY OF PERSON’, in which Novalis uses the term to 
equate with genius:  
‘A truly synthetic person, is a person who is many people simultaneously – a genius. Every 
person is the seed of an infinite genius. They may be divided into numerous people, and yet 
still be one. The true analysis of the person as such, brings forth people – the person can only 
be isolated, split and divided into people. A person is a harmony – not a mixture, not a motion 
– not substance, like the “soul”. Spirit and person are one.. (force is the cause.). 
 ‘Every personal expression belongs to a specific person. All expressions – of the 
person at once belong to the nonspecific (universal) personality and to one or several specific 
personalities.  
 ‘E.g. an expression, as a human being, citizen, family man, and a writer, all at the 
same time.’ (p10). Novalis’ theory of a synthetic identity, then, is one which encompasses all 
aspects of person- or selfhood. The true genius is one who can be a synthetic person, a term 
that is itself attributed to the ironist. To be a ‘synthetic’ person is to have enough of a handle 
on identity to know that identity or selfhood necessarily throws up several perspectives from 
which one must sympathize simultaneously. That is, to take a decidedly anti-Fichtean stance 
on the ‘ego’. The nature of ‘genius’ for Novalis is thus complementary to the views of genius 
within the writing and thinking of Schlegel and Wordsworth: to master a plurality in roles or 
perspectives – to achieve and exercise ironic distance – is to arrive at the heart of genius.     
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Coleridge.128 Using the central concepts of irony and metaphor, Wheeler’s 
comparative study suggests, quite rightly I think, that discerning the difference 
between the conscious and unconscious ironic activity of the ironic writer is a 
difficulty scholarship faces.129 This question remains pertinent and extends to 
the case of Wordsworth; in a recent essay on Lyrical Ballads Andrew Bennett 
has argued persuasively that the prefatory material to that volume uncovers 
what he calls a ‘poetics of ignorance’.130 According to such a reading, 
Wordsworth is championing a poetics that minimizes its own epistemological 
claims; knowledge, then, is an end that is sought through philosophical poetry, 
but certainly not what is claimed. The poet shares a certain amount of 
ignorance with the reader, Bennett’s reading suggests, because his work aims 
to determine how far poetry can encompass knowledge.  
But it is Wordsworth’s implied relationship with the reader that 
expounds the poet’s understanding of irony as a mode of writing; Bennett 
argues that, in appealing to a select class of readers who will apprehend the 
limits of any epistemological claim that can be made, Wordsworth is actually 
privileging ignorance. And this is what makes the defamiliarization of the 
quotidian possible: poetry is a sort of ‘ignorance machine’ because it 
defamiliarizes what we know and by doing so it reveals what we do not 
know.131 I would add to this by suggesting that the discovery of ignorance and 
knowledge is constantly at play in the Romantic poem; irony assumes 
knowledge of the writer’s methods, but ignorance of the final meaning – or 
indeed of the text as anything but a fragmentary Universalpoesie – which is 
always deferred. Although he does not give this poetics of ignorance the name 
of irony, Bennett’s reading of Romantic methods seems more penetrative than 
Wheeler’s in this respect, as it seeks to establish the degree to which the 
Romantic writer intends for poetry to be epistemological. 
 
 
‘He shouts from nobody knows where’ 
 
                                                            
128 See Chapter 4 of Kathleen Wheeler’s Sources, Processes and Methods in Coleridge’s 
Biographia Literaria, pp.59-80. 
129 Wheeler, Sources, Processes and Methods in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, p.59.  
130 See Andrew Bennett, ‘Wordsworth’s Poetic Ignorance’, pp.19-35. 
131 See Andrew Bennett, ‘Wordsworth’s Poetic Ignorance’, p.22. 
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Turning to ‘The Idiot Boy’, a seemingly incongruous fusion of a light and 
comic tone and a darker irony similar to ‘Simon Lee’ in its design is found, 
which forces readers to rethink their preconceptions of both poetic subject 
matter and purpose. As with ‘Simon Lee’, Wordsworth’s subversion of 
readers’ expectations partly rests on many ironic techniques; before, the 
reader is aware that this is a parodic mock-epic – at the centre of which is an 
‘idiot boy’ as the ‘hero’ – the poem is presented in the manner of a typical 
gothic ballad, 
  
’Tis eight o’clock, - a clear March night, 
The moon is up - the sky is blue, 
The owlet in the moonlight air, 
He shouts from nobody knows where; 
He lengthens out his lonely shout, 
Halloo! halloo! a long halloo! 
    (ll.1-6) 
 
The opening stanza here includes all the atmospheric details one might expect 
from a poem catering for a ‘degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation’: the 
scene is a night-time one, the moon is mentioned, as is an owl with a ‘lonely 
shout’, suggestive of isolation.  
However, the details are all wrong. This opening description of the 
atmosphere avoids any implication of the sinister or supernatural - indeed, the 
insouciance of ‘He shouts from nobody knows where’ brilliantly denies any 
adherence to the conventions of the ballad tradition. In this it joins Coleridge’s 
‘Christabel’ in thwarting reader expectation: 
 
 'Tis the middle of night by the castle clock, 
And the owls have awakened the crowing cock ; 
Tu--whit !-- -- Tu--whoo ! 
And hark, again! the crowing cock, 
How drowsily it crew. 
    (ll.1-5) 
 
In contrast to Wordsworth’s poem, Coleridge’s opening presents an 
immediate hint of the supernatural to the reader, with the simultaneous 
presence of the cock and owl blurring any distinctions of connotations of night 
and day (whilst still maintaining, ‘’Tis the middle of the night’, thus 
displacing the poem); however, a few stanzas on, Coleridge, too, begins to 
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play gently with the reader by subverting the familiar aspects of the gothic 
ballad: 
 
Is the night chilly and dark ? 
The night is chilly, but not dark. 
The thin gray cloud is spread on high, 
It covers but not hides the sky. 
The moon is behind, and at the full ; 
And yet she looks both small and dull. 
     (ll. 14-19) 
 
Coleridge’s skilful rhetorical questioning here operates in a similar way to 
Wordsworth’s 1832 revisions to ‘Simon Lee’ – instead of patronising the 
reader, the repetition and questioning seek to establish a greater consciousness 
on the reader’s part of her involvement with the text. As Susan Wolfson has 
noted in her essay on the function of rhetorical questioning in Lyrical Ballads, 
‘the speaker as questioner, instead of remaining the traditionally anonymous 
rehearser of the ballad, becomes a dramatic participant in the action and 
situation of the poem’.132 Here, Wolfson is highlighting an important aspect of 
Wordsworth’s ironic techniques that are designed to re-evaluate the reader’s 
engagement with the text, something which is vital in order to convey the 
poet’s philosophy. The narrator is a character who necessarily dramatizes 
Johnny’s tale through questioning, rather than merely rehearsing, which 
facilitates our understanding of where the poet intends the search for 
‘knowledge’ to lie. It is certainly not with the narrator (who knows nothing of 
Johnny’s adventures through the night); rather the reader is expected to 
partake in the ‘anti-tale’ by questioning the questioner. The irony, then, serves 
a dual function: the first is to ridicule the taste for ‘outrageous stimulation’ 
and the second is to mock the analytical writer who goes through the motions 
for such a passive reading public by reiterating the impossibility of arriving at 
a stock or definite conclusion. The poetics of ignorance that plays out in 
‘Simon Lee’ from the point of view of the popular reader is now doubled to 
include the narrator who is expected to claim objectivity. As I shall show 
below, this is taken a step further in ‘The Thorn’ with Wordsworth shuttling 
between the narrator’s claims of ignorance and his desire to reclaim narrative 
                                                            
132 Susan J. Wolfson, ‘The Speaker as Questioner in Lyrical Ballads’ in Journal of English 




 The ridicule of the uncultivated reader (that of the analytic writer) is 
apparent in the next stanza of ‘The Idiot Boy’, which effectively explodes the 
mock-Gothic atmospheric solitude and isolation of the first, with 
Wordsworth’s introduction of human presence and action, 
 
- Why bustle thus about your door, 
What means this bustle, Betty Foy? 
Why are you in this mighty fret? 
And why on horseback have you set 
Him whom you love, your idiot boy? 
    (ll.7-11) 
 
Having thus disrupted his narrative with action – accentuated by the repetition 
of ‘bustle’ – Wordsworth introduces the domesticity and maternal love with 
which the ballad is partly concerned, and from which the humour and pathos 
will simultaneously be extracted. As Mary Jacobus has noted, all Betty’s fuss 
and ‘bustle’ is over ‘the most unlikely ballad hero one could imagine, her idiot 
son’,133 and with this another kind of irony is introduced, as the poet 
reassesses conventional subject matter. As Gravil has noted, ‘Subnormality is 
a popular theme in sensational writing: guaranteed to chill. The discomfort 
aroused by treating the theme comically is purely intentional, and is increased 
by the element of satire on excessive feelings.’134 Here, it is again possible to 
see the link between irony and Wordsworth’s handling of sympathy; Gravil’s 
reference to ‘excessive feelings’ introduces the false sentimentalism that was 
often inextricable from gothic literature, and Wordsworth consciously draws 
attention to it.  
 The poem never mocks Johnny nor his mother, and the lines quoted in 
the previous paragraph as well as the conclusion to the poem make clear that 
the poet’s – and his ideal reader’s – sympathies lie with the maternal 
sentiments of the mother and the naïve hero of the poem. Though Wordsworth 
is sending up the conventional archetype of the hero, there is nothing insincere 
about his positioning of Johnny as a deserving protagonist; by giving Johnny 
the last word on his own ‘adventure’ Wordsworth reminds us that the 
                                                            
133 Jacobus, Tradition and Experiment, p.251. 
134 Gravil, ‘Wordsworth as ironist’, p.51. 
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narrator’s ignorance shows up the flaw in thinking that one can ever get a 
handle on ‘the whole story’. Despite semi-hysterical imaginings of the 
possible dangers Johnny may be facing alone while his mother searches 
frantically for him – with Gothic favourites such as the ‘horseman-ghost’, 
encounters with ‘goblins’ and potential death by drowning offered up – the 
narrator is perpetually at a loss as to how to account for the missing Johnny 
and his pony: 
 
Oh reader! now that I might tell 
What Johnny and his horse are doing! 
What they’ve been doing all this time, 
Oh could I put it into rhyme, 
A most delightful tale pursuing! 
    (ll.322-326) 
 
Eventually, however, the muses evade the narrator and the clever cutting back 
and forth from speculation to Betty Foy’s frantic search for her son reinforce 
what is philosophically at stake here: the relationship between the sympathy 
for Susan Gale that drives Betty to send Johnny to the doctor and the 
sympathy that empowers Susan Gale to move beyond her hypochondria, and 
the maternal love that drives Betty’s actions. The figures within the poem are 
heroic, Wordsworth is arguing, because they act out of genuine concern. 
 The ‘tale’ that the narrator is ostensibly so concerned with pursuing is 
quashed by the philosophical depth Wordsworth insists on giving the poem. 
As such, it becomes an ‘anti-tale’ in which, like ‘Simon Lee’, details and 
objective truths are consciously evaded. Johnny very appropriately gets the 
last spoken words of the poem and his reply to Betty’s, the narrator’s and the 
reader’s interrogation is suitably apt: 
 
For while they all were travelling home, 
Cried Betty, ‘Tell us, Johnny, do, 
Where all this long night you have been, 
What you have heard, what you have seen, 
And Johnny, mind you tell us true.’ 
 
Now Johnny all night long had heard 
The owls in tuneful concert strive; 
No doubt too he the moon had seen; 
For in the moonlight he had been 




And thus to Betty’s question, he 
Made answer, like a traveller bold, 
(His very words I give to you,) 
‘The cocks did crow to-whoo, to-whoo, 
And the sun did shine so cold.’ 
- Thus answered Johnny in his glory, 
And that was all his travel’s story. 
    (ll.447-463) 
 
Johnny turns out in the end to embody the ironic spirit of Lyrical Ballads, 
however inadvertently. His ‘travel’s story’ – consisting of hooting cocks and 
cold sunshine – signifies an endearing naivety outside the limits of logic and 
language. However, it also directs the reader to the absurdity of imposing 
logical strictures on philosophical poetry; there is nothing surreal or absurd 
within the poem, yet it defies the kind of logic that a passive reader might 
bring to bear on the text all the same by operating outside of the sphere of 
systematization or rationality. Johnny’s confusion of night and day, hot and 
cold, light and dark, cock and owl and crow and hoot sees an imaginative, 
intellectual and sensory repudiation of what the reader expects. Though he is 
lacking the self-conscious and cultivated detachment from binary oppositions 
of the ironist, he is privileged with an insight that the analytic writer’s readers 
may still be struggling to grasp. That is, Johnny’s ‘story’ strips away the 
sensationalism and the supernatural that so many narrators of the ballad have 
come to rely on, and in doing so he unwittingly makes the most genuine claim 
to being a narrator in the poem: Johnny becomes the most authoritative 
commentator on his adventures because he epitomizes the impossibility of 
producing a linear and logical narrative. Wordsworth’s poetological aim – to 
give his readers philosophical truth and poetic pleasure – is achieved by 
conveying playfully that a story or history cannot be understood or transmitted 
in either objective or subjective entirety.           
 It is useful here to compare the poem with ‘Simon Lee’s’ pejorative 
handling of a multifaceted sympathy that – like Blake’s pity – is negative due 
to the comparatively excessive gratitude it evokes. As Storey observes,    
 
As with ‘Goody Blake’, ‘Simon Lee’ works towards that conclusion, 
whose complexity is rolled up into the inscrutable ball of those last 
four lines, an oblique undermining of the social philosophy so many 
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readers might have expected.135 
 
Storey goes on to quote these last four lines of the poem: 
 
- I’ve heard of hearts unkind, kind deeds 
With coldness still returning; 
Alas! the gratitude of men 
Has oftener left me mourning. 
    (ll. 101-4)  
 
These lines, delivered with devastating simplicity, epitomize Wordsworth as a 
philosophical ironist, as he uses irony throughout to generate more questions 
than answers in order to make the reader think, the irony here enabling the 
power of the poet’s philosophical thinking to transcend the initial didacticism. 
It might also be useful to consider how it enables Wordsworth to express his 
personal concerns over his own privileged status.136   
 In ‘The Idiot Boy’, he prevents his own narrative from becoming 
mired within this sentimentalism, undercutting it by unaffected, reciprocal 
sympathetic engagement between characters. Thus, Susan Gale is roused into 
action at the end of the poem by a genuine concern for Betty and Johnny, 
causing her to overcome her own hypochondria, as she considers another’s 
distress, ‘And as her mind grew worse and worse, / Her body it grew better’ 
(ll. 425-6). Paul Hamilton has commented on ‘an uncomfortably close parallel 
between the reader and Johnny’ as being ‘part of the poem’s ironic mischief’, 
saying that ‘the sympathetic reader is only consciously re-enacting the idiot 
boy’s unconscious evasion of the rational censorship which normally rules our 
                                                            
135 Storey, Poetry & Humour from Cowper to Clough, p.33. 
136 See David Simpson, Wordsworth’s Historical Imagination: The Poetry of Displacement 
(London: Methuen, 1987), pp.150-1 - Simpson discusses the character of Simon Lee as being 
inspired by Christopher Tricky, a neighbour of Wordsworth’s at Alfoxden, and at whose 
expense the Wordsworths benefited from staying there. Simpson’s observation of 
Wordsworth’s unease at belonging to the class that benefited at the expense of men like 
Tricky parallels the precarious balance between sympathy and detachment found in his 
anonymous narrators.  Part of his ironic humour derives from an attempt to confront these 
difficult truths as much as making his reader do so. In this case, Wordsworth takes great care 
to place the poet and reader on the same footing, at the very same time that he gently plays 
with the reader’s expectations. The irony, therefore, is just as important to the poet and his 
processes as to the finished poetry and the pleasure or discomfort that the reader will 
variously derive from it. Simpson’s reading also highlights the contextual complexity missed 
in Jordan’s discussion of the protagonist: ‘There is no suggestion that he has been exploited 
and cast aside: not only is his master dead, but no successor lives in the hall of Ivor. He has 
his little plot of ground, he is just too feeble to tend it properly.’ - see John E. Jordan, Why the 
Lyrical Ballads? The Background, Writing, and Character of Wordsworth’s 1798 Lyrical 
Ballads (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p.154. 
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perceptions. Johnny becomes the reader’s humbling approach to a natural 
intimacy of Wordsworthian richness.’137 I would like to extend this to include 
another parallel between the reader and Susan, suggesting that her ‘recovery’ 
prefigures the reader’s ‘recovery’ from the ‘almost savage torpor’138 of both 
her everyday perception and the imagination addled by gothic excess. 
Wordsworth has here not only supplanted the gothic sentimentalism of the 
contemporary ballad with a philosophical human sympathy, he has challenged 
the reader’s understanding of ‘meaning’. As with Schlegel’s reader, then, the 
‘alive and critical Wordsworthian reader responds to the text in a way that 




‘In truth you’d find it hard to say’ 
 
Wordsworth’s dramatic irony becomes even more crucial in his re-evaluation 
of sympathy in ‘The Thorn’. The poem has been seen as inviting the reader ‘to 
perform a ‘heuristic’ function, to build up for ourselves a balanced case, but 
there is a prior process of selection and intentionalising going on right from 
the start of the captain’s narration which we would be gravely in error to read 
as the truth’.139 This unselfconscious intentionality of the narrator helps to 
understand one level on which the irony works; namely, that of Wordsworth’s 
use of drama to acknowledge the conflict between subjectivity and objectivity 
within narrative, and so the ultimate unreliability of the narrator. However, 
another level of irony can be added here with a consideration of how 
Wordsworth not only explores consciousness, but also the complications 
arising from the chief poetic purpose of imparting pleasure, as theorized by 
his ’Preface’. Both this and the Note to ’The Thorn’ (1800) clearly emphasize 
the technical function of metrical verse with reference to pleasure; however, 
the Note then confuses this by challenging explicitly the literal meaning of the 
poem itself, again making the reading experience both emotive and 
intellectual. As will be seen in the Wanderer’s relationship with sympathy, 
Wordsworth provides the reader with the tools to feel and enter into the poem 
                                                            
137 Paul Hamilton, Wordsworth (Sussex: Harvester, 1986), p.59. 
138 Prose Works, i, (1800: p.128; 1850: p.129). 
139 Simpson, Irony and Authority, p.104. 
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whilst retaining the ironic detachment necessary to think and view meaning 
objectively. 
 However, as Mary Jacobus has accurately identified, this does not 
mean that the poem is predominantly concerned with tracing how the mind 
operates.140 Jacobus’ emphasis on the distance between Martha Ray’s 
suffering and the narrator’s reliance on gossip and rumours once again 
accentuates the complexity of Wordsworth’s philosophical thinking; on the 
one hand, the poem is the most explicit handling of the difficulties of 
representation in narrative in the Lyrical Ballads volume (a concern that 
becomes paramount in The Prelude’s ironic depiction of London). On the 
other, it is equally concerned with reception, with the dramatic form 
deliberately and actively inviting the reader to question the reliability of the 
narrative. This is achieved by a process of affirmation through negation, with 
the narrator presenting not only his own views, but also making assumptions 
about the listener/reader’s concurrence with these,  
 
     There is a thorn; it looks so old, 
     In truth you’d find it hard to say, 
     How it could ever have been young, 
     It looks so old and grey. 
   (ll. 1-4) 
 
What seems at first a colloquial introduction to a local legend becomes 
immediately striking upon a second reading as anticipatory of the intentional 
tautology and repetition that follows throughout the entire poem; by drawing 
attention to the changed appearance of the thorn, the narrator invites the 
reader to think actively about the story as belonging to the past, and thus one 
which requires perception arising from two consciousnesses, past and present. 
Not only does this set the tone for the rest of the poem, it also comes closer to 
prefiguring Wordsworth’s use of dual consciousness to represent memory and 
                                                            
140 See Parrish, The Art of the Lyrical Ballads, p.99 – ‘It was intended to be a psychological 
study, a poem about the way the mind works.’  For an opposing argument, see Jacobus, 
Tradition and Experiment, p.248 – Jacobus rejects Parrish’s reading of the poem as a dramatic 
monologue exploring the sea-captain’s psychology, suggesting instead that the main focus of 
‘The Thorn’ is its exploration of the difficulty in comprehending suffering. See also Gravil, 
p.54 – ‘The one great fact in this poem, incidentally, is that of the giant suffering of the 
woman. ‘I have at all times endeavoured to look steadily at my subject’, says Wordsworth in 
the Preface. Which is something the captain and the villagers fear to do. While on one level 
the poem is an ironic enquiry into the working of the human mind (the narrator’s and the 
reader’s), on another it is a stark presentation of isolated pain.’ 
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the instability of representation itself in The Prelude.  
 This striking detail was initially attacked and underestimated as 
‘prolixity’ and ‘garrulity’ by contemporary criticism.141 Among modern 
criticism, Raymond Havens’ The Mind of a Poet has followed suit in 
undermining the importance of Wordsworth’s irony, referring to the poet’s 
use of topographical and atmospheric details in poems such as ‘Goody Blake 
and Harry Gill’, ‘Simon Lee’, ‘The Idiot Boy’, and ‘The Thorn’ as ‘this 
prolix, anxious adherence to reality, this dwelling upon unessential details’.142 
Havens also extends his charge of prolixity to the geographical details in The 
Prelude, overlooking what is, in fact, an essential realization of the poet’s 
craft as an ironist. In The Prelude, heavily-revised descriptions may seem 
prolix, until the reader realizes that the nature of the poem – one that traces 
memory and (re)presents at several stages in later life – demands an awareness 
of how memory for details operates and what function it could possibly play 
in understanding, or altering, consciousness. The tendency to misread 
Wordsworth’s philosophical irony in this way is often perpetuated by the view 
that his poetry fell into a steady decline. Even readings perceptive of 
Wordsworth’s use of irony, such as William Galperin’s discussion of The 
Excursion open with an all-too familiar dissatisfaction with the poem. 
Galperin asserts, ‘In a way criticism has been right to accord this terminal 
status with The Excursion, since the poem, very clearly, is determined to 
beleaguer - to be a difficult poem - rather than to satisfy.’143 But how much 
more difficult is The Excursion than The Prelude? Certainly, to contemporary 
readers unfamiliar with the unpublished Prelude, it may well have seemed so. 
However, Galperin seems to speak for modern readers as well, reiterating a 
generally weak argument for not reading the poem in any detail that would 
                                                            
141 See in particular Robert Southey’s scathing review, in which he writes of ‘The Thorn’: 
‘The author should have recollected that he who personates tiresome loquacity, becomes 
tiresome himself.’ – ‘Review of Lyrical Ballads’, Critical Review, XXIV (October 1798). 
Reprinted in Elsie Smith, An Estimate of William Wordsworth: By his Contemporaries 1793-
1822 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1932), pp.30-32; p.31. Coleridge later repeated this view in 
his Biographia Literaria, ‘But in a poem, still less a lyric poem… it is not possible to imitate 
truly a dull and garrulous discourser, without repeating the effects of dulness and garrulity.’ - 
Biographia Literaria, i, p.49.  
142 Raymond Dexter Havens, The Mind of a Poet: A Study of Wordsworth’s Thought 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941), p.12. 
143 William Galperin, Revision and Authority in Wordsworth: The Interpretation of a Career 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), p.29. 
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afford it a higher critical status. The Excursion can seem, at times, to be 
significantly more lugubrious than The Prelude, but for the modern reader 
who has the benefit of access to Wordsworth’s entire corpus, it should be no 
more intrinsically ‘difficult’ than either an epic philosophical work, such as 
The Prelude, or the shorter – though no less challenging – ‘Immortality Ode’. 
By focusing on providing a defence for why The Excursion should be read, 
such criticism undermines the continuity in Wordsworth’s thought, with 
studies of his poetic aims largely limiting themselves to a discussion of the 
‘Preface’.    
 In order to understand the significance of this continuity in 
Wordsworth’s use of irony in his philosophical poetry, it is useful to return to 
‘The Thorn’, and consider sympathy, and the role of a dramatic, detached 
narrator. Tradition and Experiment has been seminal in highlighting the ways 
in which Wordsworth simultaneously engaged with ballad tradition and 
departed from it. However, one aspect of Jacobus’ study has met with little 
attention from recent scholarship – while the influence of Percy’s Reliques,144 
and the poetry of both Cowper and Burns (and, in the case of his comic 
experiments, Bürger) has been much reiterated and examined, I would like to 
draw attention briefly to the influence of evangelical literature and hymnody 
in Lyrical Ballads and beyond. As Jacobus notes, Wordsworth’s ‘lyric writing 
is essentially doctrinal, and in this it owes something to the hymns of an 
evangelical period.’145 Jacobus goes on to explore the way in which 
 
Wordsworth’s celebration of nature relies on the same heartfelt 
simplicity, but Watts’ evangelical fervour has been replaced by 
doctrine of a more personal and subtly imagined kind. What both poets 
share is their concern to make belief accessible - to carry it out of the 
church or the book and into the heart.146 
 
This adaptation of Watts’ ‘evangelical fervour’ for philosophical poetic 
                                                            
144 However, in relation to Percy, the case for its direct influence on Lyrical Ballads may be 
overstated somewhat; see Robert Woof, Towards Tintern Abbey: A Bicentenary Celebration 
of ‘Lyrical Ballads’, 1798 (Grasmere: The Wordsworth Trust, 1998), p.1 – Woof opens by 
quoting Wordsworth’s acknowledgement of Percy’s work on the English ballad in 1815; 
however, he points out that, ‘Arguably, Wordsworth’s knowledge of traditional ballads 
increased after 1798, for, after his arrival in Hamburg in September that year, one of the few 
books he purchased from a bookseller there was Percy’s Reliques.’ 
145 Jacobus, Tradition and Experiment, pp.91-2. 
146 Jacobus, Tradition and Experiment, p.93. 
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purpose accounts, I argue, for much to do with Wordsworth’s treatment of 
sympathy. It is a primarily mediatory poetics that negotiates the implications 
of oral forms of poetry and moral philosophy (whether these are in doctrinal 
or balladic forms) within print culture and production; Wordsworth is 
attempting to reconcile philosophical, poetic and theological heritage with the 
need for a modern poetics based on education and reorientation rather than 
sermonizing. It is the poet’s view of sympathy as upheld by both thinking and 
feeling that allows him best to portray the pleasure-pain dialectic necessary to 
philosophical poetry, and it finds in the  evangelical tradition of ‘affectionate 
religion’ a predecessor, uniting as it did the importance of heart and mind.147 
In many ways, the influence of the Watts tradition of ‘affectionate religion’ 
reaches its Wordsworthian incarnation in The Excursion, with the dramatic 
detachment supplanting black humour as the principal ironic technique. 
Contrary to the view that Wordsworth’s experimentation with the dramatic 
medium ceased with the Lyrical Ballads,148 I explore the sustained interest in 
sympathy and dramatic irony in the following chapters. In the next chapter 
this will be done by considering Wordsworth’s reception of drama and 
spectacle itself in Books VI-VIII of The Prelude, and then in the concluding 
chapter I shall show how drama plays a central role to understanding how The 
Excursion shows continuity with Wordsworth’s earlier major works, including 
the Immortality Ode. 
 The spirit of an ‘affectionate religion’ that seems to preside over 
Wordsworthian sympathy is strikingly similar to that of Novalis, as the 
concluding chapter aims to show. The narrators of Lyrical Ballads learn as 
well as the eponymous hero of Heinrich von Ofterdingen or the student of Die 
Lehrlinge zu Sais that the path to self-consciousness – to finding oneself at 
home in the world – necessitates a cultivation of sympathy for what is external 
                                                            
147 The phrase ‘affectionate religion’ is taken from Isabel Rivers’ discussion of Watts, 
Doddridge and the evangelical tradition. See Reason, Grace and Sentiment: A Study of the 
Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), i, pp.164-204. 
148  See Parrish, The Art of the Lyrical Ballads, p.134. Parrish here undermines the dramatic 
ironic strategies employed by Wordsworth in later poetry, commenting that ‘It is ironic, 
however, that Wordsworth should have gained his greatest dramatic success by abandoning 
the ballad form in which his dramatic experiments had been cast. It is no less ironic that 
having gained the success he should have begun to move away not only from the 
experimental techniques but from the dramatic method in general.’  
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to oneself, to the extent that one does not feel divided from the ‘object’ to 
perceive it as such. The narrator of ‘The Thorn’ is denied this ironic 
detachment that simultaneously celebrates involvement in the ‘object’ as the 
self. With this denial, therefore, comes the inability to sympathize, according 
to Wordsworth: the ‘narrator’ is far too invested in a narrative of which he 
knows very little factually. However, it is Wordsworth’s exaggeration and 
manipulation of the unreliability of any one narrator and the difficulty of 
presenting a tale to the reader that revisits the grounds that ‘Simon Lee’ and 
‘The Idiot Boy’ tread; ‘The Thorn’ is also an ‘anti-tale’ because it operates 
wilfully on the kind of poetics of ignorance seen in those poems.  
 By doing away with the epistemological claims and objectivity that a 
narrator of a ballad conventionally expects to make, the old sea captain 
reveals his narrative instability, reiterating constantly his own ignorance. In 
doing so, he embodies Wordsworth’s most sophisticated dramatization of 
Unverständlichkeit and Sympoesie of all Lyrical Ballads’ narrators. ‘The 
Thorn’ is sympoetic since it imagines an ‘alive and critical’ reader who will 
enter with poet and narrator into the generation of meaning. Wordsworth 
undercuts the garrulity and sensationalist curiosity of the old sea captain’s 
narrative by extending his reader’s critical, emotional and intellectual input – 
Martha Ray may have given birth to a living child. Equally, she may not have. 
Supposing she did give birth to a child that was not stillborn, the narrator then 
skips forward by questioning what might have become of the child. Without 
successfully establishing whether or not the child was born alive he then goes 
on to ponder that it is difficult to say whether Martha Ray killed the child or 
not. Having left this, too, unresolved he jumps ahead of himself and forfeits 
any epistemological claims he might ordinarily hold as narrator (and local 
gossip) by wondering how the mother might have killed her child. Every 
claim to ‘knowledge’ or information about Martha Ray and her baby made by 
the narrator is predicated on speculation and the conflation of others’ 
narratives into his own. As such, these claims are rendered absurd in almost 
comic fashion; though the poem contains little in the way of comedy (aside 
perhaps from the black humour of the rhymes ‘cinder’ and ‘tinder’ to describe 
the physiological effects of her lover’s rejection of her), the ludicrous and 
self-defeating efforts of the narrator are held up mockingly by the poet as a 
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reminder of the limits of knowledge that we can make claim to.  
 The enduring poetological legacy of the poem lies partially in 
reminding us that the reader may succeed sympoetically where the narrator 
has failed, and that this can be achieved through embracing the 
incomprehensibility of an absolute meaning or objectivity. The ‘alive and 
critical’, cultivated reader who is more attuned to bringing her own emotional, 
moral and intellectual faculties to bear on the ‘anti-tale’ of Martha Ray is 
eventually the reader Wordsworth is aiming to shape with ‘The Thorn’. The 
incomprehensibility here – arising from the instability of narrative itself as 
much as events or (his)stories narrated – echoes that of the Märchen and 
poems considered in the previous chapter, to an extent. Though ‘The Thorn’ 
pushes its metadiscursive agenda a little further than Coleridge’s ‘lyrical 
ballads’ or Tieck’s Märchen, the poem is ultimately tied to that sympoetic and 
symphilosophical writing, because it questions any claims one might make to 
a definitive or absolute story. Martha Ray’s story is unknown to the old sea-
captain, yet the urge to tell it remains irresistible to him nonetheless. Like 
Coleridge’s Mariner or Christabel, the narrator of ‘The Thorn’ is caught 
between the struggle to tell a story and his inability to comprehend his own 
narrative. Although he does not come directly under the influence of the 
supernatural in the way Coleridge’s protagonists do, he is very much afflicted 
by the workings of superstition and the gothic upon his mind; the narrator, 
Wordsworth seems to suggest, fails in creating successfully a poetological 
narrative because of his decision to let the supernatural impede his faculties of 
rationality or sympathy. He does not choose to narrate an epitaphic tale of a 
fellow neighbour as a means to memorializing that individual in the way that 
the narrator of ‘The Brothers’, for example, wishes to do. Thus, such a 
narrative of the deceased is ultimately unacceptable for Wordsworth’s 
poetological aims, rooted as they are in sympathy for one’s fellows; according 
to the poet, the primary function of story-telling that is not autobiographical is 
for that narrative to serve as a means to memorialize, to ‘Epitomize the life’, 
as he would later describe epitaphic narration in ‘The Excursion’.149  
   
                                                            




‘a polyhedric Peter’ 
 
The use of comedy, irony and the treatment of the grotesque in Lyrical 
Ballads perhaps reaches its most surreal with Peter Bell, another poem 
composed in 1798 as a ‘lyrical ballad’, yet remaining unpublished until 1819. 
The Fenwick Note to Peter Bell makes it clear that Wordsworth originally 
intended the poem to feature in the first edition of Lyrical Ballads.150 This 
alone might not qualify it as a ‘lyrical ballad’ – rather, what centralises it in 
discussion of Wordsworth’s irony is the moral philosophy taken to be at its 
core by contemporaries. The poem was notably parodied by John Hamilton 
Reynolds in April 1819, before the appearance of Wordsworth’s original, and 
later and more famously by Shelley with ‘Peter Bell the Third’. In both its title 
and subject matter Reynolds’ poem makes no distinction between Peter Bell 
and Lyrical Ballads; titled ‘Peter Bell; a Lyrical Ballad’, the poem operates 
more as a parody of the perceived garrulity and moral philosophy of Lyrical 
Ballads than of Peter Bell. Indeed, the title is conspicuous in its conflation of 
Peter Bell with several of the poems published two decades earlier. Although 
the relationships the parody sketches between various individual poems of 
Lyrical Ballads is reductive, what is interesting about Reynolds’ approach is 
that he does draw on several poems from the volume, creating a sort of a 
meta-hybrid text in his poem, a Mischgedicht of a Mischgedicht. As a parody, 
though, this might also be seen as the point at which Reynolds’ poem fails: 
how far is it possible, we might well ask, to parody poetry that is itself part-
parodic and always metadiscursive? Reynolds essentially produces the same 
misreading that many reviewers of Lyrical Ballads produced upon publication 
in 1798, overlooking this metadiscursive nature of Wordsworth’s 
experimental ballads. In satirically titling his poem ‘a Lyrical Ballad’, 
Reynolds is quite right in drawing on the continuity between Wordsworth’s 
earlier work and later work, but by missing the ironic nature of the poetry, his 
parody becomes somewhat ineffectual.  
 Shelley’s parody has more of the polished self-reflexivity of the 
original Mischgedicht; rather than jokingly assuming the identity of an 
exaggeration of the Wordsworthian poet (as Reynolds does with his satirical 
                                                            
150 See Wordsworth’s Dedication to Southey, in Cornell Lyrical Ballads, pp.41-42. 
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footnotes and the epigram declaring, ‘I do affirm that I am the REAL SIMON 
PURE’), Shelley’s ‘Miching Mallecho’ seeks to underscore mischievously 
what it sees as the bloated moral didacticism of the original. His Peter Bell is 
‘the Third’ – a projected successor and reformer, not imitator, of the previous 
two. In calling Reynolds’ poem ‘the antenatal Peter’, Shelley is presumably 
not only commenting on the poem’s publication as preceding Wordsworth’s, 
but also suggesting that there is something necessarily undeveloped about 
Reynolds’ parody because of this. The ‘antenatal’ Peter poem never really 
emerges from its inchoate, foetal status, Shelley implies, while his own poem 
follows and addresses Wordsworth’s ‘real’ Peter Bell. We might ask, then, 
what the implications of a postnatal Peter are. On the one hand there is a 
parody of Reynolds’ parody, which itself tends to overlook the ironic or satiric 
tones of its target(s). On the other hand, there is an implied maturation in 
themes both political and moral in this third incarnation of Peter Bell. 
However, ‘Miching Mallecho’ assumes a curious position in relation to his 
direct narrative predecessor; he is not, like Reynolds, an exaggerated imitator, 
but nor is he overlooking the relationship between his and Wordsworth’s 
poem. In fact, the relationship is emphasized in order to highlight the moral 
and political distance Shelley feels from the ‘Predevote’.  
 The ‘Dedication’ to ‘Peter Bell the Third’, however, plays on the 
poem’s engendering of parody in order to appropriate it. Shelley’s Mallecho 
notes that, ‘Peter is a polyhedric Peter, or a Peter with many sides. He changes 
colours like a chameleon, and his coat like a snake. He is a Proteus of a 
Peter.’151 Of course, there is a double understanding of ‘Peter’ at play here; 
Shelley goes on to make it clear that ‘Peter’ is being discussed 
interchangeably with Wordsworth the poet, once ‘sublime’ ‘and now dull–o 
so dull!’ Yet, interestingly, the understanding of Peter Bell the poem, too, is 
as a multifaceted text. Though Shelley may not appreciate the inherent irony 
of the poem, this prefatory prose on the poem makes clear his understanding 
of what is at stake poetologically. That is to say, Shelley seizes on 
Wordsworth’s Peter Bell as a poetic moment in which to demonstrate how the 
latter’s poetology is indubitably at odds with his own. In order to achieve this, 
                                                            
151 Shelley, Poetry and Prose, p.340. 
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though, he appropriates the text for his own poetic ends, and in doing so 
further establishes it as a Mischgedicht, by suggesting a necessary accretion of 
the text. Though Shelley’s hyperbolic structural parallels between various 
Peter Bells and the Iliad are ironic, he shows his intention that ‘Peter Bell the 
Third’ should not only join directly after Wordsworth’s, but that it should also 
constitute the final comment on Peter Bell,  
      
I have violated no rule of syntax in beginning my composition with a 
conjunction; the full stop which closes the poem continued by me 
being, like the full stops at the end of the Iliad and Odyssey, a full stop 
of a very qualified import.152 
 
Shelley’s appropriation of the poem looks to be founded on a principle of 
generosity regarding authorship: it is perfectly acceptable for him to begin his 
poem in medias res because the poem is a continuation.153 Though slightly 
more aggressive in its reasons for appropriating, Shelley nevertheless 
recognizes the poem as lending itself to what I am interpreting as Schlegel’s 
Sympoesie. Such a reading of the concept has further-reaching implications 
for the Peter Bell parodies, I am suggesting, because the poem – as with many 
other ‘lyrical ballads’ – invites participation. Shelley may not be 
Wordsworth’s ‘ideal’ reader, but he is a reader, and is therefore given the 
power of authorship and/or authority in some measure.  
  This is perhaps a less desirable outcome of Sympoesie for 
Wordsworth, whose theoretical prose suggests that the ideal reader will 
extrapolate from his poetry a morality and philosophy that is not at odds with 
his own. However, the poem legitimates the parodies it spawns; 
poetologically, it speaks directly for reader participation in the same way as 
‘The Idiot Boy’: 
 
Is it the shadow of the moon? 
                                                            
152 Shelley, Poetry and Prose, p.341. 
153 Not to mention, of course, the mirroring of Wordsworth’s own structural decision to begin 
the poem with a stanza from about a third-way through the narrative: 
       
All by the moonlight river side 
It gave three miserable groans 
 ‘’Tis come then to a pretty pass’, 
Said Peter to the groaning Ass, 
‘But I will bang your bones’. 
    (ll.1-4)  
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Is it the shadow of the cloud? 
Is it a gallows there pourtrayed? 
Is Peter of himself afraid? 
Is it a coffin or a shroud? 
 
Is it a fiend, that to a stake 
Of red-hot fire himself is tethering? 
Some solitary ward or cell, 
Where lies a damned soul in hell, 
Ten thousand miles from all his brethren? 
 
Is it some party in a parlour 
Crammed, just as they on earth were cramm’d, 
Some sipping punch, some sipping tea, 
But, as you by their faces see, 
All silent and all damn’d? 
 
‘Tis no such thing, I do assure you, 
Which Peter sees in the clear flood. 
It is no ugly apprehension 
Of eyes and ears, ‘tis no invention; 
It is a thing of flesh and blood. 
    (1798: ll.531-550)154 
 
As with ‘The Idiot Boy’, ‘Peter Bell’ here plays with the reader’s Gothic 
imaginings or expectations, before asserting plainly the fleshly reality of the 
corpse. The workings of the supernatural are clearly refuted at this point, 
including Peter’s fears and paranoia (which later grow more significantly). 
The greatest form of damnation from the narrator’s perspective, however, 
appears to be a type of exclusion from communitarian life that is reminiscent 
of the sort suffered by Coleridge’s Mariner: ‘Some solitary ward or cell, / 
Where lies a damned soul in hell, / Ten thousand miles from all his brethren?’ 
These lines, along with the following stanza, seem to suggest that ‘hell’ in the 
narrator’s conception is a state of isolation. The prospect of being ‘crammed’ 
with others and yet perpetually ‘silent’ is as hellish and damned as being ‘Ten 
thousand miles’ from society, and this moral and social exclusion is the fate 
suffered by those who fail to develop sympathy, the quality we now take to be 
empathy. Both Peter and the Mariner fail empathetically towards the Ass and 
Albatross respectively; though Peter’s general morality is elaborated clearly as 
                                                            
154 See Cornell Lyrical Ballads, p.91 for the 1819 revisions. Interestingly, the final stanza 
quoted here (ll.546-550) is omitted in the later version, but the rhetorical imaginings the 
narrator delights in are increased.  
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being ‘wicked’, his redemption is more complicated than the crude workings 
of the fears of the supernatural upon the ignorant mind that Shelley and his 
contemporaries denounced.155  
  As with the hypochondriac Susan Gale, Peter Bell’s symptoms are 
psychosomatic and his recovery is triggered by his empathetic awakening 
toward the Ass, firstly, and secondly toward Robin, the lamenting son of the 
deceased man. The pain that seizes Peter after he takes pity upon the Ass and 
rides it back to its owner’s house appears to be a psychosomatic reaction to his 
stirring conscience: 
 
He thought – he could not help but think – 
Of that poor beast, that faithful Ass, 
And once again those ugly pains 
Across his liver, heart and reins, 
Just like a weaver’s shuttle pass. 
   (ll.871-875) 
 
The first time that Peter feels these ‘ugly pains’ is when he drags the corpse 
out of the river (ll.661-665) and, as he looks upon the Ass with the realization 
that it is the corpse of the Ass’s master, ‘all those ugly pains encreased’ 
(l.662), suggesting a direct correlation between the responsibility he feels 
toward recovering the corpse and pity of the Ass, and a physiological reaction 
to these unknown sentiments. Far from a supernatural visitation, it is the 
momentous dawning of empathy for fellow man and beast that haunts Peter on 
the journey back to the deceased man’s home, as he hears the boy’s sad song: 
 
But soon as Peter saw the Ass 
His road all on a sudden change 
And turn right upwards from the hollow, 
That lamentable noise to follow, 
It wrought in him conviction strange. 
 
A sober and a firm belief 
Is in the heart of Peter Bell 
That something to him will befall, 
Some visitation worse than all, 
Which ever till this night befell. 
                                                            
155 See The Romantics Reviewed, II, pp.538-39 for Hunt’s review. Both Hunt and Shelley take 
up the last stanza I have quoted above to disagree with what they see as morality founded on 




    (ll.786-785) 
 
Far more ominous than supernatural workings or fear upon his mind, these 
empathetic associations shock Peter as much as any Gothicism might excite 
the imaginatively challenged reader. Yet, these lines rouse the reader to 
recognize the intrinsic sympathy at work here. Peter is, in a way, hearing a 
version of the ‘still, sad music of humanity’ that the adult ‘Wordsworth’ of 
‘Tintern Abbey’ credits time with affording him, the sad wisdom of the 
Ancient Mariner’s Wedding-Guest, the ‘mourning’ of ‘Simon Lee’s narrator, 
or the anxiety that rouses Susan Gale. In all cases, a kind of bittersweet 
sympathy is at work here, a wisdom gained through a somewhat disturbing 
apprehension (and at times comprehension) of the double-edged nature of 
sympathy itself. 
   
 
Benjamin, The Waggoner 
 
So far, I have endeavoured to show how Wordsworth’s use of humour in the 
early poetry of Lyrical Ballads and the associated Peter Bell have striven to 
develop a poetics of sympathy as a distinct revision of – and antidote to – 
conventional moral philosophy. I have considered the relationship between the 
ironic tone and the ironic mode of writing – that is, the relationship between 
humour and dramatic interjection – in Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads and 
argued that an understanding of Wordsworth as an ironist is central to an 
understanding of his poetic practice. To conclude this chapter, I will now 
extract these claims further by showing more clearly how they have a bearing 
on Wordsworth’s poetological pursuit, through reading another poem 
published in 1819 very shortly after Peter Bell – The Waggoner.156 Pitched by 
Wordsworth himself as a work of fancy – not, crucially, of imagination – The 
Waggoner was subsequently appreciated by some of Wordsworth’s friends 
                                                            
156 My discussion of the poem considers both the 1806 manuscript (MS. 1) of the poem titled 
Benjamin the Waggoner and its revised and published first edition of 1819, titled The 
Waggoner as found in William Wordsworth, Benjamin the Waggoner, ed. by Paul F. Betz, 
The Cornell Wordsworth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981). Therefore, I shall 
distinguish between each version of the poem by referring to the former as Benjamin the 
Waggoner and the latter as The Waggoner. For the title of this chapter, I have opted to refer to 
the poem as Benjamin the Waggoner, as this was the more familiar working title for 
Wordsworth and his circle, and so takes into account the processes of composition it 
underwent, which is predominantly my interest in the poem here.    
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and literary circles as a playful poem.157 In some ways, critical attention to the 
poem in relation to Wordsworth’s other major works has been lacking; The 
Waggoner is seen – at best – as a fine example of Wordsworth’s use of 
humour, but the poet’s own presentation of the poem as fanciful and playful 
has, by and large, stuck, meaning that commentary on it has not really reached 
the depth that its thematic (and, to an extent, stylistic) predecessors of Lyrical 
Ballads have.158 
  However, the poem we know as The Waggoner plays a greater part in 
understanding Wordsworth’s corpus than perhaps contemporary admirers of it 
may have realized. In the poem, Wordsworth is certainly playing with 
conventions of satire, most obviously the mock-heroic genre, which he had 
experimented with in poetry as seemingly discrete as ‘The Idiot Boy’ and 
Books V and VII of The Prelude. Like Johnny, the Infant Prodigy or the city 
of London, Benjamin is the subject of satirical poetry. However, unlike those 
seeking to create the Infant prodigy or to perpetuate a fantastical 
reconstruction of London, neither Johnny nor Benjamin is the subject of the 
satire. The Waggoner is different in its treatment of satire, because it extends 
itself beyond that genre. It is, like ‘The Idiot Boy’, a poem that frequently 
steps outside of its conventional limitations in order to reposition its generic 
sympathies. The Waggoner is Wordsworth’s most extended treatment of the 
mock-heroic.159 Yet, just as we begin to read it as a playful mock-heroic tale 
complete with tongue-in-cheek references to our ‘Hero’ Benjamin, it 
progressively becomes clearer that the poet-narrator is presenting Benjamin as 
a hero in his own way. Rather than become a poster-boy for the perils of 
irresponsible drinking, as a Hogarth might satirically have had him be or a 
                                                            
157 An apt example of this is Henry Crabb Robinson calling the poem ‘purely fanciful’. 
According to Crabb Robinson, the poem has ‘far less meaning’ than Peter Bell. The constant 
parallels between Peter Bell and Benjamin the Waggoner – Charles Lamb also saw the poems 
as connected, something that Wordsworth reiterated when he dedicated The Waggoner to 
Lamb in 1819 after the latter’s appreciation of Peter Bell – are important because they 
connect the poem to Lyrical Ballads. However, I am also suggesting that this relationship 
between the three publications is both more complex than perhaps contemporary readers 
realized and rewarding for the present discussion of the centrality of irony in Wordsworth’s 
poetics.  For a more detailed look at the responses quoted and referred to here and for more on 
reception of the poem, see Betz’s Introduction in Benjamin the Waggoner, especially pp.17-
23. 
158 Even discussion dedicated to Wordsworth’s use of comedy and humour, such as Jordan’s 
‘Wordsworth’s Humor’ tend to dismiss the poem as affecting to be anything more than a 
mock-heroic comedy – Jordan see pp.87-88.  
159 For more on this see Betz’s Introduction in Benjamin the Waggoner, especially p.4.  
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Hannah More might morally have chastised him as in preceding generations, 
Wordsworth’s Benjamin follows his rustic predecessors in Lyrical Ballads in 
becoming a genuine hero in Wordsworth’s ‘treatment of human life’, to take 
Novalis’ phrase.  
  The evolution of the poem from Benjamin the Waggoner in 1806 to 
The Waggoner published in 1819 is important for uncovering a transition in 
Wordsworth’s use of irony as well as understanding better his continuing 
commitment to what Schlegel and Novalis theorize as Sympoesie. I hope that 
my consideration of the poem will help to contribute towards a greater 
appreciation of the role irony played in immortalizing. This will, in turn, 
enable us to see why writing of the self and the epitaphic poetologies of The 
Recluse fragments are so concerned with immortality and memorializing. 
When both the 1806 and 1819 versions are read in parallel they show just how 
strong the continuity between Lyrical Ballads and the Recluse fragments is. In 
diction and tone the poem belongs to the Lyrical Ballads tradition, which is 
unsurprising, given that it was being worked on and revised alongside Peter 
Bell. However, by the time it reaches the finished published form in 1819 it 
has become a more descriptive poem, showing a commitment to the longer 
poems whilst retaining the subject matter and ironic tone of Lyrical Ballads. 
So, Benjamin the Waggoner shows its affinity with Lyrical Ballads, but The 
Waggoner has moved this along, taking the irony and moral philosophy of the 
volume and developing some ironic distance and connecting it to 
Wordsworth’s more descriptive lyrics. The result is that both The Waggoner 
and Benjamin the Waggoner are more complex than often thought. As I have 
said, contemporaries such as Henry Crabb Robinson followed Wordsworth’s 
lead in calling it a poem of fancy and thinking it less poetically serious than 
Peter Bell. In fact, however, The Waggoner represents a shift from ballads to 
the ironic narrative lyric of self-representation, and it thus emerges as an 
important poem: this shift from ballad form to lyric and the shift from a 
narrator who is anonymous or apparently impartial – however much that 
impartiality is shown up as false or redundant, as in ‘The Idiot Boy’ or ‘The 
Thorn’ – to one who is personally invested in the story with recourse to 
biographical detail that touches on the subject’s life. Such a poem, then, 
exposes and explores what many of the poems of Lyrical Ballads slyly argued 
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in their technique. That is, Benjamin the Waggoner documents a significant 
move towards Wordsworth’s production of narrative that relinquishes even 
the most superficial claim to objectivity, but also reinforces the vanity of 
viewing the subject as external ‘other’.  
 Unlike many of the ‘lyrical ballads’ that dramatize their subjects from 
the point of view of an external narrator, we are encouraged to believe that the 
narrator of Benjamin the Waggoner is a version of Wordsworth himself; with 
playful references to Dove Cottage as the former inn that now houses the 
‘Poet’ we know to be Wordsworth, ‘A simple water drinking Bard’ (1806 & 
1819: l.60),160 Wordsworth establishes the intersection of Benjamin’s life with 
his own domesticity. The comedy is produced from the explanation of the way 
in which this intersection is presented: 
 
For at the bottom of the Brow 
Where once the Dove and Olive-bough 
Offered a greeting of good Ale 
To all who entered Grasmere Vale 
And tempted him who must depart 
To leave it with a joyful heart, 
There where the Dove and Olive-bough 
Once hung, a Poet harbours now – 
A simple water drinking Bard. 
Then why need Ben be on his guard? 
He [?amb]les by, secure and bold – 
Yet thinking on the times of old 
It seems that all looks wond’rous cold. 
He shrugs his shoulders, shakes his head, 
And for the honest Folks within 
It is a doubt with Benjamin 
Whether they be alive or dead. 
    (1806:ll.52-68)            
 
Having established Benjamin as ‘one of much infirmity’ (1806 & 1819: l.51) 
and one who needs divine protection from ‘mishap’ (1806 & 1819: l.46), the 
narrator-poet goes on to explain the potential danger the protagonist could 
face as being an ale-house. The heroic introduction of the toiling ‘Benjamin 
the Waggoner’ and his trusty horses is ironized by the revelation that his 
Achilles heel might be a public house. Knowing that this has since become a 
home for a poet with simpler drinking preferences, Benjamin is able to pass 
                                                            
160 In 1819: ‘A simple water-drinking Bard’. 
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unthreatened by the temptation to stop by and get drunk. However, we are 
reminded that the spectre of the past looms over Benjamin as he thinks of 
‘times of old’; Wordsworth magnifies the humour of a heroic figure whose 
one vice is drinking by contrasting his precarious situation of an imminent 
adventure with his own fictional self who is so safe in his domesticity that he 
could be dead for all Benjamin knows. Wordsworth effaces his ‘self’ even as 
he projects it into the narrative: he is there, but he is almost not there. This 
intersection, then, reminds us of both poet and narrator as liminal figures 
skirting the action of the tale, but it also makes clear that some version of 
‘Wordsworth’ has invested in Benjamin’s story and cannot remain detached 
from it: Benjamin is not the simple ‘object’ of the narrative, but a figure who 
inhabits the same temporal and spatial sphere as the poet/narrator.   
  The 1819 revisions to this section, though subtle, are significant and it 
is worth quoting the 1819 version of the passage: 
 
For, at the bottom of the Brow 
Where once the DOVE and OLIVE-BOUGH 
Offered a greeting of good ale 
To all who entered Grasmere Vale; 
And called on him who must depart 
To leave it with a joyful heart; -  
There, where the DOVE and OLIVE-BOUGH 
Once hung, a Poet harbours now, – 
A simple water-drinking Bard; 
Why need our Hero then (though frail 
His best resolves) be on his guard? 
He marches by, secure and bold – 
Yet, while he thinks on times of old, 
It seems that all looks wond’rous cold; 
He shrugs his shoulders – shakes his head – 
And, for the honest folk within, 
It is a doubt with Benjamin 
Whether they be alive or dead! 
     (1819: ll.52-69 
 
In these revisions we see that the mock-heroic humour has been extended 
further: ‘Ben’ is now referred to as ‘our Hero’, the name of the former public 
house has become a name in capital letters that emphasize its status as both 
written legend and as a legendary place from ‘times of old’, and Benjamin the 
‘Hero’ no longer ambles by in a nondescript fashion, but now ‘marches’ past 
131 
 
his former nemesis.161 The mock-mythologizing of Benjamin’s struggle 
against the temptation is clearly heightened in the language of ‘The 
Waggoner’. Perhaps less obvious is the way in which the text’s typographical 
revisions lend themselves to this purpose; Wordsworth’s revisions transform 
the poem in terms of diction and tone, but they also draw attention to how the 
poem is read; the punctuation draws attention to the fact that it is a product of 
print culture, thus distancing it further from the oral tradition Lyrical Ballads 
was ostensibly steeped in. Benjamin the Waggoner reads much like a ‘lyrical 
ballad’, despite the fact that it is not a ballad in formal terms – the passage 
quoted above is typical of the way punctuation is used relatively sparingly in 
the 1806 text to echo the light, bouncy pace of the comic poems in Lyrical 
Ballads. Like Benjamin, everything ambles along without much typographical 
disruption for the most part. The Waggoner, however, tells another story. Or 
rather, it tells its story in a different manner; the 1806 version of the above 
passage uses eleven punctuation marks in total, compared to the twenty 
punctuation marks of 1819. Almost doubling the number of the first version, 
the latter text transforms the typography of the poem, turning it from a jaunty, 
evenly-paced text to one that is self-consciously pausing, fragmenting and 
interrupting itself. The increase in dashes and commas and the introduction of 
parentheses all serve to draw attention to the fact that this is a poem which 
will abandon the notion of objective and ‘complete’ narration in favour of a 
narrative that will punctuate its own story with pauses and revisions.162 In 
Schlegelian terms, it refuses to be a Gedicht, that perfectible poem that can be 
completed, but Poesie that simply creates and re-creates (for more on this see 
the first chapter herein).     
  For a poem that makes moves to blur the distinctions between the 
narrator as spectator and the narrator as player and poet, such subtle 
                                                            
161 The references to Benjamin as a ‘Hero’ or ‘Conqueror’ become more frequent in 1819 (see 
also the change from ‘good Benjamin’ (1806: l.94) to ‘the Conqueror’ (1819: 101), showing 
that the poet is playing up the mock-heroic aspects of the poem in a way similar to ‘The Idiot 
Boy’, thus indicating that The Waggoner is a connective between Lyrical Ballads and later 
work. 
162 For more on Wordsworth’s use of punctuation and its significance for the poet’s 
fragmentation, see Alexander Regier’s Fracture and Fragmentation in British Romanticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.95-118. Regier is particularly interested 
in the use of the parenthesis to fragment Wordsworth’s narrative in The Prelude, but I think a 
similar case can be made for The Waggoner, as the fragmentation of the text reveals the 
instability of the uninterrupted narrative. 
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typographical shifts are important. In order to focus my discussion of the 
poem I will limit myself to two further sections of the text for the remainder 
of the chapter. The first of these is the ‘Rock of Names’ passage found in 
1806, but omitted in 1819, and the second is a very brief comment on the 
implications of the conclusion of the poem. Both of these, I argue, continue to 
inform our understanding of the poem as transitional in both the use of irony 
and writing of the self.  
  The ‘Rock of Names’ passage is a particularly poignant section of the 
1806 poem: 
 
Ah! dearest Spot! dear Rock of Names 
From which our Pair thus slaked their flames! 
Ah! deem not this light strain unjust 
To thee and to thy precious trust, 
That file which gentle, brave, and good, 
The [?de]ar in friendship and in blood, 
The hands of those I love the best 
Committed to thy faithful breast! 
No, long as I’ve a genial feeling 
Or one that stands in need of healing 
I will preserve thy rightful power 
Inviolate till life’s final hour. 
A[?ll take with kind]ness then as said 
With a fond heart through playfull head, 
And thou thy record duly keep 
Long after they are laid asleep. 
    (ll.496-511) 
 
The last two lines of the passage suggest that its inclusion is somewhat 
redundant for Wordsworth, as the rock will ‘duly keep’ the records of the 
inscribed names. However, as I shall argue in the final chapter of this thesis, 
this is not so; the physical memorial is not in itself adequate as an epitaph. 
Rather, epitaphic narrative – whether verbal or written – is what ensures 
memorialisation (and thus immortality) for Wordsworth. Why, then, is this 
written epitaphic narrative omitted from the published version? The passage 
sketches out the period in Wordsworth’s literary career that I have argued in 
the previous chapter as being his most fruitful collaborative period. That is, it 
presents a sympoetological moment in the poet’s biography. It was removed, 
ostensibly, to improve the smooth narration of Benjamin’s tale. Yet, for a 
poem that becomes progressively more punctuated and interrupted, this reason 
133 
 
seems unsatisfactory in itself. It is easy to suggest that its omission is a natural 
result of souring personal relations between Wordsworth and Coleridge, and 
the breakdown of the circle. However, I am more interested in the fact that the 
omission limits the intersection of ‘Wordsworth’ and Benjamin, ensuring that 
the poem maintains some distance from writing of the self, even if it borders 
both Lyrical Ballads and the autobiographical writing. I am suggesting that 
the ‘Rock of Names’ passage makes clear that Wordsworth is working on the 
elegiac, epitaphic philosophical poetry and the ironic-dramatic philosophy 
side by side, but that he hesitates to let one subsume the other in The 
Waggoner. Even though the two types of poetry overlap in both the 1806 and 
1819 texts, by 1819 he has decided that the biographical, memorializing 
poetry that the passage represents belongs to the drama of recollection and 
composition, rather than the ironic-dramatic poems of Lyrical Ballads with 
which The Waggoner is more closely affiliated; the elegiac strains of ‘a fond 
heart’ cannot adequately be expressed in a poem that results from a ‘playfull 
head’. The passage is incongruous in this poem, not because it disrupts the act 
of reading, but because it disturbs the poet’s own misgivings of incorporating 
biographical epitaph into ‘light strain’ even as he commits it therein. So, the 
omission is an exercise in autobiographical restraint in this instance, but this 
restraint is necessary in order to maintain the integrity of that autobiographical 
writing.  
  The conclusion of the poem, however, hints at the universal 
importance of memorializing, reminding us that some biographical investment 
of the narrator-poet in the story remains, and once again affirming that there is 
no clear-cut distinction between the writing of self and the memorializing and 
dramatizing of another. The poet-narrator’s fond and playful memory of 
Benjamin becomes an epitaph for the waggoner; the self narrating the story of 
another self effaces the distance between the two in its summation through 
epitaph. The tricky question of how far the poet’s biography can impose on 
the story of the waggoner is negotiated by turning Benjamin into a genuine 
hero. The anonymous multitudes who suffer through their travels without his 
protection draw attention to the importance attached to the waggoner. Thus, 
the poem’s final comment is not on the poet-narrator’s self, but on how to 
memorialize a self.  
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  I have suggested that in Benjamin the Waggoner/The Waggoner we 
see a palpable shift from the universalizing moral philosophy of Lyrical 
Ballads to a more dynamic self-reflexivity that is closer to ‘Tintern Abbey’ 
and the moral episodes of The Prelude (this is particularly the case with Book 
VII). In making clear the biographical connections between Wordsworth and 
the poem’s narrator, the poet is shifting from the drama of characters and 
unreliable narrators to the drama of the ‘I’ and its personal experiences. He 
has not refracted or split this ‘I’ as in The Prelude, but the poem is a space in 
which he acknowledges the inherent drama of the recollection and 
composition of the experiences of the ‘I’. Curiously, therefore, The Waggoner 
further undermines a neat linear chronology of Wordsworth’s work (the 
implications this has for reading Wordsworth are explored further in the 
following chapter). Indeed, it shows that two unifying factors in 
Wordsworth’s major poetry outside of The Recluse are irony in narrative and 
the inherent drama of narrative and composition. These unifying factors, in 
turn, are the very same that connect this poetry to that of the Recluse project. 
So, a linear reading of Wordsworth’s poetry – a codified ‘system’ a la Francis 
Jeffrey or Geoffrey Hartman – is too neat and ordered to work, but continuity 
across the Wordsworth corpus reveals a sustained commitment to both irony 
and drama. Such a commitment to ironic revision through revisioning is 
apparent in major work as early as ‘Tintern Abbey’, but the importance of 
Benjamin the Waggoner/The Waggoner lies partly in seeing how this is 
sustained; by working and reworking the poem, Wordsworth is showing a 
need to write and rewrite the self in a way that is similar to The Prelude. As 
with ‘Tintern Abbey’, then, this poem shows a move toward becoming a 
dramatic character narrating the self a la The Prelude, rather than a dramatic 
self emerging through the narration of others’ tales.   









Chapter 4. ‘Irony is permanent parabasis’: ‘Wordsworth’s’ dramatic 
voice in The Prelude(s), 1805 & 1850 
 
But though the picture weary out the eye, 
By nature an unmanageable sight, 
It is not wholly so to him who looks 
In steadiness, who hath among least things 
An under-sense of greatest; sees the parts 
As parts, but with a feeling of the whole. 




At first glance, the two dominant ways in which drama features within 
Wordsworth’s major poetry seem opposed to one another. On the one hand, 
there is the dramatic diffusion of voices, narratives and characters from 
Lyrical Ballads to The Excursion; instead of a central authorial voice (such as 
the one found in the ‘egotistical’ poetry of The Prelude), the narrative is 
delegated to an external voice or character. In the case of Lyrical Ballads this 
is achieved through anonymous narrators who subjectively interpose a 
seemingly straightforward, linear tale. With The Excursion, Wordsworth’s 
reliance on drama is clearer still; the poem’s Preface acknowledges the 
dramatic style and use of characters within the poem.163 On the other hand, 
and perhaps less obviously, there is the poet’s dependence on drama in his 
seemingly ‘egotistical’ poetry. Wordsworth’s often-documented 
preoccupation with how best to represent the visual world joins the latter 
category of poetic use of drama, most noticeably in The Prelude’s Books VI-
VIII. While the poem’s depiction of London has often been highlighted as a 
point of imaginative crisis for the poet, it also marks a pivotal moment in the 
resolution of a wider crisis. The relationship between the London book and 
Books VI and VIII is central to this resolution, and to the realization of 
‘Wordsworth’s’ dramatic voice. Distinct from the dramatic diffusion of 
                                                            
163 As noted on above (see n.91 herein), this characterization was criticized by Coleridge as ‘a 
species of ventriloquism’, with Coleridge focusing on the weakness of attributing the Pedlar 
with such unlikely words, before continuing: ‘un undue predilection for the dramatic form… 
presents a species of ventriloquism, where two are represented as talking, while in truth one 
man only speaks.’ (Biographia Literaria, i, pp.134-5). What Coleridge misses here, though, is 
the significance of drama as a means to diffuse narrative voice (see also Francis Jeffrey, ‘On 
Wordsworth’s Excursion’, pp.29-30). This is a theme I shall return to in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis. 
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narrative voices and characterization employed in other major works – 
explored further in the two chapters that follow – Wordsworth’s use of drama 
here is centred upon the creation and representation of the ‘self’. The central 
positioning of Book VII shows up a crisis in this representation, a rupture 
between two ways of seeing/experiencing nature164, the dominant aesthetic 
categories of the late eighteenth-century: the sublime and the panoramic 
beautiful. The natural sublime impedes Wordsworth’s imagination in a way 
that makes it impossible for him to describe the external world, exemplified 
by the Simplon Pass and Ravine of Arve episodes of VI. By Book VIII, the 
beginning of the resolution of this impediment is evident through the 
panoramic view of Grasmere Fair atop Helvellyn, and the treatment of 
spectacles and theatricality in Book VII is central to this, as Wordsworth 
moves from the obstructive sublime to a traditional, ordered natural panorama. 
I argue here that the centrality of Book VII in the poem accentuates its 
critical position in the common creation of a new, reparative aesthetic and 
philosophical category. This I understand to be Romantic irony, underpinning 
which are drama and other existing forms of irony.165 When Schlegel refers to 
irony as ‘permanent parabasis’ he highlights a crucial element of Romantic 
irony. The dramatic potential for Romantic irony is implicit within the concept 
of parabasis. Parabasis, here understood as conscious interruption of one’s 
own narrative (though it may also relate to conscious interruption by other 
narrators/characters, as discussed elsewhere in the thesis in relation to Lyrical 
Ballads), is aligned with irony in this tendency to punctuate the narrative or 
text. In The Prelude, this is seen as the main function of Wordsworth’s 
extensive revisionary habit. This suggests that Wordsworth was, like the Jena 
Frühromantiker, engaged in rehabilitating the philosophical value of irony 
through literature, specifically through the production of the ‘philosophical 
                                                            
164 See David Simpson, Wordsworth and the Figurings of the Real (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1982), p.xi - ‘Many of Wordsworth’s poems are concerned with the variations, whether 
momentary or habitual, between how people ‘see’ things.’ 
165 For an early discussion of the significance of German Romantic irony, see Peter Firchow’s 
Introduction in Lucinde and the Fragments, especially pp.29-30. Firchow is among the 
earliest modern Anglophone scholars to produce a critical edition of Schlegel’s Fragments, 
and his Introduction discusses the interrelationship of irony and parabasis in Schlegel’s 
conception. See also Wheeler, German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, pp.3-4. Though my 
conclusions differ at times from those that Wheeler draws, her seminal work on Anglo-




poem’. So, Wordsworth’s rejection of Coleridge’s rigorous projections for this 
type of poetry – insistent as they seemed on a philosophical model for poetry 
– does not equate with a failed or abandoned project. Rather, Wordsworth’s 
treatment of the philosophical poem is strikingly similar to German poet-
philosopher contemporaries, in that it calls for philosophy to delegate some 
authority to poetry, not vice versa. In other words, it is philosophical poetry 
that Wordsworth aims to write, not poetic philosophy.166  
The poet’s most striking use of irony in Book VII – alongside the 
revisionist dual consciousness employed throughout the poem167 – is seen in 
the ironic creation of an urban analogue to the sublime experience, 
encountered most notably in the previous Book with the Ravine of Arve 
passage. This provides him with one of his most fruitful imaginative 
possibilities as a philosophical poet and ironist; a dramatic response to 
spectacles in the city enables the poet to utilise the seemingly negative, 
alienating experiences of the city to find a versified unity in the anarchic 
diversity he describes. Though Wordsworth – in his capacity as both spectator 
and retrospective poet – is certainly resistant to the excess and vices of the 
city, manifest in its spectacles and theatricalizing, he nevertheless recognizes 
their poetic and philosophical value. In the following discussion I shall argue 
that his successful manipulation of spectacle is achieved through dramatic 
interruption of his own narrative. This is framed by his handling of two 
popular contemporary spectacles, the panorama and phantasmagoria. As I 
shall demonstrate below, these are denigrated for their mimetic and/or 
sensationalist properties, making them visual analogues to the Gothic and 
unnaturally refined types of literature denounced in the ‘Preface’ to Lyrical 
Ballads. They are, therefore, visual counterparts of the ‘analytic’ writing that 
Schlegel criticized in theory and Wordsworth in practice; the panorama and 
phantasmagoria are akin to ‘analytic’ ways of seeing and, so, they seek to 
                                                            
166 See Chapter 1, n.13 for more on this. However, it would not only be unfair, but also short-
sighted to dismiss wholesale Coleridge’s literary theory or practice, as discussed in the second 
chapter of this thesis. 
167 See Simpson, Wordsworth and the Figurings of the Real, p.xviii - ‘In many of 
Wordsworth’s poems, the ‘first sight’ produces either confusion or misreading, and must be 
corrected by the second look. It becomes important, then, that we live in a society which 
allows us time for the second time.’ Although the conclusions I come to are sometimes in 
contention with his, Simpson’s terms are nevertheless a valuable starting point for my 
discussion of irony in Book VII. 
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inspire pre-conditioned aesthetic responses from their audiences. As 
spectacles they dominate over the poet’s senses and imagination, threatening 
to overturn his ability to process mentally, and subsequently poeticize, the 
London experience. Adapted as modes of visualizing, however, they restore 
the poetic imagination, enabling Wordsworth to alternate his narrative 
perspective between the solitary condescension of overviews of the city, and 
dizzying accounts of walking the streets. Thus, what emerges from the 
manipulation of ‘analytic’ ways of seeing is a ‘synthetic’ and ironic 
dramatization of London, much like the ‘synthetic’ writing produced in 
Lyrical Ballads, as seen in the previous chapter. Through considering Book 
VII in relation to its position between two natural examples of the chaotic 
sublime and the panoramic beautiful, I aim to show how these descriptions of 
the poet in the midst of barely contained crowds – the daily ‘hubbub’ of the 
metropolis – and the narrative mastery over this chaos, are enabled through 
irony – here equated with parabasis. My argument is therefore presented by 
reading the text on two levels, structural and thematic. What unites this 
manifestation of irony with the former one of dual consciousness is the fact 
that they are both concerned with ‘ways of seeing’, with Wordsworth able to 
explore their potential for ways of showing.  
The title of this chapter comes from Friedrich Schlegel’s famous 
fragment stating, ‘Die Ironie ist eine permanente Parekbase’ [Irony is 
permanent parabasis].168 For Wordsworth, too, irony appears to be permanent 
parabasis. In fact, parabasis is the crux of Book VII. However, I believe his 
parabasis – or dramatic interruption – throughout The Prelude has been 
misread as a disruption, and, in the case of London, a failure to account for 
that experience.169 Much of Wordsworth’s experimentation with the dramatic 
voice demonstrates irony as parabasis, though, as noted above, The Prelude 
                                                            
168 Philosophische Lehrjahre I, in Friedrich Wilhelm Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-
Ausgabe, ed. by Ernst Behler, Anstett and Eichner, 35 vols (Munich: Schoningh, 1958-), xviii, 
p.85.  
169 This appears to be the dominant tendency, following Geoffrey Hartman’s reading of The 
Prelude in Wordsworth’s Poetry. Though it is a work of undoubted importance, I think 
reluctance to break away from its view that Wordsworth’s narrative is prone to constant 
unwitting diversions and disruptions (see especially pp.218-236) overlooks the poet’s 
revisionary impulse as a modern mode of writing itself. In reconsidering Hartman’s insistence 
that the poet is ‘waylaid’ during Book VII’s narrative, I hope to show how Wordsworth’s 
aesthetics accounts for his self-reflexivity, i.e. how irony forms the revisionary habit.  
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stands out with its purpose of creating the ‘self’.170 The present concern is 
with permanent parabasis, a Schlegelian innovation in the theory of irony and 
a practical concern for Wordsworth in creating the ‘self’ and finding 
‘Wordsworth’s’ dramatic voice. The Prelude consists of permanent parabasis; 
for example, each of the ‘spots of time’, episodes with the solitaries, and 
effusions/revisions are instances of conscious interruptions of the linear (and 
thus not always chronological) narrative of the poem. Paul de Man’s 
discussion of the paradox inherent in the concept of ‘permanent parabasis’ is 
interesting here.171 De Man takes up previous commentators’ observations 
that permanence appears to contradict the idea of parabasis (a single 
interruption or turn in rhetoric/register), and that this is the point of Schlegel’s 
theory of irony. This can be extended, quite usefully I think, to Wordsworth’s 
own revisionary poetic practice of dual consciousness, which depends upon 
permanent parabasis, the ability to interrupt one’s own narrative in order to 
revise it. This is as much philosophical as it is poetic – irony becomes a 
necessary mode of writing, not just a literary device invoked for a certain 
purpose. 
Of course, cross-cultural parabasis itself is not specifically a Romantic 
technique in literature and drama, and Schlegel and his contemporaries are not 
alone in drawing their examples from the Elizabethan stage and beyond. The 
introductory material of Goethe’s Faust (such as the address to the audience) 
may have been influenced to some degree by the examples of parabasis he 
found in Shakespeare (and others), whom he greatly admired, as much as the 
Greek chorus.172 Though it is speculative to suggest that Wordsworth’s own 
handling of Bartholomew Fair was influenced by Ben Jonson’s play, he would 
nevertheless have been conscious of the dramatic – and dramatized – 
                                                            
170 Though it may be more clearly seen in certain Lyrical Ballads – notably ‘Simon Lee’, ‘The 
Thorn’, ‘The Idiot Boy’, and ‘Goody Blake and Harry Gill’ – this is done through an 
anonymous narrator, rather than any recognizable version of ‘Wordsworth’ as we might 
imagine him. These shall be read in the following chapter, within the context of the 
Mischgedicht. 
171 See his Aesthetic Ideology, ed. by Andrzej Warminski (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), pp.178-99. 
172 See Goethe’s and Herder’s efforts to re-evaluate German literature and nationalism 
through readings of Shakespeare: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, ‘Shakespeare: A Tribute’ 
(1771) in Essays on Art and Literature, Goethe’s Collected Works, trans. by Ellen & Ernest 
H. von Nardroff (New York: Suhrkamp, 1986), iii; see also Herder, ‘Shakespeare’ (1773) in 




possibilities of the event. It is these possibilities that distinguish Wordsworth’s 
use of parabasis in the formation of an ironic mode of writing; the key 
difference between this and earlier examples of parabasis in drama is that in 
Romantic theory and literature it now reflects the ‘I’, which then takes on a 
dramatic role rather than the drama producing the ‘I’.173 The represented ‘self’ 
externalizes its sense of being and drama, like philosophy, becomes a means 
to recovering self-consciousness through art. So, whilst acknowledging its 
debt to it, the Romantic use of drama subverts previous efforts at self-
reflexivity in drama, and it is this that makes Book VII especially interesting 
for any discussion of parabasis. 
 If the ‘self’ of autobiographical poetry is constantly subject to revision 
until the notion of a single, stable identity itself is subverted, it comes to 
embody the Schlegelian conception of modern literature and its author(s) as 
forever ‘in the state of becoming’. What this means in the widest context of 
Anglo-German Romantic irony is that Wordsworth’s mode of writing may be 
located not only among his contemporary thinker-writers, but also among the 
writings of those opposed to his apparent egotism. As the dramatic application 
of irony to the narrative of philosophical poetry, the use of parabasis means 
that Wordsworth’s poetry may not, after all, be at such a far remove from, for 
example, the Keatsian ‘poetical Character’. Though that concept was 
introduced by Keats in critical response to Wordsworth’s poetic practice, 
Book VII of The Prelude can be seen to establish its author, even in an 




‘…the NE PLUS ULTRA of optical delusion’  
 
I began by suggesting that Book VII is pivotal to the resolution of a visual and 
imaginative crisis and it is to the visual scene/object I wish to return now in 
order to argue that Wordsworth dramatizes his reception of spectacles, and so 
                                                            
173 This is also the case when we consider more prominent examples of parabasis punctuating 
writing of the self, such as Diderot’s Jacques the Fatalist or Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, both of 
which Schlegel sees as exemplary ironic texts – see Lucinde and the Fragments, p.29.  




rescues the senses and imagination from an excess of sensory stimuli that 
London presents him with. Sandwiched between the respective sublime and 
panoramic experiences of nature as Book VII is, it is dramatic parabasis that 
allows the chaotic urban landscape to become comprehensible in some form 
to Wordsworth. Wordsworth takes both the natural sublime of Book VI and 
the panoramic totalizing of Book VIII as models on which to project 
dramatically his narrative. As with the Lyrical Ballads’ critique of the popular 
gothic genre in contemporary literature, Book VII continues with a critique of 
contemporary popular entertainment, this time in the visual forms of the 
panorama and phantasmagoria.175 And again, as with the gothic parodies of 
Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth subverts conventions of the popular and/or 
sensational to reveal their instabilities and in turn produce ‘philosophical 
poetry’. Unlike arguments developing Geoffrey Hartman’s, like Neil Hertz’s, 
which have Wordsworth’s writing here in crisis, struggling against a sublime 
aesthetics it cannot abandon, my reading has him confidently critiquing public 
theatricality of a kind he can stand back from and dramatically entertain in his 
own writing as one aesthetic posture among others he can adapt before 
moving on to another. 
Before I turn to Wordsworth’s treatment of these in Book VII, it is 
useful to consider how the spectacles themselves were presented. Both 
exploded onto the London entertainment scene towards the end of the century 
and were hailed as visual phenomena, the panorama paradoxically seen as 
both masterful artistic imitation of nature, and a new way of perceiving nature 
itself – what would be considered in David Simpson‘s terms to be both the 
‘first sight’ and ‘second look’.176 The panorama (one of those ‘spectacles 
                                                            
175 For a reading of the possible interrelationship between these two spectacles themselves in 
Romantic London, see Iain McCalman, ‘Mystagogues of revolution: Cagliostro, 
Loutherbourg and Romantic London’, in Romantic Metropolis: The Urban Scene of British 
Culture, 1780-1840, ed. by James Chandler and Kevin Gilmartin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp.177-203. McCalman’s essay stands out in a relatively under-
researched area of scholarship on these two forms of spectacles. 
176  For a reading of the technological implications of the panorama and the concept of visual 
‘reality’ in modernity, see Peter Otto’s article, ‘Between the Virtual and the Actual: Robert 
Barker’s Panorama of London and the Multiplication of the Real in late eighteenth-century 
London’, in Romanticism on the Net, 47 (2007), 
[http://www.erudit.org/revue/ron/2007/v/n46/016130ar.html]. Otto’s article is a useful 
rehabilitation of the dominant critical tendency: ‘In contemporary criticism the panorama is 
routinely associated with the modern attempt to contain everything within a single view or 
picture.’ (3). For an in-depth contextual discussion of the contemporary critical and popular 
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within doors’ discussed early on in the Book) was at the height of its 
popularity at the end of the eighteenth century. The illusory nature of the 360-
degree painting so deplored by the poet here was, in fact, celebrated by many 
spectators, who praised its ‘realism’. As typical subjects of panoramic 
painting included natural landscapes, cityscapes, and artefactual ruins within 
which one could immerse one’s self, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Wordsworth denigrates these as mere imitations. The phantasmagoria was 
also marketed as both a unique scientific and aesthetic innovation. This 
spectacle was born out of magic-lantern shows circulating around Europe 
earlier in the century, with the phantasmagoria light show performed in 1790s 
Vienna, typically involving eerie supernatural imagery such as ghosts and 
skeletons, accompanied by music.177  
Relatively few contemporary accounts of the phantasmagoria are 
available to us; however, the opening paragraph of a pamphlet from 1805 is 
typical in its reiteration of wider marketing strategies, highlighting such 
spectacles as typical of an enlightened age.178 The exhibitors’ astonishing 
claims for their show include promises of entertainment encompassing the 
fields of ‘STATUARY, PAINTING, MUSIC, ACOUSTICS, MECHANICS, 
OPTICS, and AEROSTATICS’,179 using  
                                                                                                                                                           
reception of the early panorama, including Barker’s marketing of his exhibitions, see 
Markman Ellis, ‘‘Spectacles within doors’: Panoramas of London in the 1790s’, in 
Romanticism, 14 2 (2008), pp.133-148. Ellis’ discussion stands out among recent scholarship 
on the panorama, by focusing on the presentation and reception of the panorama, a focus 
made more important by the fact that no original panorama remains today. 
177 Though generally under-researched, the history of the phantasmagoria and related light 
shows is traced in Mervyn Heard’s Phantasmagoria: The Secret Life of the Magic Lantern 
(Hastings: The Projection Box, 2006), and Marina Warner, Phantasmagoria: Spirit Visions, 
Metaphors, and Media into the Twenty-first Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
178 Schirmer and Scholl, Sketch of the Performances; and a short account of the ORIGIN, 
HISTORY, and EXPLANATION of the Ergascopia, Phantasmagoria, Pantascopia, 
Mesoscopia, &c. And the Invisible Girl (London: Warde & Betham, 1805), p.6. There is also 
a gendered discourse operating within such marketing strategies that works along the 
targeting of classes in the opening paragraph of the pamphlet: ‘In less civilized and 
enlightened ages, and countries, the study of the Polite Arts and Sciences was as much 
impeded by grave pedantry and dogmatism --- as it was degraded by impudent charlatanism 
and mysticity. However, in proportion as Arts and Sciences have triumphed over quacks and 
pedants of all descriptions, they have been courteously received by the Polite World, and they 
now begin to enliven the cabinets and studies, and even the toilets, of all people of fashion.’ 
The reference to ‘toilets’, typically feminine spaces, suggests that the phantasmagoria was 
deemed suitable for ‘Polite’ women as well as gentlemen. It is useful to compare such self-
presentation to marketing of the panorama, which, as Markman Ellis reiterates, has been 
commented on by scholars in relation to its suitability for women, who required no aesthetic 
education in order to appreciate the spectacles – see Ellis, ‘Spectacles within doors’, p.142. 




far different and most difficult scientific construction, such as would 
have done honour to Sir Isaac Newton himself. All the learned 
professors in the difficult science of Optics, who saw them produced 
on the continent, readily confessed, that these Ergoscopic Phantoms 
produce the NE PLUS ULTRA of optical delusion, on the human 
vision.180 
 
But such promotion betrays its own popular nature by investing in the very 
‘optical delusion’ it seeks to denounce, a fact not lost on Wordsworth in his 
ironic linguistically-phantasmagoric account of Bartholomew Fair, in which 
the poet can be seen to be attacking the claims made by exhibitors of offering 
a sublime or epistemological experience. In the poet’s eyes, such spectacles 
only cater for the city’s appetite for sensationalism and illusion, and I return to 
these claims and Wordsworth’s response to them below in my discussion of 
Bartholomew Fair. Wordsworth’s critique of the panorama is similarly based 
on a denunciation of distortion and illusion:  
 
    At leisure, then, I viewed, from day to day, 
The spectacles within doors, birds and beasts 
Of every nature, and strange plants convened 
From every clime; and, next, those sights that ape 
The absolute presence of reality, 
Expressing, as in mirror, sea and land, 
And what earth is, and what she has to shew. 
I do not here allude to subtlest craft, 
By means refined attaining purest ends, 
But imitations, fondly made in plain 
Confession of man’s weakness and his loves. 
   (1850: ll.229-239; 1805: ll.244-255)  
 
This denigration of the imitative spectacle by the poet continues to attract 
attention as epitomizing the poet’s dissatisfaction with ‘those Spectacles 
within doors’ that embody the falseness of the city. Ross King’s reading of 
Book VII of The Prelude, for example, was one of the first to explore fully 
Wordsworth’s distrust of a constructed means of representation, and remains 
insightful in many respects. King’s association of visual and linguistic 




180  Schirmer and Scholl, p.20.  
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Wordsworth’s panorama may likewise be understood as a figure which 
reflects a prior original, in this case “Nature’s circumambient scenery” 
(257). As such the panorama is a secondary inscription which mimics 
and purports to simulate nature but, like the carpenter’s painting, 
confuses itself with and thereby threatens the real thing, the scene of 
nature. This threat is not confined to a painted scene like the panorama 
but exists in linguistic representation as well.181 
  
Here, King goes to the heart of Wordsworth’s criticism of the panorama 
spectacle, as well as the poet’s perceptions of the challenges it presents to his 
own representative role. However, it seems to me that King’s reading of the 
function of the panorama in Book VII misses the mark somewhat with its 
suggestion that Wordsworth attempts – and fails – to gain an all-embracing 
view, placing his reading in line with those noted by Peter Otto: 
 
The introduction of the panorama is in some respects ironic here, for 
these exhibitions purport to accomplish what Wordsworth himself 
attempts but ultimately fails to execute in Book Seventh, namely, a 
panoptic view, in his case one of the city of London.182 
 
The irony is read as something purely external, and is typical of a general 
tendency of critics like King to underestimate the role of poet as ironist, seen 
even in the case of Lyrical Ballads, where Wordsworth’s irony has been, to an 
extent, recognized as a consciously employed literary strategy. When that 
work is discussed in relation to Wordsworth’s later poetry, it is often marked 
by its difference to the later work, a move seen as punctuated by ‘curious 
ironies that make up the history of Lyrical Ballads’,183 with the irony 
generated by the poet himself in the texts rarely examined. Irony is seen as 
something operating outside of Wordsworth’s design as a poet, as 
                                                            
181  Ross King, ‘Wordsworth, Panoramas, and the Prospect of London’, in Studies in 
Romanticism, 32, 1 (1993), pp.57-73, p.64.  
182  King, p.57. This reading of the poet’s handling of the panorama as being a failure to 
achieve an all-embracing perspective of the city is also present in Theresa Kelley’s important 
study of the sublime and beautiful in Wordsworth’s poetry, Wordsworth’s Revisionary 
Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.109-110. Though I am often in 
agreement with Kelley’s reading, particularly her reading of the ever-shifting aesthetics of 
Wordsworth from sublimity to the beautiful and back again (p.92), her insistence on Book VII 
as a failure of expression seems symptomatic of a critical reliance on Hartman’s reading of 
Wordsworth. For example, Kelley’s assertion that, ‘What he [Wordsworth] attempts but 
cannot achieve in this book without making himself monstrous is a manageable perspective 
on London, one that would allow him to read what he sees. Instead, London offers an “endless 
stream of men and moving things,” which he can at best catalogue’ (p.109), overlooks the 
reparative function of shifting perspectives within the Book.     
183  See Stephen M. Parrish, The Art of the Lyrical Ballads, pp.134-5. 
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symptomatic of his waning poetic thinking, and his supposed move away from 
experimentation with dramatic poetry. However, it would be simplistic to 
suggest here that Wordsworth attempted to emulate, without a trace of irony, 
the panoramic view that he denounced, as this would not account for his 
description of Bartholomew Fair. Wordsworth’s purpose in recreating the 
panoramic Bartholomew Fair enables him to reject the notion of an all-
embracing view of the anarchic city (as imitated by contemporary panorama 




‘the endless stream of men and moving things’ 
 
What Wordsworth attempts to create in Book VII is an ironic urban analogue 
to the natural sublime, and his passage highlighting the aesthetic, imaginative, 
and sensory failure of the panorama is consciously enveloped in the language 
of sublimity, both within and outside of the book. It is no coincidence that the 
height of the poet’s representative and imaginative ‘crisis’ should be presented 
at the centre of the entire poem, less still that it follows from the natural 
sublimity of the Alps experience of Book VI, and precedes the natural 
alternative to the panorama of Grasmere Fair that opens the eighth book. Irony 
here consists in the recognition of doubling and repetition, which the poet then 
extends in his poeticized simulation of a sublime experience. Hence, the 
description of the city as an ‘endless stream of men and moving things’ (1850: 
l.151; 1805: l.158) echoes the infinity of the dynamic natural universe, ‘the 
sick sight / And giddy prospect of the raving stream’ (1850: ll.632-3; 1805: 
ll.564-5). Owing to the rhetorical function it serves, this emphatic application 
of the language of the natural sublime to the urban experience is not in itself 
interesting until its place within Book VII itself is considered; here, another 
redoubling of the language of sublimity can be found, with the failure of the 
panorama situated between the lines describing the ‘endless stream of men’, 
and the dizzying account of Bartholomew Fair, though this time the language 
relates to a sensory excess, not the ‘usurpation’ from which ‘the light of sense 
/ goes out’ (VI, 1850: ll.600-1; 1805: ll.534-5), and it is this refiguring of 
sublimity that is interesting.  
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 The 1850 revisions to the ‘endless stream of men’ passage condense it 
considerably, dispensing with 1805’s ll.158-171, including the not-entirely 
tautological ‘illimitable walk’ (1805: l.159) – although both ‘endless’ and 
‘illimitable’ indicate infinity, I suggest the omission of the latter word is 
significant in that it is indicative of direction, thus directly antithetical to the 
language of sublimity so necessary to Wordsworth’s ironic (re)presentation of 
representation.184 Instead, the endlessness of the city is now accentuated by a 
rapidly accumulating list of a mounting sensory assault, ‘the quick dance / Of 
colours, lights, and forms; the deafening [1805 ‘Babel’] din’ (1850: ll.154-5; 
1805: ll.156-7): 
  
          Rise up, thou monstrous anthill on the plain 
Of a too busy world! Before me flow, 
Thou endless stream of men and moving things! 
Thy every-day appearance, as it strikes – 
With wonder heightened, or sublimed by awe – 
On strangers, of all ages; the quick dance 
Of colours, lights, and forms; the deafening din; 
The comers and the goers face to face, 
Face after face; the string of dazzling wares, 
Shop after shop, with symbols, blazoned names, 
And all the tradesmen’s honours overhead; 
Here, fronts of houses, like a title-page 
With letters huge inscribed from top to toe; 
Stationed above the door, like guardian saints, 
There, allegoric shapes, female or male, 
Or physiognomies of real men 
   (1850: ll.149-164) 
 
Wordsworth’s narrative is here broken up and heavily punctuated, which 
could easily be read as acknowledgement of the breakdown of linguistic 
representation, under pressure from external stimuli. However, in eliminating 
                                                            
184 Simon Jarvis’ Wordsworth’s Philosophic Song stands out in recent scholarship not only for 
its rehabilitation of Book VII as meriting lengthy critical attention, but also Wordsworth’s 
thinking in relation to his poetry. For a discussion of infinity in relation to these lines and the 
London experience in general, see pp.137-152. Jarvis points out that the word ‘illimitable’ 
suggests the poet’s sense that ‘one can never in truth arrive anywhere, and thus that one can 
never in fact go anywhere either’ (p.140). I would add to this by suggesting that the 1850 
omission of this word indicates Wordsworth’s reluctance to commit to commenting on the 
logical progression of any kind of ‘walk’ altogether, so that by the 1850 text notions of 
circularity and infinity are preserved. In these early lines, written to make clear the tone of the 
Book (and nature of the city) as a whole, the omission of the reference to walking itself may 
also be indicative of Wordsworth’s intention of shifting fluidly from street-level to bird’s-eye 
views of the metropolis, an intention that might be played down were walking to be seen as 
the primary means of observation. 
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the expository elements of narrative and reducing it to the largely descriptive, 
Wordsworth is addressing the success of imagination as much as admitting the 
limitations of language. David Simpson is among those who have commented 
on the significance of Wordsworth’s urban critique, arguing that a rural 
environment was essential to the success of the poetic imagination, as it alone 
afforded the poet with the time necessary for the ‘second look’, ‘This 
environment had to be rural (indeed marginal), sparsely populated by both 
natural objects and other people, and governed by a subsistence rather than a 
surplus economy.’185 He rightly identifies the importance of the ‘second look’ 
in Wordsworth’s philosophy of perception and imagination. However, taking 
the rural as the sole space that engenders this ‘second look’ undermines the 
distinction between the poet’s own ‘second look’ and his presentation of it. It 
is true of The Prelude as a whole that much of Wordsworth’s irony lies in 
being able to create this ‘second look’ through revision, and, in the case of 
Book VII, through a conscious urban reconstruction of the natural sublime 
experience encountered elsewhere in the poem. The ‘second look’ in this way 
becomes possible for the reader, even when the temporal and geographical 
restrictions Wordsworth’s philosophy ordinarily eschews are in place. The 
poet has already corrected the ‘improper figurations’186 of the initial 
perception, by acknowledging and re-working them through the poetry itself, 
and nowhere is this more manifest than in his portrayal of London.  
While ‘imagination’ has become an unfashionable focus for 
Wordsworthian criticism, I find much in John Whale’s Imagination Under 
Pressure, 1789-1832 that re-evaluates the reactive potential for the celebrated 
faculty, reinstating it as both multifaceted and topical. Whale’s insistence on 
viewing imagination as ‘a reflex or a reaction to an epistemological, cultural, 
or representational crisis rather than always invoking its hegemonic control or 
potential’187 is complementary to the way in which I view it as operating in 
Wordsworth’s representation and ironic manipulation of the phantasmagoria. 
Similarly, Whale’s emphasis on the paradoxical nature of imagination – ‘even 
when imagination is shown or seen to fail… it maintains a necessary and vital 
                                                            
185  See, David Simpson, Wordsworth’s Historical Imagination, pp.59-60. 
186  Simpson, Wordsworth’s Historical Imagination, p.60. 
187 See John Whale, Imagination Under Pressure, 1789-1832: Aesthetics, Politics and Utility 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.11. 
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presence’188 – persuasively sums up the success of Wordsworth’s narrative, 
rescuing it from the status of mere ‘catalogue’, to which it has been relegated 
by even the most astute critics.189 Wordsworth the revisionary poet is not 
merely listing the sensory overload here – instead this torrent of words records 
the sights, sounds, and motion of the city as a phantasmagoria itself, so that 
this excess of the metropolis might be manipulated linguistically in order to 
invigorate and perpetuate the narrative. This is done to the point that the 
spectacular nature of London is no longer resisted.190 Rather, the possibility of 
theatricalizing an experience that might otherwise be defeated by spectacle 
presents itself to the poet, and anticipates the Book’s climactic Bartholomew 
Fair account.    
 
 
‘Upon some showman’s platform’ 
 
This importance of theatricality in response to spectacle in Wordsworth’s 
exploration of representation has largely been critically undermined. Even 
where theatrically has been commented on, there is a tendency to follow in the 
kind of mode of thinking that has resulted in focus on the ‘anti-theatricality’ 
of the Romantics.191 This is the case even in readings that otherwise 
                                                            
188 Whale, p.2. 
189 Again, scholarship has been too quick to follow Hartman’s assessment that Book VII has 
little of interest, other than the Maid of Buttermere and Blind Beggar passages (Wordsworth’s 
Poetry, p.235). 
190 Ultimately, my reading here is therefore in contention with those such as William 
Galperin’s: ‘book 7 is largely about the resistance of spectacle (or of the tyranny of the eye, as 
Wordsworth later describes it) in the experience of spectacle.’ – see The Return of the Visible 
in British Romanticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p.118. 
Though Galperin’s study is valuable for the sustained consideration it gives to the Romantic 
response to modes of visuality, his reading of Wordsworth’s response to spectacles does not 
account for how those spectacles ultimately frame the poet’s narrative. More recently, re-
evaluations of Wordsworth’s London experience are emerging. See, for example, Eugene 
Stelzig, ‘Wordsworth’s Invigorating Hell: London in Book 7 of The Prelude (1805)’, in 
Romanticism and the City, ed. by Larry Peer (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
pp.181-196. On the Bartholomew Fair passage, Stelzig writes: ‘Wordsworth’s antipathy to the 
infernal urban spectacle and his disgust with the outrageous festivities are presented with a 
gusto that makes the description of it a satirical tour de force’ (p.184). While I concur with 
Stelzig’s fundamental argument – that London provides the poet with a renewed imaginative 
impetus for narrative – I disagree that Book VII is wholly satirical, or that the energy of the 
narrative comes from its satirical force. Rather, I shall argue here that Book VII is an ironic 
triumph.   
191 Though there have been notable exceptions to this tendency and the importance of the 
theatre has gradually gained the attention of scholars. For a reading of the inherent 
theatricality in Wordsworth’s public persona, see Judith Pascoe’s Romantic Theatricality: 
Gender, Poetry, and Spectatorship (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp.194-228. 
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rehabilitate Book VII as a success of imagination, such as Stuart Allen’s 
essay, ‘The centrality of the theatre to his vision of London also disrupts any 
confirmation of a stable identity that is predicated on a disinterested and 
objective perspective or prospect.’192 Allen’s re-evaluation of the complexity 
behind what received wisdom sees as the poet’s desire for organic unity is 
accurate. However, in suggesting Wordsworth seeks a ‘stable identity’, it 
undermines the function of parabasis, the constant, and conscious, interruption 
of writing of the ‘self’. Like Hartman, Allen reads the chaotic narrative as 
being disrupted by external stimuli. For reasons outlined above and 
expounded below I find this view, though influential, unsatisfactory; I do not 
think it is easy to account for the poet’s revisionary habit without reading 
irony (in this form, parabasis) as central to his ultimate goal, that drive 
towards self-consciousness. Additionally, this view does not account for the 
objectivity Wordsworth ultimately manages to create through his ironic 
representation of the panorama and phantasmagoria. The poet’s overtly ironic 
treatment of ‘objective perspective or prospect’ when faced with spectacle, 
cannot be overlooked: 
 
     For once, the Muse's help will we implore,  
     And she shall lodge us, wafted on her wings,  
     Above the press and danger of the crowd,  
     Upon some showman's platform. 
   (1850: ll.682-85; 1805: ll.656-659) 
 
Though the poet has already demonstrated the failure of the panorama as a 
spectacle, he nevertheless recognizes its potential for dramatization in his 
poetic representation of London. As with the phantasmagoria, a spectacle that 
would otherwise threaten his vision – and so representation of the city – is 
successfully adapted to negotiate the chaos of the Fair. Wordsworth’s tone is 
                                                                                                                                                           
For a reading of revolutionary politics and theatricality see Mary Jacobus, Romanticism, 
Writing and Sexual Difference: Essays on The Prelude (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
‘That Great Stage where Senators Perform’: Macbeth and the Politics of Romantic Theatre, 
pp. 33-68 – although this has not been my focus Jacobus’ important readings have been 
influential in forming my own. See also Frederick Burwick’s Romantic Drama: Acting and 
Reacting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) for a recent study of the self-
conscious anti-illusionism of Romantic theatre. Burwick’s study of audience participation in 
the illusion of the theatre is particularly interesting when considering the mutuality of irony. 
192  See Stuart Allen, ‘Metropolitan Wordsworth: Allegory as Affirmation and Critique in The 




ironic here; the elevated position he assumes is wholly imagined. And in 
assuming this imagined vantage-point, he demonstrates his ability to contain a 
vision of a spectacle ‘that lays, / If any spectacle on earth can do, / The whole 
creative powers of man asleep!’ (1850: ll.679-681; 1805: ll.653-655), by 
ironically applying the panorama’s principles to the phantasmagoria-like 
experience of Bartholomew Fair in order to emphasize the impossibility of 
containing the sensory excess of the city.  
The poet can therefore escape the sublimity of the scene. This is 
significant, as the phantasmagoria and the technological light shows it 
spawned were themselves predicated on a type of sensationalist imitation of 
the sublime experience; as Marina Warner has noted, ‘The intrinsic subject-
matter of phantasmagoria turned to spectral illusion, morbid, frequently 
macabre, supernatural, fit to inspire terror and dread, those qualities of the 
sublime.’193 However, Wordsworth’s narrative aims to expose this as 
delusional and as a visual extension of the gothic literature that his Lyrical 
Ballads critiqued. For, despite the attempt at marketing them as sensory 
stimulants to a sublime experience, their own recourse to sensationalism 
divests the shows of this imaginative status.194 Much like gothic literature, the 
‘terror and dread’ they inspire amounts to nothing but the oft-quoted ‘craving 
for extraordinary incident’ to which ’the literature and theatrical exhibitions of 
the country have conformed themselves,’195 and Wordsworth deconstructs the 
pseudo-epistemological claims of both panorama and phantasmagoria by 
following the ironic panoramic viewpoint quoted above with, 
 
          What a shock196 
For eyes and ears! What anarchy and din, 
Barbarian and infernal, - a phantasma 
Monstrous in colour, motion, shape, sight, sound! 
   (1850: ll.685-8; 1805: ll.659-662) 
                                                            
193 Marina Warner, Phantasmagoria, p.148. For a discussion of the contemporary associations 
of Barker’s panorama and the sublime experience, see Ellis, p.135.  
194 This is the mechanics of parabasis, a moment in which a ‘character’ in a Greek drama, the 
Chorus, is used to interrupt critically and comment on the limitations of ‘character’ in the 
main protagonists. Parabasis makes Wordsworth both spectator/narrator and character, 
making him function as the traditional Chorus. Though his interruptions are not comic, they 
are often wry and critical, as he becomes both writer and critic of his previous self and the 
external world. 
195  Prose Works, i (1800: p.150; 1850: 151). 




The word ‘phantasma’ here is the vital connection between the attack on the 
Fair and the wider spectacle of the city of which it is representative. 
Significantly, this was an 1816 revision from the 1805 original text, where 
Wordsworth used ‘’tis a dream’197; the difference between a ‘dream’ and a 
‘phantasma’ immediately externalizes – and gothicizes – the subject under 
attack.  
 As mentioned above, the phantasmagoria was marketed as being at 
once a scientific, artistic, epistemological, and imaginative breakthrough.198 In 
her innovative study of the uncanny in the eighteenth century, Terry Castle 
traces the history of phantasmagoria as, 
 
a way of approaching a larger topic, namely, the history of the 
imagination. For since its invention, the term phantasmagoria, like one 
of Freud’s ambiguous primary words, has shifted meaning in an 
interesting way. From an initial connection with something external 
and public (and artificially produced “spectral” illusion), the word has 
now come to refer to something wholly internal or subjective: the 
phantasmic imagery of the mind. This metaphoric shift bespeaks, I 
think, a very significant transformation in human consciousness over 
the past two centuries – what I have called elsewhere the 
spectralization or “ghostifying” of mental space.199 
 
I am suggesting here that Wordsworth was conscious of this duality of the 
spectacle, and sought to maintain a distinction between the external and 
internal, thus prefiguring this transformation that Castle notes. The irony is 
elucidated by the conscious revision the poet makes to his own perception 
with the word ‘phantasma’, thus allowing him to represent the spectacle itself 
as purely extrinsic to the imagination. By (re)presenting the phantasmagoric 
experience of the Fair as subject to the imagination, as another ‘character’ 
which his poetry can adapt, the poet is thus able to refute the connotations of 
sublimity claimed by the producers and audiences of the mimetic spectacles of 
the city, both panoramas and phantasmagoria. Were these claims to be 
                                                            
197  See The Thirteen-Book Prelude (Cornell), p.727 for the transcription and revision details. 
198 Warner also notes this contemporary emphasis on epistemology, p.151 - ‘Eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century artist-showmen, like Robertson and Horner, were moving on all fronts to 
expand the knowledge and scope of human faculties.’ 
199 Terry Castle, ‘Phantasmagoria and the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie’, in The Female 
Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and the Invention of the Uncanny (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), pp.140-167, p.142. 
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successful, then popular entertainment would have vulgarized and put into 
crisis the imaginative core of Wordsworth’s experience, the very task of 
claiming a high poetic vocation for an experience that is aligned with such 
sensationalist amusement. However, by adapting panoramas and 
phantasmagoria as other characters with which he can appear on stage, the 
poet evades the very terms of this crisis created for him by criticism from that 
of Geoffrey Hartman onwards. Plainly stated, he is able to order linguistically 
the sensory excess, and to bring a unity to the disparity he perceives. Thus, the 
poetic imagination is preserved from the external ‘sights that ape / The 
absolute presence of reality’ (1850: ll.232-3; 1805: ll.248-9) through its poetic 
power to dramatize them. 
  
 
‘…a pause, a contrast, a point of departure…’ 
 
Although Bartholomew Fair is singled out here as the climactic example of 
parabasis in Book VII, it is worth emphasizing the structure of the Book itself 
– as a series of spectacles or ‘scenes’ strung together. Stood alone, each of 
these ‘scenes’ replace the ‘blank confusion’ of the natural sublime that 
Wordsworth has hitherto described by their incomprehensibility. However, 
when read together as they are presented, they can be seen as the most striking 
exposition of ‘permanent parabasis’ in the entire poem. Shifting scenes 
offered in rapid succession impart to the reader some of the ‘dizzying’ 
incomprehensibility of the sensory experience of London. And in doing so, 
they also provide Wordsworth the opportunity to communicate the 
philosophical incomprehensibility [Unverständlichkeit] that is really signified 
in his treatment of various manifestations of sublimity. The permanence of the 
parabasis is perhaps most clearly seen in Book VII’s overall mise-en-scène; 
with each scene Wordsworth gives the reader a conscious interruption of a 
linear narrative, seamlessly moving from such seemingly disparate passages 
as descriptions of sensory overload, to the (1850) ‘genius’ of Burke effusion, 
theatre, the blind Beggar, the Maid of Buttermere, etc. What these – 
importantly – seek to reinforce is the sheer diversity of the London 
experience, nowhere else more pronounced; among the things the poet is 
confronted with are commerce, politics, spectacle, leisure, urban topography, 
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racial diversity, the gendered exploitation of individual tragedy for urban 
entertainment, and social alienation. With such diversity of subject matter, the 
poet’s task of representation can only be attempted through a permanent 
parabasis, in this case a series of overwhelming scenes that, on the crudest 
level, seem to align the very experience of being with a phantasmagoric 
spectacle. The irony – that permanente Parekbase – though, is what saves the 
experience from being reduced to this most basic level, and instead enables 
the poet to experience his being as interrupted, not disrupted. Poetic expertise 
rather than poetic crisis is on display here. 
I would suggest here that, along with the sublime, the inclusion of the 
grotesque in Book VII needs to be accounted for. The way in which I intend to 
do this is by reading – and so, in a sense, ‘viewing’ – the individual ‘scenes’ 
that Wordsworth presents as part of a global attempt to convey parabasis. The 
grotesque elements are very interestingly positioned throughout the book as 
reminders of London as a sort of sensory and imaginative pandemonium, as 
they are woven into episodes that may be seen as more traditionally 
‘Wordsworthian’, those specific passages on individuals who may remain 
nameless but are by no means without identity for the poet. So, the ‘Maid of 
Buttermere’ and the ‘blind Beggar’ make their appearances between shifting 
scenes describing the grotesquery of the massive spectacle that is the city. 
Unusually for The Prelude (and, barring the sonnets, most of Wordsworth’s 
poetry – and certainly his philosophical poetry), Wordsworth’s 1850 text 
includes a cameo of a named and well-known public figure in the form of 
Burke. While this passage undoubtedly has a profound bearing on the 
direction the poet’s revised text takes, I refer to his appearance as a ‘cameo’ 
because it, too, adheres to the general format of the Book; as with the Maid 
and the Beggar Burke’s passage is sandwiched between passages and/or 
descriptions of the general grotesquery found in London. This zooming in and 
out between the general and the particular echoes the poet’s adoption of the 
alternating panoramic view and the phantasmagoric street-level 
claustrophobia and chaos throughout the book. However, with respect to 
positioning, I think it may also be useful to read it in relation to the connection 
between the grotesque and the sublime. Although I am briefly drawing on 
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Victor Hugo’s theory here,200 there is much in Wordsworth’s favoured 
presentation of a pleasure-pain dialectic that advocates the fusion of 
seemingly incongruous elements in order to produce philosophical poetry.201 
In this respect, reading the grotesque as a necessary companion (if not quite 
the complete contrast) to the sublime becomes plausible, and perhaps 
profitable. 202  
Continuing the Romantic tendency to disperse 
philosophical/theoretical writing into poetic and dramatic Prefaces, Hugo 
theorizes the grotesque as being the ‘counterpart’ of the sublime, the 
significance of which is expounded below. He also writes, ‘Now, the 
grotesque may act as a pause, a contrast, a point of departure from which we 
can approach what is beautiful with fresher and keener powers of 
perception.’203 What is immediately striking here is the idea of the grotesque 
as being a ‘pause’, as well as a ‘contrast’; in Book VII the grotesque can be 
seen as functioning in both these roles. Wordsworth appreciates this mutuality 
with the result that the grotesquery of Bartholomew Fair acts as an impetus for 
his apprehension of the urban sublime and its eventual ordering of the beauty 
of Grasmere Fair. As for the ‘pause’, there may be reason to suggest that this 
is a variation of the parabasis that is generated by the grotesque. I mentioned 
above that the episodes of the individual and the general – the mobs, the mass 
of unknown entities that indulge in, and become, the spectacles of 
                                                            
200 Victor Hugo, The Essential Victor Hugo, ed. and trans. by E. H. and A. M. Blackmore 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ‘Preface’ to Cromwell, p.27. 
201 This is read elsewhere in the thesis through his use of black humour in Lyrical Ballads. My 
argument there is that Wordsworth unites two principal poetic aims (theorized in the Preface 
to the volume as providing pleasure and conveying philosophical truth) through his humorous 
treatment of unpleasant – and sometimes potentially grotesque – subject matter. Such 
‘experimental’ poetry, then, was not just an attempt to take up the lowbrow and often 
sensationalized themes of popular literature, such as the supernatural folklore of ‘Goody 
Blake and Harry Gill’, or the gothic adventures of a social outcast, an ‘Idiot Boy’; rather, the 
poet aimed to rehabilitate the subjects of these poems as worthy of philosophical 
consideration as opposed to mere literary curiosities for a reading public obsessed with the 
sensational. It is in this sense, I think, that Wordsworth wished to present his work in a 
common language.  
202 William Hazlitt also theorizes the grotesque as a tendency of English literature and drama, 
‘Our literature is, in a word, Gothic and grotesque’ – see Lectures on the Dramatic Literature 
of the Age of Elizabeth; Delivered at the Surrey Institution, 2nd edn (London: John Warren, 
1821), p.36. Although Hazlitt largely sees the Elizabethan age as characterized in this way, 
his text broadly situates all English drama and literature in opposition to French ‘models’, 
(p.37), thus suggesting considerably more substantial connections between it and the art of 
Germany, connections that extend to his own age. In this way, Hazlitt’s writing picks up the 
cross-cultural efforts of Goethe and Herder in ‘appropriating’ Shakespeare.  
203 Hugo, p.27. 
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Wordsworth’s London – are presented as alternating ‘scenes’. These scenes of 
spectacles overtly invoke the grotesque in its various manifestations, 
culminating towards the end of the Book in the climactic human 
phantasmagoria of Bartholomew Fair, which renders ‘The whole creative 
powers of man asleep!’ This alternation would suggest that each example of 
the grotesque does indeed constitute a ‘pause’, a conscious interruption of the 
philosophical narrative by the dramatic. So, the grotesque now comes to have 
two points of significance when reading Wordsworth’s London experience, 
the first of which is as a ‘contrast’, a counterpart of the sublime, always on the 
other side of it. Wordsworth’s depiction of the grotesque sheds further light on 
his understanding and representation of sublimity in Book VII, with greater 
implications for the centrality of the visual in Books VI and VIII, something I 
shall return to further below. For now I wish to turn to the second point of 
significance, the ‘pause’ or parabasis that the grotesque can be seen as. As the 
other side of the sublime, the grotesque is often found alongside 
Wordsworth’s descriptions of ‘sublimity’ as we know it, and, as I have 
suggested, together these form the conscious interruptions of the philosophical 
poetry that constantly punctuate Book VII. The grotesque now comes to 
exemplify permanent parabasis. 
  
 
‘dramas of living men’ 
 
As the description of the dizzying ‘endless stream of men and moving things’ 
upon and around the ‘monstrous ant-hill’ (1850: l.149) gives way to the 
(antithetically) restrained description of the ‘life-like’ – but, crucially, lifeless 
– panoramas and various other ‘spectacles within doors’, this again shifts to 
the general spectacle: 
 
          Add to these exhibitions mute and still, 
     Others of wider scope, where living men, 
     Music and shifting pantomimic scenes, 
     Diversified the allurement. 204  
   (VII, 1850: ll.260-263) 
   
                                                            
204 1805: ‘Together joined their multifarious aid / To heighten the allurement’ (284-5). 
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These instances of ‘pantomimic scenes’ anticipate the later grotesquery of the 
Fair; here, too, are giants, dwarves, contortionists and other entertainers 
performing ‘Amid the uproar of the rabblement’ (1850: l.273; 1805: l.296). 
Theatre, the designated arena for spectacle itself has been taken over by the 
masses, of which the revisionary poet is able to recognize his former self as 
being a part. Though this is certainly not an impassioned mob reacting on 
incitation, Wordsworth’s description of the audience as ‘rabblement’ is 
striking for its implication that interiority and designation are not able to 
prevent the spectacle from becoming dangerously close to the riots and 
‘chaos’ on the streets. The dismissal of domesticity in an earlier passage of the 
book saw Wordsworth as a self-proclaimed ‘idler’ content to live in a house 
without the need of a home in London. This goes one step further by 
threatening to overturn the claims that interiority can usually lay to security in 
containment. There is no distinction between inside and outside; spectacle 
infiltrates all spaces of the city to the point where it defines it.  
Despite this loss of order, however, neither former nor present 
incarnation of the poet feels threatened in acknowledging a part in this 
audience; the Wordsworth of the poem ‘took his seat’ among others and the 
revisionary poet notes this without the condemnatory checks that he otherwise 
places on his former self. This seems initially puzzling given that the kind of 
entertainment offered (and accepted) here resembles that of Bartholomew Fair 
in its presentation of what he later labels ‘freaks of nature’. However, there is 
a crucial difference as seen in the example Wordsworth gives of Jack the 
Giant-killer: 
 
          Lo! 
He dons his coat of darkness: on the stage 
Walks, and achieves his wonders from the eye 
Of living Mortal covert, as the moon 
Hid in her ‘vacant interlunar cave’.                                                                                              
Delusion bold! And how can it be wrought? 
The garb he wears is black as death, the word 
‘Invisible’ flames forth upon his chest. 
   (1850: ll.280-287; 1805: ll.303-310) 
 
Plainly, the situation is too ludicrous as to pose any sensory or imaginative 
threat; it is therefore unlike experiences such as Bartholomew Fair, which 
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subsequently required irony to manipulate the effects of a version of the 
sublime. There is a clear stage upon which ‘Jack’ walks and the illusion of his 
invisibility is derisively labelled a ‘Delusion’, made only too ridiculous by the 
word ‘Invisible’ emblazoned across his coat. The spectacle is so contrived and 
pantomimic in the modern sense of the word that the poet is able to satirize 
the scene, with no need for the irony with which Bartholomew Fair is later 
negotiated. The grotesquery here is a pause – parabasis – instrumental to 
making sense of the ‘dramas of living men’ that frame Wordsworth’s 
philosophical passages of the fate of the individual among these in the city. 
One such drama is the fictionalized biography of the Maid of 
Buttermere, an ‘artless daughter of the hills’ (1850: l.300; 1805: l.325), who 
was tricked into the ‘cruel mockery’ of a bigamous marriage in 1802.205 
Wordsworth’s handling of this biography is necessarily offered through a 
dramatic filter, as he comments on the staging of her story in Sadler’s Wells. 
The Maid – a Mary Robinson of the Lakes – is just one of the many figures 
whose lives are dramatized in, and by, the City. However, the prevalence of 
this tendency does not mean that the gravity of her situation is lost on 
Wordsworth; even in a space that engenders spectacles from the everyday, this 
‘too serious theme for that place’ stands out as incongruously as the mental 
deficiency of a Johnny in a sensationalized gothic ballad or the story of an 
infirm Simon Lee told in a light-hearted tone. The key difference between 
those earlier dramatizations and these stories, though, is that the former had 
already been manipulated by the poet: they were versions of the popular 
literature and entertainment critiqued in his Preface to the volume and 
consciously mediated by irony. Cases such as that of the Maid of Buttermere, 
however, are real situations and selves exploited, distorted for a dramatic 
purpose. As outlined above, this is where the staging of the Maid’s tale is a 
departure from Romantic use of drama; Wordsworth is content to take a self 
and dramatize it. However, he is less comfortable with the conscious staging 
of a subject in which the need to understand the ‘real’ self gets lost. So, in the 
play based on the Maid’s story the real story is sacrificed as it becomes 
secondary to the drama. Wordsworth’s response to this is to recreate the 
                                                            
205 William Wordsworth, The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850, ed. by M. H. Abrams, Stephen Gill 
and Jonathan Wordsworth (New York: Norton, 1979), p.242, n. 5. 
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Maid’s ‘self’ and story in a way that retains the emphasis on her humanity. 
This is done by bringing her mortality to the fore through reclaiming her 
biography as an epitaph:  
  
thy image rose again, 
Maiden206 of Buttermere! She lives in peace 
Upon the spot where she was born and reared; 
Without contamination doth she live 
In quietness, without anxiety: 
  (1850: ll.319-323; 1805: ll.350-354) 
 
Unlike the spectacles of London, which are deliberately thrust upon the poet’s 
sense, the image of the Maid is summoned up in his mind with other ‘sundry 
forms’, part of a mental montage of solitaries that assist Wordsworth in 
making sense of the metropolitan experience. As with many of the figures, the 
Maid of Buttermere can best be commemorated through epitaph; as soon as 
her image appears to the poet, he associates it with her death. Though Mary 
Robinson lived on and recovered from this personal misfortune, Wordsworth 
rewrites her story with an epitaph. In doing so, he both draws attention to her 
as an individual and places her – and so Book VII – within a universal 
framework. Amidst all the excess and grotesquery of London, Wordsworth 
seems determined to tell the reader, that universalizing vision of humanity that 
permeates his philosophical poetry can be found. The Maid could equally 
have been placed in the Lyrical Ballads, or indeed that great catalogue of 
epitaphs, The Excursion. Yet, her inclusion here reinforces the importance of 
reclaiming reality from false spectacle. For Wordsworth, her story ends far 
away from the staged ‘biography’; in this epitaph she is returned to her 
homeland, living free from the ‘contamination’ of London’s excess, and thus 
she is able to live in death. Wordsworth’s insistence on the effacement of 
death as a boundary or end ensures that the Maid lives through 
commemoration, a theme I shall return to in the concluding chapter. In this 
way, his own dalliance with the vulgar and the grotesque is also justified to 
some extent, though he remains uneasy with his reliance on ‘low’ culture and 
art in order to produce his own elevated poetry.  
                                                            
206 1805: Mary. 
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The unnaturalness of this parodying of the Maid’s life for the sake of 
entertainment is echoed with the artifice of the child described directly after 
the Maid of Buttermere passage. The child is ‘foremost of the scenes / Which 
yet survive in memory’ (1850: ll.334-335).207 The child – and the scene itself 
– is connected in the poet’s mind to Mary Robinson; Wordsworth presents the 
child in its artificial surroundings as a sort of displaced ‘alien’ that would have 
been loved had he been amongst nature: 
 
              The Boy208 had been  
The pride and pleasure of all lookers-on 
In whatsoever place, but seemed in this 
A sort of alien scattered from the clouds. 
   (1850: ll.347-350; 1805: ll.375-378) 
 
Somewhere in Wordsworth’s own native Lakes is confirmed as the desired 
place further down the passage, when he makes a direct connection between 
this child and the Maid of Buttermere’s dead child. At the same time, the child 
is necessarily divorced – both in the poet’s memory and in morality – from his 
mother; his innocence endures among the dissolute pleasure-seekers in one of 
London’s vice-ridden theatrical and red-light districts, ‘Like one of those who 
walked with hair unsinged / Amid the fiery furnace’ (1850: ll.369-370; 1805: 
ll.398-399), but the mother does not survive in the memory. She fades from 
the scene in the poet’s mind, the momentary thought of her instead giving rise 
to associations with the general ‘public vice’ of prostitution, itself described as 
‘spectacle’. The morality here may be conservative, but I think this passage is 
made interesting by the fact that it does show a moral aspect to hitherto 
aesthetic categories. For Wordsworth, the grotesque is not only to be found in 
a satirical Hogarth etching or the conscious spectacle of Bartholomew Fair – 
disturbingly, it may also be discovered more commonly in the corruption of 
what is natural or innocent. In this scene, it is not only the artifice of the 
mother’s ‘false tints’ (which the poet sets against the ‘rose’ of the child’s 
cheek) and the ‘glare / From play-house lustres’, it is the moral vice that they 
                                                            
207 In 1805, the description of the child and his mother is ll.364-367: 
    Those days are now  
 My theme, and ’mid the numerous scenes which they 
 Have left behind them, foremost I am crossed 
 Here by remembrance of two figures[.] 
208 1805: boy. 
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suggest wherein the grotesque lies. Like that other example of nature 
perverted, the Infant Prodigy, the child in London is exposed to the 
grotesquery of artifice and its moral consequences.  
 
 
‘foolishness and madness in parade’ 
 
The next scene of the Book sees a kind of interlude in Wordsworth’s 
catalogue of metropolitan grotesques as he comes to deal with theatre itself. 
Whereas spectacles have been denigrated by the poet thus far, youthful 
indulgence in theatre itself is remembered fondly, ‘Enchanting age and sweet! 
Romantic almost’ (1850: ll.441-442; 1805: ll.474-475). Following on directly 
from depictions of the vice surrounding the world of the theatre, this may 
seem unusual until one considers the nature of the artifice in question here; as 
with the episode of Jack the Giant Killer, the poet is at ease at the theatre 
because the artifice is self-conscious and does not attempt to conceal itself. 
Wordsworth is not threatened by spectacles on the stage; they may be mocked 
for the lengths to which they go in order to maintain an impossible illusion (as 
is Jack’s ‘invisibility’), but the poet is all too aware of the audience’s – 
including his own – participation in such illusions. Unlike the pseudo-
sublimity of the phantasmagoria or panorama – which thrives on its 
spectators’ reactions to the ‘ne plus ultra’ delusional reproduction of natural or 
supernatural phenomena – theatre makes no claims to reality, nor does it make 
such gruelling demands on its audience’s imagination. This relationship 
between actors and spectators mirrors that of ironist and reader; the ironist-
writer or actor on a stage may present seemingly absurd scenarios, but these 
are validated by a certain understanding on the audience’s or reader’s part, 
what Coleridge later called ‘that willing suspension of disbelief for the 
moment, which constitutes poetic faith’.209 Though Coleridge is writing of the 
supernatural elements of Lyrical Ballads, his famous defence is, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, commonly understood in a dramatic context. This may be 
partly due to the self-reflexivity that Frederick Burwick identifies in his 
Romantic Drama – the actor-spectator (and, by extension, the author/reader) 
relationship depends on an awareness of the distinctions between illusion and 
                                                            
209 Biographia Literaria, ii, p.6. 
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delusion that both Wordsworth and Coleridge make.210 Despite this common 
tendency between the latter’s literary theory and the former’s poetic practice, 
Coleridge fails, in his discussion of The Excursion, to account for 
Wordsworth’s careful handling of these categories of fictionality. Akin to the 
charge of ‘ventriloquism’ in its critical short-sightedness, Coleridge’s critique 
of Wordsworth’s dramatic poetry does not account for the practical 
application of the irony that he himself theorizes.211 
 In this passage, the physicality of the actors is described in similar 
terms to those of the other performers – figures on the stage bounce, leap and 
paw their way through performances, ‘striving to outstrip each other’, but the 
effect is not a display of the grotesque. Instead, this passage takes centre-stage 
in the Book as a justification for the pleasure taken in theatre by the youthful 
poet. Here, at the centre of the London account and sandwiched by 
denunciation of the city’s spectacles of the everyday, is Wordsworth’s 
acknowledgement of his debt to drama. The passage dealing with the theatre 
as a space of spectacle is consciously offered as self-indulgence in memory, 
and so it is necessarily restrained in its praise of this pleasure; the mind is 
compared to a sportive kitten at play, reacting almost instinctively to external 
stimuli. In this imagery the passage expresses the pleasurable passivity found 
in The Kitten and Falling Leaves (comp. 1804, pub. 1807). At the conclusion 
of the poem, Wordsworth acknowledges the divide between his rational, 
experiential thought and the innocent passivity of the kitten and infant, his 
only hope being that every now and then he, too, can ‘gambol with Life’s 
falling Leaf’ in this way. This conclusion to The Kitten and Falling Leaves is 
significant in that it illuminates the Book VII passage as a positive reflection 
on passivity and spectatorship, one of few in the entire Book.  
However, the Wordsworthian determination to make the highest poetic 
use of the ‘lowest’ stimuli prevents him from recollecting these memories in 
                                                            
210 Biographia Literaria, ii, p.134. 
211 In dramatic criticism, this form of irony finds a counterpart in the subtle ‘judicious 
understanding’ between actors and audience in comic drama, as identified by Charles Lamb in 
his essay ‘Stage Illusion’ – see The Complete Works of Charles Lamb: Containing His 
Letters, Essays, Poems, Etc. (Philadelphia: William T. Amies, 1879), pp.434-435. Lamb’s 
argument for the necessity of breaking through illusion in order to maintain audiences’ 
participation not only mirrors Coleridge’s theory of ‘willing suspension of disbelief’, it also 
perpetuates the applicability of dramatic to literary irony and vice versa.   
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mere self-indulgence. Instead, the theatre is used to introduce the poet’s 
appreciation of Shakespeare (implied in 1805 and clearly stated in 1850: 
ll.475-485). These pleasures, Wordsworth suggests, would have had little 
lasting beneficial value had it not been for the literary and dramatic genius of 
Shakespeare, inextricable from reflection on them. Far more than 
reminiscence of youth, then, the centrality of theatre here serves to introduce 
the next major philosophical passage – the appreciation of Burke – by shifting 
attention from the spectacles of entertainment to those of the legal and 
political arenas. As ever, Shakespeare provides grounding for Romanticism’s 
nationalising efforts. Invoking his ghost enables the poet to validate the uses 
of the dramatic within high art that strives toward a national identity through 
individual consciousness. For Romantic thinker-writers – English and German 
– Shakespeare is emblematic of both the universal and individual human, his 
genius lying in a reconciliation of the two, and Wordsworth’s connection 
between ‘low’ art/entertainment and artistic genius reminds the reader of the 
wider significance of this passage; as uncomfortable as he may be with his 
poetic recourse to popular culture and entertainment, Wordsworth is 
determined to find a higher purpose. The content of Book VII, then, seems to 
suggest that grotesquery, both physical and moral, can always find a purer 
aesthetic application when aligned with poetic genius. 
This is reinforced in the next ‘scenes’ by what may be referred to as 
the conscious ‘dramas of living men’ in courtrooms, pulpits, and Parliament, 
where theatricality and rhetoric become so entwined into the discourse of each 
respective stage that it is no longer possible to distinguish between drama and 
the ‘real’.212 The dramatic address to Burke in the 1850 version, however, is 
the poet’s attempt to do just this. While the rhetoric of the MPs and of Pitt is 
ironically connected to Henry V, Wordsworth introduces Burke as a force that 
can penetrate mere rhetoric in order to arrive at great philosophical and 
political truths. The mock awe with which ‘tongue-favoured men’ are 
described – ‘Silence! hush! / This is no trifler, no short-flighted wit’ (1850: 
                                                            
212 Mary Jacobus has noted how these various examples of rhetoric and oratory have been 
placed by the poet under the category of popular entertainment – see ‘That Great Stage where 
Senators Perform’: Macbeth and the Politics of Romantic Theatre, pp. 33-68. I suggest these 
spectacles indicate a point in the narrative of Book VII where drama and spectacle become 




ll.498-499; 1805: ll.529-530) – reveals the insubstantiality of rhetoric 
(however powerful) that does not strive for a philosophical end when it turns 
suddenly to the ‘Genius of Burke’. Wordsworth’s response to the much-
debated role of eloquence in oratory is clearly driven by this need to 
demarcate it from spectacle; the ‘specious wonders’ (1850: l.513) that 
entertain and seduce impressionable audiences ultimately fail because they are 
founded on eloquence alone. The ‘genius’ of Burke, however, lies in his 
ability to utilize eloquence for philosophical purpose – his skilful rhetoric 
affects the passions as well as any of the other ‘tongue-favoured men’, but the 
key difference here is that Burke is remembered primarily for the wisdom 
underlying his eloquence. As an 1850 revision (first introduced in 1832), the 
passage (ll.512-543) is a significant instance of parabasis; the revisionary poet 
interrupts his memory of London with the Burke effusion, but that effusion, 
too, is an interruption of the 1805 ‘self’. Along with the satirical look of the 
dramatic preacher (whose sermon also borrows heavily from a literary and 
dramatic tradition) in the following verse paragraph (1850: ll.544-572; 1805: 
ll.544-566), parabasis here enables the poet to document the corruption of 
eloquence, a considerably more sinister aspect of the drama of everyday life. 
In versifying this Wordsworth uses irony and drama to encourage the reader to 
take that ‘second look’ so important to Romantic striving for self-
consciousness.  
 Having elaborated on these ‘few conspicuous marks’ (1850: l.573; 
1805: l.567), the poet then returns to the general, emphasizing that these are 
just individual examples from a vast catalogue of human folly and vice. In 
1805, this allows the poet to launch directly into ‘the foolishness, and madness 
in parade’ (1850: l.594; 1805: l.589) apparent all over the city: 
 
      How often in the overflowing streets 
Have I gone forwards with the crowd, and said 
Unto myself, ‘The face of every one 
That passes by me is a mystery.’ 
Thus have I looked, nor ceased to look, oppressed 
By thoughts of what, and whither, when, and how, 
Until the shapes before my eyes became 
A second-sight procession, such as glides 
Over still mountains, or appears in dreams, 
And all the ballast of familiar life – 
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The present, and the past, hope, fear, all stays, 
All laws of acting, thinking, speaking man – 
Went from me, neither knowing me, nor known. 
   (1805: ll.595-607) 
 
This parade of madness and excess that becomes emblematic of the city as a 
whole not only anticipates the climactic account of Bartholomew Fair, it also 
serves as another connector between Books VI and VII, and both of these 
effects are achieved through the language of sublimity (though without the 
grotesque that later accompanies the ironic manipulation of the sublime). The 
reference to the ‘second sight procession’ is indicative of the visual scene 
experienced as a phantasmagoria, in its implications of a ghostly, often 
morbid, spectacle. However, the effect of the ‘procession’ here is also similar 
to that of the phantasmagoria in the eerie ‘spectralization’ – to borrow Terry 
Castle’s term again – of spectacle. The chaotic external objects are 
internalized until distinctions between world and self become blurred and all 
seems to be replaced by the kind of ‘blank desertion’ described earlier in the 
poem.  In its original incarnation, the procession (of spectral horsemen in An 
Evening Walk) is a supernatural and ghostly phenomenon experienced in a 
natural setting, thus violating the natural visual and visionary experience.213 
Intersecting the sensory and the imaginative in this way, the ‘second-sight 
procession’ takes on new significance in Book VII as it comes to exemplify 
the continuous preoccupation with spectacle and visuality running from Books 
VI to VIII. This process of defamiliarization taking place here, though, differs 
from the Alps experience of Book VI, whereby the blankness – the usurpation 
of imaginative thought – is caused by the unfamiliar (in that case, Mont 
Blanc) becoming familiar.214 In the crowd the very face of another person 
becomes a ‘mystery’, an interesting contrast to a previous observation 
following an urban experience that ‘The face of every neighbour whom I met / 
Was like215 a volume to me’ (IV, 1850: ll.67-68; 1805: ll.58-59). 
                                                            
213 For a reading of the spectral horsemen myth in An Evening Walk and this passage, see W. 
J. B. Owen, ‘”A second-sight procession” in Wordsworth’s London’, in Notes and Queries, 
16, 1 (1969), pp.49-50. 
214 This dynamic relationship between the two sides of the heimlich, the homely and the 
mysterious is discussed at length in the concluding chapter, where it is argued – through 
readings of central texts by Novalis and Wordsworth – that this concept is central to 
understanding the process of ‘romanticizing’ in Anglo-German literature and philosophy. 
215 1805: as. 
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Wordsworth’s repeated emphasis on the legibility (or indeed illegibility) of a 
face reinforces this notion of defamiliarization. In a city where all sights and 
labels have been reduced to signs to be read the crucial ‘sign’ of the living 
face becomes illegible.216  
For Wordsworth the catalyst here for all of this is the utter loss of hope 
for communication with those around him. The poet is once again confronted 
by the city’s power to disarm both sense and imagination through sheer 
excess. However, the overall debilitating effect of this ‘second-sight 
procession’ is understated in 1850 by cutting lines 604-607; the omission of 
these lines seems to emphasize the account of the Fair as the climax of the 
overload, so that this ‘moving pageant’ – though spectacular in its nature – is 
not sublime. It also allows for an accentuated transition to the description of 
the blind Beggar. In the 1850 version, an additional passage of the individual 
that endures in the poet’s mind amidst the ‘foolishness and madness in parade’ 
is the image of a father with a sickly child. This passage (1850: ll.602-618) 
continues the tendency to zoom into and out of individual scenes in the poet’s 
mind. The episode is remembered as one of those moments that may counter 
the chaos of the city, with the man seeming like a model for Wordsworth 
himself in his detachment from the madness surrounding him. It is interesting 
that the father is so consumed by love for his child that, ‘Of those who passed, 
and me who looked at him, / He took no heed’; such detachment is what the 
poet himself is not able to exercise entirely comfortably at this point in the 
narrative. After all, the Wordsworth in both 1805 and 1850 Preludes is so 
profoundly affected by involuntarily alienation that he is not yet afforded the 
kind of ironic detachment The Excursion’s Wanderer, various narrators of 
Lyrical Ballads, or indeed his later poetic ‘self’ (as initiated by the ironic 
dramatization of Bartholomew Fair) achieve. In revising the narratives, the 
poet becomes self-reflexive, but the ‘self’ – or ‘selves’ – traced at this point in 
the poem are, like the literature they inhabit, in the state of becoming. Thus, 
this simple figure who is unaffected by the excess of the city remains as a 
                                                            
216 Following Thomas Weiskel’s study of the sublime through twentieth-century theory of 
semiotics and psychoanalysis, Neil Hertz has commented on Book VII as being full of signs 
to be read – see his The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p.56. See also Thomas Weiskel, The Romantic 
Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
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lingering snapshot in the memory – a model for the young poet overwhelmed 
by anonymity. In this respect, the father functions in much the same way as 
the blind Beggar (who is himself an incarnation of Resolution and 
Independence’s Leech Gatherer).217 
Yet the blind Beggar signifies more. As well as a model of 
detachment, both sensory and social, he is representative of epistemology 
itself; the piece of paper on which his story is written is, to the ‘Wordsworths’ 
of 1805 and 1850, emblematic of all we can know about self and world: 
 
      Caught by the spectacle my mind turned round 
As with the might of waters; an apt type 
This label seemed of the utmost we can know, 
Both of ourselves and of the universe; 
And, on the shape of that unmoving man, 
His steadfast face and sightless eyes, I gazed, 
As if admonished from another world. 
   (1850: ll.643-649)218 
 
The Beggar’s story is referred to as a ‘spectacle’, but this is far removed from 
the spectacles that have hitherto punctuated the poet’s journey through the 
city; unlike those, the Beggar displaying his story is not contributing to the 
overall chaotic theatricality of London, but is instead set apart from it in doing 
so. Wordsworth’s insistence that the story is ‘an apt type’ or ‘emblem’ of all 
that we can and do know of self and the world seems a rather astonishing 
statement to make. After all, the Beggar is, we are reminded in 1850, ‘a sight 
not rare’ (l.638). However, I would suggest that this claim stems from the 
externalization of the Beggar’s story; his words are read by all but himself and 
the attraction for Wordsworth is that this is a – perhaps extreme – version of a 
                                                            
217 That the passage of the father with the sickly babe was originally composed as part of 
Book VIII (1805: ll.840-859) seems to confirm this; as Book VII was composed after Book 
VIII, the transposition of this ‘scene’ strengthens the suggestion that the revisionary poet 
intended to highlight this detachment as a way of contrasting his own conflicted state of 
alienation. It is also more in line with the poet’s approach to VIII, 1850 in its minimalizing of 
episodes or ‘scenes’ of individuals, and thus the minimalizing of characterization. 
218 In 1805, lines 616-623: 
 My mind did at this spectacle turn round 
 As with the might of waters, and it seemed 
 To me that in this label was a type 
 Or emblem of the utmost that we know 
 Both of ourselves and of the universe, 
 And on the shape of this unmoving man, 
 His fixed face and sightless eyes, I looked, 
 As if admonished from another world. 
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self externalized through writing. Both the poet and the Beggar strive to tell 
stories about an ultimately unrealized, or unrealizable ‘self’.219 In contrast to 
Hertz’s reading into the beggar of Wordsworth’s crisis of self-expression, we 
can see another figure in his continual drama of self-characterization. 
 
 
‘As parts, but with a feeling of the whole’ 
 
I began by suggesting that underlying Wordsworth’s revisionary habit is a 
modern reparative aesthetic, widely theorized by the Frühromantiker as 
Romantic irony. One way in which this aesthetic is effected in Wordsworth’s 
poetry is through parabasis, which takes on new significance in Book VII, as 
it enables the poet to construct a new way of seeing and therefore of showing; 
the chaos of the sensory and imaginative overload presented by London fails 
to overturn Wordsworth’s ability to produce philosophical poetry precisely 
because of the poet’s tendency to interrupt his own narrative through irony. I 
have also argued that Book VII’s narrative is driven primarily by various 
spectacles and the dramatic possibilities they offer the poet, the climax of 
which is reached in the account of Bartholomew Fair. Here, two dominant 
forms of entertainment, the panorama and phantasmagoria, are utilized to 
create an ironic counter to an urban sublime experience. Along the way the 
role of the grotesque has been explored as another counterpart of the sublime. 
The grotesque is central to Wordsworth’s narrative, enabling him to shift 
focus from the general to individual spectacle, once again interrupting 
continuity in order to dramatize difference. It also marks the difficulty the 
‘self’ within the poem has in making sense of the spectacle he is assaulted 
with. I would like to conclude by turning again to the two modes of 
visualizing I began with and, by considering their significance in the transition 
from Book VI to Book VIII, explore the wider framework within which 
Wordsworth’s aesthetics is operating. 
 There is a notable shift from the natural sublime in Book VI to the 
beautiful panorama of Book VIII’s Grasmere Fair, enabled by the dramatized 
spectacles of the city in Book VII. London itself, like the ironic mode of 
                                                            
219 See also Galperin, The Return of the Visible, p.121: ‘…what makes Wordsworth’s 
spectacle – or the spectacle of the blind beggar – so special and so prescient is precisely its 
ability to foreground, and paradoxically to see through, blindness.’  
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writing by which it is represented, is a stage for mediation.220 Here, the 
inadequacy of the simulated panorama and phantasmagoria as ways of seeing 
is established. As aesthetic experience, both fail due to their recourse to 
simulating either the beautiful or sublime in nature. The panorama purports to 
present audiences with an all-embracing view, but fails because it is little 
more than a mimetic, static rendering of the world, either beautiful or sublime. 
The phantasmagoria and associated spectacles, on the other hand, are 
inadequate because the excess they present to the senses threatens the 
imagination, the creative faculty essential to poetic living and production; the 
result of this is not a sublime experience, as its promoters hoped to persuade 
spectators, but rather a sensationalized dramatic counterpart to the ‘low’ 
literary culture deplored by the philosophical poet. The aversion the 
‘Wordsworths’ of both Preludes feel towards these spectacles – and other 
forms of ‘low’ culture – is mediated by the revisionary poet’s ironic 
manipulation of these to articulate his own ‘high’ literature and aesthetics. 
These poetic productions must negotiate a way between familiar and 
unfamiliar, natural and urban sublimity, inherited traditions of the natural 
prospect and the technological innovations of the imitative panorama; as a 
high ‘crisis’ point, London provides the most fruitful sustained opportunity to 
confront these extremes.  
The resolution reached in Book VIII’s Grasmere Fair indicates a step 
forward in the transition from chaotic sublimity to the panoramic beautiful. 
This all-embracing concept of the beautiful, though, is not limited to visuality. 
The concluding verse paragraph of Book VII makes it clear that this is 
experienced through an internal harmony that may sustain one even in the 
midst of the spectacle and grotesquery of the city. However, the 1850 text also 
echoes the description of the sublime landscape of Book VI; the ‘everlasting 
streams and woods’ (VII, 1850: l.745) that, when reflected upon, enable the 
poet to transpose meditation (and so a sense of home) from one environment 
to another are reminiscent of the ‘woods decaying, never to be decayed’ (VI, 
1850: l.625; 1805: l.557), further strengthening the connection Wordsworth 
                                                            
220 The function of drama as mediator is explored in greater depth in the concluding chapter 
of the thesis, with a particular focus on mediation between boundaries of life and death, 




sought to make between the Books. The clearest indication of the 
interconnection of VI-VIII, however, comes in that most Romantic concept, 
the fragmented sense of being: 
 
 Oh, blank confusion! true epitome 
Of what the mighty City is herself 
To thousands upon thousands of her sons, 
Living amid the same perpetual whirl 
Of trivial objects, melted and reduced  
To one identity, by differences 
That have no law, no meaning, and no end – 
Oppression, under which even highest minds 
Must labour, whence the strongest are not free. 
But though the picture weary out the eye, 
By nature an unmanageable sight, 
It is not wholly so to him who looks 
In steadiness, who hath among least things 
An under-sense of greatest; sees the parts 
As parts, but with a feeling of the whole. 
   (1850: ll.722-736; 1805: ll.696-712) 
 
This relationship between part and whole is repeated again in the Preface to 
The Excursion in relation to the poem’s position within the Recluse project. 
There, Wordsworth sets the poem as simultaneously a fragment and a 
complete poem in itself, and the experience of being is no different, as 
discussed elsewhere in the thesis. The significance here, though, is that the 
London experience is shown to be surmountable; perhaps it is not all-
embraceable, but nor is it all-consuming either. And so, in presenting them in 
this way, as ‘scenes’ of an ever-shifting picture, Wordsworth enables himself 
and his reader to retain awareness of this part-whole relationship. It is some 
sense of this relationship that I aim to uncover in the discussion that follows. 
 Turning briefly to the Ravine of Arve passage it is possible to see how 
this part-whole relationship is echoed in the sublime landscape: 
 
        The immeasurable height  
Of woods decaying, never to be decayed, 
The stationary blasts of waterfalls, 
And in the narrow rent at every turn221 
Winds thwarting winds, bewildered and forlorn, 
The torrents shooting from the clear blue sky, 
Black drizzling crags that spake by the way-side 
                                                            
221 1805: ‘And everywhere along the hollow rent’. 
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As if a voice were in them, the sick sight 
And giddy prospect of the raving stream, 
The unfettered clouds and region of the Heavens, 
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light – 
Were all like workings of one mind, the features 
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree; 
Characters of the great Apocalypse, 
The types and symbols of Eternity, 
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end 
   (1850: ll.624-640; 1805: ll.556-572) 
 
Each aspect of the landscape represents to the poet ‘workings of one mind’, a 
feature inextricably connected with eternity. Imposing an infinite vision on an 
otherwise finite, eroding atmosphere enables the poet to begin to uncover a 
sense of the part-whole relationship that is identified as being so important 
amidst the tumult of the city. However, it is not until Book VII that the 
revisionary poet can fully appreciate the significance of this relationship. The 
‘blank confusion’ passage quoted above follows on directly from the end of 
the Bartholomew Fair description; in this sense it is a sort of coda to both Fair 
and Book, a reaffirmation of the ironist’s success in containing the chaotic 
spectacle through theatricalizing it and a look ahead at the philosophical 
poet’s ongoing task of endeavouring to look ‘In steadiness’. It is also a look 
back, though, at how dramatic manipulation of the threat of the sublime 
experience, characterized here by a reduction of parts to a chaotic whole, 
enables an eventual triumph of that very relationship. As such, the poet 
coming to the end of his reflections on London is able to recover and decode 
this equation that was hinted at in the Ravine of Arve. The external world is 
no longer an incomprehensible mass of signs that amount to ‘workings of one 
mind’. The Unverständlichkeit that would otherwise overturn the poet’s mind 
is instead mediated by an ironic mode of writing which strives to see all parts 
‘As parts, but with a feeling of the whole.’ By doing so, the poet finds impetus 
for motion – and so poetic production – where he had previously been left 
transfixed. No longer gazing on a ‘soulless image’ such as Mont Blanc nor 
facing the ‘dizzying’ Ravine, Wordsworth apprehends spectacle afresh. 
 By the conclusion of Book VII the need for ‘order and relation’ 
(1850: l.761; 1805: l.730) in perception is thus made clear, paving the way for 
the panorama of Grasmere Fair. Wordsworth has already begun the 
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revisionary mode of writing here in his re-imagining of London. In declaring 
that, ‘The Spirit of Nature was upon me there’ (1850: l.766; 1805: l.736), the 
poet is anticipating Book VIII’s reflections of residence in London as an 
uncontaminated time.222 The metropolis may be full of vices, but these do not 
impede the poet’s ability to find, ‘Through meagre lines and colours, and the 
press / Of self-destroying, transitory things, / Composure, and ennobling 
Harmony’ (1850: ll.769-771; 1805: ll.739-741). This considerable revision to 
the majority of the Book, throughout which the ‘Wordsworth’ of both versions 
of the poem’s London is apparently constantly threatened by effacement of 
the barrier between self and external spectacle, ensures that the reduction of 
all ‘to one identity’ is not absolute. 
This becomes apparent when the narrative segues into the account of 
Grasmere Fair that opens the eighth Book. As with the metropolitan fair, 
Wordsworth achieves an imagined panoramic view of this Fair (though the 
gathering here is distinguished from the rabble of the former as ‘a little family 
of men’ [1850 & 1805: l.7]). Unlike the previous fair, however, Grasmere 
does not strive to be objective in the sense of being detached; Wordsworth 
narrates the action as one who is atop Helvellyn, yet immediately eradicates 
this distance by zooming in on individual, identifiable figures. Moreover, if 
the ‘ancient wedded pair’ of 1850 (l.46) refers to him and Mary Wordsworth it 
would appear he has gone a step further in including himself in this scene; as 
with London he is both spectator and dramatic character within the spectacle. 
However, this time the duality of his role is voluntary; unlike London, the 
poet is at home here at Grasmere and so does not feel the need to perceive 
himself to be at the centre of the landscape. London threatened to reduce the 
poet to being a part of the spectacle, a threat with which Wordsworth dealt by 
becoming a dramatic character through parabasis, which in turn enabled ironic 
dramatization of the spectacle itself. The poet has achieved the detachment so 
desired in the previous Book – so much so, in fact, that by the 1850 version, 
several passages that presented individual episodes in 1805 have been omitted 
altogether from the poem.  
                                                            
222 This ‘anticipation’ is, of course, structural – as VIII was composed first, the conclusion of 
VII itself is the poet’s meta-discursive commentary on the interrelationship of the two Books. 
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 As much of the eighth Book was composed before Book VII (though, 
significantly, not the Grasmere Fair description), there is further reason to 
suggest that the London book is a more pronounced example of both 
intermediary experience and parabasis – Wordsworth’s intention for Book VII 
as illustrative of the experiences that enabled the transformation evident in 
Book VIII results in the specific structure discussed above. Additionally, 
though, Book VIII complements the interrelationship of the books in its 1850 
text. The first major portion of the 1805 text to be omitted is ll.64-119. The 
passage in question details two examples of rural ‘spectacle’ that the poet 
remembers witnessing by chance as a child, having strayed ‘far from home’. 
Both of these are introduced to illustrate the early love felt by the poet for 
shepherds, a community of men who come to emblematize man in the mind of 
the poet. Attempts at revising these lines having failed, however, Wordsworth 
omitted them from the later text and it is not too difficult for a reader familiar 
with The Excursion to guess why this may be the case. As an enthusiastic 
reader of that later poem, I would hesitate to label Wordsworth’s descriptive 
tendencies ‘prolix’ as previous reviewers and commentators have, but it does 
seem that these particular lines are somewhat indulgent given that they detract 
from his point here; that the poet felt, even as a child, great love for man is 
evident enough throughout Book VIII and individual scenes are not needed as 
they were in London to highlight this. For part of the argument Wordsworth is 
putting across here is that London itself was instrumental in helping him come 
to such realization. On the face of it, early appreciation of the beauty in nature 
aided him during his residence there: 
 
      With deep devotion, Nature, did I feel 
In that enormous City’s turbulent world 
Of men and things, what benefit I owed 
To thee, and those domains of rural peace, 
Where to the sense of beauty first my heart 
Was opened.  
  (1850: ll.70-75) 
 
But the following words are somewhat revealing in their insistence 
that the natural landscape was ‘more exquisitely fair’ than any enchanted or 
exotic landscape, be it found in mythology or travel literature. While the 
superiority of the natural landscape is not called into question here, a look 
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back at the early lines of Book VII that detail the boy-Wordsworth’s 
fascination with a fantasy version of London suggests that the allure of 
romance was nevertheless strong, 
 
    There was a time when whatso’er is feigned 
Of airy palaces, and gardens built 
By Genii of romance; or hath in grave  
Authentic history been set forth… 
… 
   … fell short, far short, 
Of what my fond simplicity believed 
And thought of London – held me by a chain 
Less strong of wonder and obscure delight.  
  (1850: ll.77-87; 1805: ll.81-91) 
 
So much so that the disenchantment that follows such romantic notions results 
in the most Wordsworthian conclusion, 
 
Those bold imaginations in due time 
Had vanished, leaving others in their stead: 
And now I looked upon the living scene; 
Familiarly perused it; oftentimes, 
In spite of strongest disappointment, pleased 
Through courteous self-submission, as a tax 
Paid to the object by prescriptive right. 
(1850: ll.142-148223) 
 
These lines seem to confirm that romance – here the product of boyish fancy – 
has already been overcome during the poet’s residence in London. To take up 
romance again in order to deconstruct it in Book VIII, therefore, is to 
acknowledge yet another aspect of the reparative function of London; if the 
metropolis (along with the residence in revolutionary Paris) left the poet 
disenchanted with respect to community, it also compensated for this in some 
measure by reaffirming the value of the ‘living scene’, rural or urban, by 
                                                            
223 In 1805, lines 136-144: 
 These fond imaginations, of themselves 
 Had long before given way in season due, 
 Leaving a throng of others in their stead; 
 And now I looked upon the real scene, 
 Familiarly perused it day by day, 
 With keen and lively pleasure even there 
 Where disappointment was the strongest, pleased 
 Through courteous self-submission, as a tax 
 Paid to the object by prescriptive right, 
 A thing that ought to be. 
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stripping away false ideals of perfectible beauty. Having experienced the 
grotesque and the sublime in turns throughout London, the notion of beauty 
itself is reconsidered in terms of the real. In other words, it is approached with 
‘fresher and keener powers of perception’.  
Disenchantment, then, is ultimately a positive thing for Wordsworth. 
On the one hand, the child-Wordsworth felt the sublime power of nature (the 
much-discussed notion of being ‘fostered alike by beauty and fear’ seeming to 
epitomize this). This was carried through to his adult life, where the landscape 
continued to impose on the poetic mind, a few of the most striking images of 
which are relayed in Book VI. On the other hand, romance born out of a fancy 
that placed emphasis on the beautiful or the fantastic would have threatened 
the poetic imagination were it not for an ironist’s ability to refigure these 
aesthetic categories according to the ‘living scene’ – nowhere more alive than 
in London. Insofar as it is a counterpart to the beautiful, the falsity of romance 
aligns it with the grotesque.  London is the space in which all of these 
aesthetic categories can co-exist simultaneously and provide stimulus to the 
poetic impulse, transforming the city into a sort of topographical 
Mischgedicht: a space which provokes the poet to exercise an ironic mode of 
literary production. Like that modern, Romantic literature, which is the 
subject of the following chapter, the city appears to be without boundaries. 
Though Book VII’s navigator finds it difficult to escape the claustrophobia of 
the streets to find a ‘sequestered nook’, the revisionary poet of the next Book 
remembers it as ‘enormous’ (1850: l.71), and later – and significantly when 
‘unity of man’ is found therein – ‘huge’ (1850: l.666)224. This seemingly 
limitless capacity of the city becomes clear to the reader by the end of Book 
VIII when the poet turns yet once more to reflections on the metropolis. 
Having considered landscapes of fantasy and mythology, Wordsworth turns to 
that original seat of romance in a final, striking revision of his perceptions. 
Adding to the sublimity and grotesquery catalogued in Book VII, he now 
finds a moral and philosophical beauty in the ‘unity of man’ (1850: l.668; 
1805: l.827) to match the beautiful perceived by the eye. In a chiasmic turn, 
love of nature leads to man largely because love of man enables appreciation 
                                                            
224 In 1805 the city is described as ‘huge’ in both cases. 
175 
 
of nature with that ‘fresher’ perception effected through the revisionary mode 




 ‘Thus moderated, thus composed’ 
 
I have focused in this chapter on the implications Wordsworth’s revisionary 
habits have for his aesthetics. My consideration of this has been necessarily 
constrained to Book VII in order to examine effectively, and with focus, the 
extent to which the poet’s ironic practice impacted upon his philosophical 
poetry. Although this has thus been at the expense of considering the effects 
of the French Revolution and the intellectual development charted in The 
Prelude in the Books following VIII, I have intended my approach here – as is 
the case with the approach the thesis as a whole takes – to be foundational. 
That is, I have sought to identify why London remains a high point for the 
argument of the poem in a way that I believe has not yet been adequately 
explored. Moreover, I have sought to re-evaluate the critical consensus that 
Wordsworth in London is a poet in crisis. I have argued that reading 
Wordsworth as an ironist is central to understanding his philosophical poetry 
– his poetology – with the intention that my methodology provides scope for 
further consideration of the poet’s corpus, and this includes building on the 
important scholarship of the later Books of The Prelude that exists.225 Being 
necessarily selective here, I have focused on the relatively under-researched 
Book VII and its relationship to Wordsworth’s handling of aesthetic 
categories in Books VI and VIII. However, I would like to conclude the 
present chapter by looking ahead to the ‘conclusion’ of the poem itself. 
 The Prelude begins to work definitively towards its conclusion – 
which identifies itself as more of a beginning to The Recluse, and so a 
fragment, in any case – in the penultimate Book (1805: XII; 1850: XIII). By a 
definitive move towards concluding I mean that the narrative points we 
associate as moments of climax or ‘crisis’ – the Alps, London, and the French 
Revolution – have come to pass, giving way to what we might call the ‘third 
                                                            
225 See in particular James Chandler, Wordsworth’s Second Nature: A Study of the Poetry and 
Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984) for a study of Wordsworth’s 
intellectual and political crisis points.  
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look’, the reflection, revision and revisioning of those events.226 I will argue 
that this ‘third look’ culminates in the passage recounting the climbing of 
Snowdon, itself a strategically positioned conclusion that interrupts a linear 
chronology. Crucially, however, this metareflective ‘third look’ is reinforced 
at the beginning of Book IX as the natural segue from VIII’s recovery; IX 
opens with comparisons of the narrative to a river that ‘Turns, and will 
measure back his course’ and to the traveller who ‘is tempted to review / The 
region left behind him’ (1850: ll.5-12; 1805: ll.5-9), thus phasing in the ‘third 
look’ as the agenda for the third and final section of the poem. Significantly, 
the latter comparison of the narrative to the traveller is a late – 1832 – 
revision, again projecting the importance Wordsworth himself places on ironic 
writing and re-writing of the self, which is thus constantly historicized 
because it is subject to constant re-evaluation. Wordsworth’s earlier 
repudiations of book learning/philosophizing and radical politics in V, VI, VII 
and the French Revolution Books are reasserted in the opening of the 
penultimate Book, with the reparative aesthetic and moral lessons taught by 
the central Books being championed instead; as with VI, VII, and VIII (and 
the earlier ‘lyrical ballads’) these lessons are learnt by retaining an ability to 
look past the ‘busy dance / Of things that pass away’ (1850: ll.30-31; 1805: 
ll.34-35) and ‘to seek / In man, and in the frame of social life, / Whate’er there 
is desirable and good / Of kindred permanence, unchanged in form / And 
function’ (1850: ll.34-37: 1805: ll.39-42).227 This might be read as a logical if 
not explicit reference to the triumph of the poetological narrative in London 
over the city’s sensory and moral chaos, which was also described as a furious 
dance of the transience that threatened the poet’s sense of ‘kindred 
permanence’. Reading these lines in this way enables us to see just how 
decisive the apparent crisis point of London is for Wordsworth’s long-term 
recovery and poetological growth, as it reinforces the ability to overcome a 
                                                            
226 As I have stated above and elsewhere in this thesis, I am borrowing, and building on, 
David Simpson’s phrase for Wordsworth’s ironic revision of narrated events, the ‘second 
look’. I am also, once again, indebted to James Chandler’s emphasis on Wordsworth’s ‘first’ 
and ‘second’ nature.  
227 For more on the significance of the ascent of Snowdon for Wordsworth’s moral recovery, 
see Adam Potkay’s very recent Wordsworth’s Ethics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2012), pp.121-147. Potkay’s study is a timely reminder of the importance of 
the moral implications of the poet’s aesthetic re-evaluation and restored imaginative faculties. 
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counter-productive solipsism to become a socialized, historicized (and 
historicizing) and political individual capable of creating narrative. The 
emerging picture of the ‘selves’ Wordsworth is able to create by this point, 
then, is one that is very similar to that of the creators of sympoetological 
narrative in Chapter 2, who are successful because they are able to write and 
re-write their stories and histories actively. 
 
Thus moderated, thus composed, I found 
Once more in Man an object of delight, 
Of pure imagination, and of love; 
And, as the horizon of my mind enlarged, 
Again I took the intellectual eye 
For my instructor, studious more to see 
Great truths, than touch and handle little ones. 
Knowledge was given accordingly; my trust 
Became more firm in feelings that had stood 
The test of such a trial; clearer far 
My sense of excellence – of right and wrong; 
The promise of the present time retired 
Into its true proportion; sanguine schemes. 
Ambitious projects, pleased me less; I sought 
For present good in life’s familiar face, 
And built thereon my hopes of good to come. 
   (1850: ll.48-63; 1805: ll.53-68) 
  
The passage quoted above is a concise and timely reminder of the 
reflective methodology driving Lyrical Ballads, as seen in the previous 
chapter. The emphasis on thought and wisdom gained through a mind 
‘moderated’ and ‘composed’ reinforces the rejections of abstract political and 
intellectual systems. Wordsworth implies that he has recovered enough 
through his poetic education to hope sincerely for future good, but also to 
recognize ‘present good’ in the familiar world. The poet has, it seems, almost 
come home. This continues to inform the metareflective ‘third look’ for the 
rest of the Book, which itself concludes with a sympoetological validation of 
Wordsworth’s vocation: he turns to Coleridge’s assessment of Salisbury Plain 
as a ‘case study’ which prefigures the famous justification for the Recluse 
project at the very end of The Prelude. Its presence at the end of this Book 
points the way forward to the Snowdon passage, which is the climax of the 
poem, as it links it to a relationship not yet matured into a sympoetological 
friendship such as the type the end of the poem recounts; Wordsworth is clear 
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in pointing out that Coleridge’s assessment of Salisbury Plain was made at a 
time when they were ‘as strangers’, not fully acquainted as friends and fellow 
poets. Coleridge was at this point engaged in a critical dialogue with 
Wordsworth but not yet an active collaborative one. In order to enable 
entering into a sympoetological friendship, Wordsworth would first need to 
reach the climax of his narrative of the ‘self’, the ascent of Snowdon. This 
climax would thus enable a closer account of the sympoetological debts owed 
to the circle (again, see Chapter 2 for more on the concept of the 
‘philosophical friendship’), a way to bring his personal ‘history’ and the 
collective, sympoetological history to its ‘appointed close’ (1805: l.270; 1850: 
l.303). 
 The ascent of Snowdon represents the decisive moment in the 
narrative in which Wordsworth is able to surmount the aesthetic crises that the 
sublime has hitherto presented in the poem. Having worked towards a 
mediation of the urban sublime through irony, the central Books present an 
opportunity to re-evaluate both the sublime and the beautiful. However, 
whereas the latter is evident in Book VIII, it is not until Snowdon that a fuller 
appraisal of the poet’s handling of the sublime in nature emerges. The ascent 
is presented as a struggle for physical exertion, certainly, but the sublimity of 
the natural world in this experience is tempered by the restoration of the 
poetological faculties – the ability to take both second and third look and to 
engender a poetic narrative of one’s history as both personal and socialized. It 
is thus a very different experience from the crossing of the Alps. Whereas 
Book VI saw the ‘light of sense’ go out and a usurpation by Mont Blanc of the 
poetic imagination, Snowdon represents both a metaphorical and visual 
inversion of this experience; climbing up the mountain in quiet determination 
with his walking companion and their guide, Wordsworth describes a sudden 
illumination of the ground, ‘instantly a light upon the turf / Fell like a flash’ 
(1805: ll.39-40; 1850: 38-9). The flash-like light is that provided by the moon 
and it occasions the remarkable climax of the ascent. However, as Alexander 
Regier points out, the passage is every bit as fractured as the rest of the 
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poem.228 The same self-disruptions and doubts pervade the ascent of 
Snowdon, and I am suggesting that this makes it less of a resolution and more 
of a resolve to continue writing his ‘selves’. As Regier sums up, ‘After 
thirteen books, the ‘growth’ of the poet’s mind still has to be described 
parenthetically’.229 Snowdon, is important, then, not because it represents a 
climax or closure that sees the poet gain that sought-after self-consciousness, 
but because the myth of that absolute closure is acknowledged. It is a 
‘conclusion’ of sorts because it marks the aesthetic and moral recovery that 
London partially enabled – the imagination and senses are no longer usurped 
upon by the natural sublime as they were in Mont Blanc – but also because it 





















228 See Regier on the Ascent of Snowdon, in Fracture and Fragmentation, pp.114-118. 
Regier’s reading is in contention with Alan Liu’s suggestion that Snowdon represents a 
moment of ‘Absolute Knowledge’ for the poet, arguing instead that it represents the 
impossibility of closure (p.116). Regier’s reading is based on the 1805 text, not the 1850. 
229 Regier, Fracture and Fragmentation, p.118. 
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Chapter 5. ‘… as in a sort of interregnum’: Mediation and the 
Mischgedicht in Romantic poetry 
 
It is only because of the weakness of our organs, and of our self-
reflection, that we do not see into a fairy world. All fairy tales are only 
dreams of that home that is everywhere and nowhere. The higher 
powers in us that once, as genius, executed our will, are now muses 
that refreshen us with sweet memories during this dreary journey. 
(Novalis, Sketches)230 
 
Lyrics and ballads 
 
The ways in which the Lyrical Ballads volume specifically sets out to redefine 
readers’ expectations of both the lyric mode and the ballad form has been 
noted by various scholars of Wordsworth’s poetics.231 More specifically, it is 
the cultured reader who is targeted in Wordsworth’s campaign to speak to 
others in a common, everyman’s language.232 Rather than reading this as a 
kind of snobbishness on the poet’s part, it may be profitable to read within it a 
sort of parallel to Friedrich Schlegel’s ‘gebildete Kenner’ (see Chapter 1 for 
more on this); whereas this label had previously referred to the learned author, 
the one who might be engaged in a poetological literary production, I think it 
could equally apply to the learned or cultured reader of poetry and 
philosophy. In this context, then, Schlegel’s Notebook entry fragment might 
be understood as suggesting that, as well as the poetologizing writer, it is also 
the reader who creates meaning through engaging with the text – in this case, 
the reader is a participant in the fusion, or Verschmelzung, of poetic genres, 
modes, and styles. As seen in the third chapter, such expectations of reader 
participation formed the basis for Romantic irony, with conventional roles of 
                                                            
230 See Beiser, Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, pp.85-86. 
231 Once again, it is useful to turn to Mary Jacobus’ seminal Tradition and Experiment, pp.1-
11. Jacobus’ argument for Wordsworth’s debt to poetic tradition and predecessors in his quest 
to forge an original poetic identity remains undoubtedly influential for any study of the 
volume and partly informs my discussion of Romantic negotiation of the ancient-modern 
dialectic. This mix of tradition and experiment not only addresses Romantic anxieties of 
originality, it also concerns itself with the kind of literary production that could transmit 
writers’ ‘modern’ manifestos. As I intend to argue in this chapter, the ‘lyrical ballad’ becomes 
an early form of exemplary Romantic literature in that it actively seeks to bridge this gap 
between past and present, oral and print culture. For an influential study of Wordsworth’s 
emphasis on the art of poetic composition, see also Stephen M. Parrish, The Art of the Lyrical 
Ballads. 
232 See E. J. Clery, The rise of supernatural fiction, 1762-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p.173. 
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reader, writer, and critic becoming interchangeable in that the writer’s notion 
of authorship becomes somewhat decentralized from the figure of the writer. 
To this form of participation through irony is added that of participation 
through appreciation of the centrality of interdisciplinarity to modern 
discourse. 
 As London became a topographical Mischgedicht in Books VII and 
VIII of The Prelude, a physical space in which heterogeneity might be unified 
to a degree by the poem’s narrative, so it also came to represent a space that 
might inspire revisionary attention to different literary genres; the city invokes 
– simultaneously, it seems – satire, epic, and romance. In other words, genres 
corresponding to the three broad categories Schlegel attempts to bring 
together in his literary Mischung: the satiric, mimetic, and idyllic. As each of 
these alone is destructive for Schlegel’s Romantic poetry, so they proved 
inadequate for Wordsworth’s poetic expression of the metropolitan 
Mischgedicht that is London. Again, irony (manifest in the revisionary habit) 
became central to Wordsworth’s narrative Mischung. As I have shown in the 
previous chapter London opened the Mischgedicht up for consideration as a 
ground for Verschmelzung, in terms of both topography and subject matter, 
and this was achieved, in part at least, by acknowledging the generic 
possibilities offered by the city for versification. What I now wish to return to 
is Wordsworth’s earlier experiment in generic mixing, the ‘lyrical ballads’ of 
1798, a collection that might be seen as a ground for typographical 
Verschmelzung. 
Returning to Mary Jacobus’ central focus of tradition and 
experimentalism in Lyrical Ballads, we see that with this publication 
Wordsworth set about engaging in the kind of negotiation of old and new that 
Schlegel and his contemporaries extensively theorized and practised. Though 
this is partly down to the fact that any author seeking to claim originality is 
akin to Hannibal crossing the Alps233, a large driving factor for Wordsworth 
with this work, I am suggesting, is the conscious evaluation of what future 
literature of the past (here seen as that belonging to the oral tradition) might 
                                                            
233 See Jacobus’ treatment of this comparison Wordsworth draws in his 1815 ‘Essay 
Supplementary to the Preface’, in Tradition and Experiment, p.1.  
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have in his contemporary print culture.234 The recovery of the ballad form and 
antiquarianism, though not new to Romantic poetic theory and practice – as 
shown by the vast source material drawn from earlier in the eighteenth-
century – took on a new significance in the literature of Wordsworth and his 
contemporaries in that it made little attempt to imitate or catalogue existing 
literature, such as Chatterton’s imitations or Percy’s Reliques. Rather, 
underpinning these writings was the very theory that proposed 
Universalpoesie, a modern literature that might consider generic and temporal 
boundaries to be as permeable as those of disciplines and authorship. The 
Mischgedicht in both its German and English Romantic incarnations was the 
aspired product of this methodology of Sympoesie and Symphilosophie. For 
Coleridge the Symphilosophie might later have taken a life of its own, 
independent of Wordsworth’s Recluse, but with the Lyrical Ballads we see the 
drive towards a collaborative Mischgedicht in its initial stages, however much 
each poet would later attempt to forge distinctions between his work and the 
work of the other. 
Much has been said about the collaborative nature of the project.235 
Perhaps, however, Mary Jacobus’ assessment most succinctly summarizes the 
value of it for this discussion: ‘The relationship, in fact, provides the best 
possible illustration of Wordsworth’s later theory about the poet’s twofold 
debt to other writers. For all that they gave one another, the most important 
                                                            
234 For a reading situating the volume within a print culture poetics see Alan D. Boehm, ‘The 
“1798 Lyrical Ballads” and the Poetics of Late Eighteenth-Century Book Production’, ELH , 
63, 2 (1996), pp. 453-487. See also Anne Janowitz, Lyric and Labour in the Romantic 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), whose dialectical reading of the 
Romantic lyric is partly concerned with ‘the rhetoric of an unrelieved tension between what 
came before and what will come after.’ (p.1).  
235 See for example Paul Magnuson’s Coleridge and Wordsworth: A Lyrical Dialogue 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). For more on the conflicts of this collaborative 
venture, see again Parrish, The Art of the Lyrical Ballads (especially the Preface and pp.34-
70). For more on this and on the conflict both Wordsworth and Coleridge felt between 
adopting the Gothic ballad genre and rejecting its politics, see Michael Gamer’s chapter on 
Lyrical Ballads in his Romanticism and the Gothic: Genre, Reception, and Canon Formation, 
pp.90-126. For a reading of the relationship in terms of literary property between the two 
poets’ work of this period, see Susan Eilenberg’s Strange Power of Speech: Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, and Literary Possession (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), particularly her 
discussion of displacement and ventriloquy in ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’ (pp.31-59) 
and the implications of replacing ‘Christabel’ with ‘Michael’ (pp.87-107). See also 
Coleridge’s own account of the production of the volume and his later view of the differences 
between the two poets, in his Biographia Literaria, which was taken up by me in the second 
and third chapters. 
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effect of the partnership was to make each more fully himself.’236 This is 
certainly illuminating when considering how Coleridge’s ‘Christabel’ and 
‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’ became the poems that they did. 
Originally conceived as part of the poet’s meditations on the philosophical 
origins of evil, his collaborative project with Wordsworth enabled Coleridge 
to push generic, thematic, and temporal boundaries. As the third chapter of 
this thesis argued, Romantic attempts to challenge what Wordsworth calls 
readers’ ‘pre-established codes of decision’ are dependent on the use of irony. 
As a mediator of boundaries, irony is also the mode of writing that makes 
effective Novalis’ Potenzirung, or intensification, the poetic process whereby 
the everyday or commonplace occurrence or phenomenon is given a renewed 
perspective, thus a new significance for both reader and author.237 This re-
awakening, whether seen as from a ‘slumber’ or from a ‘savage torpor’, is 
what is of interest in this chapter, and I wish to read ‘Christabel’ as a 
Mischgedicht that consciously attempts to redefine ‘pre-established codes of 
decision’. 
 Some of the rationale underpinning this decision to read the poetry of 
Coleridge and Wordsworth as engaging in a constant dialogue with the other 
stems from the poets’ assessment of the collaborative endeavour of Lyrical 
Ballads, which has begun to receive renewed critical notice. In his 
introduction to the (fairly recent) Routledge Classics edition of the text, 
Nicholas Roe points out that Norman Fruman and Stephen Parrish have 
challenged the idea of Wordsworth’s agreement to the account Coleridge 
gives in his Biographia Literaria of the latter’s task to produce poems about 
‘places and characters supernatural, or at least romantic’ and the former’s to 
find incidents from everyday life. Roe astutely argues that Wordsworth did 
not ever confirm this statement, but that he did not deny it either.238 I would 
like to add to this that the texts produced by both poets point towards the kind 
                                                            
236Jacobus, Tradition and Experiment, p.6. 
237Though the close parallels between Wordsworth’s and Novalis’ theoretical prose and poetic 
practice are read in detail in the final chapter, it is worth keeping in mind here Novalis’ short 
fragment on this fructifying property of poetry: ‘All poetry interrupts our usual condition – 
our everyday life; almost like slumber, it renews us, and so keeps active our feelings for life’ 
–Sketches, 196, in The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, p.86. 
238 See Wordsworth & Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads, ed. by Nicholas Roe (Oxford: Routledge, 
2005), pp.11-12.  
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of conscious sympoetology I have identified in the second chapter of this 
thesis; one of the things I am arguing about the Lyrical Ballads project in 
terms of collaboration is that these two types of poetry converge in Romantic 
poetologies. By its very definition, the supernatural ‘or at least romantic’ 
poem is the one that romanticizes. Yet, as we know, to ‘romanticize’ in both 
English and German early Romanticism is to give the ordinary a colouring of 
the extraordinary, or to consider it by taking that all-important ‘second look’ 
identified by David Simpson (see Chapters 3 and 4 for more on this). 
Romanticizing – what Novalis calls Potenzirung – is what joins Coleridge’s 
supernatural poems with Wordsworth’s ‘natural’ poems. The Lyrical Ballads 
volume is therefore an active work of Potenzirung, whether Wordsworth or 
Coleridge realized it in these terms or not. The argument that follows in this 
chapter is that Lyrical Ballads as a whole volume is a Mischgedicht because 
its primary aim is to mediate: between old and new, between real and 
supernatural, between oral and print, between modern and antiquarian, and 
between ‘high’ poetry and ‘low’ culture. As I have demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, such mediation between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture has been 
consistently significant for Wordsworth’s poetic practice, which I think is 
itself an interpretation of the kind of ‘reciprocal elevation and debasement’ 
Novalis saw romanticizing to be. 
‘Goody Blake and Harry Gill’ is of particular interest to discussion of 
the collaborative nature of Lyrical Ballads. The question of whether or not the 
work of each poet was divided on this project into the commonplace and the 
‘supernatural, or at least romantic’ is complicated by this poem. A genuine 
ballad (which echoes the black humour, tone and moral philosophy of 
sympathy of poems such as ‘The Idiot Boy’, ‘The Thorn’, and ‘Simon Lee’), 
‘Goody Blake and Harry Gill’ is also – like ‘Peter Bell’ – Coleridgean in its 
use of the supernatural to explore moral philosophy. As with ‘Peter Bell’, the 
grotesque finds some anchor in this poem, arising mainly in the shape of 
morality, rather than conventional aesthetics. Wordsworth paints a picture of 
moral grotesquerie in the character of Harry Gill, rather than in the unnatural 
and unnerving humour of his constant ‘chattering’: as with the experience in 
London, the grotesque is not in appearance but in what that appearance 
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signifies of morality and social attitudes. Indeed, this is what makes the 
description of his former pre-curse state so significant, 
 
Oh! what’s the matter? what’s the matter? 
What is’t that ails young Harry Gill? 
That evermore his teeth they chatter, 
Chatter, chatter, chatter still. 
Of waistcoats Harry has no lack, 
Good duffle grey, and flannel fine; 
He has a blanket on his back, 
And coats enough to smother nine. 
 
In March, December, and in July, 
 ‘Tis all the same with Harry Gill; 
The neighbours tell, and tell you truly, 
His teeth they chatter, chatter still. 
At night, at morning, and at noon, 
 ‘Tis all the same with Harry Gill; 
Beneath the sun, beneath the moon, 
His teeth they chatter, chatter still. 
 
Young Harry was a lusty drover, 
And who so stout of limb as he? 
His cheeks were red as ruddy clover, 
His voice was like the voice of three. 
Auld Goody Blake was old and poor, 
Ill fed she was, and thinly clad, 
And any man who passed her door, 
Might see how poor a hut she had. 
  (1798: ll.1-24) 
 
The stark contrast between the Harry Gill with cheeks ‘as red as ruddy clover’ 
and the absurdly ‘chattering’ Harry Gill of the present moment may remind us 
of the parallel between the young Simon Lee – ‘A running huntsman merry’ – 
and the aged and feeble man with ‘swoln and thick’ ankles who struggles to 
chop ‘A stump of rotten wood’. However, the effect of these descriptions 
could not be more different. Whereas the contrast in ‘Simon Lee’ succeeds in 
evoking pathos at the thought of this once-lively figure struck down by 
infirmity and poverty, the absurdity of a ‘young’ Harry Gill with constantly 
chattering teeth paints a darkly comic picture. In the opening stanza of the 
poem, Wordsworth’s playfulness becomes more evident in the repetition of 
the word ‘chatter’ as well as in the rhetorical questioning, both of which 
reference the tone of ‘The Idiot Boy’ and ‘Christabel’. But it is in the second 
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stanza that the surreal nature of this playfulness is elaborated: Wordsworth 
chooses to bring together incongruous seasons and, like Coleridge, the 
oppositions of day and night, sun and moon. Harry Gill’s teeth chatter through 
summer as well as winter, through day and through the night, and regardless 
of how many layers he is wrapped up in. Linearity and logic are dismissed 
from the outset and the central concern with ‘What’s the matter?’ is 
immediately the focus of the poem – the narrator’s off-hand tone indicates that 
sympathy clearly does not lie with young Harry Gill and the question is posed 
as a way into the real matter of the ballad, the contrast between this young and 
once ‘lusty’ figure and ‘auld’ Goody Blake. 
The poem parallels several others in the Lyrical Ballads project, 
certainly – yet, of all the ones discussed above, ‘Goody Blake and Harry Gill’ 
is perhaps the most simply expressed in terms of both punctuation and 
diction.239 It is a poem about the collision of rich and poor, landowner and 
peasant, young and old, a poem of oppositions. What Wordsworth does with 
these oppositions is what leads to the surreal image of a young man with 
ceaselessly chattering teeth through all seasons: in her poverty Goody Blake is 
forced to steal twigs from Harry’s hedge in order to light a fire in her modest 
hut. Upon catching her in the act of stealing, Harry Gill restrains her rather 
‘fiercely’, prompting the old Goody Blake to lay a curse upon him that will 
render any fire or comfort of his useless. The cold Harry Gill is condemned to 
live out forever the consequence of his refusal to empathize with the poor, and 
it is this point that is driven home by the oppositions of comfort and poverty. 
The landowner’s negligence towards the poor is bad enough, but the inability 
to empathize with suffering is what really takes effect here. The moral of 
Wordsworth’s tale – told so simply through highlighting incongruity line by 
line, clause by clause – seems to be that where there is no meeting or genuine 
mediation of social polarities suffering will continue. Such a moral points 
                                                            
239 Wordsworth himself states in his ‘Preface’ that this poem was one of the ‘rudest of this 
collection’, Prose Works, i (1800: p.178). Such an assessment goes some way to explaining 
the consciously intended effect of ‘Goody Blake and Harry Gill’ on the reader; Wordsworth 
clearly intended this to sit apart from others in his volume in its expression, and the deliberate 
‘rudeness’ of its language and typographical form is indicative of Wordsworth’s pared-down 
efforts at purging the supernatural ballad of its sensationalist elements through parody. The 
simplicity of something that is playing for shocks and cheap thrills, on the one hand, and the 




towards the urgency of negotiating extreme social conditions, and it is the 
artifact of the poem, the ‘lyrical ballad’ that enables this democratization. It 
reminds us that reconciliation is vital, because without it the totality of 
authority – in stark contrast to die politische Totalität that Schlegel equates 
with universality (see Chapter 1 for more on this) – threatens to dominate. 
Democratization, in the sense of reader participation in engendering meaning, 
also becomes central to reading ‘Christabel’, to which I now turn. 
 
 
‘that home that is everywhere and nowhere’ 
 
In an essay on ‘Christabel’, Karen Swann begins by observing Geraldine’s 
initial presentation of herself as an equal to Christabel’s nobility.240 As Swann 
notes here, Geraldine’s story offers no specific answer to the questions 
Christabel asks her. Rather, it serves to reinforce the central paradox of the 
poem, namely that of the heimlich, the simultaneously familiar and unknown. 
Geraldine is just like Christabel, her story insists, yet she must necessarily 
remain a stranger to both Christabel and the reader. Swann uses discussion of 
Christabel’s readiness to identify herself with this stranger to introduce her 
argument that the poem, ‘both dramatizes and provokes hysteria. The poem 
explores the possessing force of certain bodies – Geraldine’s, of course, but 
also bodies of literary convention, which I am calling “genres”’.241 This 
mention of genre is especially important to my discussion of the Mischgedicht 
here; the transgression – and therefore eradication – of boundaries occurs on a 
literary level as well as a literal one, and Coleridge does indeed present the 
‘body’ of the poem as reflecting the identities of its two female figures in its 
lack of fixity. As with the poem’s other gothic themes, Coleridge’s doubling 
takes the familiar Romantic trope and subverts it – there is, for example, no 
mysterious haunting, nor mistaken identity among the characters, no 
doppelgängers. In fact, the identity of individuals does not seem to be a 
concern within the narrative of the poem; Christabel does not wonder about 
the truth in Geraldine’s reply, nor does she seem to question her further. 
Instead, she invites the stranger to spend the night in the castle with her, based 
                                                            
240 Karen Swann, ‘“Christabel”: The Wandering Mother and the Enigma of Form’, Studies in 
Romanticism, 23 (1984), pp.533-47, p.533. 
241 Swann, p.534. 
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only on the facts that Geraldine is in need and that her ‘sire is of a noble line’ 
(l.79). This lack of concern with individual identity is bound up with the 
question of generic boundaries; the poem seems to suggest instantly that a 
straightforward ‘truth’ or ‘meaning’ is to be denied to the poetic figure, 
narrator, reader, and critic. In other words, identity equates with genre in its 
ambiguity here. 
More specifically, Christabel, along with the reader, participates in the 
‘republican speech’ that Schlegel identified poetry to be. The language of 
‘Christabel’ is a variation of the Romantic language identified by Novalis as 
the lingua romana, and the resulting form of poetry/literature is the 
Mischgedicht. As discussed in Chapter 1, the language of Romanticism – this 
lingua romana – is primarily the language of interdisciplinarity. In 
‘Christabel’ the reader finds a similar collapse of literary genres and, in the 
content, of identities. The poem defies categorization, with the reader left 
wondering if it is a fairy tale? A gothic parody? A medievalist ballad? The 
poem is, in fact, a mixture of existing literary genres, and can be seen as a 
response to various literary and philosophical ambitions recorded by 
Coleridge in the 1790s.242 Coleridge’s Notebook entries read as fragmented 
counterparts to Novalis’ interdisciplinary Das Allgemeine Brouillon or, Notes 
for a Romantic Encyclopaedia; both works clearly represent a desire to unify 
disciplinary genres as symptomatic of a modern, Romantic drive towards an 
‘absolute’ that is, paradoxically, necessarily always in the process of 
completion. However, the poet-thinkers have more in common than this 
apparently surface comparison. Both Coleridge and Novalis provide, through 
their literary fictions, expositions of these seemingly idealistic philosophical 
aims. A way in which they seek to achieve this is through historicizing, and 
‘Christabel’ is just one such example; the poem is a fairy tale, it is a gothic 
parody, and so a poeticized reconstruction of an ideal history. The 
historicization of an individual’s – Christabel’s – ontological and 
epistemological experience is used to invite the reader to participate in the 
                                                            
242 See, for example, The Notebooks, 4 vols, Collected Works, 16 vols, ed. by Kathleen 
Coburn (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957-90), i: 1794-1804,  Entry 161 for the 
projected epic meditation: ‘The Origin of Evil, an Epic Poem’. 
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poet’s expression of human experience as being fragmented, forever ‘in the 
state of becoming’. 
In suggesting that a primary aim of ‘Christabel’ is to historicize 
Romantic theory in an attempt to reconcile past and present for a feasible 
philosophy, I am reading the poem – and the Mischgedicht in general – not as 
an ideal, but rather an essential literary form. As historicists, Romantic writers 
seek to make sense of the ancient/modern literary debate of their day – what 
might be usefully considered as Jacobus’ tradition and experiment – and, more 
importantly, to advance this debate in a way that could be compatible with 
their philosophical aims. These aims, being centred on the opening up of 
literary genres as well as of the modes of literary production (as discussed in 
the first and second chapters), necessarily involve mediation. In terms of 
literary production, this mediation perpetuates the favoured ‘republican 
speech’ of Romantic theory, joint authorship and the intergeneric, 
democratizing the literary process. This is taken one step further in Romantic 
theory, though, as interdisciplinarity plays an additional part in the rationale 
behind the Mischgedicht in that it actively seeks to produce a literature of self-
consciousness – ultimately, poetology. It does this, I have suggested above, by 
recognizing the need to reassess existing subject/object distinctions. Though 
inspired by the philosophical preoccupations of the day, thinkers like Novalis 
ultimately take this project to apply to genre itself, and the Mischgedicht is 
one term Schlegel uses to refer to his ‘progressive’ literature. 
 In both its formal status as a published fragment and its thematic 
concern with the ineffability of being and knowing, ‘Christabel’ provides an 
unsurprising model for this progressive and democratic poetry. It is, after all, a 
ballad that tells an incomplete story; a dark fairy tale in which dreams, 
nightmares, and reality become indistinguishable; a poem that deals with love 
and duty (be it between parents and their offspring, old friends, or peers), but 
does this so ambiguously as to resist all generic connotations of morality. 
Above all, though, ‘Christabel’ is a poem that explores the gaps between 
knowledge, experience, and articulation, and it is this philosophical concern 
that generates the thematic layering. The poem is not ‘about’ any one thing; 
indeed, it suggests that it cannot be so, because to ‘complete’ the poem – in 
either compositional or critical terms – would be to negate the argument it 
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makes in relation to the inadequacy of language. Although much has been said 
about the Romantic concern with the inadequacy of language (so much so 
that, in Coleridge’s case, this has generally become little more than an 
alternating play between indictment and sympathetic, but weak, defence of his 
perceived inability to complete literary projects), scholars have been reticent 
when it comes to engaging with the poem’s philosophical premise. Instead, 
‘Christabel’ is too often read as an unintentional fragment, a testimony to the 
waning creative powers of a potentially brilliant poet.243 
 But not enough is made of the uses and presentation of history in 
‘Christabel’. If it were, the poem could emerge as an example of the Romantic 
project of finding a way to express the inexpressible. Coleridge’s medievalism 
could be read in line with that of contemporary Romantic theorists and 
writers, were the liminality related to the wider project of theorizing poetry. 
Part of what drives the poem’s elimination of boundaries is its concern with 
the function of dreams. A dark fairytale in which that which is dreamlike is 
not easily separated from that which is real, the poem seems to comment on 
the dream as a space that celebrates ambiguity. This is certainly the case for 
Novalis, I think, whose writings often use the dream as both a catalyst for 
clarification and as a stimulant for necessary ambiguity. For Novalis in his 
Sketches the dream is a revivifying occurrence that better equips the senses to 
penetrate the everyday. In the fragment quoted at the beginning of this 
                                                            
243 Here I am addressing the most influential indictment of Coleridge’s intellectual legacy, 
Coleridge: The Damaged Archangel (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1972). Fruman’s 
study has sought to reassess the reticence with which scholars have approached Coleridge’s 
contributions to the many disciplines in which he engaged. Fruman’s research has challenged 
cherished notions of Coleridge’s indisputable originality and remains important in that it 
encourages Coleridgean scholarship to reposition itself when considering the poet-thinker’s 
approach to fact and fiction. What it does not do, however, in its preoccupation with 
challenging the veracity and originality of Coleridge’s writings and statements, is adequately 
account for the inherent voracity that is the real crux of the issue here: Romantic 
interdisciplinarity does not push for originality in all its production, nor does it insist on being 
taken at face value by the reader. On the contrary, the centrality of irony places the reader 
within that very sphere of production, enabling – encouraging – her to claim some authority to 
the text. No small part of this is achieved through a very conscious attempt to reconcile 
familiar terrain, or tradition, with originality through a text that aims to be all-encompassing, 
whilst remaining simultaneously conscious of its fragmentary nature. Thus, a text such as the 
Biographia Literaria – which Fruman treats as a primary offender in his case against 
Coleridge’s originality – demands to be read and assessed along with other contributions to 
the Romantic project of interdisciplinarity that consciously challenge veracity or authenticity 
as the predominant concern for literary production. Among these, I am counting Lyrical 
Ballads, Fragmente, Lucinde, and the Recluse project – all Mischgedichte which depend on 
their reader’s rejection of linearity, generic and disciplinary boundary, or 
discernible/conclusive ‘fact’ or ‘truth’.     
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chapter, he goes further in elucidating the relationship between the everyday 
‘real’ and the dream space by suggesting that ‘all fairy tales are only dreams 
of that home that is everywhere and nowhere’. This again indicates the dream 
is a space that transcends boundaries, but it also highlights the fairy tale as a 
literary medium for communicating this.  
 
 
‘And nothing else saw she thereby’ 
 
Portents are found in the familiar guise of dreams at crucial points in the 
narrative; Christabel’s restless dreams of her absent lover lead her to step out 
of the domesticity of the castle and into the woods where she first encounters 
Geraldine, and the following events are later symbolized in the Bard Bracy’s 
dream of the serpent suffocating the dove. However, perhaps more crucially, 
these seemingly straightforward uses of the dream are then complicated by the 
exploration of dream-like sensations, which punctuate the gaps between 
Christabel’s experience and attempts at comprehension and articulation. These 
descriptions seem to problematize the actual dreams within the poem as they 
themselves step out of the realm of the descriptive – that is, they transcend the 
perceived boundaries of the conventional folk tale or ballad as they come to 
accentuate the narrator’s relationship with the reader as opposed to with the 
figures within the poem. The revelation that Christabel wakes up and greets 
Geraldine ‘With such Perplexity of Mind / As Dreams too lively leave behind’ 
(ll. 385-386) is now a matter for the reader to decode actively as opposed to 
ingest as part of an omniscient narrative. Similarly, Geraldine’s account of her 
trance-like state, like that of Coleridge’s Mariner, becomes unclear in how far 
it might be a nightmare, rather than a trance, ‘For I have lain entranc’d, I wis’ 
(l.92).244 Geraldine’s account differs from the Mariner’s, however, in that the 
reader becomes conscious that it may not in fact be encrypted by an apparent 
aporia associated with knowledge or articulation. Or rather, the reader is made 
conscious of this possibility through emotional/hysterical interjections that 
hint at more sinister goings-on, such as, ‘O shield her! shield sweet 
                                                            
244 See ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’: ‘How long in that same fit I lay, / I have not to 
declare’ (1798: 393-4; 1834: 398-9).  
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Christabel’ (l.254).245 As well as undermining the detachment usually 
associated with the ballad narrator, such outbursts direct the reader’s attention 
to the very gaps she should aim to fill, and, in turn, to the smaller details that 
hint at Geraldine’s nature as a supernatural being. Geraldine’s inability to 
cross the threshold of the protected abode and failure to praise the Virgin are 
both instances of the kind of details that would ordinarily be absent from the 
ballad; after all, they are included for the benefit of the reader’s 
understanding, having no bearing on Christabel’s actions. Instead, Christabel 
remains unaware that something is amiss and carries Geraldine over the 
threshold, accepting that she is able both to narrate the story of her ordeal and 
walk to the castle (which, we are told, is a ‘furlong’ from the woods where 
Christabel finds her) but is then too weary to speak a few words or cross a few 
steps: 
 
      The Lady sank, belike thro’ Pain, 
And Christabel with Might and Main 
Lifted her up, a weary Weight, 
Over the Threshold of the Gate: 
Then the Lady rose again, 
And mov’d as She were not in Pain. 
   (ll.129-134) 
 
The reader also notices that Christabel fails to question how Geraldine, having 
been carried over the threshold, then walks with a light and easy step once 
inside the castle, ‘as She were not in Pain’. The supernatural portents continue 
with the pair crossing the fireplace. The dying brands suddenly spark up as 
Geraldine passes yet Christabel notices nothing once she sees Geraldine’s 
bewitching eyes, ‘And Christabel saw the Lady’s Eye / And nothing else saw 
she thereby (ll.160-161). This description seems to suggest that Christabel is 
taken by Geraldine’s eye suddenly, not necessarily struck on first appearance, 
and the mastiff bitch’s moaning further confirms that Geraldine’s supernatural 
power is now at its strongest.  
Though portents of the supernatural are commonplace to the point of 
being clichéd in the gothic genre that instructs his poem, Coleridge’s handling 
                                                            
245 That this line is a later revision of July 1817 seems to suggest that Coleridge’s editing 
sought to emphasise the moral/hysterical intervention of the narrator, thus further 
complicating the expected distance between narrator and characters/events within the 
narrative. See Coleridge, Poetical Works, i, p.491n 
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of these ingredients of the gothic differs in that he uses them to an ironic, not 
sensational, end; the omens are presented to the reader, but not to the 
character, and the narrative does not seek to shock, but rather to unnerve the 
reader’s ‘pre-established codes of decision’. In this it is much closer to the 
Lyrical Ballads volume it was originally conceived as being a part of; in 
rejecting the poem for that publication, Wordsworth perhaps neglected to 
draw important parallels between it and his own brilliant effort at parodying 
the gothic genre in ‘The Idiot Boy’. As with ‘Christabel’, ‘The Idiot Boy’ 
employs narrative irony to reconfigure readers’ generic expectations.  
However, a crucial difference between the two collaborators’ 
treatment of the gothic fashion brings consideration back to the dream as an 
epistemological space: Wordsworth’s experiments with irony in poems such 
as ‘Simon Lee’ and ‘The Idiot Boy’ are grounded in the encouraging of his 
reader to re-evaluate what she perceives to be present within her conscious 
apprehensions. This is the case even in the lyrics that fall outside of these 
experiments – the conclusion of the ‘Immortality Ode’ finds its speaker with 
‘Thoughts that lie too deep for tears’, a state of conflict between knowledge 
and articulation/expression that Christabel is arguably in after her night with 
Geraldine in the castle. Though there are very clear differences between the 
two texts in terms of content and argument the Ode’s line might be contrasted 
with Christabel’s epistemological struggle that ‘dreams too lively leave 
behind’. Where Wordsworth is concerned with the conscious state, Coleridge 
presents this aporia through the dream. In uniting the fairy tale and the dream 
the poet considers the familiar problem of the inexpressible homesickness 
along very similar lines to Novalis’ search for ‘that home that is everywhere 
and nowhere’. In Christabel’s case, the dreams disorientate her in one sense, 
in that she has lost her ability to articulate her experience as Geraldine’s spell 
has bound her ‘utterance’. But the extent of Christabel’s knowledge of what 
has come to pass between her and Geraldine upon the strange lady’s entering 








‘for what she knew she could not tell’ 
 
The relationship between homesickness and inexpressibility forms the basis 
for the fundamental actions in both ‘Christabel’ and ‘The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner’. With both of these poems Coleridge’s narrative explores how 
domesticity and hospitality are overturned or interrupted – in the case of the 
latter poem, by the actions of the Mariner himself. What is of interest is that in 
both poems the cause of such subversion is never known or expressed.246 
Geraldine binds Christabel’s speech and action with a mysterious spell and the 
Mariner shoots the albatross, which, we are told, has previously been a 
companion on the ship. In either case neither poetic figure nor reader can 
comprehend the cause behind the pivotal action: 
 
At length did cross an Albatross, 
Thorough the fog it came; 
  As if it had been a Christian soul, 
  We hailed it in God’s name. 
 
It ate the food it ne’er had eat, 
And round and round it flew. 
The ice did split with a thunder-fit; 
The helmsman steered us through! 
 
And a good south wind sprung up behind; 
The Albatross did follow, 
And every day, for food or play, 
Came to the mariner’s hollo! 
 
In mist or cloud, on mast or shroud, 
It perched for vespers nine; 
While all the night, through fog-smoke 
 white, 
Glimmered the white moon-shine. 
 
 “God save thee, ancient Mariner! 
From the fiends, that plague thee thus!– 
Why look’st thou so?”–With my cross-bow 
I shot the Albatross. 
  (1834: ll.63-82; 1798: ll.61-80) 
 
                                                            
246 Even for very recent readings of Coleridge’s supernatural poetry, the gaps between 
experience, utterance and knowledge figure prominently; for Gregory Leadbetter, much of 
‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’s ‘imaginative charge exists in this tension between 
experience and explanation’ – see his recent Coleridge and the Daemonic Imagination 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p.164.  
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When recounting the act, the Mariner’s face becomes visibly disturbed by the 
recollection, prompting the Wedding-Guest to question what troubles him, 
and his reply – that he shot the bird – is the only information the Wedding-
Guest is given regarding the act. The reader of the 1834 poem, however, is 
told by the gloss of an unknown narrator (ll.79-82) that ‘The ancient Mariner 
inhospitably killeth the pious bird of good omen’.  
The crucial adverb ‘inhospitably’ prompts further connections between 
the poem and ‘Christabel’, in that a violation of hospitality (whether in terms 
of giving or receiving it) is inextricably linked to the heimlich. For Christabel, 
Geraldine’s abuse of her hospitality results in an alienation of the homely 
within familiar domestic surroundings – she very literally becomes a stranger 
in her own home and even her father shuns her in favour of Geraldine, 
believing, ironically enough, that Christabel’s strange behaviour in her 
possessed state demonstrates an inhospitable disposition toward the ‘guest’. 
Though falling at her father’s feet and begging him to turn Geraldine away, 
Christabel cannot say why she wishes him to do so, ‘For what she knew, she 
could not tell / O’ermaster’d by the mighty Spell’ (ll.619-620). The narrator 
prompts the reader to consider the love Leoline has for both his deceased wife 
and the daughter who is a living reminder of his union with her. However, as 
with much of the narrative of the poem, this reminder is for the readers and 
does not change the actions of the figure: 
 
  And would’st thou wrong thy only Child, 
Her Child and thine! 
      
Within the Baron’s Heart and Brain 
If Thoughts, like these, had any Share, 
They only swell’d his Rage and Pain, 
And did but work Confusion there, 
His Heart was cleft with Pain and Rage, 
His Cheeks they quiver’d, his Eyes were wild, 
Dishonour’d thus in his old Age; 
Dishonour’d by his only Child, 
And all his Hospitality  
To the wrong’d Daughter of his Friend 
By more than woman’s Jealousy, 
Brought thus to a disgraceful End– 
He roll’d his Eye with stern Regard 
Upon the gentle Minstrel Bard, 
And said in tones abrupt, austere– 
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Why, Bracy! dost thou loiter here? 
I bade thee hence! the bard obey’d; 
And turning from his own sweet Maid, 
The aged Knight, Sir Leoline, 
Led forth the Lady Geraldine! 
  (ll.634-655) 
 
In Leoline’s mind, his daughter’s jealousy violates his hospitality toward the 
daughter of his old friend, Sir Roland de Vaux, causing him to turn from her 
in anger and accept Geraldine in her place. The strong implication here is that 
Leoline is allowing Geraldine to complete her usurpation of Christabel’s place 
– ‘Whom her Father loves so well’ (l.24) – both physically and emotionally, 
leaving the daughter’s fate uncertain. However the poem might have turned 
out on completion is perhaps a less fruitful line of enquiry to pursue, seeing as 
Coleridge did publish and present the poem in fragment form. In doing so, it 
might be accepted that he was more concerned with the reader’s reception of 
what was published rather than how the events of the narrative were to be 
resolved, more of which is considered below in relation to ‘Kubla Khan’ and 
the publication of the volume as a whole. 
 What is significant about the ‘ending’ of the narrative of events as the 
reader has it, I think, is the connection the narrator reinforces between 
Christabel and her mother throughout Part I. At each pivotal moment of the 
poem’s narrative this relationship is invoked: when the mastiff bitch moans in 
the second stanza, portending the supernatural and possibly seeing the 
mother’s ‘shroud’ just as Christabel is about to step beyond the domestic 
boundary into the woods; as Christabel offers Geraldine a wine ‘of virtuous 
powers’ that her mother made; and the eerie union between the two women 
after Geraldine binds Christabel’s speech, which is compared to the image of 
a mother holding her sleeping child. The first instance might be read as a 
straightforward example of a portent. But in a poem where nothing – not even 
what is real and what is dream or trance – is straightforward, it seems that the 
mention of the dead mother is significant here because it comes at the point 
where Christabel is about to perform one of only three major actions she 
performs in the poem (stepping out of the forest to pray, offering Geraldine 
her hospitality, and offering Geraldine the strange wine). As Coleridge’s 
Mariner, whom Wordsworth faulted for his passivity, Christabel appears to be 
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acted upon more than acting of her own accord, and so any action of hers is 
pivotal. Moreover, this first action of stepping physically outside of the 
domestic realm not only triggers but also parallels the act that will displace 
her from it, i.e. inviting Geraldine to stay at the castle. The second and third 
instances where the mother is mentioned in Part I are of even greater interest 
in that they might hold the key to understanding the strange usurpation that 
takes place at the end of Part II. 
 Christabel’s revelation about her relationship with her dead mother, 
‘She died the hour, that I was born’ (l.197) becomes important because it 
makes clear the fact that the mother and daughter have never inhabited the 
same domestic space simultaneously, other than at the moment of Christabel’s 
birth. This illuminates the usurpation, effected by Geraldine, of both 
Christabel and her deceased mother. Christabel herself has never met her 
mother, whose presence within the castle is perceived only as a guardian 
spirit, and so Geraldine’s usurpation of this role, ‘”Off, wandering Mother! 
Peak and pine! / I have power to bid thee flee”’ (ll.205-206), is 
understandable, as it enables her to penetrate the protective charms that 
separate her from Christabel. In being cast in this grotesquely pseudo-
maternal role both before and after her night with Christabel, Geraldine comes 
to signify a usurpation and subsequent subversion of maternal domesticity. 
Bearing in mind this close association of Christabel with the maternal role 
throughout pivotal points in the narrative, the concluding action of Leoline 
turning away from Christabel and becoming enchanted by Geraldine perhaps 
becomes more comprehensible, in that we see that it is not merely the actual 
daughter being substituted, and therefore a reading of Leoline’s choice as 
incestuous – in which the daughter-substitute Geraldine becomes a potential 
sexual partner to whom Leoline appears to offer domesticity – is complicated 
by the fact that Geraldine usurps mother and daughter.247 This usurpation is 
taken to the point that Christabel’s own body appears to undergo an unwilling 
physiological transference, whereby she takes on Geraldine’s most 
undesirable physical attributes (which have only been revealed to her, and 
                                                            
247 See also Leadbetter, Coleridge and the Daemonic Imagination, pp.215-6. Leadbetter reads 
the ambiguity of the distinctions between Geraldine and the dead mother as ‘one of the most 
suggestive aspects of the doubling of vision that occurs throughout the poem.’ (p.215). 
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even then presented to her through her enchanted state), whilst Geraldine 
herself manages to imbibe Christabel’s own wide-eyed innocence, as she 
looks on at her while Leoline offers his aid: 
 
He kiss’d her Forehead as he spake, 
And Geraldine in maiden wise, 
Casting down her large bright Eyes, 
With blushing Cheek and Courtesy fine 
She turn’d her from Sir Leoline; 
Softly gathering up her Train, 
That o’er her Right Arm fell again; 
And folded her arms across her Chest, 
And couch’d her Head upon her Breast, 
And look’d askance at Christabel – 
Jesu, Maria, shield her well! 
 
A Snake’s small Eye blinks dull and shy, 
And the Lady’s Eyes they shrunk in her Head, 
Each shrunk up to a Serpent’s Eye, 
And with somewhat of Malice, and more of Dread 
At Christabel she look’d askance! – 
One moment – and the Sight was fled! 
But Christabel in dizzy Trance, 
Stumbling on the unsteady Ground – 
Shudder’d aloud, with a hissing Sound; 
And Geraldine again turn’d round, 
And like a Thing, that sought Relief, 
Full of Wonder and full of Grief,  
She roll’d her large bright Eyes divine 
Wildly on Sir Leoline. 
 
The Maid, alas! her thoughts are gone, 
She nothing sees – no sight but one! 
The Maid, devoid of Guile and Sin, 
I know not how, in fearful wise 
So deeply had she drunken in 
That Look, those shrunken serpent Eyes, 
That all her Features were resign’d 
To this sole Image in her Mind: 
And passively did imitate 
That Look of dull and treacherous Hate, 
And thus she stood, in dizzy Trance, 
Still picturing that Look askance, 
With forc’d unconscious Sympathy 
Full before her Father’s View – 
As far as such a Look could be, 
In Eyes so innocent and blue! 




This description of ‘large bright Eyes’ is the only kind of information the 
reader is given regarding Geraldine’s eyes. The only mention made before this 
point to her eyes is their effect on Christabel, not appearance of them, ‘And 
Christabel saw the lady’s Eye, / And nothing else saw she thereby’. These 
lines indicate direct eye contact between the two women, but they do not 
intimate to the reader that there is any real similarity at this point between 
them. Following the possession of Christabel, however, the Conclusion to Part 
I makes it clear that a change has occurred in Christabel’s eyes, ‘And both 
blue Eyes more bright than clear’ (ll.290); though not changed in appearance, 
her experience has literally appeared to cloud her vision. With the binding of 
her utterance has come a disorientation not only in her view of the world, but 
also in her very sense of being and Christabel is from this point no longer 
within the safety of the heimlich. With the loss of utterance comes the loss of 
the homely, and with it possibly her very identity.248      
This seems to be affirmed by the fact that Christabel emits an 
involuntary hissing sound, a seemingly serpent-like sound that leads directly 
from the description of Geraldine’s ‘shrunken serpent eyes’. The very 
expression on her face, the reader is told, ‘passively did imitate / That look of 
dull and treacherous hate’; the centrality of Christabel’s passivity here 
highlights something deeper than enchantment and bodily usurpation, though, 
as Christabel seems to be mirroring what she alone sees in Geraldine. 
Geraldine’s ‘treacherous’ abuse of hospitality is imprinted not only on 
Christabel’s mind as an unutterable image, but is also reflected on her facial 
expression. The narrator tells of how ‘her thoughts are gone’ – though this is a 
reaffirmation of the Conclusion to Part I rather than a revelation. That ‘her 
thoughts are gone’ is confirmed at this point is significant in that it confirms 
the complete usurpation by Geraldine of her physical and psychological being, 
a usurpation that enables that of her domestic fixity, the heimlich. This 
usurpation is, of course, anticipated ironically by Bard Bracy’s allegorical 
                                                            
248 This might be seen as a reclamation by the poet of his own sense of a loss or failure of 
utterance – the poet is in real danger of failing to express through language and so is in danger 
of losing the homely. This constant danger shrouds any sense of a single, knowable identity or 
selfhood, thus necessitating a refraction of the self and a subsequent division into selves. 
Christabel’s fate, Coleridge is suggesting, is one with which we must all concern ourselves, 
because it is one which reveals what is at stake poetically and ontologically: in other words, 
the poem is a fundamental poetological enquiry. 
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dream of the serpent crushing the dove in the woods. Though a seemingly 
simple allegory that echoes (though acted as a warning when first appearing to 
Bracy) the events of the previous night, its positioning at this point within the 
narrative is vital as it confirms the usurpation that is about to reach completion 
in this exchange between the two women.249    
  
 
‘higher colors and shadows’ 
  
As with ‘Christabel’ and ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen often uses the dream space as (and for) an exploration of the 
limits of human knowledge, and the uncertainty of whether what has passed is 
‘real’ or not. The novel opens with its protagonist reflecting on a mysterious 
stranger’s words. Heinrich himself is unsure of whether these words have 
come to him in a dream or a trance, ‘I have never felt like this before; it seems 
as if I had a dream just then, or as if slumber had carried me into another 
world’ [So ist mir noch nie zu Muthe gewesen: es ist, als hatt’ ich vorhin 
geträumt, oder ich wäre in eine andere Welt hinüber geschlummert].250 The 
initial reflection jolts, in turn, another recollection, this time certainly of a 
dream he has had. This dream is notable even before it introduces the novel’s 
central recurring motif of the blue flower, as it emphasises the notion of 
wandering that becomes so crucial to the young poet’s experiences. In the 
dream Heinrich chances upon the blue flower as he wanders into a cave on a 
cliff, a way of experiencing nature that is championed in greater detail not 
only later on in the novel, but also in his philosophical fragments and his 
beguiling prose-poem Die Lehrlinge zu Säis. Although the significance of 
mineralogy and the subterranean in that work is discussed at greater length in 
the concluding chapter, a brief comparison may be drawn here between the 
two works in the emphasis they place on the seemingly paradoxical notion of 
wandering within that which is circumscribed; both Heinrich and the narrator 
                                                            
249 See also Eilenberg, Strange Power of Speech, p.99: ‘Christabel’s passive imitation of her 
guest is the most dramatic instance of the confusion of the two characters, who have switched 
and shared roles from the beginning. For another reading of doubling within the poem, see 
Paul Magnuson, Coleridge’s Nightmare Poetry (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1974), pp.101-4.  
250 Novalis, Henry von Ofterdingen, trans. by Palmer Hilty (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 
1990), p. 15. 
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of Die Lehrlinge zu Säis are travelling toward a fixed goal, albeit through a 
circuitous path, and this seems, to an extent, to mirror the novel’s concern 
with finding an order through seemingly chaotic or less conventional 
means.251 Bearing this intention in mind enables a reading of Novalis’ work as 
conscious Mischgedicht, a work that strives toward poetic composition 
through heterogeneity. Heinrich’s varied experiences of nature combine with 
his learning and culture to equip him to become a poet, making the novel itself 
a metadiscourse on the education of the Romantic poet. The gap between such 
a work and Romantic autobiography that professes to trace the author’s own 
poetic education is thus considerably closed, and becomes the subject of more 
detailed consideration below. 
The early discussion of dreams within the novel’s first chapter 
becomes a dialogue between Heinrich and his father on the value of dreams, 
with two facets of the dream emerging. The first comes in the father 
commenting that ‘Dreams are spindrift’. The reason he gives for this opinion 
is important for consideration of the role of the dream space in the 
Mischgedicht, ‘In the age we live in there is no longer any direct intercourse 
with heaven’. 252  This revision and idealization of a past is remarkably similar 
to that found in Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa. The historicizing 
found in both these texts serves to advocate a time when distinctions between 
the material and immaterial worlds were (and will again be) absent. In finding 
within the dream space a possibility for such mediation Novalis lends his 
novel that philosophical weight that charges of mysticism have undermined. 
As with a political work such as Die Christenheit, reconciliation and 
mediation are presented as essential to managing diversification that might 
otherwise threaten to engulf the subject, a point that is reinforced in the 
second chapter of the novel by the narrator’s words on a mediating age that 
may well have been joined by the ‘Wordsworth’ of The Prelude’s London in 
its condemnation of chaotic diversity. The language in which the novel’s 
narrator deplores luxury and dissipation in modernity itself seems at one with 
Wordsworth’s own prose commentary on rustic versus metropolitan life, the 
                                                            
251 See Hilty’s Introduction to Henry von Ofterdingen, especially pp.6-8. My interest in citing 
Hilty here is to highlight Hilty’s salutary consideration of the philosophical seriousness of 
Novalis’ use of the mystical or fantastical. 
252 Henry von Ofterdingen, p.18. 
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Preface to Lyrical Ballads. Though the medieval framework of the novel does 
not quite allow for such a clear demarcation between urban and country life, 
the narrator’s reverence for a lost ‘idyllic [original emphasis] poverty’ 
parallels the Preface’s attempt at idealizing an austere, rustic life, deploring 
the luxury and sensation that gives rise to vice in the city. Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen’s narrator is opposed to modernity because it seems to have 
engendered a similar luxury, one that is at the expense of a genuine veneration 
for one’s limited possessions.253 
 Furthermore, the narrator’s comments on a transitional period 
penetrate the narrative of fiction and become again a metadiscourse on the 
novel’s own project, ‘During every period of transition higher spiritual powers 
appear to want to break through as in a sort of interregnum’. The age in which 
Heinrich lives, and thus the age in which the events chronicled in the novel 
take place, is an age of mediation between old and new, a Romantic age: 
 
And just as on the surface of our dwelling place the districts richest in 
natural resources above and below ground lie between the wild and 
inhospitable primeval mountains and the boundless plains, so between 
the rough and crude times of barbarism and the modern age abounding 
in wealth, art, and knowledge there was a reflective and romantic 
period concealing a higher form under its simple garment. Who does 
not like to walk in the twilight, when the light of day and the darkness 
of night are shattered by each other and fused into higher colors and 
shadows? And so we immerse ourselves willingly in the years when 
Henry lived and went to meet new experiences with an eager heart.254 
 
In comparing this ‘romantic period’ to twilight, the narrator describes a 
chronological reconciliation as a fusion – a Verschmelzung– through metaphor 
of a natural act of Verschmelzung, that of night and day, and the ‘higher colors 
and shadows’ thus produced are akin to the Potenzirung or intensification in 
intuition and apprehension that the lingua romana is to produce. This 
heightened experience of the everyday is to be achieved, Novalis’ narrator 
suggests, only through reconciliation, whether of two ages or two extremes. 
                                                            
253 Henry von Ofterdingen, pp.24-25. See also The Excursion’s narrator, the Poet/Author, on 
the Wanderer, who has been raised in ‘The keen, the wholesome air of poverty’ (II: ll.305-
306). Both texts share an emphasis on an almost pious austerity that becomes the basis for 
their protagonists’ ability to eschew excess in favour of assessing the value of morals over 
materiality. 
254 Henry von Ofterdingen, p.25. 
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The second function of the dream comes in the form of Heinrich’s counter-
argument to his father’s assertion that dreams in the present age have no value 
for the waking life. Heinrich’s defence of the dream rests on its ability to tear 
at the veil separating the conscious mind and the ‘inner life’. According to this 
argument, the dream might be confused and seemingly lacking in logic and 
linearity – but therein lies its value: 
 
Dreams seem to me to be a defense against the regularity and routine 
of life, a playground where the hobbled imagination is freed and 
revived and where it jumbles together all the pictures of life and 
interrupts the constant soberness of grown-ups by means of a merry 
child’s play.255 
 
Two things emerge from this answer: the first is that the dream is clearly 
essential to the Mischgedicht because it, too, is an ideal space for 
Verschmelzung. The dream delights in fusing incongruent images and ideas 
together and in eliminating distinctions, whether they are linear, 
chronological, or ratiocinative. The second is that the dream does delight in 
doing so. In describing it as a playground for ‘merry child’s play’, Heinrich-
Novalis is not trivializing the dream, but rather reinforcing the need for 
playfulness in poetic and philosophical thinking that is close to Schlegel’s or 
Richter’s irony as well as the tone he adopts in his own Fichte-Studien, a 




‘the right to a charming confusion’ 
 
It is possible to see this tendency toward playfulness in poetic and 
philosophical thinking as acutely in Schlegel’s philosophical novel, Lucinde, 
                                                            
255 Henry von Ofterdingen, p.19. 
256 See Chapter 3 for more on Wordsworth’s use of humour to inject playfulness into the 
philosophical crux of Lyrical Ballads. The main difference between Wordsworth’s and his 
contemporaries’ use of playfulness and play in his Mischgedichte is perhaps that Wordsworth 
does not use the dreamscape to reject linear narrative, but rather to interrupt a seemingly 
straightforward narrative. In such cases as ‘Simon Lee’, for example, the humour is used to 
dismiss the notion that a ballad is only ever lowbrow entertainment for the masses. Rather, 
Wordsworth reinvents the ballad as a poetological literature in which the reader is encouraged 
to consider the everyday in a renewed light. The ‘right’ to a ‘confusion’ – if not quite as 




as in Novalis’ defence of the dream. Published in 1799 to great controversy 
over the alleged eroticism of the novel, Lucinde became notorious for its 
semi-autobiographical account of Schlegel’s own love affair with Dorothea 
Veit. Since then, it has been largely overlooked in favour of his Fragmente, 
but the novel is important, I think, for understanding not only how he 
envisages the Mischgedicht as working formally (as with Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen and Biographia Literaria, this exemplary Roman freely mixes 
poetry, prose, letters, biography and dramatic dialogue), but also just how 
central the Mischgedicht is to Schlegel’s theory of romantic literature. Lucinde 
was projected as the first in a series of four philosophical novels, but it 
remains the only published fragment of this plan. 
The protagonist and narrator of Lucinde, Julius, takes the above-
mentioned assertion of the necessity of playfulness one step further in that he 
incorporates playfulness both within the dream and outside of it. For Julius, 
the dream recounted in the opening letter of the novel is an allegory of his 
love affair with the recipient of the letters, Lucinde. In the dream itself, Julius 
appears to apply this Verschmelzung to his conception of Lucinde herself; 
Lucinde appears in all forms of femininity to Julius – as a girl, as a young 
woman, and as a mother with her child – and each of these forms correlates to 
those that she is subsequently shown in later on in the novel. The 
Verschmelzung here is representative of both ironic subject and object; just as 
Romantic creation of the self necessitates representation of various ‘selves’, 
so biography also takes various selves as constituent of one’s being. In short, 
it is as representative of any ‘self’ as possible.  
The overt eroticism of the lovers’ interaction in the dream garden, is 
presented within the context of play and playfulness. Reciprocal love – 
intellectual, spiritual and physical – is presented by Julius as being driven by 
the concept of play, in that even the most passionate sensuality must be 
tempered; speaking of the sexual union of the two lovers within the dream, the 
narrator says, 
 
Wit and rapture alternated between us and became the common pulse 
of our united life and we embraced each other with as much 
wantonness as religion. I begged you that for once, you might give 
yourself completely over to frenzy, and I implored you to be 
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insatiable. Still, I listened with cool composure for every faint sign of 
bliss, so that not a single trace might escape me and leave a gap in our 
harmony. I didn’t simply enjoy but felt and enjoyed the enjoyment 
itself.257 
 
Wit here appears to be defined as the self-reflexivity that allows Julius to 
reflect within the very act, to enjoy ‘the enjoyment itself’; so, as with ‘irony’ 
Schlegelian ‘Wit’ takes the firmly established aesthetic concept and attaches 
to it a detached self-reflexivity as its chief value. In this sense, a sort of 
conscious parabasis occurs at the point of action, before narrative or 
recollection even take place, intimating to the reader that Wit is later 
centralized in ‘An Allegory of Impudence’ for its reflective value. Rather than 
the active properties associated with a cultured or satirical ‘Wit’, Schlegel’s 
concept is championed for its passivity. Wit enables reflection – it is the part 
of the self that is removed from action at all times, proving an antithesis even 
to sexual ‘rapture’. When these antitheses meet in the lovers’ union the result 
is not merely physical desire ‘to break the tormenting thorn of yearning’ [den 
quälenden Stachel der Sehnsucht zu brechen], but, rather, ‘a romantic 
confusion’ [eine romantische Verwirrung], or ‘wonderful mixture of the most 
various memories and yearnings’ [ein wundersames Gemisch von den 
verschiedensten Errinerungen und Sehnsuchten]. As the antithesis to action 
and intensity, Wit allows for the sort of Potenzirung or Wordsworthian 
tranquillity that the production of the Mischgedicht necessitates.258 
Subsequent conversations that Julius recounts in his letters to Lucinde 
build on this initial suggestion that play is foundational to the novel, both in 
its depiction of love and of the narrator’s ironic interactions with the reader. 
Of the narrator, we might say that he can be referred to as Julius-Schlegel, 
being as he is a fictionalized ‘version’ of Schlegel. Though it is a 
philosophical novel, Julius-Schlegel hints from the outset that the philosophy 
                                                            
257 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, p.44. 
258 In his earlier Critical Fragments, 56, Schlegel writes, ‘Wit is logical sociability’: see 
Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, p.149. This is an interesting point of reference for the 
treatment of Wit in Lucinde: in being ‘logical sociability’, Wit is immediately raised to the 
status of philosophical dialogue, yet the notion of ‘sociability’ undercuts the systematization 
one might expect from logic; Wit, instead, emerges as the result of the sort of conviviality I 
have elsewhere discussed as ‘philosophical friendship’ (see Chapter 2 herein). In this way, 
Wit is born out of society, whether that is society in love or in friendship. Thus, the account of 
eroticism between Julius and Lucinde is primarily an elucidation of the conditions in which 
Wit negotiates actions and facilitates poetological reflection.      
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therein is not concerned with systems or ideologies as they are known to the 
reader. His assertion that ‘“Even if this world isn’t the best or the most useful, 
still I know it’s the most beautiful”’ suggests that the Enlightenment’s 
tendency to pit optimistic against pessimistic systems of thought, and Kantian 
preoccupation with utility and morality are far removed from the novel’s own 
philosophical claims, which appear here to be centred around an individualist 
spirituality through love. Abstract concepts are removed from the narrator’s 
mind at the point of the dream: 
 
I felt that everything lived eternally and that even death was only an 
amiable deception. But, actually, I didn’t think about this very much – 
at least I wasn’t particularly disposed to classify and analyze abstract 
concepts.259 
 
Yet, this is not to say that Schlegel is dismissing concern with such ‘abstract 
concepts’. Quite the opposite, in fact; Schlegel is reiterating the distance 
between experience and the knowledge that comes with reflection of it. In a 
rather Wordsworthian (but characteristically Schlegelian, too) turn, the 
narrator punctuates the recollection with the conscious realization that, in 
actual fact, the ‘abstract concepts’ that intimate immortality to him are a 
product of recollection. With this reminder, Schlegel introduces the centrality 
of the concept of passivity: 
 
It was an illusion, my dear friend; everything was an illusion except 
that a moment ago I stood by the window and did nothing, and that 
now I am sitting here and doing something, a something which is 
perhaps only a little more, or even a little less than doing nothing.260 
 
The relationship between this ‘something’ and doing nothing might be seen 
as, among other things, a Schlegelian version of Wordsworth’s ‘emotion 
recollected in tranquillity’, that meditative reflection that can only be achieved 
through interruption and conscious revision of the original thought or feeling. 
Julius can now revise his narrative through recollection – in fact, as with 
Wordsworth’s narrative ‘selves’, he has little choice. Directly following his 
account of the dream this becomes apparent when he says that his own 
recollections were interrupted. Julius wants to recount not only his love affair 
                                                            
259 Lucinde and the Fragments, pp.43-44. 
260 Lucinde and the Fragments, p.45. 
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with Lucinde, but also an account of his own life prior to meeting her. The 
inability to write this account systematically is called an interruption ‘by 
chance’, yet Julius seizes on this playfully to suggest that he will mould this 
opportunity to write a narrative that resists order and systemization anyway: 
 
No purpose, however, is more purposeful for myself and for this work, 
for my love for it and for its own structure, than to destroy at the very 
outset all that part we call “order,” remove it, and claim explicitly and 
affirm actually the right to a charming confusion.261 
 
This is as metadiscursive as Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen, and the 
reader is presented again with the methodology most conducive to producing 
the Mischgedicht. Order is resisted in the writing of a self, because it would 
suggest the creation of a conclusive selfhood or identity. Julius-Schlegel’s 
consciousness of ‘self’ (or ‘selves, as the case proves to be) is, like the dream 
or its recollection, and, like the novel within which it is represented, always 
subject to parabasis. As with ‘Christabel’ or Heinrich von Ofterdingen, then, 
Lucinde utilizes the dream space to suggest that underlying all passivity is 
creative re-fashioning or appropriation, whether it is the passivity of 
‘Christabel’ which gives way to generic and bodily usurpation by Geraldine 
and to the reader’s re-fashioning of narrative and consequent appropriation of 
meaning, or the passive meditation of the poet, which allows for re-creation of 
various selfhoods. As with Coleridge’s fictional ‘letter’ from a friend in his 
Biographia Literaria, or his ‘visitor’ from Porlock, we might understand 
parabasis for Julius-Schlegel as meaning a delegation of the very narrative; 
such a reading would suggest strongly that the third-person narrative adopted 
in the ‘Apprenticeship for Manhood’ section is actually Julius stepping away 
from ‘himself’ as he switches to a third-person narrative in order to tell his 






261 Lucinde and the Fragments, p.45. 
262 Dreamscapes and play (both as a concept and as a narrative technique) pervade the 
fragment, with further intimations of their importance for the four complete novels it might 
have become present. This is especially so in the dream allegory in which this project is 
explicitly outlined, ‘Allegory of Impudence’ – see pp.53-63, in Lucinde and the Fragments. 
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‘Thoughts so all unlike each other’ 
 
A reconciliation of two extremes such as the types shown in the works of 
Novalis and Schlegel is not unlike the one suggested by the Conclusion to Part 
II of ‘Christabel’: 
 
A little Child, a limber Elf,  
Singing, dancing to itself,  
A faery Thing with red round Cheeks  
That always finds, and never seeks, 
Makes such a Vision to the Sight  
As fills a Father's Eyes with Light;  
And Pleasures flow in so thick and fast 
Upon his Heart, that he at last  
Must needs express his Love's Excess  
With Words of unmeant Bitterness. 
Perhaps 'tis pretty to force together  
Thoughts so all unlike each other;  
To mutter and mock a broken Charm,  
To dally with Wrong that does no Harm 
Perhaps ’tis tender too and pretty  
At each wild Word to feel within,  
A sweet Recoil of Love and Pity.  
And what, if in a World of Sin  
 (O sorrow and shame! should this be true!) 
Such Giddiness of Heart and Brain  
Comes seldom save from Rage and Pain,  
So talks as it's most us’d to do. 
  (ll. 656-677) 
 
Coleridge’s enigmatic coda is the only ‘conclusion’ that we have in the 
published text of the unfinished fragment, but it may serve as a conclusion for 
the purposes of a discussion on the poem as a Mischgedicht. The ‘Thoughts so 
all unlike each other’ are certainly relating to opposing emotional reactions, 
but they also stand for the Mischgedicht project; as a metadiscursive, self-
reflexive type of literary production the Mischgedicht steps out of its own 
narrative framework in order to address its philosophical concerns. With 
‘Christabel’ these need to be understood through consideration of two 
contexts, the 1797 context in which it was conceived and begun, and the 1816 
volume in which it was published as a fragment.  
 I have considered in the second chapter how Ludwig Tieck’s Märchen  
use the instability of bodies to destabilize our understanding of generic bodies 
or boundaries, and I have continued to pursue this in the present chapter by 
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tracing similar patterns of bodily usurpation in Coleridge’s fairy tales and 
Mischgedichte of the supernatural. In the second chapter I argued that these 
texts, when grouped together, allow us to read a preoccupation with the 
Nachtseite and that this in turn sheds light on the use of the dream in 
poetological texts, an argument that has been shown to have important 
implications for reading the Mischgedicht. The relationship between the 
Nachtseite, Märchen and Symphilosophie / Sympoesie was set out therein and 
has been followed up in the present discussion. The second chapter tended to 
focus on explicating this relationship in terms of reading Sympoesie / 
Symphilosophie as collaborative writings or intersecting patterns of 
authorship, an approach which was then shown to highlight the relationship 
between the second component of Sympoesie / Symphilosophie, the 
intergeneric. So far I have read ‘Christabel’ largely as a ‘lyrical ballad’ by 
virtue of its collaborative origins and a justification of its place in that volume 
has been argued on grounds of authorship as well as its ironic mode of 
writing. However, these focus on the 1790s context of its conception, whereas 
it is also important and rewarding for its assessment as a Mischgedicht for it to 
be placed within its publishing context. ‘Christabel’ as we have it was 
published in 1816 along with ‘Kubla Khan’ and ‘The Pains of Sleep’. ‘Kubla 
Khan’, like ‘Christabel’, steps out of its own narrative framework to reflect on 
its philosophical processes. Coleridge presents not only the poem as a 
Mischgedicht, but also its intriguing Preface.  
To say this particular text is poetological because of its metadiscursive 
nature is not enough; any preface to a work one has authored will attempt to 
illuminate or explicate the sources, methods and aims of one’s work. What 
makes it poetological is that it seeks actively to make connections between 
poetic theory and practice. The fact that it does this through defamiliarizing 
both the poem it is prefacing and the concept of a preface makes it even more 
beguiling. ‘Kubla Khan’ is a Mischgedicht because it takes this poetologizing 
aim and executes it through the mixing of genres, subject matter and through 
its mediation of time and space. ‘Kubla Khan’ is a poem but it is offered as ‘a 
psychological curiosity’ in a preface that falls into the realm of literary 
biography. The fantastical within the poem is trumped by the fantasy of the 
circumstances of its composition as presented by Coleridge; the myth of the 
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visitor from Porlock and the ‘lost’ lines of the verse threaten to overshadow 
the myth of Kubla and his ‘stately pleasure-dome’. This exercise in literary 
self-construction is a fine example of Schlegel’s paradoxical assertion that ‘A 
sizeable proportion of autobiographers are actually autopseudists.’263 To say 
that Coleridge’s autobiographical sketch in the Preface to ‘Kubla Khan’ shows 
him to be an ‘autopseudist’ is to suggest that his fiction is a self-conscious 
construct and that this construct enables him to address the processes as well 
as aims of poetological writing. This is because the word ‘autopseudist’ 
encourages us to consider the fiction intrinsic to biography of any kind, 
particularly autobiography; constructing – and reconstructing – the self holds 
up the very concept of selfhood or identity to scrutiny. Selfhood, it suggests, is 
something that an awareness of is achieved through literary and philosophical 
means – a poetological process. The term ‘autopseudist’ in this context is thus 
not a pejorative term because it recognizes the importance of self-reflexivity. 
Had Schlegel or Coleridge endeavored in a pseudo-autobiographical venture, 
they might have failed in their philosophical aims, but the prefix ‘auto’ 
reminds us that it is the necessity of invention of self that they are 
highlighting, rather than a fiction or untruth peddled as fact. 
‘Kubla Khan’ itself, though not a Märchen in any recognizable sense, 
is more close to ‘Christabel’ than it might initially seem. In this text we see 
the ‘thoughts so all unlike each other’ take precedence over the details of the 
narrative. The poem is a Mischgedicht because it is concerned – first and 
foremost – with mediation and reconciliation. In both form and content it is a 
hybrid; the varying meter from four-beat to five-beat (and back again) seems 
to confirm mediation between his ballads and conversational poetry of the 
1790s. Coleridge veers from the ‘revamped’ loco-descriptive poems such as 
‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’ – poems which romanticize a familiar 
landscape by approaching it afresh – in his description of Kubla Khan’s 
grounds and location of his pleasure-dome to the supernatural ballads – which 
romanticize by presenting the effect of the uncanny on community or 
domesticity – in the descriptions of the stranger details of the scene. ‘Kubla 
Khan’ is thus intergeneric on a formal level; it aims to reconcile supernatural 
                                                            
263 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Athenaeum Fragments, 196, p.188. 
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ballad and descriptive-meditative lyric. It is also self-consciously intergeneric 
in its source material, and this encompasses both Preface and poem. Much has 
been made of the various sources on which ‘Kubla Khan’ draws – both 
indirectly and directly – and it is not my purpose to reiterate these references 
in any painstaking detail, but to draw attention to the fact that they point the 
way towards a self-aware Mischgedicht. The fiction of the ‘Vision in a 
Dream’ offered as a subtitle to the poem is never really one that Coleridge 
expects to be received at face-value when it so clearly references familiar 
works of Milton, Ovid, Plato and Collins, to name a few. To say that these 
references (sometimes lines almost replicated with only minor alterations) 
composed themselves – ‘without any sensation or consciousness of effort’264 
– is too bold a claim for even Coleridge to make without some reliance on an 
ironic author-reader relationship. Schlegel’s term ‘synthetic writer’ as that 
type of writer who produces literature that is both intergeneric and 
collaborative is in evidence here: like his Lyrical Ballads collaborator, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge is again demonstrating a commitment to the kind of 
‘synthetic’ writing that volume initiated in both poets’ works. Here, the notion 
of collaboration extends beyond that which occurs between two writers to 
include the collaboration between writer and reader for a joint authorship of – 
and so authority over – texts. Once again, we see Sympoesie in practical 
evidence, that tacit move beyond Kantian distinctions of analytic and 
synthetic judgments, operating on the ironic understanding that what is 
presented by the writer is reflected and re-worked in the mind of the reader.265      
 The poem also suggests that spatial and temporal boundaries are 
reconcilable: the scope of Coleridge’s ‘Xanadu’ and its several associations 
surpass by far any one topographical or temporal region. ‘Xanadu’ – like 
Wordsworth’s ‘London’ – becomes itself a Mischgedicht, a ground for 
Verschmelzung. The ‘recovery’ of ‘Xanadu’ as a ‘Vision in a Dream’ further 
accentuates the connections of the dream or dreamscape to the Mischgedicht 
that I have been making here and elsewhere in the thesis. In fact, they are 
amplified in Coleridge’s suggestion that the dreamscape Mischgedicht is 
                                                            
264 Coleridge, Poetical Works, p.511. 
265 See Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, Critical Fragments, 112, pp.156-7, and Chapter 
3 herein for more on the synthetic writer versus the analytic writer and the impact of these 
concepts on Lyrical Ballads. 
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evoked through a dream-process. As with the Lyrical Ballads volume, ‘Kubla 
Khan’ too is an ‘experiment’ in poetic method, what Schlegel termed broadly 
as Symphilosophie/Sympoesie; it may be presented ingenuously as an account 
of subconscious activity – ‘a psychological curiosity’266 – but it is certainly 
calculated in its theoretical and philosophical reach. Like ‘Christabel’ and 
‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, the poem and its Preface both seek to 
validate the dream-space as a legitimate ground for intergeneric literary 
practice.  
Furthermore, like Lyrical Ballads and The Prelude, the poem is an 
experiment in deducing how the topographical might have a bearing on the 
typographical; the metrical variations of ‘Kubla Khan’ lead the reader through 
as much ‘meandering through a mazy motion’ as the landscape. As argued 
above, the form of the poem seeks to reconcile the two seemingly very 
different styles of poetry we have come to associate with Coleridge’s most 
famous output of the 1790s: the meditative, quasi-loco-descriptive lyric and 
the antiquarian supernatural ballad. What this reconciliation does, then, is 
suggest that these styles are not so dissimilar as to preclude any mixing, after 
all. The poem embraces what is symphilosophical and sympoetic about both 
‘types’ by producing the intergeneric lyric, the self-proclaimed Romantic 
poem: when that ‘savage place’ (l.14), the ‘deep romantic chasm’ (l.12) is 
referred to, Coleridge is also drawing attention to the apparent violence with 
which two seemingly incongruous forms or ideas are yoked together by their 
propensity for Verschmelzung. From ‘stately pleasure-dome’ (l.2) to ‘chasm’ 
(l.17) to ‘mighty fountain’ (l.19) and ‘cavern’ (l.27) and back to ‘sunny 
pleasure-dome with caves of ice’ (l.36), Coleridge is presenting various 
topographical constituents of a single mixing-ground, a Mischgedicht. As 
Wordsworth’s ‘London’ was a Mischgedicht for all the people, places and 
genres that both child and adult ‘Wordsworths’ could conceive, ‘Xanadu’ is a 
topographical Mischgedicht that enables generic mixing of all kinds. It is 
volcanic and glacial, landscaped with woods and yet fantastical, five-beat 
verse and ballad, ‘exotic’ and yet English, and simultaneously both ancient 
                                                            
266 Coleridge, Poetical Works, p.511. 
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and ‘romantic’. Above all, it is both autobiographical and fictive in its scope: 
it is a Mischgedicht and utterly poetological in its execution.267  
 
 
‘Desire with loathing strangely mixed’ 
 
The third poem in the 1816 ‘Christabel’ volume also makes its poetological 
concerns clear; ‘The Pains of Sleep’ is a poem that is even more pronounced 
in its autobiographical basis than ‘Kubla Khan’ and it revisits the question of 
reconciling incongruous ideas, emotions and states of mind. It is also – 
significantly – a poem that was written in some draft form long before 
publication; a version was sent in a letter to Southey on September 11, 1803 
and then to Thomas Poole on October 3, 1803. If we return to the Conclusion 
to the published ‘Christabel’ fragment (first drafted in 1801), we see that the 
impulse ‘to dally with Wrong that does no Harm’ takes a darker turn in this 
painfully personal lyric about nightmares trespassing into the waking, 
conscious Nachtseite. ‘The Pains of Sleep’ is about the impact of guilty 
fantasies upon the dreamscape and vice versa, and at the philosophical crux of 
the poem is, on the one hand, the long-held preoccupation of Coleridge to 
theorize and then poeticize the origins and nature of evil and, on the other 
hand, a life-long struggle to reconcile religious submission with philosophical 
enquiry. These are the same stimuli that prompted his initial poetic forays into 
the Nachtseite with the ballads of the 1790s, and references to it in his 
Notebooks in relation to those ballads is frequent; it is difficult not to think of 
references to ‘Christabel’ and dreams as part of a single, wider project at a 
time when Coleridge was mulling over several literary projects and schemes 
of diverse nature. These Notebook entries twin ‘Christabel’ with ‘The Rime of 
                                                            
267 Coleridge’s off-hand presentation of ‘Kubla Khan’ as ‘a psychological curiosity’ also 
indicates his intention that the poem be read both alongside ‘Christabel’ and as a fictionalized 
poetology; clearly, the poem is presented for its ‘poetic merits’ as much as its psychological 
inquiry, but Coleridge’s characteristically exaggerated modesty slyly points to the importance 
of the latter. Its metadiscursive reflection on the process of poetologizing achieves the kind of 
ironic distance that Schlegel saw as being characteristically Romantic and which Paul 
Hamilton has usefully called ‘meta-romanticism’: see his Metaromanticism: Aesthetics, 
Literature, Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). I am arguing here that 
‘Christabel’ and ‘Kubla Khan’ demand to be read alongside each other because they are 
aspiring to make that crossover from poetry to poetology; the psychological curiosity inherent 
to both texts and their prefatory materials elaborates the sympoetological relationship between 
the inquisitive reader and the writer of fragments. 
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the Ancient Mariner’ in terms of their philosophical impetuses, making the 
connections between these two Mischgedichte ever more vivid.  
However, they also point towards a certain direction in which 
Coleridge was taking his major contributions to Lyrical Ballads. ‘Christabel’ 
and ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’ make evident Coleridge’s dedication 
to writing poetry that is primarily philosophical: the poems arise from 
questions about knowledge and the articulation of what is known and what 
cannot be known. Such questions, we have seen, provoke explorations of guilt 
and the loss of innocence, autonomy and/or utterance. In turn, these inspire 
one or several conflicts of theme, emotion, or idea. In ‘Christabel’ the loss of 
autonomy brings about a confusion in the protagonist regarding her very 
orientation in the world, the loss of domesticity unfixing her identity. With the 
Mariner, we see a similar problem arise from his experiences and subsequent 
narrative(s) of them. The Mariner’s story confirms to the reader that his place 
in the world is certainly questionable, as he is relegated to a life of travelling 
‘like night, from land to land’ telling a story over which he appears to have 
little control. The Mariner is excommunicated; he longs for ‘goodly company’ 
but is in actuality left wanting company or community of any sort. He haunts 
the wedding feast, but he cannot enter the communal celebrations. Thanks to 
his ‘strange powers of speech’ he has no shortage of listeners, but he is 
forever denied someone with whom to commune.    
‘The Pains of Sleep’, too, is connected to these poetological texts in 
that it seeks to understand and articulate the distances between knowledge and 
experience. Here, though, we are presented with the reverse of the prospect of 
dallying with harmless wrong which was discussed in the Conclusion to the 
‘Christabel’ fragment; in this poem there is no easy or harmless reconciliation 
between desire and action. Instead, desire is ‘strangely mixed’ with ‘loathing’ 
to produce a nightmare of both the subconscious and the conscious minds. 
The violence with which these emotional and psychological extremes are 
mixed together is ultimately destructive for the poet’s state of mind, unlike the 
fusion of extremes seen in ‘Kubla Khan’, which give way to poetic fertility. 
Yet ‘The Pains of Sleep’ is deliberately connected to the Mischgedichte with 
which it is published as well as ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, with 
which it shares some of its philosophical preoccupations. For one thing, it 
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shares its metre and form with the Conclusion to ‘Christabel’: though the 
results of attempting to mediate between desire and action (as in this poem) or 
between desire and consequence (as in ‘Christabel’) are decidedly different, 
Coleridge chooses to compose the poem in four-beat rhyming couplets. This 
decision stands out in the Conclusion to ‘Christabel’ as it firmly indicates a 
verse that is connected theoretically with the rest of the poem, but removed 
from the narrative (and connotations) of the ballad. In fact, just as the 
Conclusion was a ‘coda’ to the poem, ‘The Pains of Sleep’ might be seen as a 
kind of coda to the poetological works with which it is affiliated through form 
and publication.  
Just like ‘Christabel’ and ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’ it deals 
with the loss of autonomy in a state of passivity: perhaps more 
problematically for Coleridge, the passivity for his tormented persona arises 
from prayer. The implication for this is that he has ‘No wish conceived, no 
thought expressed! / Only a sense of supplication’ (ll.8-9). The scenario is 
familiar to the reader of ‘Christabel’, the narrative of which makes clear that 
one of the few actions of the protagonist is to pray actively – an action that 
could be seen to lead her to Geraldine, setting the wheels of her loss and 
alienation in motion. The narrator also notes that Christabel gives herself over 
to a prayer-like state, whereby the protection and blessings over saints are 
given to the meek and good. However, prayer (or meditation) in itself is not 
problematic for Coleridge. In ‘The Pains of Sleep’, though, what is an issue is 
the attempt to relinquish both desire and thought – ‘Coleridge’ makes an 
attempt to conceive no wish or conscious thought, and this proves to be harder 
when faced with physical and psychological pain. The italicized ‘sense’ in 
‘sense of supplication’ contrasts the sensory (in this respect, spiritual rather 
than physiological) experience with emotional and intellectual activity: the 
apprehensions of the ‘Coleridge’ of this poem are voluntarily divided in 
prayer, and the sensory takes precedence in prayer. However, this gives way 
to conflict when the passivity of such a state is overridden by guilt and pain: 
 
But yester-night I pray’d aloud 
In anguish and in agony, 
Up-starting from the fiendish crowd 
Of shapes and thoughts that tortured me: 
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A lurid light, a trampling throng, 
Sense of intolerable wrong, 
And whom I scorn’d, those only strong! 
Thirst of revenge, the powerless will 
Still baffled, and yet burning still! 
Desire with loathing strangely mixed 
On wild or hateful objects fixed. 
  (ll.14-24)  
 
The irreconcilable nature of this conflict between desire and loathing is what 
maps out the Nachtseite in ‘The Pains of Sleep’ – they are mixed, but 
‘strangely’ so, and their intermingling does not suggest the sort of intimacy of 
Universalpoesie, or the ‘charming confusion’ presented by Schlegel. As in 
‘Christabel’ and ‘The Rime of the Ancient Mariner’, dalliance with the 
Nachtseite ‘Sadden’d and stunn’d the coming day’ (l.34) after repeated 
nightmares of the conscious mind. The guilt and pain felt by ‘Coleridge’ in 
this poem are caused in part by his debilitating addiction to opium, though he 
stated in the letter to Southey with which he sent the draft that he was taking 
only prescription medication and had ‘abandoned all opiates except Ether’.  
The more considerable guilt and its ensuing pain, however, appears to 
arise from the inability of the tormented ‘I’ to reconcile the various elements 
of ‘the fiendish crowd / Of shapes and thoughts’ that haunt his psychological 
state. In this respect the treatment of guilt in ‘The Pains of Sleep’ parallels that 
in Coleridge’s earlier, overtly political work such as ‘Fears in Solitude’ or 
‘France: an Ode’. ‘Fears in Solitude’ is a particularly interesting contrast to 
‘The Pains of Sleep’, as it concerns itself with a public, collective guilt, rather 
than a private one. Coleridge’s anxieties are born out of a nation’s tyranny and 
subsequent injustices towards other nations and peoples, and the thoughts of 
‘uproar’ and ‘strife’ that infringe upon his private meditations are a result of 
this consciousness: 
 
We have offended, Oh! my countrymen! 
We have offended very grievously, 
And have been tyrannous. From east to west 
A groan of accusation pierces Heaven! 
The wretched plead against us; multitudes 
Countless and vehement, the Sons of God,  
Our Brethren! Like a cloud that travels on, 
Steam’d up from Cairo’s swamps of pestilence, 
Ev’n so, my Countrymen! have we gone forth 
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And borne to distant tribes slavery and pangs, 
And, deadlier far, our vices, whose deep taint 
With slow perdition murders the whole man, 
His body and his soul! 
  (ll.42-54) 
 
If the poet ‘brings the whole soul of man into activity’, then the tyrant and his 
supporters (both active and passive) cast the ‘whole man’, body and soul, into 
‘perdition’. Yet Coleridge is very much the poet here and that too the poet 
directing his rhetoric against tyranny and those who practise it: he has escaped 
the personal taint of a guilt brought upon a nation by its oppression and 
subjugation of others by retaining some necessary detachment from it. Though 
it does not prove him insincere, the private meditations with which the poem 
begins remind us that Coleridge is sufficiently detached from the unrest to 
find ‘a meditative joy’ through ‘many feelings, many thoughts’. In other 
words, he is a man who is privately successful in reconciling the conflicts 
within his own mind – like Wordsworth’s exemplary Wanderer (and, to an 
extent, Wordsworth’s later ‘Wordsworth’ of the Preludes), he is free from 
troubles of his own, save those which arise from others’ sufferings and so can 
‘afford to suffer’. The Coleridge of ‘Fears in Solitude’ is an ironist and this 
detachment is what enables him to empathize more acutely with suffering. 
Like the narrators of Wordsworth’s contemporaneous ‘lyrical ballads’, 
Coleridge is developing an ironic – a decidedly Romantic – moral philosophy 
in his meditative verse by engaging an unencumbered ‘I’ into the business of 
vicarious suffering (which, I have argued, is one way to look at Wordsworth’s 
desired end in his Prelude(s) and other Recluse fragments). But ‘The Pains of 
Sleep’ tells a very different story in respect of guilt and suffering. Coleridge’s 
‘I’ is not at all sufficiently unencumbered and the poem documents a failure of 
Coleridge’s persona to become wholly the ironic poet engaged in poetological 
reflection. I am not suggesting the poem itself is a failure, but as a 
Mischgedicht it does fall short of its poetological peers: its value, perhaps, lies 
more in its illustration of what makes those other texts so triumphant in 
bringing together ‘Thoughts so all unlike each other’. It is a kind of coda to 
the poetological texts preceding it, but one which bears witness to the inherent 




‘These shapings of the unregenerate mind’ 
 
Such a failure at the sort of meta-narrative ability I have been highlighting as 
belonging under the term ‘Romantic irony’ is hinted at in both ‘The Eolian 
Harp’ and its later, darker counterpart, the masterful ‘Dejection’ Ode (1802). 
Though the latter is considered in greater detail in the following chapter, 
alongside the ‘Immortality’ Ode with which it is in dialogue, I mention it as 
the counterpart of ‘The Eolian Harp’, because of the claims to failure both 
highlight in spite of their clear poetic merits. On the surface, ‘The Eolian 
Harp’ is a poem about a man who is contented enough to dismiss whatever 
bubbles may appear ‘On vain Philosophy’s aye-babbling spring’ (l.57) in 
favour of ‘The Incomprehensible’ (l.59) divinity of a God through whom he 
has gained peace, romantic felicity and domestic fixity.268 The claim goes 
something like this: ultimately, it doesn’t matter what fanciful, ambitious or – 
and this is at the crux of the poem either way – irreconcilable thoughts enter 
the poet’s head as he idly meditates, because his domesticity owes itself to 
religious and matrimonial commitments (and, consequently, stability). But 
there is more than just the one problem here, and perhaps the first place to 
begin is to question whether marriage and religion give him his sense of 
fixedness, or whether his desire to be fixed leads him to marriage and 
religion.269 To cast too long a shadow of doubt over Coleridge’s belief in 
these institutions would be cynicism, easily refutable by either biography or 
his corpus. However, to position his belief in either (or both) against his 
alienating experience of them is to invite consideration of how comfortably 
these sat together and where they belong in his considerable writings of 
community and exclusion from it. The circumstances of his marriage to Sara 
Fricker have been detailed enough by biographers and it is not my purpose to 
reiterate what has already been so efficiently and painstakingly presented by 
others.270 However, it is important to remember that the marriage was 
                                                            
268 For more on the domestic aspects of the poem, see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
269 Paul Hamilton’s important study of Coleridge’s philosophy stands out among fairly recent 
scholarship in that it addresses in detail this difficulty Coleridge experienced in reconciling 
Christian theology with his various philosophical commitments – see his Coleridge and 
German Philosophy: The Poet in the Land of Logic (London: Continuum, 2007). 
270 See Rosemary Ashton, The Life of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: A Critical Biography 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). For a sympathetic, if conventional, look at Coleridge’s early life, 
see Richard Holmes’ Coleridge: Early Visions: 1772-1804 (London: Flamingo, 1995), 
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ultimately a means to realizing a political philosophy. It is also important to 
remember that this political philosophy, Pantisocracy, was to be a decisive 
turn away from conventional theism for Coleridge (his sonnet on 
‘Pantiscocracy’ has, ostensibly anyway, more in common with the dark 
romance and possession of the Mischgedichte I have discussed above than 
with the meditative lyrics of this early period that find solace in notions of 
nationhood, Christianity, and brotherhood) in his search for community. 
Certainly, the ill-fated scheme was too utopian even by the standards of the 
idealism of the early 1790s, but Coleridge invested a potentially risky 
marriage as well as a belief that was incompatible with orthodox Christianity 
for the sake of fixity within its political philosophy.     
 So, ‘The Eolian Harp’ and ‘Dejection: An Ode’ are antitheses in one 
sense but also counterparts in that they both profess to mark the passing of 
something in relation to poetic production, whereas actually both emerge from 
similar conditions: the dilemmas that result from the impossibility of 
reconciling discordant elements. Poetologically, they are self-reflexive (and 
both are indeed successes in terms of Mischung), but the earlier poem fails to 
mediate successfully between the discordant elements at its core. For all its 
harmony – structural, acoustic and thematic – ‘The Eolian Harp’ is essentially 
a poem about the impossibility of certain reconciliations and conclusions. In 
Schlegelian terms it would perhaps be seen as a failure to join two extremes in 
order to find ‘the true middle’. In accepting the ‘Incomprehensible’, it accepts 
Unverständlichkeit as the prevailing epistemological pathway; a poetics of 
sublimity as well as a poetics of wilful theological ignorance is thus 
embraced. This incomprehensibility Coleridge embraces at the end of the 
poem becomes fundamental to understanding the drive of the poem – 
                                                                                                                                                           
especially the fourth chapter. Holmes’ biography is reluctant to take risks in reviewing its 
subject, and, as a result, his reading of Coleridge perhaps appeals more to the general reader 
of biography than to the critic of Coleridge’s work. However, his biographical accounts of 
Coleridge in this work and its sequel, Coleridge: Darker Reflections: 1804-1834 (London: 
Flamingo, 1999), are the collective result of very careful reading and research as well as a 
labour of love, and the insight into Coleridge’s early life and preoccupations afforded to the 
reader by his biographical approach make it a rewarding read. Rosemary Ashton’s critical 
biography of Coleridge is in many ways more incisive and balanced. It is a work designed to 
aid the Coleridgean scholar for whom biography has a bearing on literary criticism. Though it 
does not devote as much discussion to Coleridge’s early life in the way that Holmes’ work 




philosophy is not rejected. Rather, a poetological decision is taken whereby 
the need for comprehensibility (and comprehension) is deferred, much like the 
belief in the efficacy of philosophical systems which is deferred to theological 
sublimity. This is a consciously uneasy and contradictory resolution to the 
poem, though, rather than a genuine subscription to the ironic 
incomprehensibility that would drive his explorations of the Nachtseite. 
Coleridge is not able to mediate the theological and philosophical polarities 
driving his meditations. It might be useful to note here Schlegel’s equivalent 
of the Coleridge ‘whole soul’ brought into activity: 
 
A really free and cultivated person ought to be able to attune himself at 
will to being philosophical or philological, critical or poetical, 
historical or rhetorical, ancient or modern: quite arbitrarily, just as one 
tunes an instrument, at any time and to any degree.271 
 
Like Coleridge’s expectations of the poet in ideal perfection, Schlegel outlines 
some tall orders for the poetological person(a); Schlegel’s familiar reader will, 
however, be inclined to take some of this as the confidently exaggerated and 
playful tone that pervades his earlier work. Generally speaking, the Critical 
Fragments are not as accomplished as the Athenaeum Fragments or Ideas, but 
that is not to say that they are insincere or that they should not be regarded as 
useful for our present purposes; on the contrary, I have endeavoured 
throughout to show how the Critical Fragments might be used to illuminate 
some of the more original theoretical thinking Schlegel was developing and 
polishing around the time that English Romanticism was yet to produce a 
poetic or theoretical ‘manifesto’. The tone may be easy to the point of 
hyperbole, yet it is in keeping with the expectations of the ironic poet-thinker 
of the Mischgedicht, who can move from one generic or disciplinary discourse 
to another with the ease of will. My interest in quoting the fragment here is to 
suggest that the resolution Coleridge seeks in ‘The Eolian Harp’ may be – like 
this fragment – a little too neat in its expectations to be fully credible. In fact, 
the ‘Coleridge’ of this poem is too trapped within the conventional motif of 
the instrument itself: like his later Mariner or Christabel, this ‘Coleridge’ is 
passive. He is too content in his inactivity to have the instrument play over 
                                                            
271 Critical Fragments, 55, in Lucinde and the Fragments, p.149. 
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him to consider the alternative motif Schlegel suggests – that of the instrument 
tuned by poetic-philosophical man. In choosing the Aeolian harp for his 
central image Coleridge is choosing an instrument that creates arbitrarily, 
whereas Schlegel suggests above that arbitrariness is something that, 
paradoxically, is worked at: the result of a ‘cultivated’ process. In this respect, 
we can surmise that the passivity invited by the Aeolian harp image is far 
from the narrative-generating Wit of Lucinde or the roughly corresponding 
tranquillity that engenders the Wordsworthian lyric:  
 
Full many a thought uncalled and undetained, 
And many idle flitting phantasies, 
Traverse my indolent and passive brain, 
As wild and various, as the random gales 
That swell or flutter on this subject Lute! 
And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic harps diversely fram’d, 
That tremble into thought as o’er them sweeps, 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of All?     
  (ll.39-48) 
 
I am suggesting that we know this because this tension between 
fixity/community, wilful passivity and philosophical pursuit takes a darker 
turn in ‘Dejection: An Ode’. Like ‘The Eolian Harp’, ‘Dejection’ is ultimately 
concerned with the inability to mediate successfully in order to find a ‘true 
middle’. But the poem is even more self-reflexive than its earlier counterpart, 
as it does not make any pretence of an achieved thematic harmony. The 
structural and elemental harmonies (the latter achieved through 
acknowledging the conflict therein) so noted by Abrams and critics writing in 
his wake, such as John Beer, self-consciously mock the discordant elements of 
the poet’s life.272 The crafting of the text from an autobiographically explicit 
love-poem to a public (and publishable) poem about ‘dejection’ shows it to be 
a prime example of poetologizing at its strongest. Such a transition banishes, 
then, the notion that the poem is ‘about’ lamenting a loss. It is elegiac, 
certainly, but only insofar as it might demonstrate rather triumphantly its 
successes and its ironic victory over its failures. Poetologically, it is a 
                                                            
272 See M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p.67. for a consideration of the relationship 
between joy and the ‘optical, acoustical, meteorological and marital’. See, John Beer, 
Coleridge the Visionary (London: Chatto & Windus, 1959), p.163. 
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considerably more sophisticated meditation on the inability to mediate than 
‘The Eolian Harp’.      

































Chapter 6. ‘The world must be romanticized’: writing immortality as 
infinity  
Archimedes said that he could move the world if he had a point 
whereon to rest his machine. Who has not felt the same aspirations as 
regards the world of his own mind? Having to wield some of its 
elements when I was impelled to write this Poem on the ‘Immortality 
of the soul’ I took hold of the notion of pre-existence as having 
sufficient foundation in humanity for authorizing me to make for my 
purpose the best use of it I could as a Poet.273 
 
‘Sufficient foundation in humanity’ 
 
Wordsworth’s Note on the ‘Immortality Ode’ (1802) explicates a type of 
poetics in which the value of both philosophy and theology are maintained; at 
the same time the Platonic myth of pre-existence – anamnesis – is used as the 
basis for the purely poetic handling of the innately human intimation of‘a 
sense of the indomitableness of the spirit’274 within the poet, the philosophical 
content of the poem is authorized by the blurred distinction between poetry 
and philosophy. Here, Wordsworth makes it clear that a systematic pursuit of 
truth arrived at through any one philosophical or theological standpoint is not 
his aim. Rather, he is at work attempting a poetological process whereby 
poetry and philosophy are assimilated into a single discourse which concerns 
itself with the poet-ironist’s self-imposed task of leading the drive towards 
self-consciousness; the ‘Ode’ embodies his job description for the aspiring 
philosophical poet in the ‘Preface’ to Lyrical Ballads – ‘truth, not individual 
and local, but general and operative’ is the desired end.275 In this instance, 
‘truth’ is defined as that which leads to self-consciousness, and bears little 
resemblance to the doctrinal or pedagogic notions of truth that Wordsworth 
seeks to dispel. Yet this poetologizing is rarely focused on by readers of the 
‘Ode’ and, consequently, the relationship it bears to a wider Romantic attempt 
at synthesizing literature and philosophy is overlooked.276 However, the ‘Ode’ 
                                                            
273 William Wordsworth, Poems, in Two Volumes, and Other Poems 1800-1807, ed. by Jared 
Curtis, The Cornell Wordsworth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.428. All 
subsequent references to the poem are from this edition, and all further line references to 
poetry appear parenthetically in the main text. 
274 Poems, in Two Volumes, p.428. 
275 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of the ‘Preface’ and its implications for 
reading Wordsworth’s philosophical poetry. 
276 Geoffrey Hartman’s reading of the ‘Ode’ rightly acknowledges the wilful ambiguities of 
the poem, and recognizes the need to read outside the ‘Ode’ itself in order to grasp the wider 
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is characteristic of a Romantic Zeitgeist concerned with such a synthesis, in 
dialogue with the Jena theorists’ concepts of Sympoesie, Symphilosophie, and 
Poëtisirung, 
Taken as a whole, the Note itself is undermined in significance if 
considered solely by its own formal status; much more than an explanatory 
‘note’, it is, rather, a prose analogue to the verse, which draws attention to this 
poetologizing process. Taking Wordsworth’s prose as an authoritative theory 
is usually made problematic by the fact that he himself rejected a systematic 
poetic theory, preferring his reader to derive ‘meaning’ immanently from the 
poetry itself.277 This has led to Wordsworth’s philosophical thought being 
neglected by commentators, with the result that he is at best viewed as a 
philosophical poet engaged in dialogue with Coleridge, but not as a 
philosopher in the company of his collaborator, or the German Romantic 
ironists. However, the Note on the ‘Ode’ merits closer consideration for its 
continuous intellectual engagement with not only the poem itself, but also 
Wordsworth’s epitaphic poetry of the Lyrical Ballads (1800) (with a particular 
focus on ‘The Brothers’, the ‘Lucy’ poems, and ‘We are Seven’), and later 
Essays upon Epitaphs, the first of which was published in Coleridge’s Friend 
in 1810, and later reprinted as a Note to The Excursion (1814).278 What I 
propose to argue, firstly, is that through both his poetry and prose of epitaphs 
and immortality, it is possible to read a continuous commitment to a 
poetologizing process which consolidates Wordsworth’s position as a thinker 
and writer attempting a synthesis of philosophy and poetry in order to arrive at 
a theory of an infinite drive towards self-consciousness. Secondly, I wish to 
read this as being in dialogue with Novalis’ writing and theory on immortality 
                                                                                                                                                           
concepts at work here – see Wordsworth’s Poetry, p.276. However, Hartman’s discussion, in 
isolating The Excursion from this framework, overlooks a key aspect of continuity in 
Wordsworth’s poetological projections. His reading of The Excursion (pp.292-323) concerns 
itself with emphasizing the poet’s supposed flight from the visionary, thus undermining the 
extent to which epitaph and elegy serve as an entry to reading the poet as a thinker. More 
recently, Paul Hamilton has placed the ‘Ode’ in the philosophical context of his 
contemporaries, see Coleridge and German Philosophy: The Poet in the Land of Logic, 
pp.10-12. Hamilton reads the ‘Ode’ as an essential part of a dialectic between Coleridge’s and 
Wordsworth’s philosophical ambitions and argues that, ‘Poetry and philosophy are each 
other’s extension. They are on the stage, at the same time, in dramatic dialogue’ (p.12). This 
approach, with its emphasis on synthesis and collaboration, has been influential in forming 
my own argument here. 
277 See ‘Preface’ to The Excursion, in Prose Works, iii, p.6.  
278 Prose Works, ii, p.45. 
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and the grave. Although I do not make the claim that either philosopher-poet 
was consciously aware of the other’s work – a claim that would be wholly 
unfounded – I do argue a case for reading Wordsworth within a comparative 
framework that allows us to make better sense of sympoetologies across early 
English and German Romanticism. To this end, I shall conclude by 
considering the implications for writing immortality as infinity that 
Coleridge’s poetic dialogue with Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’ stimulates.  Finally, I 
will show how Wordsworth’s place within this sympoetological framework is 
consolidated by his use of irony in his presentation of self-consciousness in 
these writings on immortality, the grave, and epitaphs. I shall reiterate my 
argument that Wordsworth’s debts to drama and irony, which run throughout 
several of his major works, are suggestive of reading him as a 
sympoetological writer and thinker in the company of Coleridge, Schlegel, 
Novalis and Tieck. By the end of this chapter, then, I hope to have 
demonstrated that Wordsworth’s and Novalis’ writings on immortality are 
more closely affiliated with the poetry and prose read in Chapters 1-5 than 
might be thought, and that these writings reveal a shared striving towards 
‘Romantic’ poetry (or, Universalpoesie) as a negation of both philosophical 
and literary ‘absolutes’. This chapter, therefore, will conclude my exploration 
of the principal research aims I set out in Chapter 1. Namely, to consider how 
Wordsworth’s placement within an Anglo-German Romantic poetological 
framework can stimulate readings of generally under-researched, yet central, 
aspects of his poetic theory, methodology and practice; how reading romantic 
texts as poetological enables a clearer understanding of how these writers 
situate their own work; and how poetologies are practised through 
collaborative (what I have called sympoetological) ventures.279   
The Note itself is characterized by a certain ironic language, with the 
poet neither confirming nor denying an adherence to any one philosophical 
opinion on immortality; the Platonic version is offered as a palpable example, 
yet Wordsworth is careful to acquit himself of Coleridgean accusations of 
                                                            
279 Having addressed conclusively my final research question of how far poetologizing and 
collaborative venture result in the Mischgedicht in the preceding chapter, I shall not return to 
it directly here. However, I reiterate that many of the important writings considered in the 
present chapter (such as ‘Dejection: An Ode’, Novalis’ and Schlegel’s fragments and The 
Recluse) have been presented as Mischgedichte throughout the thesis, and so the question runs 
implicitly through some of the readings herein. 
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affirmation of a decidedly un-Christian spiritual ideology. Indeed, 
Wordsworth’s Note reads like an ironic prose dialogue in which several 
positions are offered in succession, connected only by the suggestion of the 
universal appeal of the sense of immortality. A self-universe chiasmus is 
presented, as any discussion of the validity of the concept of immortality is 
enveloped within general claims of human experience, which is presented as 
transcending the particular. Thus, Wordsworth begins with the child’s earliest 
experience, ‘a sense of the indomitableness of the spirit’, and ends with the 
universalizing ‘sufficient foundation in humanity’ that validates the theme. 
 Within this universal philosophy, the particular is interestingly offered 
in suitably ambiguous terms, with the poetological potential of both Christian 
orthodoxy and Platonism emphasized. Although the child’s imagining is ‘far 
too shadowy a notion to be recommended to faith as more than an element in 
our instincts of immortality’, Wordsworth emphasizes that it is not in conflict 
with religious belief, ‘tho’ the idea is not advanced in revelation, there is 
nothing there to contradict it, and the fall of Man presents an analogy in its 
favour.’280 This doubles as a defence of not only his poem against criticism on 
poetic and scriptural grounds, such as Coleridge’s famous disapproval of 
Wordsworth’s handling of the grave, but also his decision as a thinker to draw 
attention to and reinterpret the imaginative recesses between faith and fact. A 
few sentences on, the philosopher turns ironist, as he now presents his poem 
as a non-literal Platonic idea and forces the reader to think again about any 
‘meaning’ or system that may be offered here. 
The Christian theology is then presented as a logical starting point for 
the development of Platonic anamnesis, ‘Accordingly, a pre-existent state has 
entered into the popular creeds of many nations, and among all persons 
acquainted with classic literature is known as an ingredient in Platonic 
philosophy.’281 A closer look at the way this development is documented 
elucidates the process of drawing the universal from the particular, with the 
word ‘notion’ immediately drawing attention to the negation of a 
systematically derived doctrine. Instead, ‘notion’ is offered as a vague 
philosophical term, neither concrete as an explicable concept, nor a belief that 
                                                            
280Poems, in Two Volumes, p.428. 
281Poems, in Two Volumes, p.428. 
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one necessarily subscribes to. Additionally, Wordsworth seeks to find in his 
sources ‘sufficient foundation in humanity’, a seemingly casual phrase which, 
upon reflection, reads as a single approach to his entire corpus. Later 
objections to a literal reading of Wordsworth’s application of mythology, such 
as Coleridge’s famous attack in the Biographia Literaria282, are anticipated 
here, and the literal itself is reduced as Wordsworth’s striving towards a 
universalized starting-point for comprehending and representing the self, the 
ultimate ‘I’, is posited as the chief aim of the poem, and, implicitly, of poetry 
that presents itself as intrinsically philosophical. This is the ‘best use’ – 
Wordsworth makes no reference to any concern with the ‘correct’ use – of 
source material for poetic purpose, and it is this use that ‘authorizes’ him to 
mark the transition from the particular to the general. 
 
  
‘The little Actor’  
 
In its attempts to reconfigure the everyday and make intelligible (insofar as it 
may be made intelligible) the relation that the everyday or familiar – the 
ultimate encapsulation of the knowable understood as the external world – 
bears with the imaginative, poetic self, the ‘Ode’ is joined by much of 
Novalis’ poetological writing. Several shorter fragments, along with Die 
Lehrlinge zu Sais, Die Christenheit oder Europa, and Hymnen an die Nacht 
can be read in line with the ‘Ode’, and other central Wordsworthian works in 
their exploration of self-consciousness as achieved through consideration of 
immortality. The concept of the imaginative, poetic self is a myriad one, 
variously diffused through writings on genius, the child, and the visionary 
imagination, with the Child of the ‘Ode’ – the ‘best Philosopher’ – presented 
as a progenitor of the adult philosopher-poet, prefiguring both the ironic 
creator of the dramatic self, and the visionary seer who is charged with the 
task of eventually uniting this individuating process with the universal. The 
Child is presented as a Philosopher predominantly due to the inexhaustible 
capacity for dramatizing ontological enquiry and the self that will become 
central to the adult’s vocation: 
 
                                                            
282 See Biographia Literaria, ii, pp.138-141. 
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See, at his feet, some little plan or chart, 
 Some fragment from his dream of human life, 
 Shap’d by himself with newly-learned art; 
      A wedding or a festival, 
  A mourning or a funeral; 
   And this hath now his heart, 
      And unto this he frames his song: 
   Then will he fit his tongue 
 To dialogues of business, love, or strife; 
      But it will not be long 
      Ere this be thrown aside, 
      And with new joy and pride 
 The little Actor cons another part, 
 Filling from time to time his “humorous stage” 
 With all the Persons, down to palsied Age, 
 That Life brings with her in her Equipage; 
      As if his whole vocation 
  Were endless imitation. 
    (ll.90-107) 
 
The Child is here presented in clearly dramatic terms, although, paradoxically, 
this language of artifice and drama is used to describe an innate and natural 
ability to diffuse his experience of being; the ‘little Actor’, then, is valued for 
his capacity for naturalizing the dramatic process through unselfconscious 
diffusion of identity.283 What distinguishes this instance of drama from the 
artifice with which the adult views the dramatic is the loss of the 
unselfconscious element, one aspect of the lost ‘visionary gleam’ the poem 
elegizes. The recovery of any visionary power in adulthood will, conversely, 
depend on the individual’s capacity for reflection, and any successful 
restoration of self-identity through drama can only be achieved with the 
ironist’s conscious awareness of this process.  
The mature poet as ironist, as I have demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, 
can sympathize with the child’s ability to sympathize, to place itself 
                                                            
283 For a brief but illuminating discussion of the loss elegized by Wordsworth in the ‘Ode’, 
see James Chandler, Wordsworth’s Second Nature, pp.79-81. Chandler’s reading of the poem 
goes against that of Abrams in that it produces the argument that Wordsworth was not 
attacking central notions of ‘custom’ or ‘habit’. My interest in citing Chandler here lies 
predominantly in what he has to say about the relationship between the child and the future 
self at the end of the eighth stanza: Chandler argues that ‘the depth to which the weight of 
custom sinks is what insures that some part of ourselves remains out of our reach, beyond our 
intellectual tampering’ (pp.80-1). Chandler is suggesting custom enables the irretrievability of 
what I have called the unselfconscious element that is lost in adulthood; to my mind, the 
primary implication of this argument is that this eventuality is desirable, because it enables the 
adult to realize that the ‘self’ is ineffable, which in turn stimulates the ironic diffusion of 
selfhood into several ‘selves’. 
229 
 
effortlessly in various imagined situations; the similarity being that both the 
ironist-poet and the child present these imagined situations as no different to 
the everyday conception of ‘reality’, the events themselves distinguished 
instead – as theorized in the ‘Preface’ to Lyrical Ballads – by the feelings 
giving importance to them, not vice versa. Nevertheless, this intensity of 
vision is mediated by the child’s ability to feel detached from (or, rather, 
unencumbered by) any one situation, thus ensuring it effortlessly ‘cons 
another part’. The child’s detachment anticipates the unencumbered ironist-
poet of later adulthood; however, this is as yet achieved only 
unselfconsciously, and thus must necessarily be relegated to the status of 
‘endless imitation’ from the adult’s point of view. This idea of the child’s 
‘vocation’ as consisting of ‘imitation’ echoes the Preface’s view of the poetic 
vocation as being to some extent a ‘mechanical’ reproduction. Where the 
child’s epistemology is circumscribed chiefly by a lack of self-consciousness, 
the poet is encumbered by language and the need for an appropriate medium 
through which to convey consciousness; the common similarity they share is 
the value in drama and detachment as a means to intensity. This ‘best 
Philosopher’ anticipates The Excursion’s exemplary adult visionary, the 
Wanderer, through the way in which he is able to assimilate his self and his 
experience of being into a series of imagined situations and identities, the 
paradox being that this is dependent upon detachment from any one of those 
identities. The Wanderer, we are told, ‘could afford to suffer / With those 
whom he saw suffer’,284 and this capacity is brought on by an ability to invoke 
sympathy for others through the imaginative condition, a point I shall return 
to. 
This evolution of the imaginative (thus essentially poetic) faculty from 
childhood to intellectual maturity is expressed by Novalis in strikingly similar 
terminology, 
 
The first human being is a seer. To him everything appears to be a 
spirit. What are children but the first human beings? The fresh vision 
                                                            
284 William Wordsworth,The Excursion, ed. by Sally Bushell, James A. Butler, and Michael 
C. Jaye, and David Garcia, The Cornell Wordsworth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2007), ll.399-400. All subsequent references to The Excursion are from this edition, and all 
further line references appear parenthetically in the main text.  
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of a child is more fanciful than the presentiment of the most resolute 
seer.285 
 
In relation to the sensory and imaginative, it is interesting to see how part of 
this fragment has been translated elsewhere; Margaret Mahoney Stoljar has 
translated the German Blick as ‘gaze’ instead of ‘vision’, and 
überschwenglicher, or ‘effusive’, is offered as ‘brimming with emotion’, as 
opposed to Beiser’s ‘fanciful’.286 Aside from reiterating the obvious 
difficulties of translation, these choices also respectively privilege the sensory 
or imaginative emphasis of Novalis’ fragment. By using the word ‘fanciful’, 
Beiser makes a distinction between emotion (as translated in Stoljar) and 
imagination. Beiser’s emphasis on imagination makes the child a more poetic 
figure – poesis in the sense of actively creating – and links to the ‘fresh 
vision’. The child here is characterized as a prophetic figure experiencing 
these visions, whereas in the Stoljar, the vitality of the child’s participation 
lies in the sensory, rather than imaginary realm. Both ‘brimming with 
emotion’ and ‘fanciful’ can be seen as translatable for the German, and I think 
the important thing to note is the creative result – in either emotion or 
imagination – of the early sensory experience. 
Novalis’ child is also a progenitor of the mature visionary poet-
philosopher; the child creates from perceptions and an imaginative processing 
of those then shapes the way in which the child perceives the external. Novalis 
privileges – or encumbers – the child with the status of ‘seer’ in terms that 
Coleridge might have found as astonishing and difficult to get on terms with 
as Wordsworth’s child-philosopher. However, like Wordsworth, Novalis 
credits the child with a truly creative faculty that is later only recovered 
through the drama of reconstruction. For both writers, memory will become 
represented as inextricably linked to ironic re-writing. In writings of 
immortality, representation of memory and its functions in the drive to self-
consciousness is achieved through anamnesis and the imagery of palimpsests. 
 Both Novalis’ and Wordsworth’s recognition of the way in which the 
functionality of an unreliable memory may be recovered through an alteration 
in its uses and processes leads to the palimpsest serving as a connective image 
                                                            
285 Novalis, Sketches, 194, in The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, p.85. 
286 See Novalis, Philosophical Writings, p.67. 
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to poetry of immortality and epitaph. Anamnesis and epitaph both relate to a 
past, however fictionalized or reconfigured in the poet’s mind it may be. The 
palimpsest, though, ensures that this past is rewritable; when standing alone, 
mythologizing, cosmogonizing, or physical memorials are all too entrenched 
in a certain past to provide anything more than ‘intimations’ of immortality. A 
literary immortality bound up with an ongoing drive towards self-
consciousness, represented through spiritual immortality, is the preoccupation 
here, and only a means of conveying this as on-going adequately represents 
the idea that human consciousness or identity is at any stage inchoate and 
subject to revision and rewriting. So, the child, the ‘little Actor’ who adopts 
and discards identities in an imitative manner, transcends mimicry, with 





The opening of Die Lehrlinge zu Sais explores this transcended imitative 
experience through the presentation of both mind and nature as palimpsests – 
sites for writing and re-writing – and through reading the latter, the seer will 
penetrate the purely sensory experience. Of the relation between the 
individual and the external world, Novalis writes, ‘It is as though an alkahest 
had been poured over the senses of man’287 – this initially seems evocative of 
the palimpsest, yet this ‘alkahest’ acts as a hindrance to comprehending the 
‘magic writing’ that manifests itself in the natural world. The external world is 
a palimpsest in that it is presented as being written over by various mysterious 
signs, underlying which is the true ontological discovery the seer aspires to 
make. The mind of man mirrors nature in its capacity for being written (and 
rewritten) upon; what saves the poet’s experience from being a merely 
mimetic one, though, is this process of vision and revision. The mind is 
constantly creating from what it perceives – but if what it perceives is in itself 
encoded and needs deciphering, any process of perception is simultaneously 
both sensory and imaginative from the very outset. This experience is also 
                                                            
287 Novalis, The Novices of Sais, p.3. The alchemical term ‘alkahest’ refers to a hypothetical 
universal solvent with the power to dissolve all other substances. Novalis’ use of the term is 
typical in that it is indicative of the ways in which he is seeking to establish intergeneric 
connections. For more on Novalis’ intergeneric terminology, see Chapters 1, 2 and 5 herein.    
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found in ‘Tintern Abbey’s (1798) ironic revisioning, where to perceive is to 
‘half-create’, and where each re-writing of the past is a stage in decoding.288  
Similarly, in the ‘Ode’, ‘Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting’ 
(l.58); birth itself acts as the alkahest over the palimpsest of the mind, 
endowing it with a renewed capacity to perceive the external, create and to re-
create from these sense perceptions. Seemingly contrary to the Platonic 
anamnesis that the poem takes its central philosophical cue from, these 
‘obstinate questionings’ (l.144) that strive to restore the original visionary 
powers of the mind include the use of the senses. However, the sensory is 
compensation for loss of the visionary, and is thus not adequate in itself. Here, 
the intimations of immortality come as ‘Perpetual benedictions’ (l.137), 
driving the child’s pursuit towards an original state of being, as described 
previously: 
 
 Not in entire forgetfulness, 
  And not in utter nakedness, 
 But trailing clouds of glory do we come 
   From God who is our home: 
 Heaven lies about us in our infancy! 
 Shades of the prison-house begin to close 
   Upon the growing Boy, 
 But he beholds the light, and whence it flows, 
   He sees it in his joy; 
 The Youth, who daily farther from the East 
  Must travel, still is Nature’s Priest, 
      And by the vision splendid 
      Is on his way attended; 
 At length the Man perceives it die away, 
 And fade into the light of common day. 
     (ll.62-76) 
 
This passage once again finds a parallel in Novalis, for whom, as we have 
seen in previous chapters, ‘Philosophy is really homesickness – the desire to 
                                                            
288 For Wordsworth, the language of poetry has also suffered the influences of another type of 
‘alkahest’ – the dual alkahest of poetic diction and metre. Wordsworth argues in his 
‘Appendix on Poetic Diction’ (1802) that the original language of poets did not require metre 
and was actually much closer to the common spoken language of men. It is tempting to see 
this as yet another justification for the Lyrical Ballads volume – and in one respect it is just 
that – but I think there is something more significant at play here, particularly in relation to 
the alkahest and its effect on perception. It is my feeling that Wordsworth is driving at the 
infinity of the poetic source itself: words. By emphasizing the source as infinite he is able to 
develop the core of his palimpsestic poetry. 
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be everywhere at home’.289 Poetry, too, joins in this search for a lost sense of 
the heimlich. Anticipating Freud’s later famous definition of the word in his 
discussion of the uncanny,290 both Wordsworth and Novalis fuse the homely 
and the hidden in their poetologizing. Again, although I do not wish to impose 
a distinctly Freudian reading on the work of either writer, I find the 
connections made between the homely and the unfamiliar a useful way to 
approach the passage quoted above. Daniel W. Ross has read the ‘Ode’ (in 
line with much of the poet’s other major work) as a Freudian revelation of the 
struggle towards the primal – defined as maternal – origin, and of the 
subsequent failure of memory as compensation for loss of the original self.291 
Ross argues that the uncanny here relates to the conflict between the two 
selves and the child is a threat to the present self. While the links between the 
maternal and the sense of home are convincing, I find the interpretation of the 
child as the uncanny figure a limiting one; by reducing the poeticized return to 
an original state of being to the status of fantasy arising from repressed 
anxieties, the reader runs the risk of overlooking the philosophical value of 
tracing ‘home’. 
Although these postulated intimations ‘fade into the common day’ 
with time, they nevertheless leave behind their memory, the faculty which 
Ross reads as the problem disguised as a solution.292 This may certainly seem 
the case through a close (and immanent) reading of the poem; however, it fails 
to acknowledge the way in which memory plays a central role in the ironic re-
writing of the past, as well as the present, a capacity for which holds the key 
to synthesizing poetry and philosophy. Memories of a former glory are 
certainly mixed blessings, but the opportunities they provide for 
reconfiguration are of vital importance to the philosophical poet. An 
‘alkahest’ over the senses is thus, in a way, essentially regenerative, as it alters 
both the functions and the properties of perception. With the synthesis of the 
sensory and imaginative comes the potential for genius, the semi-recovered 
adult counterpart to the child-seer: 
                                                            
289Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia, p.155.  
290 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Uncanny’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works, 24 vols, (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), xvii, p.224. 
291 Daniel W. Ross, ‘Seeking a Way Home: The Uncanny in Wordsworth’s “Immortality 





…genius consists in the capacity to treat imaginary objects as if they 
were real, and real objects as if they were imagined. So the talent for 
representation, for exact observation, for the purposeful description of 
what has been observed, is different from genius. Without this talent, 
one’s vision is incomplete, one is but half a genius, one can have a 
disposition towards genius, but lacking that talent one will never 
develop into a genius. Without genius we would none of us exist at all. 
Genius is necessary to everything. But what we call genius – is the 
genius of genius.293 
 
As with the child, the merging of the real and the imaginary is essential to the 
way in which representation takes place. The dramatic-ironic figure, outlined 
above, returns to discussion here in the reiteration of the importance of close 
observation. Wordsworth’s almost contemporaneous comments on the poet’s 
vocation – which serve the best purpose of a manifesto of his poetry in this 
period – also emphasize the importance of close observation, ‘I have 
endeavoured to look steadily at my subject’,294 as well as the capacity to 
refigure imaginatively ‘reality’, as outlined by Novalis’ fragment:  
 
The principal object, then, which I proposed to myself in these Poems 
was to [chuse incidents and situations from common life, and to relate 
or describe them, throughout, as far as was possible, in a selection of 
language really used by men; and, at the same time, to throw over 
them a certain colouring of imagination, whereby ordinary things 
should be presented to the mind in an unusual way; and, further, and 
above all, to make these incidents and situations interesting] by tracing 
in them, truly though not ostentatiously, the primary laws of our 
nature: chiefly, as far as regards the manner in which we associate 
ideas in a state of excitement.295 
 
The ‘language really used by men’ has been commented on often enough, and 
I do not intend to add to readings of the Preface’s theory of poetic language; 
my interest in quoting the passage fully here lies in the equal importance 
placed on language and transfiguring the everyday. To give representation of 
the everyday ‘a certain colouring of imagination’ is precisely ‘to treat 
imaginary objects as if they were real, and real objects as if they were 
                                                            
293 Novalis, Vermischte Bemerkungen (1797), 22, in German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, 
p.86. 
294 Prose Works, i, (1800: p.132; 1850: p.133). 
295 Prose Works, i, (1850: pp.123-5). 
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imagined’, and this is the compensation received for the loss of that original 
‘fresh vision of a child’ celebrated by Novalis.  
Ludwig Tieck’s comment on this ability of Novalis to reverse the 
sense of reality, in his posthumous brief Life of the poet is worth returning to,  
 
It became natural for him to regard what was most usual and nearest to 
him, as full of marvels, and the strange and supernatural as the usual 
and common-place. Thus everyday life surrounded him like a 
supernatural story; and that region, which most men can only conceive 
as something distant and incomprehensible, seemed to him like a 
beloved home.296 
 
As a biographical comment – moreover, a posthumous account written by a 
friend –this could easily be dismissed as romanticized reminiscence of a 
writer who lived through the ideals of his art. However, Tieck’s comments on 
Novalis and everyday life are valuable for the role biography plays in 
Poëtisirung, and Potenzirung, both of which relate to an intensified 
fictionalization of life and the familiar. It is hardly surprising that these 
concepts, related as they are to Symphilosophie and Sympoesie, should find a 
significant place in wider writing of the Jena Romanticists, fictional or 
otherwise. The nature of fiction is elevated in this process to meet an 
intensified reality – a Romanticized one – with the gap between the two closed 
by consciously rewriting/recreating the latter. Novalis’ own most penetrating 
fragment on this process is worth quoting fully here once more, as it further 
elucidates the aims his poetologizing shares in common with Wordsworth: 
 
The world must be romanticized. Then one will again find the original 
sense. Romanticizing is nothing more than a qualitative involution. In 
this operation the lower self is identified with a better self. In the same 
manner we are such a qualitative series of powers. This operation is 
still completely unknown. When I give the commonplace a higher 
meaning, the customary a mysterious appearance, the known the 
dignity of the unknown, the finite the illusion of the infinite, I 
romanticize it. The operation is the converse for the higher, unknown, 
mystical and infinite; through this connection it becomes 
logarithimized. It receives a customary expression. Romantic 
philosophy. Lingua romana. Reciprocal elevation and debasement.297 
                                                            
296 See Novalis, Henry of Ofterdingen, p.xvi. See Chapter 2 of this thesis for more on the 
significance of romanticizing. 
297 The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, p.85. See also Chapter 1 herein for 




Indeed, this is one of the most comprehensive reflections ‘romanticism’ 
makes on its own processes, keeping in line with other writings on the 
‘commonplace’ or everyday; it is also useful as theory with which to approach 
Die Lehrlinge zu Sais’ mysticism and emphasis on the child and the wanderer 
in relation to immortality. 
 
 
‘Various are the roads of man’ 
 
Novalis does, in fact, extend visionary childhood intimations even further in 
Die Lehrlinge zu Sais, with the mysterious child figure placed at the centre of 
the piece. As a prose-poem, Die Lehrlinge takes on a much more active role in 
synthesizing poetry and philosophy than the shorter fragments. However, this 
is not solely formal; the piece contains the fullest expression of the writer’s 
emphasis on childhood experience. The teacher’s childhood is described early 
on in the fragment as one which depended on a close communion with nature 
through observation, and a youth spent wandering in a pursuit of self-
consciousness, and in this it is joined by the Wanderer figure of Wordsworth’s 
Excursion. As with the ‘Ode’s Child, the first lesson of the teacher as a child 
is imitative, ‘He looked up at the stars and copied their paths and positions in 
the sand’,298 though not in the dramatic sense. The child is soon attuned to the 
noumenal, and begins to wander in a natural education: 
 
He listened closely to his spirit and thoughts. He knew not whither his 
yearnings led him. When he grew older, he roamed the earth, saw 
distant lands and seas, new skies, strange stars, unknown plants, 
beasts, men, went down into caverns, saw how the earth was built in 
shelves and multicoloured layers, and pressed clay into strange rock 
forms. Everywhere he found the familiar, only strangely mixed and 
coupled, and thus strange things often ordered themselves within 
him.299 
 
Here, the process of ‘romanticizing’ begins, with the child able to assimilate 
the unknown and familiarize it from within; the analogy of the logarithm is 
useful in conveying what could easily be dismissed as mysticism in a 
language of logic. Novalis’ description of romanticizing paradoxically 
                                                            
298The Novices of Sais, p.7. 
299The Novices of Sais, p.7. 
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becomes more familiar and comprehensible to the reader in its admission of 
the necessity of incomprehensibility [die Unverständlichkeit]; appropriately, 
this is again expressed through the example of language, 
 
I heard a voice say from afar that the incomprehensible is solely the 
result of incomprehension, which seeks what it has and therefore can 
never make further discoveries. We do not understand speech, because 
speech does not understand itself, nor wish to; the true Sanskrit would 
speak in order to speak, because speech is its delight and essence.300 
 
In this way, an unfamiliar world becomes more habitable due to this 
awareness of the incomprehensible. Furthermore, this Unverständlichkeit is 
not limited to human epistemology; it is intrinsic to both the external world 
and the medium – language, whether written or spoken – used to convey it. 
However, the adult seer recognizes the necessity of the incomprehensible best 
through language, whereas it is already graspable to the child as an intuition 
before the encumbrance of language, ‘or shades of the prison-house’ appear – 
here interpreted as the vain striving for unimpeded intelligibility. 
 Similarly, Wordsworth’s exemplary protagonist gains an education 
which privileges self-discovery: 
 
     But by the native vigour of his mind, 
By his habitual wanderings out of doors, 
By loneliness, and goodness, and by kind works, 
Whate’er in docile childhood or in youth 
He had imbibed of fear or darker thought 
Was melted all away: so true was this 
That sometimes his religion seemed to me 
Self-taught, as of a dreamer in the woods; 
Who to the model of his own pure heart 
Framed his belief as grace divine inspired, 
Or human reason dictated with awe. 
(I, 433-443) 
 
Although the conflict between the significance of the geographical and 
culturally-specific education that the Wanderer receives and the concept of 
wandering itself is discussed in more detail below, it is interesting to note the 
parallel with Novalis; his religious affirmation in childhood is ‘Self-taught’ as 
a result of ‘his habitual wanderings out of doors’. Theology is again fused 
                                                            
300The Novices of Sais, p.5. 
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with philosophy and epistemological enquiry, so that, in a ‘romanticizing’ 
move, Wordsworth is equating religion with ontological discovery. Thus, an 
education comprising ‘human reason’ and natural discovery is on equal 
ground as one of ‘grace divine’. 
However, the very first sentence of Die Lehrlinge, ‘Various are the 
roads of man’, presents an intriguing paradox inherent in both texts; while 
both Die Lehrlinge’s teacher and Wordsworth’s Wanderer are depicted as 
having an exemplary education for the prophetic figure instructing man, the 
prototypical value of this is called into question when it is considered that it is 
unique to the figures it is attributed to. This is particularly puzzling in the case 
of the Wanderer: 
 
     Unoccupied by sorrow of its own 
     His heart lay open; and, by Nature tuned 
      And constant disposition of his thoughts 
     To sympathy with Man, he was alive 
     To all that was enjoyed where’er he went; 
     And all that was endured; for in himself 
     Happy, and quiet in his chearfulness, 
     He had no painful pressure from without 
     That made him turn aside from wretchedness 
     With coward fears. He could afford to suffer 
     With those whom he saw suffer. 
    (I, 390-400) 
 
The revelation that ‘He could afford to suffer’ is generally seized on by 
commentators of this passage, and justifiably so; the idea of being able to 
‘afford to suffer’ is beguiling in itself, and steadily becomes more astonishing 
when contextualized by examples of the Wanderer’s reactions to the suffering 
of others. In terms of understanding dramatic displacement in relation to the 
Wanderer’s ironic detachment (which the absence of ‘painful pressure from 
without’ strongly implies) from the suffering of others’, the assertion that ‘His 
heart lay open’ is immediately open to question, and we are invited to 
consider whether or not the Wanderer’s ability to feel sympathy for others 
makes him, in turn, more accessible. This leaves readers wondering how far it 
is possible to emulate this idealized figure, and whether or not Wordsworth 
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actually intends them to try.301 That the Wanderer himself states early on in 
Book I, “I see around me here / Things which you cannot see”’ (I, 501-2) is 
strongly indicative of an epistemological and spiritual enrichment that is 
inextricable from the geographical, cultural and social background of the 
Wanderer.  
 This in turn draws attention to the ambiguity of a ‘Wanderer’ who can 
simultaneously claim any form of attachment to a certain geographical or 
social climate, a paradox which is useful to approach using Anne Janowitz’ 
terms for the poetic voice in lyric tradition; although Janowitz’ study focuses 
on lyric poetry, I would like to suggest that her dialectical terms for the 
narrative voice, ‘traditional and voluntaristic’, ‘embedded and unencumbered 
selves’302 can be applied to the Wanderer and beyond. Discussing 
Wordsworth and Lyrical Ballads, Janowitz writes, 
 
 One of the most powerful images of this unencumbered self is the 
solitary reader and writer; the self who is constructed as a mental space 
of voluntary choices inhabiting the realm of poetic artifice, neither 
embodied nor localised, though capable of surveying and 
understanding a locality303 
 
In the case of the Wanderer, this is particularly interesting, as he is presented 
as being both; on the one hand, ‘unencumbered’, he assumes the position that 
ought to belong to the Poet.  On the other hand, returning to the description of 
his upbringing in Book I, and the fact that he serves as the only medium 
through which the Poet – and, by implication, the reader – can penetrate the 
local geographical, social, and cultural environment, the Wanderer becomes, 
to an extent, ‘customary’, or ‘embedded’. 
 With Novalis, this is complicated by the fact that the teacher – though 
explicitly intended as a figure who leads by example and education – is aware 
that the knowledge sought by his disciples may not necessarily be attained 
through imitating his own course. The lesson of the opening sentence here 
becomes increasingly important in comprehending the role of wandering. 
                                                            
301 David Simpson discusses the question of how far it is possible to emulate the Wanderer, 
concluding that it seems unlikely, as Wordsworth strives to show that the social, economic, 
geographical factors that produced his personality and philosophy seem to be receding - see 
Wordsworth’s Historical Imagination, p.202. 
302 See Janowitz, Lyric and Labour, pp.34-5. 
303 Janowitz, Lyric and Labour, p.18. 
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Having described the education and experience of the teacher, the narrator 
turns to his own experience, which differs from the others in that he does not 
wander and retrieve natural objects. Instead, he remains where he is and 
thinks, a mode of learning that the teacher is sympathetic to, ‘With me it has 
never been as with the teacher. Everything leads me back into myself.’304 In 
the same passage, the narrator makes reference to ordinary perception as being 
clouded by divinity and mysterious images; the seer has already begun to 
break through what Wordsworth refers to as the ‘pre-established codes of 
decision’, the habitual modes of perceiving the external world. However, this 
penetration of the ‘strange figures…which seem to belong to that great cipher 
which we discern written everywhere’305 is as yet inchoate, and belongs more 
to the ‘Ode’s ‘shadowy recollections’, than to the birthright of the ‘clouds of 
glory’. Novalis’ ultimate exploration in this prose-poem – that of a return to or 
recovery of ‘home’ – necessitates a rehabilitation of the secret; as with 
Wordsworth, the two extremes of the heimlich meet in the Potenzirung.  
 So, the significance of the wandering prophetic figure is maintained in 
both Novalis’ and Wordsworth’s poetologized search for ‘home’ (here 
synonymous with self-consciousness or recovery of that original ‘I’), and this 
is expressed through the language of infinity, or immortality. The ‘Ode’ 
highlights immortality as its primary concern through its title, but the real 
implication the poem makes is one of infinity, and this is understood as being 
tantamount to the former concept. The real value of the notion of immortality 
for both poets is the opportunity it provides for explicating an otherwise 
inexpressible journey to self-consciousness, with its connotations of cyclical 
beginnings and ends which the poet-philosopher can rewrite through irony. 
However, I do not suggest this as a critical imposition on Romanticism in the 
sense that Abrams influentially posited in his Natural Supernaturalism. 
Rather, I am interested in reading these works as being in dialogue with one 
another, as well as part of a wider collaborative effort; returning to Friedrich 
Schlegel it is useful to consider no. 43 of his Athenaeum Fragment, as I think 
it is still the most succinct summary of this insistence on cyclicality: 
                                                            
304 The Novices of Sais, p.13. 
305 The Novices of Sais, p.3. 
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‘The Sublime attractions of the grave’ 
 
For the poet or philosopher of immortality this insistence on cyclicality is the 
crux; the distinction between infinity and immortality is lost in the overall 
purpose of synthesizing philosophy and literature, in order to create the 
‘modern’ literature which the Jena writers theorized extensively as the 
Mischgedicht, and which has been largely understood by Wordsworthian (and, 
to an extent, Coleridgean) criticism through the unfinished Recluse project. 
The Recluse is generally acknowledged as a collaborative project between 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, yet further comment beyond this usually collapses 
into discussion over how far it can be attributed to either writer, with few 
readers focusing on the importance both Wordsworth and Coleridge attached 
in both theory and practice (which, though often at odds with one another, are 
nevertheless of equal interest and importance) to the process here discussed as 
poetologizing. Fewer still have read this in line with German pre-1800 
Romantic theory. But the evolution of this theory can be seen in collaborative 
work on Lyrical Ballads, as I have demonstrated, as well as the Recluse 
project and beyond, and immortality/infinity best expresses Friedrich 
Schlegel’s writing on the ‘modern’ literature/mythology that was to be 
produced. It is worth quoting Schlegel’s most famous fragment on the matter, 
Athenaeum Fragment 116, once more: 
 
Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry…It tries to and 
should mix and fuse poetry and prose, inspiration and criticism, the 
poetry of art and the poetry of nature…The romantic kind of poetry is 
still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it 
should forever be becoming and never be perfected…The romantic 
kind of poetry is the only one that is more than a kind, that is, as it 




306 Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, p.166. 
307Lucinde and the Fragments, p.175. See Chapter 1 of this thesis for a more detailed 
consideration of Schlegel’s conception of ‘Romantic’ poetry.  
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More literally, this ‘state of becoming’ is expressed by The Excursion’s 
Wanderer, whose philosophy of sympathy for fellow man is exemplary 
precisely because it achieves an ironic detachment simultaneous with 
complete and unaffected sympathy for others’ suffering. He can therefore 
relate an anecdote of another’s suffering with ‘chearfulness’, before moving 
onto another story, verbal epitaph, or even place.  
 This infinite capacity for providing epitaphs for the dead also belongs 
to the Pastor, whom the Wanderer requests to: 
 
     Epitomize the life; pronounce, You can, 
     Authentic epitaphs on some of these  
     Who from their lowly mansions hither brought,  
     Beneath this turf lie mouldering at our feet. 
    (V, 652-5) 
 
Immortality finds its anchor in the epitaphic poetic mode’s potential for 
memorializing. Both the Wanderer and the Pastor are exemplary figures 
because they do not merely narrate, they also historicize and commemorate 
through their narratives.308 The stark division between the ‘mouldering’ dead 
and the living is negotiated by the potential for oral (and imaginative) 
revivification. Death is presented as an opportunity to utilize the faculty of 
memory and the process of re-visioning, not seen as an end. We can return to 
Novalis’ explanation of romanticizing as a process of bridging the gap 
between the infinite and the finite, and read it alongside Pollen 
[Blüthenstaub], no. 14, 
 
Life is the beginning of death. Life is for the sake of death. Death is at 
the same time an ending and beginning, a parting and closer reunion 
with the self. Through death reduction is completed.309 
 
Revivification of the entombed dead through an oral tradition of relating 
epitaphic stories – epitomizing the life – enables this ‘closer reunion with the 
self’. The natural analogy of the ‘reduction’ [Reduktzion] to a state of spiritual 
purification (or, self-consciousness) finds a literary analogue in the ironic 
process of writing and rewriting the self. In both its preservation of memory 
                                                            
308 For more on this capacity for historicizing, see Chapter 2. 
309 The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, p.11. 
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and its self-renewing function the spoken epitaph equates with the palimpsest 
of the mind.  
The Wanderer’s initially disconcerting choice of the word 
‘mouldering’ seems contrary to both the orthodox Christian doctrine of 
spiritual immortality and the more evangelical spirituality that he otherwise 
advocates. But this physical reminder of death further reinforces what is at 
stake in terms of literary and philosophical immortality, and again, if read 
alongside Novalis’ comments on the value of remembering the dead, 
elucidates the epitaphic memory’s role in identifying selfhood and a concept 
of home: 
 
Man lives, and continues to live, only through the idea, through the 
memory of his existence. For the time being there is no other means of 
spiritual activity in this world. Hence it is a duty to think of the dead. It 
is the only way to remain in communion with them. In no other way is 
God himself present to us through faith.310 
 
To think of the dead is to think of the fact, the physicality of death; only then 
can any memorial – written, spoken, or artifactual – stand, and both 
Wordsworth and Novalis recognize the memorial as a pre-requisite for the 
universalizing sympathy that allows an insight into the individual. 
 The grave does also hold other unique attractions for both writers in 
terms of its relationship with the maternal home, the womb. If philosophy 
equates with homesickness, the way in which one can recover a sense of home 
through immortality or infinity is to reconfigure the finite, the final, as the 
primal – in this way, the womb becomes linked to the grave, so that both 
concepts of beginning and end are annihilated. Novalis’ ‘Hymns to the Night’ 
[Hymnen an die Nacht] are largely concerned with this process of eliminating 
the finite, and making the concept of immortality in the face of the truth of a 
physical death more accessible. Indeed, the first of the Hymnen explicitly 
acknowledges the encumbrance of a physical state of being, ‘Consume my 
body with spirit-fire that I may ethereally commingle more intensely with thee 
and that the bridal night may last then forever.’311 The second in the sequence 
elaborates on the significance of the night, ‘Apportioned to the Light was its 
                                                            
310 The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, pp.15-16. 
311 Hymns to the Night, p.4. 
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time, but timeless and spaceless is the Night’s dominion.’312 Night expands 
into infinity, and, represented now as the unending, resembles the grave with 
which the Hymns are inextricably bound up. The following two Hymns are 
more lucid still in the possibilities for immortality that the physical grave 
holds. The third Hymn is predominantly concerned with relating the poet’s 
sense of loss and desolation at the graveside, followed by a visionary 
intimation of spiritual rebirth at the site of the physical memorial: 
 
Fled was earthly splendor, and with it my grief. Condensed, sadness 
flowed away into a new and unfathomable world. Thou Night-
inspiration, slumber of heaven, didst come over me: the region gently 
rose aloft and over the region hovered my released and newborn spirit. 
The mound became a cloud of dust and through the cloud I beheld the 
transfigured features of my Beloved. In her eyes reposed eternity…313 
 
Charles Passage points out that this Hymn can be contextualized by Novalis’ 
diary entry of May 13, 1797, which recounts the poet’s experience at Sophie’s 
graveside. However, manuscript evidence suggests that it was not written 
immediately after this experience, but rather in the spring of 1799, and the 
earliest mention of the poems is in a letter to Friedrich Schlegel, dated Jan 31, 
1800.314 This lapse of time between experience and commemoration is 
significant in that it allows us to see the uses of memory in practice; the 
visionary, immortalizing experience recounted in the Hymn is the product of a 
re-visioning which romanticizes the commonplace and makes the finite and 
physical infinite.  
In referring to the grave as ‘the dark womb of the mound’,315 the 
fourth of the Hymnen makes its clearest comments on the elimination of 
boundaries between life and death, and corresponds to The Excursion’s 
Churchyard books; the Churchyard of tombs, within which the Pastor relates 
the several verbal epitaphs on the dead buried there, engage in a process of 
making the finite infinite. Within this womb-like Churchyard, each story is 
akin to a birth – and consequently, re-birth – brought about by the re-visioning 
of memory. The Wanderer’s detachment (which insists on moving from story 
                                                            
312 Hymns to the Night, p.4. 
313 Hymns to the Night, p.5. 
314 See Hymns to the Night, p.x. 
315Hymns to the Night, p.6. 
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to story with equally sympathetic sentiments) is matched somewhat by the 
Pastor, and, like Novalis’ Hymnen, works to eliminate the distinction in the 
reader’s perception between life and death in favour of the cyclical. The 
spiritually vivifying potential of the earthly tomb or the subterranean can also, 
in Novalis’ case, be read in line with the teacher’s childhood education in Die 
Lehrlinge zu Sais. In the passage quoted above, the child ‘went down into 
caverns, saw how the earth was built in shelves and multicoloured layers, and 
pressed clay into strange rock forms’; these caverns can be seen not only as 
proleptic of the comfort of the graves – what the Wanderer terms the ‘Sublime 
attractions of the grave’ (IV, 239) – but also the return to the maternal or 
heimlich.  
The child of the ‘Ode’ has not yet lost this connection with the primal 
heimlich womb, and thus is capable of intuitions of these ‘Sublime attractions 
of the grave’: 
     
  Mighty Prophet! Seer blest! 
  On whom those truths do rest, 
 Which we are toiling all our lives to find; 
 Thou, over whom thy Immortality 
 Broods like the Day, a Master o’er a Slave, 
 A presence which is not to be put by; 
To whom the grave 
 Is but a lonely bed without the sense or sight 
  Of day or the warm light. 
 A place of thought where we in waiting lie 
    (ll.114-120) 
 
The attempt to recover something of this peaceful experience of the grave as a 
place for meditation for the living is recounted in Dorothy Wordsworth’s 
Journal; in an entry dated 29 April, 1802, Dorothy writes of lying in a trench 
beside William in order to hear ‘the peaceful sounds of the earth’.316Again, an 
attempt to eliminate the physicality of death and to create instead continuity in 
being between the living and the dead can be seen in both poetry and the prose 
which theorizes it. But this continuity comes with implications for the epitaph 
that is dependent upon a physical memorial. 
 
                                                            
316Dorothy Wordsworth, The Grasmere and Alfoxden Journals, ed. by Pamela Woof (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p.92. 
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‘in the remembrance of his fellows’ 
 
The first of the Essays upon Epitaphs begins with the observation, ‘It need 
scarcely be said, that an Epitaph presupposes a Monument, upon which it is to 
be engraven’,317 thus introducing the physicality of memorial that seems at 
odds with the Wanderer’s revivification of the tomb monuments through 
verbal epitaphs, as well as Novalis’ concept of immortality, which is 
predicated on an intellectual commemoration of the dead. However, this does 
indeed correlate with immortality being inextricably bound to a concept of 
infinity that renews itself through revision and rewriting. In works which deal 
with the written inscription or epitaph, both Wordsworth and Novalis 
privilege the self-renewing functions of the memory over the entrenched or 
tangible memorial. In the case of Novalis, this is extended to philology in Die 
Christenheit. In his imaginative take on the history of the Christian religion, 
Novalis highlights Luther’s introduction of the Bible as a fully accessible – 
and authoritative – text into the vernacular as a corruption,  
 
Luther generally treated Christianity in an arbitrary manner, 
misunderstood its spirit, and introduced another law and another 
religion, namely the universal authority of the Bible. In this manner, 
another alien, earthly science – philology – interfered with religious 
concerns, and its corrosive influence has been unmistakable ever 
since.318 
 
This is followed by the assertion that, ‘This decision was fatal for the religious 
sense, since nothing destroys its sensibility as much as the dead letter’, further 
accentuating the ‘corrosive influence’ of that which is entrenched and so 
cannot be rewritten or re-visioned. So, a version of the older, medieval 
Christianity is being elegized, but that version itself is an ironic rendering of 
theology, with history acting as the palimpsest this time. Philology threatens 
the renewable spirituality that is at the essence of the religion, thus threatening 
the innate intimation of immortality or infinity. Novalis condemns the ‘dead 
letter’ – his criticism here is based on the elevation of the Bible as supreme 
authority, claiming that the ‘esoteric’ quality of the Bible has been subjected 
to philological consideration at the expense of the ‘religious sense’. As with 
                                                            
317 Prose Works, ii, p.49.  
318The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, p.66. 
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Wordsworth’s poetologizing of Platonic philosophy and traditional Christian 
theology regarding immortality, Novalis poetologizes the spiritual value of the 
Bible. In his criticism of philological evaluation of Christianity, Novalis 
echoes the Note on the ‘Ode’ in its ironic dismissal of a literal application of 
Platonic anamnesis. The insistence on reconciling ancient and modern in 
theology concludes the essay, 
 
Christianity must again become alive and active, and again form a 
visible church without regard to national boundaries. Once again it 
must receive into its bosom all hungry souls and become the mediator 
of the old and new world.319 
 
Christianity – synonymous with spirituality and philosophy here – must 
become vital in its practice, and the only way in which this can be enabled is 
in an elimination of boundaries. The religion as ‘mediator’ is similar in 
purpose to the Wanderer, or figure of the poet at the graveside, who provides 
the link between the dead and living, and philology equates with physicality in 
its negation of the possibilities of reconciliation and renewal. 
 The ‘mediator’ – as either concept or specific poet-philosopher figure 
– reinforces the act of remembering, and Wordsworth’s binding of intimations 
of immortality with the desire to be remembered by others corresponds to the 
concept of mediation: 
 
And, verily, without the consciousness of a principle of immortality in 
the human soul, Man could never have awakened in him the desire to 
live in the remembrance of his fellows: mere love, or the yearning of 
kind towards kind, could not have produced it.320 
 
Immortality serves a very specific function in the human imagination from 
early childhood, and without it, Wordsworth’s conception of community 
would remain inchoate. It is this intellectual commemoration, with its 
insistence on the unending in spite of physical monument or states of being, 
that triumphs over the material rationalizing of the adult narrator of ‘We Are 
Seven’. The child’s adamant refusal to acknowledge that a physical death can 
obliterate existence arises from a negation of boundaries. The child relates the 
accounts of her departed siblings, and, though they are epitaphs for the dead, 
                                                            
319The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics, p.79. 
320Prose Works, ii, p.50. 
248 
 
these are distinguished from the ‘dead letter’ or inscription in their active 
functions, which ensure commemoration. 
 This significance of the mind as memorial can also be seen in The 
Brothers, with the Priest’s observation: 
 
   In our church-yard 
Is neither epitaph nor monument, 
Tomb-stone nor name, only the turf we tread, 
And a few natural graves. 
   (ll.12-15) 
 
The community of Ennerdale thrives on a more vital epitaph – the spoken and 
intellectual one – and the Priest is therefore confused by the lingering 
presence of Leonard (who he fails to recognize and takes as a stranger) over 
the unmarked grave. The significance of the dead in the memory of the living 
is enhanced by the implications it has here for the heimlich. Leonard’s return 
after many years to his native land, attempts to recapture a sense of former 
domesticity in both spiritual and geographical terms: 
 
 ‘Twas one well known to him in former days, 
A Shepherd-lad: who ere his thirteenth year 
Had changed his calling, with the mariners 
A fellow-mariner, and so had fared 
Through twenty seasons; but he had been reared 
Among the mountains, and he in his heart 
Was half a Shepherd on the stormy seas. 
    (ll.37-43) 
 
Leonard has been away from his native Ennerdale for so long that he has 
become inadvertently ostracized by the symbol of the community – the Priest 
no longer recognizes him – and alienated by his own sense of displacement. 
This loss of the heimlich makes Leonard’s own place ambiguous, and places 
him with the Wanderer, but only in that he is now a liminal figure; although 
not the uncanny figure that Setzer reads in the Wanderer,321 Leonard is 
nevertheless uprooted both geographically and psychologically. The poem’s 
conclusion confirms this, as he returns to his new life as a Mariner, leaving 
Ennerdale forever. Leonard too becomes a traveller, a wanderer – however, he 
                                                            
321 See Sharon Setzer, ‘Wordsworth’s Wanderer, the Epitaph and the Uncanny’, in Genre, 24, 
4 (1991), pp.361-379. 
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differs from The Excursion’s protagonist considerably, as the story related is 
his own, the loss his own. With his revelatory letter to the Priest at the end of 
the poem the reader is left with the sense that the only way he can overcome 
the dual loss of his brother and his sense of ‘home’ is to allow his memory to 
stand as epitaph for the dead.  
 The dead, too, could share this fate of dispossession and alienation if 
not remembered, and the epitaphic mode of the ‘Lucy’ poems is concerned 
with preventing this. As Hartman has noted, ‘Lucy is a boundary being…She 
reminds us of the traditional mythical person who lives, ontologically, an 
intermediate life, or mediates various realms of existence’.322 This, I suggest 
is a triumph of the poem, the crucial point here being that Lucy lives. This is 
further enhanced by the fact that she lives through the mind – and 
consciousness – of the narrator, 
 
Wordsworth’s Lucy, however, is an intermediate modality of 
consciousness rather than an intermediate being. She is seen entirely 
from within the poet, so that this modality may be the poet’s own, and 
Lucy the “inner maiden”.323 
 
It does not matter that she is an ‘intermediate modality of consciousness’; in 
fact, this retains the link between the dead and the living, and consolidates the 
epitaphic potential of memory. Hartman’s view that the ‘Lucy’ poems, along 
with the Boy of Winander passage are predominantly concerned with the poet 
confronting death in the self as well as the other, ‘The poet who stands at the 
child’s grave knows that consciousness is always of death, a confrontation of 
the self with a buried self’,324 is negotiated by the fact that the death is 
obliterated as an end. Infinity is instead offered in the form of immortality, 
which magnifies the self-universe chiasmus, whereby the individual and 
particular are achieved through the other. I remain unconvinced, however, by 
the suggestion that the Boy of Winander passage may posit the superiority of 
a physical death over one of a former self, or ‘consciousness of nature’ – I do 
not think Wordsworth presents the adult’s consciousness as one reborn, rather 
one that is altered (and alterable), and in any case, always driven by the 
                                                            
322Wordsworth’s Poetry, p.158. 
323Wordsworth’s Poetry, p.158. 
324 See Wordsworth’s Poetry, pp.21-22.  
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recovery of the potential of the child – ‘the little Actor’ – to diffuse its self-
identity and consciousness. The transition from the imaginative to the 
‘philosophic’ mind is thus collapsed to an extent, by the fact that a recovery of 
the heimlich, or self-consciousness, presents both imaginative and philosophic 
as being on a continuum. 
This reading of the narrator’s consciousness of death and finality as 
bearing over legitimate epitaphic or poetic memorializing is better understood 
in relation to ‘We are Seven’, in which the poet satirizes the narrator’s 
incomprehension of the remembrance of the dead. As with the narrator of 
‘Anecdote for Fathers’, we find in the narrator of ‘We are Seven’ an adult 
who has lost the prescience of the child; in the case of the latter poem, this is 
all the more damaging to the adult’s consciousness because it restricts that 
consciousness to the present time and material world. The little girl – who is 
so insistent that, having been one of seven children, she remains one of seven 
– is holding onto her innate intimations of immortality unselfconsciously. 
While the narrator insists she is wrong because she counts deceased and 
departed siblings among those living and resident at the dwelling, 
Wordsworth shows up such narrow logic as being precisely what is wrong 
within the poem. The preoccupation with those who are living (and, 
specifically, who are living presently at the house of the girl) means that the 
narrator’s glaringly obvious oversight becomes apparent to the reader: the 
children are seven in number because the little girl has allowed them to 
remain seven in her memory. Through the child’s mental and oral epitaphs 
death has not obliterated any one of them. Thus, the seemingly morbid image 
of the child sitting and occupying herself – and even eating – beside the grave 
of her siblings is transformed into a critical reminder of the living presence of 
the memorial:  
 
 “Their graves are green, they may be seen,” 
The little maid replied, 
 “Twelve steps or more from my mother's door, 
And they are side by side. 
 
 “My stockings there I often knit, 
My kerchief there I hem; 
And there upon the ground I sit, 




 “And often after sunset, sir, 
When it is light and fair, 
I take my little porringer, 
And eat my supper there. 
  (ll.37-48) 
 
As with ‘The Brothers’ or Novalis’ Hymnen an die Nacht, we find that the 
grave and/or written epitaph are insufficient for the purposes of 
memorialization. The girl’s act of reproducing an unselfconscious 
psychological memorial for her siblings by sitting at their graveside renders 
the narrator’s concern with logic and materiality absurd. 
 Indeed, it reveals the first stanza as an utterly ironic refutation of 
where such concern with materiality can lead one. The narrator begins the 
poem by asserting rather arrogantly: 
 
     A simple child, dear brother Jim, 
     That lightly draws its breath, 
     And feels its life in every limb, 
     What should it know of death? 
 
The assumption being made here by the narrator is that a child’s perception of 
life and the world is essentially ego-centric: since the child feels only life 
within itself, it cannot possibly know of death in any serious way since it is 
alien to its experience of being. Such a figure, then, lacks knowledge of what 
is not material and inherent to its physical experiences. As such, the narrator 
undervalues the child’s psychical experiences, too. As Wordsworth pointed 
out, this opening stanza was provided by Coleridge – yet, to read it in relation 
to the rest of the poem is to read a seamless sympoetological text, in which the 




‘I see, not feel, how beautiful they are!’ 
 
A more complex sympoetological dialogue between Coleridge and 
Wordsworth plays out in Coleridge’s response to the Immortality Ode. In the 
                                                            
325 See Coleridge, Poetical Works, pp.515-516.  
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previous chapter I read ‘Dejection: An Ode’ as a poetological success that 
referred itself back to ‘The Eolian Harp’ in its treatment of creative failure. I 
shall now conclude my study by reading it in its sympoetological framework, 
by exploring what the poem, as a response to Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’, reveals 
about Coleridge’s indebtedness to collaborative endeavour. For these 
purposes, ‘A Letter to ----- [Sara Hutchinson]’ may be counted alongside 
‘Dejection’ – indeed, the former, unpublished version of the poem more 
frequently draws directly on the sympoetologies preceding and surrounding its 
composition. ‘A Letter to ----- [Sara Hutchinson]’ is a Mischgedicht; both its 
form and content present the mediation and ‘mixing’ of genres of the 
‘conversational’ poetry and ballads of the 1790s. ‘A Letter’ is self-consciously 
private in its choice of form, whereas ‘Dejection’ is an ode that traverses the 
boundary of private and public; in transforming a letter of private romantic 
and creative loss into an ode on dejection, Coleridge is poetologizing his 
struggle over private matters by transposing them onto a dialogue with the 
literary circle. So, the final version of the poem, ‘Dejection: An Ode’, is at 
once that private letter to Sara Hutchinson and the rest of the Wordsworth 
circle and public affirmation that the poet in crisis can overturn his ‘dejection’ 
through such dialogue. The poem eventually becomes a testament to the need 
for sympoetological dialogue and it does this by negotiating the generic 
expectations of both private and public forms. Like ‘The Eolian Harp’, it 
succeeds in throwing up many perspectives of poet and poem: the ‘Coleridge’ 
of ‘Dejection’ is a poet in crisis, a philosopher who has become entangled in 
his ‘abstruse research’, and a man who is suffering romantic disappointment 
and ill health. This means that the poem is necessarily meta-narrative, 
philosophical and autobiographical. But it is also an ‘Ode’, which undercuts 
our expectations of how far it can be autobiographical – the private ‘self’ is 
being written and dramatized for a public stage. 
 Moreover, it is positioning its dramatization in response to 
Wordsworth’s Immortality ‘Ode’, and this dialogue is crucial in distinguishing 
it from ‘The Eolian Harp’. As I have suggested in previous chapters, ‘The 
Eolian Harp’ fails poetologically because it is unable to mediate the polarities 
it establishes. Perhaps more significant for the purposes of this discussion is 
the poem’s sympoetic failure I identified in Chapter 2. One of the major 
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successes of ‘Dejection’ is that it mediates the polarities it sets up, certainly, 
but another is that it does so by establishing sympoetological discourse. And 
this is the case even in ‘A Letter’: the poem very clearly casts Sara 
Hutchinson as one within a circle. Thus, mention of Coleridge’s romantic 
attachment to Hutchinson becomes inextricable from his intellectual and 
creative attachment to the circle: 
 
O dearest Sara! In this heartless mood 
 
All this long Eve so balmy and serene  
Have I been gazing on the Western Sky 
And its peculiar Tint of yellow Green: 
And still I gaze – and with how blank an eye! 
And those thin Clouds above, in flakes and bars, 
That give away their motion to the Stars; 
Those Stars, that glide behind them and between, 
Now sparking, now bedimm’d, but always seen; 
Yon crescent Moon, as fixed as if it grew 
In its own cloudless, starless Lake of Blue, 
A Boat becalm’d! dear William’s Sky-Canoe! 
I see them all, so excellently fair, 
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are! 
 
My genial Spirits fail – 
And what can these avail 
To lift the smoth-ring weight from off my breast? 
It were a vain Endeavour, 
Tho’ I should gaze for ever 
On that green Light, that lingers in the West – 
I may not hope from outward Forms to win 
The Passion and the Life, whose Fountains are within! 
Those lifeless Shapes, around, blow, above, 
O dearest Sara! what can they impart? 
Even when the gentle Thought, that thou, my Love, 
Art gazing now, like me 
And see’st the Heaven, I see, 
Sweet Thought it is – yet feebly stirs my Heart. 
    (ll.30-57 
 
There are at least two things of interest about Coleridge’s introduction of Sara 
through an address to her from the second to fourth stanzas. The first is that 
the address to her makes a connection between the night-scene Coleridge is 
looking upon and Wordsworth’s poetry, and the second is that this connection 
is used to draw upon a shared moment in which Coleridge and Sara are 
‘collaborating’, in a sense. The initial address to Sara creates an opportunity 
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for Coleridge to give utterance to his intellectual and creative dejection; by 
referencing Wordsworth’s ‘Peter Bell’ and ‘Ode’, he draws attention to his 
inability to experience the poetic impulse of feeling or thinking beyond the 
sensory. ‘I see, not feel how beautiful they are!’ identifies the weak spot in 
Wordsworth’s own poem of poetic/imaginative crisis and insists that there is 
no ‘timely utterance’ that will give relief to Coleridge’s present sense of loss. 
To experience the sensory devoid of any fresh imaginative impulse is to 
stumble poetically in the most fundamental terms (see above for 
Wordsworth’s and Novalis’ arguments for the importance of penetrating the 
sensory). Nevertheless, in referencing Wordsworth he creates from this ruin a 
sense of the immortality of sympoetology; Coleridge’s own hopes for 
imaginative relief may be dying, but the shared experience of collaboration 
that engendered Peter Bell and the ‘lyrical ballads’ of that period is extended 
beyond the chronological period by the opening up of a dialogue between 
Wordsworth’s meditation on immortality and Coleridge’s own apparently 
finite poetics. In doing so, Coleridge is slyly perpetuating an infinite literature 
through memorializing the moment. As we have seen with Wordsworth, then, 
Coleridge is championing the immortality of the work through elegizing the 
loss of the collaborative moment. 
Moreover, he persists in reading the troubling visual experience as a 
kind of collaboration; by imagining that Sara is seeing the same scene he sees, 
Coleridge creates, even in his despair, a kind of sympoetological, shared 
moment. Although this is clearly an unsatisfactory substitute for recovering 
his ‘genial Spirits’ – only stirring him ‘feebly’ – the poet in crisis becomes the 
poetologizing figure of the collaborative peak of the 1790s. The success of 
recreating the vicarious sympoetological moment does not match that of ‘This 
Lime Tree Bower My Prison’, perhaps, but it does reveal that the drive 
towards a poetics of immortality (and thus infinity) is very much alive here. 
As with the poetry of the early collaborative period, then, the shared 
experiences of the circle can still engender poetological narrative. Indeed, it is 
partly this imagined collaborative moment that drives the poem’s 
metareflection. Wordsworth’s ‘Sky-Canoe’ is connected to the Lyrical 
Ballads project that initiated this sympoetological creation of narrative. As 
such, it is given pride of place in this elegiac narrative. The fact that it is then 
255 
 
connected through Sara to the sometime romantic and domestic stability 
Coleridge experienced indicates just how wide the poem casts its net.  
Both of these instances are practised sympoetologically in a text that 
self-consciously declares its inability to do so, thus negating its own 
momentary autobiographical claims in a manner reminiscent of ‘Kubla Khan’ 
and the poetry of the 1790s considered in the previous chapter. Such under-
cutting of claims to autobiographical ‘truths’ or veracity is not dissimilar to 
the ways in which Biographia Literaria would later seek to create a 
fictionalized ‘self’. Both ‘A Letter’ and ‘Dejection’ take up sympoetology as 
their central premise. The success of the poem as a composition shows that the 
failure of the poet’s ‘genial Spirits’ as a theme is secondary to the real loss 
that is elegized by the poem, that of the collaborative friendship afforded to 
Coleridge during that period in which he found his formative poetic activity 
take shape. The poem, then – in both of its incarnations – deals with death and 
the repudiation of the finite in true Coleridgean fashion; it takes the notion of 
finite poetic activity and it uses it to create a type of meta-poetology, whereby 
the theme of loss is trumped in formal terms. In Chapter 1 I suggested that 
Wordsworth seeks to best Milton in form by attempting a more audacious 
project with his Recluse, and I see Coleridge’s choice of the ode form as a 
similar statement on the collaborative response. By offering an ode for an ode 
Coleridge is responding to Wordsworth in a dialogue of equal footing. As 
with Wordsworth’s public ‘Ode’ on private despair, both ‘Dejection’ and ‘A 
Letter’ are Mischgedichte that seek to refashion generic expectations of the 
public ode form and private epistle.  
Throughout this thesis, I have traced the relationship between writer 
and critical reader as an ironic one; I have argued that autobiographical ‘truth’ 
claims in early Romantic writing are always predicated on this ironic 
relationship, which ensures a degree of complicity between writer and reader, 
whereby the reader enters into a ‘philosophical friendship’ with the writer. My 
understanding of this has been as a sympoetological relationship that sees the 
production and authorship of texts as collaborative. Across Chapters 2 to 5 I 
have read this collaborative aspect as operating between writer and reader, but 
also between writers. Sympoetology has been identified as the type of literary 
and philosophical production that results from convivial discourse within 
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coteries as much as from a conscious collaborative enterprise such as the 
Athenaeum or Lyrical Ballads. Throughout this chapter, I have argued that 
prominent early Romantic writings produced during (and beyond) the most 
productive sympoetological years have sought to equate writings on 
immortality, elegy and memorializing with the infinity they have come to 
associate with ‘Romantic’ poetologies. That is, neither Wordsworth nor 
Novalis seeks to theorize a literal belief in immortality. Rather, the negation of 
death in the poetological writings of each shows a need for deferral of an 
absolute to an infinite drive. So, the doctrine – whether philosophical or 
theological – is ultimately overturned by poetic writing and re-writing (and 
what is often in Wordsworth’s case, particularly, envisioning and re-visioning 
through a literal series of revisions, as seen in Chapter 4). As with 
sympoetological discourse, irony is at the crux of this endeavour; infinite re-
writing of the self and its position in relation to the world is ironic because it 
refuses to occupy a single position. The ironist is necessarily detached from 
any single perspective, instead dramatizing the notion of ‘selfhood’ into a 
series of ‘selves’ which are constantly re-written. Thus, writings on 
immortality plot a journey towards self-consciousness as being necessarily 
infinite: if a conception of a ‘self’ is impossible to arrive at, consciousness of 
a ‘self’ must always be deferred. The poet must take up the philosopher’s 
mantle in order for either to remain relevant, thus the philosophical negation 
of an absolute is partially subsumed by a poetic negation of the finite. Though 
he does not theorize it, Wordsworth practices a version of the Universalpoesie 
set out by the Frühromantiker, and I have suggested here that Coleridge’s 
‘Dejection’ plays on a similar rejection of the finite. Coleridge’s bottom line, 
therefore – that joy can move him to hope and pray for his loved ones – can 
better be read as his last word on the lost sympoetology he is elegizing: 
though his own poetologizing faculties have apparently come under threat in a 
way that might be harder to recover from than the ‘Wordsworth’ of the 
‘Immortality Ode’, the success of his endeavour is cemented in his 
immortalizing of the type of shared poetologies that have driven circles as 
apparently diverse as his and the Jena circle. In the final moments of the poem 
he appears to confer upon others blessings from which he claims he is 
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excluded, but in doing so he is reminding us that the pursuit of poetic 
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